Between 1980 and 2016, the Iraqi people suffered three large-scale inter-state wars, three major intra-state conflicts and at least three significant episodes of assorted violence.‍[6] On average, this amounts to a conflict experience once every four years. Six out of these nine conflicts involved the entire Iraqi society while eight out of nine involved significant population groups. Although most of these conflicts happened under the rule of President Saddam Hussein (1979–2003), their brutality did not lessen after his fall from power. Much of the loss of popular confidence in the state, the vicious political competition for power throughout the 2000s and the inadequacy of the state’s capacity to care for its citizens can be ascribed to the insecurity, destruction and survival mechanisms that developed under the duress of quasi-permanent conflict. In consequence, politics in Iraq must be considered at least in part through the prism of recurrent and highly violent conflict.

For various reasons, these conflict episodes have gradually facilitated the fragmentation of Iraqi society into its main ethnic groups, Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds. This has become its primary political frame that is complemented by a (until now) secondary frame between distinct groups of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in terms of resources and power needed to thrive or rule. One could argue that once ethnic and religious group identities were primed as the result of a complex mix of factors,‍[7] Iraq’s elites have purposefully mobilized and used the country’s increasingly vulnerable masses through the use of sectarian logic in their competition for power and/or in pursuit of their own interests for much of the period 2003–16.‍[8]

Generally speaking, the period after 2003 brought a rapid and remarkable change of fortune for Iraq’s Kurds and Shi’a as they were finally freed from the repression and constraints imposed by Saddam Hussein. The Kurds were quick to ally with the US while retaining good ties with Iran in a bid to further develop their own proto-statelet. For a while, its buoyant partnership with the US, positive relations with Turkey, increasing self-confidence and economic growth overlaid its deep tribal and political divisions that produce many of the same problems found elsewhere in Iraq, such as patronage politics, corruption, a lack of life prospects for many and an insufficiently diversified economy.‍[9] Such problems have manifested themselves more clearly over recent years due to falling oil prices, which has somewhat cooled the aspirations of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to become independent. Public statements to this effect currently seem aimed at increasing leverage vis-à-vis Baghdad to obtain concessions about the division of oil revenue or the status of Kirkuk more than they reflect a genuine intent to take political action towards independence in the short term.‍[10]

In contrast to the Kurdish drive for regional autonomy, Iraq’s main Shi’a political parties rapidly secured dominance over the central state between 2003 and 2005, but proved to be far from a unified force in the process (see Box 1). Although the Shi’a political community has united pragmatically at critical junctures, competition, intimidation and, at times, violence, have been more salient characteristics of the behaviour of its political groups and factions. In fact, Iraq’s main political Shi’a groups differed markedly in their objectives for much of the duration of the US-led occupation:

Brutal domestic repression followed by ignorant foreign occupation

Only 13 years ago, Iraq was ruled by a well-entrenched dictatorship that showed signs of decay in areas of social governance and service provision, but not in its control over the country’s security forces or its political life.‍[11] It was under this dictatorship that a number of the fault lines emerged that characterize present-day Iraq. This included, paradoxically, strengthening sub-state religious and ethnic identities by ruthlessly suppressing them, enforcing clerical authorities to stay out of political issues (politically tinted religious activism was likely to result in assassination) and triggering the creation of Iraqi Iranian proxies (such as SCIRI and the Badr Corps) by starting the Iran–Iraq war.‍[12] Another fault line emerged from the persistent lack of economic prospects after 1991. The decade of sanctions that the United Nations Security Council imposed on Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait in 1991 wrecked Iraq’s economy and created a vicious cycle for the livelihoods and health of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.‍[13] The result has been a growing – and lasting – inequality between economic insiders and outsiders, i.e. those who have access to economic opportunity versus those who lack it.‍[14] The associated high rates of poverty and dependency have enabled and perpetuated patronage politics, facilitated populist electioneering and stifled political innovation. Factors such as these existed long before 2003 and have influenced political competition in Iraq more than has been commonly acknowledged.

