This section explores Afghan domestic politics from the perspective of how power has typically been distributed and effectuated. It distils key elements from a headline review of Afghanistan’s history, focusing on the post-2001 period.

Selected features of Afghanistan’s political settlement

Despite its current negative international image as a nation embroiled in permanent strife, deep corruption and entrenched social conservatism, the past hundred years or so of Afghan history feature both stability (e.g. 1929–78) and instability (e.g. 1979–2001), peaceful ethnic co-existence and vicious ethnic strife (especially in the 1990s), warlordism and relatively effective central rule, Islamic radicalism as well as moderate Islamic practices. In fact, from the rule of Emir Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century up to today, Afghanistan has seen the pendulum of stability, centralization and foreign influence swing back and forth a couple of times, to create tremendous upheaval and change at each passing.[4]

For example, in the early 1970s Afghanistan’s economy was growing – partly because of a signficant influx of foreign aid and investment, its educated population was increasing and basic nationwide infrastructure had just been completed (the Salang Pass of 1964 and the Great Ring Road [Highway One]). In contrast, by the late 1990s Afghanistan lay in ashes after two decades of intense fighting that had left the south under the control of the religiously conservative Taliban movement, which was largely composed of destitute refugees from madrassas in Pakistan, and the north under the control of an assortment of warlords such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan.[5]

At the risk of serious simplication, a number of features of Afghanistan’s political settlement can nevertheless be identified from even a cursory review of the country’s political history.[6] Since these are relevant for understanding the present political settlement and donor engagement with it, they merit a brief discussion.

Feature 1: A fading certainty about who has the right and ability to rule

Until 1929 the default position was that the rulers of Afghanistan originated from the elites of its Pashtun Durrani in the south and south-east. Only membership of this narrow social group provided, as it were, the right to compete for rightful rule. While success provided no guarantee of enduring legitimacy, having different social origins fatally compromised popular acceptance. However, after 1929 a Tajik, Peshawar Pashtuns (from Pakistan), Marxist-oriented Ghilzai Pashtuns, another Tajik, Taliban and, finally, another Pashtun Durrani ‘ruled’ Afghanistan. In short, as the accepted rules of succession were loosened or discarded, opportunities for competition for power (and the associated rewards) multiplied for those with the resources to pursue them. Although the notion of a Durrani ‘right to rule’ lingered (which helps explain, according to some, the ‘choice’ of Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan’s president in 2004), this development triggered a long crisis of legitimacy that has been deepened by the patronage practices, abuse and corruption that resulted from the ensuing fights for control. At the same time, these extended periods of violence not only reduced the legitimacy of (aspirant) rulers, but also gravely weakened their ability to actually rule. This further reduced the quality of governance, which in turn hindered recovery from conflict and facilitated prolonged state capture by small elite groups. The lack of a history – and thus experience – of changing power peacefully at the top (see next point), left Afghanistan unprepared for the introduction in 2001 of a democratic system in which the right to rule is established through electoral competition that assumes a basic equality of voters, parties and contenders for office.

Feature 2: Violence as an acceptable method to acquire or resist power

In connection with the point above, it should be noted that violence has been a generally used and accepted method of pursuing two political ends since at least 1901. First, succession issues around Afghanistan’s top job (whether labelled Emir, King or President) have historically been settled by force. Such episodes of violence used to affect small Durrani Pashtun elite groups, their followers and their allies throughout Afghan society, which limited the destruction they wrought. However, the social impact of these episodes gradually broadened as the result of the changes in the rules of succession discussed above, modern technology and the disruption of social fabric through conflict, urbanization and external influences. Second, encroachment on local authority, priviliges and ways of life (whether domestic or foreign in origin) that is perceived as illegitimate (that is to say, most intrusions into local affairs save the occasional bit of taxation and conscription) has historically been resisted with force by local Afghan elites and communities. When the times, purpose and popular sentiment allowed, the fight against such encroachment was sometimes cloaked in the powerful evocative frame of jihad.

