As a phoenix arising from the ashes of the destruction that the Islamic State (IS) has wrought, a mix of Iraqi security forces, paramilitary Hashd al-Sha’abi,‍[1] Kurdish Peshmerga and international coalition forces commenced the assault on Mosul in October 2016. Although the fighting is tougher than anticipated, few doubt its outcome. Yet, true victory over the IS is likely to prove elusive. It will take time to address and heal the grievances of marginalization, repression and alienation that stimulated the rise of the IS among Iraq’s Sunni population – especially as they might deepen as a result of revanchism in the battles to come.

Further along the horizon loom Iraq’s provincial (April 2017, at risk of postponement) and national (2018) elections. In a way, they have already begun, as Shi’a political parties stake claims on the reputation and legitimacy that the paramilitary Hashd al-Shabi enjoy within Iraq, due to their successful fight against the IS. Shi’a political parties seek to leverage such claims to electoral advantage. It is becoming clear that many of Iraq’s ruling Shi’a elites are more concerned with their relative power position than with developing an inclusive proposition for the country’s Sunni and Kurds that can withstand the challenges that will follow the defeat of the IS.

Another consideration that influences the prospects of Iraq’s national development after Mosul and the IS are the somewhat premature – but inevitable – speculations regarding the eventual succession of Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani (the religious leader of Iraq’s Shi’a).‍[2] Irrespective of the degree of influence Iran might exercise in this process, the leadership of the Shi’a religious community will temporarily be more inward-focused than usual, and less able to provide clear and timely authoritative guidance on religious matters of political import. Also, there are sure to be efforts to exploit this temporary ‘vacuum’ for political advantage. This could be consequential as Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani has so far exercised significant restraint on political and social forces alike.

However, developing a more profound understanding of the possibilities for Iraq’s future requires going beyond anticipated events in the short term. It necessitates taking analysis to the heart of political power in Iraq and this means focusing on its socio-political manifestations of Shi’ism. It is for this reason that the report analyses the dynamics of relation- and coalition-building between the country’s main Shi’a political groups in the period 1991 to 2016.‍[3] It identifies the factors driving such processes and highlights continuities as well as changes in their relative importance.

The rationale for choosing this topic of study is twofold. First, Iraq’s Shi’a became the country’s dominant political force after 2003 in function of their numerical superiority (c. 60% of the population) and their pre-electoral unity in 2005 and 2010. In short, anyone who wishes to understand political power in Iraq needs to grasp the objectives, the level of (dis)unity and the motivations of the country’s main Shi’a political groups.‍[4] This holds especially true in a period when sectarian profiling is common and appealing to many. Second, the degree of unity that Iraq’s Shi’a can negotiate between themselves will influence the likelihood of a political deal that is attractive to the country’s Sunni and Kurds – keeping Iraq unified and whole. This report’s hypothesis is that when Iraq’s Shi’a are united, strong and confident between themselves, there will be a greater chance of such a deal materializing. In this scenario, inclusiveness arises from strength and confidence.

The report understands coalitions as utilitarian vehicles that political groups use when they perceive that realization of their objectives requires developing longer-term collaborative relations with other political groups and a pooling of resources (e.g. votes). A key condition for their formation is that coalitions have the potential to generate collective benefits that can be distributed in such a way that they make all coalition participants better off.

The report uses a basic model to examine Shi’a political relation- and coalition-building across five distinct recent periods. It features eight factors that are used to assess different aspects of the process and outcomes of relation- and coalition-building. The model as a whole is based on a broad review of political science literature on these topics, including social identity issues and electoral strategies. It has subsequently been tailored to the Iraqi context and applied to five periods, which are delineated by key events for the Shi’a community (as opposed to Iraq as a whole). These include the Shi’a rising against Saddam Hussein in 1991, the murder of Abdel Majid al-Khoei in 2003, the destruction of the Al-Askari shrine in 2006, the elections of Al-Ja’afari in 2005 and Al-Maliki in 2006 as well as in 2010, Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani’s fatwa that called Iraqi’s to arms against the IS in 2014 or the Green Zone protests in 2016.‍[5] Annexes 1 and 2 detail the methodology and model.

Section 1 of the report analyses the relation between the volatile, contested and violent nature of the Iraqi state and Shi’a political relation- and coalition-building. It focuses on events since 2003, but covers the period 1991 to 2016. It weaves the experiences and role of Iraq’s Shi’a into its analysis as markers for how Shi’a relation- and coalition-building should be analysed and understood in the remainder of the report. Section 2 subsequently analyses the primary and secondary factors that have driven such processes over the past 25 years. It applies a comparative analysis of different factors across the five periods, using the basic model that the report employs. Section 5 offers suggestions on how relation- and coalition-building dynamics in Iraq can be stimulated in ways that address some of their problematic aspects and that can break through unproductive established patterns.

Readers familiar with Iraqi politics after 2003 could consider skipping section 1, as it is more general, and dive straight into section 2, where the report breaks most of its new ground.