As to the experience of Iraq’s Shi’a, their expectation of US-support for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein after the liberation of Kuwait became a boulevard of broken dreams when the 1991 uprising was brutally suppressed by Hussein’s security forces. Despite the US role in enacting sanctions and several public expressions of encouragement from the US administration, fear of an Iranian takeover of Iraq ultimately saw the US disengage.‍[15] The impact of the ensuing repression and large-scale murder of Iraq’s Shi’a should not be underestimated. It contributed significantly to a sense of victimhood and deepened an experience of suppression that became the basis for justifying Shi’a dominance and exclusionary rule after 2003.‍[16]

The US invasion of 2003 and its ensuing occupation of Iraq unfortunately only brought a brief period of relief from the coercive aspects of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Violent repression was rapidly replaced by violent chaos which was fuelled by several factors. First, violence was triggered by the resentment and rejectionism of Sunni groups and individuals who were abruptly marginalized after the US victory over Hussein’s forces. Second, Shi’a nationalists took to arms as well when they perceived a foreign occupier to be replacing a domestic tyrant. Third, poor post-conflict planning for civilian recovery on the part of the US administration played a role. This included errors such as allowing de-Ba’athification to take on a dysfunctional scope and duration beyond the year of its ‘official’ duration,‍[17] disbanding the Iraqi security forces, installing an Interim Governance Council based on sectarian quotas and running a hasty constitution drafting process.‍[18] Fourth, any transition out of dictatorship, irrespective of its exact pathway, would inevitably have unleashed the many tensions that had accumulated over the decades of rule under Saddam Hussein.

Although Iraq’s newly adopted constitution of 2005 could have channelled some of these tensions, the rushed process of its creation and the widespread dissatisfaction with its content became a missed opportunity that would cost Iraq dearly. Ultimately, the constitution only enjoyed the support of a few political parties‍[19] and became a bare-bones legal framework that deferred critical matters of state to later legislation by majority vote through normal parliamentary procedures.‍[20] Practically, this has meant that Shi’a-dominated parliaments have largely ‘interpreted’ the constitution. The federal structure that the constitution foresaw for Iraq could have mitigated the effect of parliamentary dominance of its interpretation, but the constitution’s low level of cross-party support meant that its ‘federal provisions’ were never applied.‍[21] The result is that the rules for political competition and adjudication of political conflict are neither solid nor adequately enforceable. This contributes to making coalition-building a more temporary affair, as promises are lightly broken and instruments of state easily leveraged for party political advantage.

As the constitution-writing period illustrates, the initial period following the US invasion was characterized by significant political competition for control over the ‘emergent’ Iraqi state that set Iraqi groups allied with the US against groups that opposed it. Broadly speaking – and for different reasons – the PUK and KDP (Kurdish), as well as SCIRI and the Islamic Da’awa Party (Shi’a) worked pragmatically with the US while various Sunni groups and the Sadrists (Shi’a) worked against it. Much of this collaboration was pragmatic and not necessarily based on shared values or objectives. Nevertheless, it led the US, unsurprisingly, to support certain parties and their political interests over others. As the 2005 constitution either deferred basic rules to regulate exercise of public authority, or put them in place without consensus, this favouritism enabled the parties involved to quasi-permanently strengthen their power basis. The 2005 elections subsequently brought Shi’a political domination over the central state that had to work with these rules.

Seize the moment: Paint it black and green

It was not a foregone conclusion that Iraq’s Shi’a would seize political power during Iraq’s first elections after Hussein’s regime in 2005. There were plenty of internal divisions and poor relations between key political groups that were in part based on history, and in part on the events that transpired immediately following the US invasion. The key Shi’a parties nevertheless united and won a resounding electoral victory. A strong push from both Iran and Great-Ayatollah Al-Sistani were major contributing factors that led to the establishment of the victorious pan-Shi’a electoral list: the United Iraqi Alliance.‍[22] The 2005 elections ultimately saw a mix of SCIRI, Da’wa, Sadrist and Kurdish representatives coming to power. In this constellation, the rivalry between SCIRI and the Sadrists (also see Box 1)‍[23] meant that neither party could provide the prime minister. Instead, a compromise figure needed to be found and the candidates came from the – at the time – much weaker and smaller Da’wa party in the form of messieurs Al-Ja’afari and Al-Maliki.‍[24] Whereas Al-Ja’afari’s tenure was short as he faced declining levels of confidence because of increasing violence in 2005, Al-Maliki used his underdog position (he was seen as a weak candidate) to build, expand and consolidate a credible power base and reputation. Once the United Iraqi Alliance had done its job of securing a Shi’a electoral victory, it fell apart fairly quickly.