Feature 3: Foreign influence as a permanent feature of power and governance

Notwithstanding such jealous guarding of local self-governance and lifestyles, Afghanistan has historically experienced a significant amount of foreign influence. Between the Mongol, Safavid, Persian, Mughal, Russian and British empires, Afghanistan has not necessarily been considered worthy of conquest from a resource point of view, but its location as transit territory between empires guaranteed their interest in securing it as a buffer zone. The more astute empires exercised their influence subtly by co-opting local elites and re-orienting their loyalties away from Kabul. Even today, Iranian influence in Herat, Pakistani influence in Kandahar and Nangarhar, and Central Asian/Russian influence in Mazar-e-Sharif is palpable. A key consequence is that foreign assistance has generally been available to groups seeking to resist the central government in Kabul and vice versa. On the positive side, this has enabled Afghan governments to play foreign nations off against each other, such as the Russians and the Americans in the 1970s, or Western countries against China, India and Pakistan today. On the negative side, it has also enabled insurgent groups such as the mujahideen and Taliban to take up arms against the central government. Remarkably, however, it has not created significant centrifugal tendencies, i.e. no regions or groups have sought to break away from Afghanistan entirely.[7] A consequence of such pervasive foreign influence is nevertheless that peace and development in Afghanistan today can hardly be secured without, at a minimum, a series of informal bilateral agreements that accommodate the interests of the country’s neighbours.[8]

Feature 4: A consultative and reciprocal relationship between centre and regions

Historically, the greater the distance from Kabul and the country’s main urban centres, the weaker the writ of Afghan governments has tended to be. There have been several causes of its limited reach, including the existence of powerful local elites, adjacent foreign empires, strong tribal structures, the absence of infrastructure adequate for the country’s rugged geography and at times inhospitable climate, and limited ability to project military power. While some of these factors have been overcome in the course of time, many remain. This has created a society in which power relations between national, provincial and local elites have tended to be established through negotiation and compromise rather than by decree and (administrative) enforcement.[9] Although the make-up of local elites has profoundly changed during Afghanistan’s different episodes of (civil) war, communities continue to expect an appreciable measure of autonomy and self-governance.[10] The limited reach of the state combined with local expectations of autonomy also mean that policies, laws and degrees emanating from Kabul do not necessarily gain traction outside of the capital, let alone outside of the country’s major urban centres. This allows the government in Kabul to be more progressive than Afghanistan is on average (for example, in terms of social affairs), but it also restricts such progressiveness to the capital. A final effect of Kabul’s relative political isolation is that it turns the capital into an echo chamber of sorts, in which government and donor narratives, arguments and views continue to circulate without being exposed to the realities of the country beyond Kabul.

Feature 5: A steady undercurrent of religious influence on the affairs of state

In Afghanistan, social and religious conservatism overlap and exercise a strong hold over the 70+ per cent of Afghans who live in rural areas, and of whom most are illiterate. The clergy have substantial influence not just over matters of family life and social behaviour, but also in terms of the general legitimacy they can confer – or take away – from policies and rulers on the basis of their interpretation of the Islamic faith. While the religious establishment has been a faithful servant of the state at times, at other times it authorized jihad against it. In short, religious influences on politics are profound and the desire for, or even the idea of a need for, a separation between the two is alien to many.[11] However, given its generally moderate nature, sense of superiority[12] and ubiquitous presence, religion represents not a cleavage but, rather, a background influence that pervades all aspects of social and political life. Even the rise of the Taliban should not predominantly be perceived as support from the Afghan population for a very conservative, sometimes radical, interpretation of Islam. Many accounts suggest instead that the Taliban’s popularity in the late 1990s derived largely from its ability to re-establish daily security and justice after 20 years of warfare and conflict, in a fast, efficient and corruption-free manner.[13] Echoing the past, most interviewees ascribed the Taliban’s current popularity to government failure, frustration with entrenched corruption and patronage, and a lack of economic prospects.[14]

These five features have, in different combinations, produced an array of elite pacts as temporary manifestations of Afghanistan’s political settlement over the last century. A remarkable factor in this equation is, since 2001, the unprecedented amount of foreign influence on Afghan politics in the form of troops, dollars and diplomatic pressure. While the British Raj and the Soviets sought to control Afghanistan politically, the US and its Western allies (have) arguably attempt(ed) to reweave Afghanistan’s social fabric to an extent not seen before. Despite the resources they have mobilized in support, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that even their influence remains shallow. One only needs to consider the growing insecurity, the inability to reach a negotiated settlement between the government, its international sponsors and (parts of) the Taliban, the unresolved Kabul bank scandal and associated deep corruption, or the mutual dependency created by the need to provide the country with an international lifeline for the next decades.[15]

Effects of international engagement on Afghan domestic politics since 2001

Notwithstanding the warning that ‘nothing is as problematic as sorting through recent events’,[16] these five features offer a very rough framework for gauging the nature and effects of international engagement on Afghan domestic politics since 2001. In doing so, two considerations need to be taken into account.

