The purpose of this report is not only to outline the present ‘state of play’ in respect of how donors go about understanding Afghan domestic politics and stimulating their inclusiveness and legitimacy. It also aims to develop ideas on how donors might do a better job of promoting these aspects of political processes. Given the array of historical legacy issues, internal constraints and other intervening factors discussed above, the question arises as to what in fact can be done that is both helpful and realistic.
Before some thoughts on this matter are offered, a final issue deserves brief discussion. Several interviewees thoughtfully wondered aloud how much – and what type of – knowledge would actually be required in order to obtain a meaningful understanding of Afghan politics. Explicitly, or implicitly, some seemed to indicate that working with representatives of the state to strengthen its capability and legitimacy was a viable long-term strategy to resolve conflict and initiate development. In short, would knowledge of the key political players at national level, and of the performance of the main institutions of government, not suffice for effective development engagement? It should be clear from the preceding analysis that this position contains dangerous assumptions in a country where formal and informal power have fused and re-created the DNA of most government institutions on several occasions in the recent past, and where the political reality of Kabul can diverge considerably from the political reality elsewhere in the country. In short, if one follows such reductionist statebuilding logic, unintended consequences are a distinct possibility, or, more negatively, the risk of doing harm is significant. A governments in a fragmented society with conflict legacies – past or present – is not, once reconstituted through elections, just a benign agent that can be nurtured through development programming and technical assistance. It may act as such at times, but it also remains another tool for the defence of parochial interests and a route for obtaining procedural legitimation of the unfettered power and private interests of armed groups, elites and strongmen.
With a view to feasibility, this report will not repeat general recommendations already made elsewhere, such as better application of whole-of-government approaches, improving donor coordination, increasing the length of postings or balancing security objectives better with those concerning development. The reality is probably that these issues are not open to change in the medium term in Afghanistan. Continuing to push for such change is likely to generate another trail of good intentions, fine rethoric, disappointing practice and lingering frustration. A better question might be what is possible within donors’ operating parameters as discussed above.
Two sets of recommendations suggest themselves to OECD donors from this perspective: one pertaining to the enablers that are needed to develop a deeper understanding of Afghan domestic politics, the other pertaining to the instruments necessary to cover PSG1 more fully.
Developing conditions that enable a better understanding of Afghan domestic politics
1.
Create greater domestic political acceptance for the higher cost of obtaining good-quality data in conflict-affected enviroments: Such a cost does not just consist of the financial expense of commissioning the applied research necessary for understanding the ‘power complexity’ of conflict-affected countries, but also refers to the opportunity costs of donor staff shaping and using such research to good effect, as well as the political cost of creating a culture that is more appreciative of the value of locally grounded analysis.
2.
Improve the living conditions of expatriate staff to make longer postings more attractive: Many donor expatriate staff accept postings in countries like Afghanistan because it fast-tracks their career. However, this does not seem to be sufficient to induce more experienced staff to agree to these postings go or to bring about longer stays. In fact it might even reduce the length of stay as it seems to become somewhat of a ‘tick in the box’ exercise in some cases. A key factor suggested by a number of interviewees is how pleasant it is to stay in a partcular country in terms of the quality of housing provided, the level of amenities available within housing compounds, the scope for social activity and how easy it is to somehow manage family life. These issues could be given greater consideration by human resource departments. A positive side effect would be that a greater ability to engage in social activity might also expose expatriate staff more to Afghan society, faciliting a basic understanding of how it functions and what issues Afghans face on a daily basis.
3.
Develop standard approaches for creating external capacity that can systematically deliver high-quality political analysis: As it seems unlikely that donors themselves will be able to develop such capacity in-house, standardized approaches to creating external capabilties for analysis should be considered. A first option might be for a donor to make a long-term arrangement (e.g. six years or more) with a reputable Afghan research body such as AAN or TLO that enables the development of a relationship of confidence, mutual awareness of needs and capabilities, and a regular stream of interactions that is necessary to put analysis to good use and vice versa. A second option might be to pool resources with other internationals to create a dedicated research body (it could even be set up in the form of a development programme for analysis, or something of that nature). This has the additional benefit that it might also lead to greater donor alignment.
4.
Develop more sophisticated risk-management practices and accept higher risk-mitigation costs: From the outside it looks as though donors’ risk policies in Afghanistan err too much on the side of caution by applying similar mobility restrictions to international and national staff alike, and by basically restricting their movement to international and governmental premises in Kabul. The practice of the German Risk Management Organization (RMO) suggests that a more sophisticated approach to risk is possible that permits greater mobility. Created as a programme in itself, the RMO combines local relations management, security assessments and early warning systems with crisis-management functions in the service of German development cooperation staff. OECD donors could benefit from a more in-depth discussion about its possibilities, limitations and cost.
Broadening the suite of instruments to stimulate inclusive and legitimate politics
1.
Build greater insight into how elite transitions can be facilitated by encouraging fresh talent and leadership to enter the political arena: Many (post-)conflict countries show high levels of elite continuity throughout conflict and post-conflict periods, with the consequence that vested interests remain in place and older generations mortgage younger ones by keeping alive a legacy of violence and conflict. Little attention has been paid so far to how the quality of political leadership in conflict-affected countries can be enhanced without resorting to a ‘pick-the-winner-approach’ that predictably has a low chance of success. University-level postgraduate educational programmes, study visits and fellowship programmes are possible examples of what could be done, as long as they are based on local needs, have critical mass and are combined with opportunities to apply acquired knowledge in local development efforts.
2.
Develop a better understanding of how institutional and personalized forms of governance can be combined in federally oriented governance hybrids: The ‘fiction of the neutral central state’ is one of the more dangerous pitfalls of donor support to PSG1. Many conflict-affected countries are fragmented along ethnic lines, are characterized by low levels of inter-group trust, and feature politics that are highly personalized. Afghanistan is no exception. Hence, a major challenge is how the personalized, vested interests of the present can be complemented by institutionalization that gradually enables a future broadening of access to services and rights at various levels of governance, with firm guarantees for elite groups that it will not result in a zero-sum game for them. From the perspective of supporting PSG1, the question might be what sort of approaches are thinkable/have been tried and what would be required to enable donors to operate in a way that supported the development of such hybrids.
3.
Explore what incentivizes warlords and armed groups to compete politically for their interests in a peaceful manner: What are really the incentives for letting go of control over lucrative assets for private or group enrichment such as border control points, poppy production facilities or the civil service payroll? What would attract armed groups to develop meaningful political organizations and parties that attract a following beyond their area of origin? In assuming that power brokers will happily surrender their interests in the service of the Bonn agreement and the road to democracy, the international community was probably somewhat naive. However, what is even less understandable is why answers to these questions remain elusive 15 years later?