What followed was an overlaying of two very violent episodes. Between 2004 and 2007/08, violence peaked against US forces who found themselves under attack from various militant and radical Sunni groups (including Al-Qaeda and the predecessor of the Islamic State) as well as Al-Sadr’s Mahdi army.‍[25] Such US-targeted violence abated only after the combined increase in US military manpower and the increase in Sunni tribal resistance against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in 2007 (‘the surge-awakening offensive’).‍[26] Despite providing at least passive support to US forces, both SCIRI and Da’wa kept active ties with Iran in this period.

In addition, major violence also occurred from 2006 to 2008 between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a,‍[27] which was largely triggered by Al-Qaeda’s destruction of the Shi’a Al-Askari shrine in Samarra in 2006, as well as between the country’s Shi’a themselves.‍[28] Especially as the threat of Al-Qaeda-sponsored violence against US forces and Shi’a groups abated due to the ‘surge/awakening’ offensive in 2007, intra-Shi’a rivalries became more pronounced. This pitted Iraqi state security units, SCIRI/Badr forces and various lesser groups against the Mahdi army of Moqtada Al-Sadr, Al-Fadhila’s armed wing and several smaller groups. The result was that the Mahdi army suffered serious defeats in both 2007 and 2008. Under Iranian pressure, Al-Sadr was forced to negotiate a ceasefire after the ‘Charge of the Knights’ Operation in 2008, which brought Basra and several other major urban centres back under government control.‍[29]

The intra-Shi’a violence that resulted from being on different sides of the US deepened existing enmities between SCIRI, Da’wa and the Sadrist movement. While this has typically been managed pragmatically by the leaders of these groups, it has negatively affected the stability of coalitions and alliances that have ruled Iraq. Intra-Shi’a violence also gave the existing narrative of victimhood a new twist as Iraq’s Shi’a masses, its poorest in particular, seemed to have traded suppression by Saddam Hussein for marginalization by Baghdad’s newly arrived ‘foreigner Iraqis’.‍[30] The prolonged violence also saw the creation of several new armed Shi’a groups such as Asaib ahl al-Haq (2006) and Kataib Hezbollah (2007).‍[31] These groups were constituted by Iran as part of a hedging strategy to cope with the unpredictable nationalist and patriotic nature of the Sadrist movement as the main Shi’a group resisting the US. Their existence made sure Iran could continue to fight US forces by proxy after Sunni-driven violence abated.‍[32] In time, these groups became political forces as well, and further fragmented the Shi’a body politic.

In the short term, working with the US turned out to be an effective power-enhancing strategy. Despite its initially modest domestic support base, SCIRI became an influential force in Iraqi politics from 2003 to 2009 until the death of Abdel Aziz al-Hakeem. Its control over the Ministry of the Interior in particular allowed the organization to use Iraq’s vast paramilitary and police apparatus for political objectives when useful, while also making it possible to bring parts of the Badr corps – its militia at the time – on the state payroll. Furthermore, SCIRI’s control over nine southern provinces provided it with a stronger territorial base, a resource that only Al-Sadr had so far benefited from, by virtue of the urban concentrations of the country’s poor (e.g. in Sadr city). For its part, Da’wa supplied two prime ministers, one of whom rose to become the country’s most powerful politician of the early 21st century. Finally, Iraq’s Kurds managed to strengthen their regional autonomy to the point of realizing de facto territorial partition. The relative political losers were the Sadrist movement and various Sunni groups.

