Despite the regime’s firm grip on the country, there is no shortage of problems in this most impoverished of former Soviet republics, which is also the most remittance-dependent country in the world, with around 50% of its GDP composed of money sent home by migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan.[27] The recent economic downturn in Russia has caused many Tajik migrants to lose their jobs, compelling many of them to return home, where they face uncertain job prospects.
The loss of migrant jobs and the collapse of the Russian rouble have, in combination, led to a distinct fall in transfers to Tajikistan. In the first half of 2015, that fall was estimated by the World Bank at 17.5% in Tajikistan Somoni terms (in US dollar terms it was a more dramatic 32%).[28] Household incomes have been hit especially hard, with many families being forced to cut non-priority expenditures. The World Bank reported that 83% of Tajik households depend in part on remittances, most of them for immediate consumption.[29]
Sluggish job creation has compounded the problem. The Tajik government has received criticism for failing to implement structural reforms, which might have assisted the emergence of a more dynamic domestic labour market. Although unemployment stood at just 2.4% in March 2016 according to official statistics,[30] the International Labour Organization has published data suggesting the real figure may be closer to 10%.[31] Neither figure accounts for underemployment, which is likely to be considerable. Nor do they say anything about low wages, with the average monthly Tajik salary amounting to just 967.5 Somoni (roughly 110 EUR) in March 2016.[32] Such numbers fuel anxieties about an impending social backlash. If migrant work was a convenient safety valve for ridding the country of potentially troublesome young men, their return in large numbers to a job market unable to absorb them may portend future instability. Although the economic problems may not breed instability in the short term, if left unaddressed, they may well prove to be a source of long-term social turmoil.
Another potential source of trouble is the narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan. Reportedly, around 25% of Afghan opiates pass through Central Asia on their way to markets in Kazakhstan and Russia, most of them traversing Tajikistan.[33] This trade originated during the Tajik civil war (1992–97), when much of the 1,300-km border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan lay wide open. Today it is a thriving business that has led to the emergence of powerful organised crime networks with tentacles that stretch into the halls of official power. Competition between groups involved in the drug trade may have been at the heart of a number of violent incidents on Tajik territory and along the Tajik–Afghan border in the past. The Tajik regime has maintained itself in power partly by tacitly accepting the drug trade, which is discussed below.[34] Nevertheless, it needs to walk a fine line between maintaining the equilibrium in the drug business and reassuring foreign governments, including Russia, that it is doing its best to stem the flow of drugs.
Growing Taliban activity in northern Afghanistan has fuelled concerns that Tajikistan may be facing a spillover of violence from its southern neighbour. In January, the ICG said a “significant number” of Central Asian fighters had recently moved from Pakistan into Afghanistan’s northern Badakhshan Province, from where they helped to stage attacks along the Tajik border.[35] The fall of Kunduz, a city within spitting distance of the border, to Taliban forces last September was a shock to the Afghan security establishment. Though the city was soon recaptured, its seizure was a display of Taliban strength at uncomfortable proximity to Tajikistan.
Islamist militancy has reared its head elsewhere, too. Hundreds of Tajiks have joined ISIS/Daesh, causing anxiety that Tajikistan may become a target of future terrorist attacks. In 2015, the Tajik interior ministry estimated that some 500 Tajiks had joined the terror organisation.[36] Of these, the most high-profile individual was General Gulmurod Khalimov, the American-trained head of the Special Assignment Police Unit, who left for Syria in May 2015 and on his arrival immediately denounced the Tajik regime. His defection shocked the Tajik political establishment. The ICG writes that it “badly wounded Rahmon’s sense of security”.[37] It certainly raises questions about Rahmon’s control over his security bodies and the growing appeal of violent Islamism in Tajikistan.
The regime’s response to the mounting economic, social and security challenges has not inspired confidence. The government has shown little inclination to address poverty and corruption but has instead sought to consolidate its own position. A venal and cronyist entity, it has gradually obliterated nearly all other sites of power, removing most alternative channels for expressing discontent. The culmination of the campaign came in August 2015, when the Islamic Renaissance Party, the last opposition party of any stature in Tajikistan, was banned and subsequently declared a terrorist organisation. This effectively turned Tajikistan into a one-party state. Meanwhile, at least one opposition leader in foreign exile has been assassinated by unknown assailants,[38] while other exiled political activists have been extradited to Tajikistan, where they have been given lengthy prison spells.
Moreover, the government’s repression of political opponents has been accompanied by a crackdown on civil society. Lawyers, mosques and journalists have all felt the heat. This includes lawyers who have represented IRP members and other opposition figures. Ishoq Tabarov, who represented the opposition leader Zaid Saidov, a former industry minister who was imprisoned in 2013 over allegations of corruption and polygamy, died after two of his sons were sentenced to prison on what has been described as trumped-up charges.[39] Other independent lawyers have themselves been jailed.[40] Meanwhile, reports have emerged that family members of exiled activists have been arrested and harassed in Tajikistan.[41]