Traditionally, US reactions to CSDP have been everything from confrontational to supportive to denigrating to mute. Instead of gauging all these perspectives, Mai'a Davis Cross argues that Europeans should rather focus on developing and strengthening CSDP on their own terms.
Since its inception in 1998, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been met with mixed reactions from the United States. One of the first responses under the Clinton Presidency was the so-called "three-Ds," when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned Europeans againstde-coupling from NATO, duplicating NATO's mandate, and discriminatingagainst NATO members not in the EU. Under the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed this discouraging tone when he said in reaction to CSDP, "Actions that could reduce NATO's effectiveness by confusing duplications or by perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive." Ongoing European diplomacy across the Atlantic helped to placate unwarranted American concerns that somehow CSDP was designed to displace NATO or balance against the US. At the highest level, numerous meetings between President Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and later, Bush and Blair epitomized this effort.
Blair emphasized CSDP's limited mandate, and reassured American leaders that it would only be used in cases in which NATO declined to be involved. But other EU leaders did not see it this way, particularly the French who regard CSDP as an instrument for crisis management, and NATO as an instrument for defense. In other words, the two would have a division of labor and both would remain crucial. The French have interpreted the CSDP's added value as providing a stronger voice for Europeans in NATO and worldwide. This interpretation, which is shared by some other EU member states for a variety of reasons, has unintentionally nurtured fears among right-wing Americans. Conservatives in Washington DC, such as at the Heritage Foundation, continue to vehemently oppose the development of CSDP, going back to the argument that the strengthening of CSDP represents a geo-political threat to US interests. Not surprisingly, US-UK discussions about CSDP in the context of their special relationship have often not been representative of the full range of expectations surrounding CSDP on either side of the Atlantic.
The 2003 Iraq invasion served as a critical juncture as widespread European opposition at the popular level aggravated the feeling that the transatlantic relationship had become more of a transatlantic divide. At the same time, cynics of EU integration in the US began talking about CSDP as though it was a joke.
The Obama administration clearly, but quietly, supports EU integration, including in the security and defense area. But its preoccupation with the Middle East and now Asia means that this understated support does not ultimately have much of an impact on international perceptions of the EU as a viable military actor. It also does little to encourage Europeans to increase their political will to further develop CSDP.
In short, US reactions to CSDP have been everything from confrontational to supportive to denigrating to mute. This is at least in part because the American government's vision for CSDP seeks to balance a fine line between encouraging the EU to gain capabilities, while discouraging it from developing different foreign policy goals to the US. The essence of the US concern can be summed up as wanting the EU to become more self-reliant (especially since America's own interests have shifted to other regions in the world), but not wanting the EU to be able to challenge US leadership in the world.
Rather than trying to gauge the many perspectives coming from the other side of the Atlantic, and react accordingly, Europeans should focus on developing and strengthening CSDP on their own terms. European leaders universally know that CSDP is in no way intended to balance against the US in a realist sense, and they should know that it is an under-exploited opportunity to decrease defense spending while increasing capabilities - because too much wasteful duplication of military and defense spending exists in Europe. The oft-repeated skeptical attitude - that CSDP has not amounted to anything - should be taken lightly. CSDP has not even been operational for ten years, and yet it has executed 27 operations across three continents. Groundbreaking initiatives like the development of a European defense and global crisis management capability take time. And by any measure, the achievements under CSDP so far have been impressive, even though there certainly is room for growth.
The US and EU have struck a kind of tacit bargain in which the EU can have more influence in the transatlantic relationship if it shares more of the military burden. Thus, integrating further and pooling resources in the area of defense is a win-win situation for the EU. The success of CSDP will also encourage greater US acceptance as fewer American resources are spread more thinly. And now that smart power - the effective combination of hard and soft power - matters more than how much force a country can bring to bear, the EU is well-positioned to transcend the transatlantic relationship and create a transatlantic partnership with the US in the coming years.
Dr. Mai’a K. Davis Cross is senior visiting fellow at the Clingendael Institute
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