The years between 2005 and 2010 represent the birth of the Iraqi state post-Hussein. It was a prolonged affair with several midwives competing for influence. Towards the late 2000s a measure of peace returned, the consequence of major violence having been neutered by the combined effect of a successful ‘surge/awakening’ offensive in 2007 (against Sunni-instigated violence) and the suppression of the Mahdi Army in 2008 (against Shi’a-instigated violence). Al-Maliki had established himself as a capable and astute politician with sufficient prestige and power to hold Iraq together through a mix of divide-and-rule tactics. This set the scene for what followed in his second term.

Strongman consolidation of the Iraqi state

Shi’a dominance created greater scope for intra-Shi’a political differences to manifest themselves in the 2010 elections. The main Shi’a groups could now focus on increasing their share of public power and control over the public purse. It is in part for this reason that the 2010 elections saw the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi National Alliance (including Al-Hakim and Al-Sadr) competing with Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition – also Shi’a dominated – and Iyad Al-Allawi’s largely secular Iraqiya list that was cross-sectarian and at the same time featured an appreciable Shi’a component. Despite the competition between these lists and the preceding violence in 2007/08 that pitted some of the armed groups of the political parties involved against each other, it is notable that such enmities did not stop the Iraqi National Alliance and the State of Law Coalition from forming a post-election alliance that kept Al-Maliki in power despite Iraqiya securing a plurality of the vote.‍[33] Factors that played a role in this development include Iranian influence and Al-Maliki’s obstinacy while he simultaneously used legal procedure and backroom deals with smaller parties as procedural tactics to retain pride of place.

From 2010 onwards, Al-Maliki, using Da’wa as his vehicle, consolidated his control over what has been termed the ‘deep state’, i.e. key government positions for exercising influence and policy including in the military and intelligence. In addition, the independence of many of Iraq’s ‘independent commissions’ and its Central Bank was neutralized while the courts were largely bent to Al-Maliki’s will.‍[34] This was possible in part because of weak institutions and fragile constitutional arrangements. Neither Iraq’s emergent democracy/administration nor its fragmented political party landscape yet had the strength, maturity or checks and balances to withstand the patronage, use of authority and political manoeuvering that someone of Al-Maliki’s skill and stature was able to muster. Both political dominance and stability resulted. Political dynamics shifted from a free-for-all competition for power using a mix of coercion, politics and religion that was infused by significant and direct foreign influences, to increasing authoritarianism and power consolidation. As far as Iraq’s Shi’a were concerned, Al-Maliki’s strategic approach can be stylistically summarized as: ‘cooptation where possible (e.g. with Al-Khazali or Al-Ameri), marginalization where necessary’ (e.g. with Al-Sadr or Al-Hakeem). However, for the country’s Sunni and Kurds he applied rather the reverse formula: ‘marginalization where possible, cooptation where necessary’.‍[35] This set a gradual dual process in motion of deterioration of inter-sectarian elite relations and penetration of the state by political and private interests that would reduce both the political ability to act in the national interest and core administrative capabilities.

Deteriorating elite relations were on display when arrest warrants were served against Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni) and Finance Minister Rafa al-Issawi (also Sunni), as well as when discord was purposely being sown between Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK.‍[36] Such intimidation was facilitated by the fact that the Obama administration had prioritized a fast withdrawal from Iraq. Al-Maliki used the resulting US sense of urgency to empower the executive branch as a way to ready the country for fully independent post-US governance. This, however, went at the expense of the powers of the Council of Representatives and the judiciary.‍[37]

State capture was illustrated by significant incidents of corruption that remained unaddressed. For instance, the Iraqi Commission of Integrity investigated 14 officials at the Ministry of Defence for taking kickbacks in a USD 4.2 billion deal. None was prosecuted. Multiple ministries’ review committees have also been accused of conditioning approval of projects on payment to committee members without meaningful further inquiries having been pursued.‍[38] More importantly perhaps, out of the 100,000 ‘Awakening’ fighters that Al-Maliki was meant to incorporate into the state’s payroll as paramilitary forces, he brought in only a fraction. Some interviewees suggested that the budget was used instead to cement his ties of patronage with Shi’a non-state armed groups.‍[39] It is also clear that Al-Maliki used his control over the Iraqi state to strengthen his power basis by enabling Iraqi non-state armed groups to engage in the Syrian civil war from 2011 onwards. Publicly, the protection of the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab in Damascus was used to justify the armed involvement in Syria of non-state armed groups like Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib ahl al-Haq. Privately, both Iran and these groups now owed Al-Maliki a favour as he backed Iranian-client President Assad and provided a range of non-state armed groups with renewed legitimacy. It is unlikely that Iraqi Shi’a paramilitary fighters could have been involved in Syria without Al-Maliki’s sponsorship, given his level of executive control.‍[40]