The first is that 2001 was early days for the international community’s peace- and statebuilding agenda: the entire vocabulary, logic and suite of corresponding interventions had yet to be developed. Neither the New Deal nor a focus on ‘inclusive and legitimate politics’ existed. Also, salutory lessons about the limited ability of external actors to initiate and fast-track processes of political and economic change in other societies – let alone engage in wholesale social engineering – had yet to be taught. In consequence, looking back at international engagement with Afghan national politics through the prism of the New Deal and PSG1 assumes a level of knowledge that was not necessarily present at the time this engagement took shape.

The second consideration is that the original US-led intervention was driven more by motives of revenge and anti-terrorism than by objectives of statebuilding and development. This suggests that assessing early international (US) engagement in Afghanistan in respect of the extent to which it promoted inclusive and legitimate politics would introduce objectives alien to the initial engagement. In fact, pursuing an anti-terrorism agenda logically creates a short-term focus on security and stability that is not necessarily compatible with improving qualitative aspects of domestic political processes.[17]

The way round these dilemmas is simply to assess the effects of international engagement with Afghan domestic politics in respect of their level of inclusivity and legitimacy without pretending that such engagement sought to increase it.[18] At least four main effects are easily distinguished.

First, excluding the Taliban – and their mostly Ghilzai Pashtun support base – from the Bonn agreement created a permanent group of potential spoilers. Although its rise commenced in Afghanistan’s Pashtun-dominated south, an increasing array of militias, warlords and tribal groupings came to support – often opportunistically – the Taliban movement as it inched closer to victory between 1995 and 2000. In time-honoured fashion, much of these ‘new allegiances’ were thin and based on perceptions of relative strength. They could easily be transferred to another party should it seem more succesful. In any case, the usual practice in a context in which many different factions compete for power and where violence is commonplace, is to hedge one’s bets. For all these reasons it was a mistake to exclude both the Taliban and its supporters from the Bonn negotiations, and this was aggravated by not giving the movement a stake in the future of the Afghan state as per the terms of the Bonn peace agreement.[19] While this might have been understandable from the perspective of the quest for revenge on those that had hosted the architects and perpetrators of 9/11, it was an act of exclusion that accumulated international experience with peace processes has shown to be generally self-defeating.[20] This initial ‘error’ was compounded by a prolonged international refusal to enter into a meaningful process of negotiation with the Taliban and its Pakistani allies from a position of strength – but with real room for accommodation. Predictably it has become more difficult to initiate such a process over time as the strength of the insurgency grew, popular hopes for a rapid peace dividend were dissapointed, government performance lagged, life-prospects for the average Afghans deteriorated and the insurgency fragmented.[21]

Second, pushing for an ambitious electoral calendar in 2001 that focused on establishing the procedural aspects of democracy entrenched existing power brokers and interests. The Bonn agreement laid out an ambitious dual timeline for re-establishing legitimate and inclusive government in Afghanistan. On the one hand it prescribed that elections should take place within two and a half years of the installation of an Interim Authority as detailed by the agreement. On the other hand it stipulated that a Constitutional Loya Jirga should convene within two years of the installation of the same Interim Authority to decide on a new constitution.[22] The electoral calendar that resulted from these provisions included presidential elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014, parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010, and a range of provincial elections. It consumed, in the view of one interviewee, much of the diplomatic attention of the international community – as well as USD 1 billion – to the neglect of greater priorities such as better service delivery, governance and more security.