From the perspective of Shi’a coalition formation, it is relevant to note that the other main political groups – the Sadrist movement and ISCI – were forced to find a form of accommodation with Da’wa (Al-Maliki in particular) in reflection of its dominant position. While Al-Sadr had grudgingly supported Al-Maliki’s second tenure in 2010/11 under Iranian pressure‍[41] – in spite of the defeat that Al-Maliki had inflicted upon him in 2008 – he proved unable to translate this support into meaningful gains or leverage. ISCI also saw its influence decline, although this process had already started with the death of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim in 2009. In response to their relative weakness, both parties teamed up with considerable success in the 2013 provincial elections to generate a counterweight to the State of Law Coalition.‍[42]

In short, while Shi’a dominance of the Iraqi state is likely to remain a fixture of future governments, this period saw the nature of this dominance shift from multi-party control towards a greater level of single-party control as a result of Da’wa accumulating control over key state functions (security in particular) and resources (chiefly oil and patronage through jobs).‍[43]

Political dysfunction and state capture exposed by the rise of the Islamic State

In 2014, the brutal onslaught of the Islamic State and the swift capture of core urban centres such as Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul, brought Iraq back to its darker days of violence in 2006/08. The revanche of a Sunni/Ba’athist coalition against their marginalization due to US neglect and Al-Maliki’s centralization of power was terrible to witness. The Islamic State could advance as far as threatening Baghdad in part because elite relations in the political centre, i.e. between Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds, had deteriorated, intra-Shi’a politics were inward-focused and the capacity of the state to act in the national interest had been significantly reduced.‍[44]

At this point, Iraq was ‘saved’ by its reluctant and reclusive religious leader, Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani, who issued a fatwa that called upon all able-bodied Iraqi males to take up arms in defence of the country against the Islamic State.‍[45] The popular response was both massive and decisive. Thousands joined either the existing array of non-state armed groups or the state security forces. This mobilization halted the expansion of the Islamic State and began the gradual process of liberating Iraqi territory seized by it, starting with retaking Jurf Al-Sakhar (a town 50 kilometres south of Baghdad on the road to Karbala).‍[46]

It was a remarkable intervention because Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani had largely stayed aloof from politics since his endorsement of the United Iraqi Alliance in 2005.‍[47] This distance can in part be explained by the fact that he had been so influential in forming the Alliance – and more generally politically – that he also started to be blamed for political events and missteps further down the line.‍[48] This led to a significant decrease in clerical political engagement during the late 2000s, despite his growing disenchantment with the Shi’a political elite. However, the threat of the Islamic State changed the calculus as it represented a serious threat due to its apocalyptical nature.‍[49] As it happened, the 2014 fatwa saved the country, but also strengthened its non-state armed groups and reinforced a Shi’a-centered narrative.‍[50] This ‘dilemma of clerical intervention’ is further discussed in section 3.

Although Al-Maliki rapidly issued executive orders to create a new official institution – the Hashd al-Shabi – that was to serve as an umbrella organization and bring all non-state armed groups under government control – at least formally – the reality remains more complex.‍[51] A number of powerful non-state armed groups that are formally united under the Hashd al-Shabi are in practice better regarded as partners in a temporary joint venture with government forces than as paramilitary forces that are controlled, commanded and sanctioned by the state’s security architecture (see Box 2).