Arguably, however, two further consequences were much more serious from the perspective of this research. The first was that the tight timeline prioritized ´legitimacy´ over inclusivity, because it was only possible to stick to this election schedule by working on the basis of an extremely procedural understanding of democracy. In turn, this enabled existing power brokers using their resources, connections and, at times, coercive capacities, to secure their interests via the elections. This gave a range of strongmen and warlords a new political life and facilitated their hold on power, with consequences that persist today.[23] A second consequence was that the elections, as several observers noted, provided the Afghan population with a welcome opportunity to express their views, but did not necessarily confer legitimacy on succesful candidates. Perceptions of legitimacy have depended, historically and at the present time, much more on the question of whether the new ruler/government was able to expand services, provide security and create better economic prospects.[24] From this viewpoint it proved a critical omission not to offer incentives to armed groups and/or warlords to develop more representative political organizations with ideas on Afghanistan’s future beyond entrenching their existing interests through electoral competition.

Third, creating a centralized government disempowered other layers of governance and, paradoxically, created an impression of government weakness that reduced its legitimacy. Fearing that a federation might result in a north–south split, the international community (UNAMA and US officials in particular) saw a strong state as the solution to many of Afghanistan’s governance problems – despite a history of decentralized governance.[25] In consequence, the 2004 Afghan constitution established a strong executive presidency in particular – mostly by granting it very extensive powers of appointment (article 64) – and stayed largely silent on the competences of subnational governance bodies such as provincial and district councils (articles 139–141). This created a lack of clarity on the role of these bodies vis-à-vis both the national government and informal governance bodies that still exists today.[26] Problematically, the 25 years of violence that preceded the 2004 Afghan constitution had starkly reduced the relevance and effectiveness of the central government while increasing popular expectations of, and appetite for, greater regional autonomy and self-rule. The centralized nature of the new government thus created permanent tension with regional interests and aspirations. While the international community might have been capable of supporting the central goverment in increasing its institutional presence across Afghanistan’s provinces, it has generally been careful not to alienate the warlords and strongmen whose support it deemed critical in the fight against the Taliban. Unsurprisingly, this created both a popular backlash – international support for a cast of unsavoury characters was not exactly what Afghans had in mind as a hoped-for ‘peace dividend’ – and an impression of a weak central government because of its inability to deliver much beyond core urban areas. In short, the internationally promoted centralization of governance arguably reduced the central government’s ‘output-legitimacy’. It also decreased inclusiveness as the president distributed the wide range of jobs at his disposal to cement alliances and co-opt enemies under a constitutional veneer of inclusiveness and legitimacy.

Fourth, focusing the international military on fighting terrorism came at the price of stimulating corruption and warlordism that reduced the legitimacy and inclusiveness of governance. Available evidence suggests that the prioritization of the fight against the Taliban by the international community (the US in particular) in the period 2006–2012/14 had rather negative effects on governance. The combination of a large military presence, an emphasis on force protection, prioritizing the war on terror and flooding the country with funds that were beyond the capacity of the Afghan state or society to absorb effectively,[27] created a situation in which both international and national accountability remained low, local allies against the Taliban were given a free hand to pursue their other interests[28] and the access and quality of governance beyond Kabul were largely ignored.[29] It can reasonably be argued that the short-term benefit of putting up a more effective fight against the Taliban and keeping international soldiers out of harm’s way as much as possible, came at the price of further informalizing governance, entrenching existing power brokers and deepening corruption.[30] Paradoxically, it also meant that local violence increased in many places, as it made the opportunity to compete for power and (international) resources more attractive. ‘Control’ over international dollars through construction and security contracts, border crossings, poppy eradication programmes and road check-points became vital revenue-generating strategies for local power holders, stimulating collusion between government official and warlords in the process.[31] This, in turn, increased support for the insurgency that many Afghans came to see as the only alternative to the local violence and corruption they continued to face.[32] Starkly put, in this permissive environment legitimacy amounted to seizing power through guns and violence; inclusiveness to joining already well-armed power brokers to share in the profits.

Despite such negative effects of international intervention on Afghan domestic politics, the current state of affairs is much improved compared with the pre-2001 situation, on a number of fronts. As one interlocutor graphically noted: ‘Overnight, we went from not being allowed to shave our beards to being able to sell drinks on the street.’ Besides civil liberties, much else has improved: health and education services, electricity, infrastructure and women’s rights are but a few examples.[33] Moreover, the foundations for a functional central government have been laid, and it is operating – albeit in a limited manner – in at least some localities. Yet, insecurity, poverty, inequality, poor economic prospects and poor governance remain. Before turning to the question of how donors actually seek to understand governance in Afghanistan, a brief synopsis of the country’s current elite pact will help to bridge past and present.

The country’s current elite pact considered in terms of its legitimacy and inclusiveness

The present government of national unity is best seen as a big-tent coalition that rests on a Pashtun/Uzkeb pillar of support around President Ghani and a Tajik/Hazara pillar of support around CEO Abdullah. Most interviewees considered the composition of the government to be adequately inclusive of the major ethnic groups. While it firmly remains a traditional elite deal, it was also seen by most as more inclusive than previous governments.[34] Moreover, it is Afghanistan’s first coalition government, and this in itself can be considered an achievement of sorts, despite the continued lack of a legal basis for the position of CEO. However, the downside of this situation is that the government essentially represents a fragile balance of many different players and interests. It is not configured for, or capable of, designing and delivering ambitious reforms – which is what donors somehow have come to expect of it.

Excepting the Taliban, the only major faction that at present is really excluded from the government is what several interviewees referred to as the ‘jihadi council’. This is a group of opposition figures (many of whom served as former government officials or ministers, and some of whom have a background as warlords), that has president Karzai as its titular head. This group was thought not to have much more in common beyond a shared interest in agitating against the government and seems to be somewhat of an ‘anti’ force without presenting an alternative to the present government. Nevertheless, it should be noted that its statements and lobbying consume some of the narrow bandwidth available to most donors for political analysis, messaging and receiving. On a final note, while its support outside of Kabul was considered to be limited, this ‘council’ has shown itself more receptive than the government to the country’s traditional power structures, and such support might therefore grow.

It is unfortunate that the current government is also the result of the disputed and inconclusive 2014 presidential elections that suffered from heavy international interference. When the two protagonists contested the results of the second round, a UN-supervised re-count of the vote was initiated. The results of this exercise were never made public because, in parallel, the US stepped in to persuade both candidates to join forces in a national unity government with the aim of mitigating the risk of sustained electoral violence and – one might add – avoiding putting at risk the calendar for international military withdrawal. Unsurprisingly, the confidence of the average Afghan in electoral democracy, and in particular in all bodies associated with the elections, dropped to an all-time low as a result of these events.[35] If the various elections in Afghanistan had started to instil a sense of civic pride and electoral awareness in ordinary Afghans, the massive, behind-closed-doors international intervention in the 2014 elections seems to have undone at least some of these efforts.[36]

While this suggests a somewhat ominous start, the sense among both interviewees and a number of analysts is that most Afghans were initially happy to give the government the benefit of the doubt, but that their trust has eroded rapidly as a result of two factors.[37] The first is that it took the new government a year to become operational, which created a discontinuity of performance that was noted across the country. A number of interviewees ascribed its lengthy formation to a combination of political naivity in the circles around President Ghani, a lack of upfront thinking about suitable candidates for ministerial posts and the need to accommodate two different constituencies that had both been made promises in exchange for their support. The result has been a slow start to a new cycle of governance including much-delayed appointments to critical positions such as those of defence minister and attorney-general, and a number of key provincial governors. This dysfunction has arguably been amplified by the governing-by-decree style of the current government which seeks to impose its writ from the centre, leading, predictably, to considerable difficulties. The second factor is that both the security situation and the economic outlook have weakened significantly on the current government’s watch. While neither issue is necessarily under its control,[38] the capture of Kunduz by the Taliban in September 2015 strengthened the growing popular perception of governmental weakness.

As the insurgency shows no sign of abating and efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban have hardly progressed, many Afghans, especially in the countryside where most of the population remains concentrated, do not appear to hold out great hope for short-term improvement in this situation at the moment.[39] This forces them to continue to look to alternative power structures for protection and a livelihood. Those that can afford it leave.[40] In terms of legitimate and inclusive politics, the international community is thus faced with a catch-22: it can continue to focus on security at the expense of governance but improving the security situation probably requires greater attention to governance. As neither can be improved through short-term fixes, what seems really required is a long-term engagement with an associated strategy.