The events of June 2014 and the ensuing emergency situation also meant that Al-Maliki’s bid to remain prime minister became untenable because he was considered – correctly or incorrectly – as the main culprit for the fall of Mosul and the disintegration of the Iraqi army.‍[52] Indirect disapproval by Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani proved decisive. This cleared the way for a more neutral Shi’a leader to become prime minister: Hayder al-Abadi. He, however, had to work within existing constraints such as poor inter-sectarian relations, tense intra-Shi’a elite relations and a dysfunctional state. He also had to deal with an aggrieved Al-Maliki who is still influential, both in the public arena and behind the scenes.‍[53]

From a Shi’a coalition formation perspective, these developments caused an informal ‘split’ in Da’wa and created opportunities for other Shi’a parties to reassert themselves.‍[54] This largely happened on the back of the popular protests that erupted in Baghdad in the summer of 2015 against elite self-enrichment, poor service provision and negative perceptions of the general state of governance in Iraq. In contrast with earlier Sunni protests in Anbar province in 2012–14, the 2015 protestors were largely Shi’a demonstrating against ruling Shi’a elites. The protests enabled Prime Minister Al-Abadi to propose a far-reaching agenda that focused on administrative reform by streamlining and ‘de-sectarianizing’ top-level state positions and on increasing the fight against corruption.‍[55] The demonstrations feature two interesting dynamics that illustrate how difficult it will be for Iraq’s political system to develop a greater measure of functionality that serves the average citizen.

First, Muqtada al-Sadr was quick to declare his support for the protests, using his substantial powers of popular mobilization to nurture and grow them. The protests fitted very well with the mass-based and anti-elite profile that the Sadrist Movement is keen to give itself. However, his support also politicized the protests, as it was perceived as a largely self-interested move to increase his political influence. After all, the Sadrist Trend has been part of government at times and its leaders are part of the Shi’a political elite as well. Moreover, many have not forgotten the violence his followers wreaked upon Iraq between 2006 and 2008. Finally, Al-Sadr’s claim to staunchly support Prime Minister Al-Abadi’s desire to install a technocratic government and initiate substantial reform to reduce corruption and increase political/administrative efficiency seems at best incongruous with the breaching of the Green Zone security perimeter – which could only happen because of his support. This made the Iraqi government and in particular its prime minister look weak and it undermined parliamentary procedure. Such factors prevented a wholesale Sadrist takeover of the protests. Nevertheless, many other Shi’a political parties closed ranks in response, for example Al-Maliki’s Da’wa faction and ISCI. The main force of the protests – popular anger – was in the end both harnessed and neutered by existing political elites.‍[56]

Second, many reform measures ultimately got bogged down in parliamentary procedure and/or were subjected to a successful legal challenge for non-respect for proper procedure, authority and/or legal basis – despite street protests, the political lobbying of the Sadrist Trend and the support of Grand-Ayatollah Al-Sistani.‍[57] In short, Iraq’s dominant political parties and elites rallied effectively, in part around Al-Maliki, to safeguard their personal privileges and political interests.‍[58]

A final factor in this volatile mix of Shi’a relation- and coalition-building after Mosul is the ongoing efforts by many Shi’a political groups and leaders to claim the popular legitimacy and appeal of the Hashd al-Shabi with the aim of increasing their popular/electoral support. That a number of the non-state armed groups under the Hashd al-Shabi are likely to play an influential political role can be inferred from the statements of some of its commanders.‍[59] Comparative experiences, for example in Afghanistan or Somalia, also suggest that such organized force with significant foreign support is unlikely to disband without a political bargain of some sort, irrespective of any laws that are put in place.

In short, the main Shi’a parties were facing substantial threats and opportunities at the same time in the summer of 2016. In terms of threats, internal divisions within some parties (Da’wa in particular), poor relations between parties (such as between the Sadrist Trend and ISCI) and growing popular discontent feature significantly. In terms of opportunities, the attractiveness of continuing coopted elite rule that includes all main Shi’a political parties, stalled reforms and riding the coat-tails of a successful fight against the Islamic State by trying to assert control over (parts of) the Hashd al-Shabi has its place. Coalitions between Shi’a parties continue to prove, as before, to be temporary and convenience-based but may yet solidify in the face of the 2017 and 2018 elections in function of how these threats and opportunities play out.