


Military Mobility and the EU-NATO Conundrum

Margriet Drent
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Clingendael Report



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July 2019

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1 Introduction

Improved military mobility in Europe is identified as one of the key steps towards a more credible deterrence and has become one of the flagships for EU-NATO cooperation. The Dutch government has a specific stake in the success of military mobility because of its geographic position in Europe, but also because of its initiative to lead a PESCO project¹ on the subject. Both NATO and the EU, as well as their member states, have an interest in being able to rapidly move defence forces, equipment and supplies across Europe. It moreover speaks to those areas in which the EU and NATO are jointly dependent on each other, which should make it into a very promising area for cooperation. The EU, for example, has more to say on legal and regulatory issues and has available funds and programmes on cross-border mobility. NATO is able to plan and calculate the military's needs for transport across Europe to ensure credible deterrence. However, the EU and NATO still remain very different entities which operate on a different political, legal, governance and membership basis. If military mobility is to be successful, stakeholders need to be aware of these obstacles and how to overcome them.

The EU and NATO's military mobility challenges mainly fall into two categories. The first is logistical, which includes localizing roads and bridges that can support the weight of military equipment or increasing capacity at key ports. This is a field that has been neglected after the end of the Cold War. The second is legal and regulatory, which involves ensuring that nations have the necessary administration in order to allow the armed forces of other nations to cross their borders (including airspace) more quickly. An enlarged NATO and the rapid increase in legal and regulatory provisions makes this into a complicated task. There are a large number of stakeholders involved to tackle these challenges. These range from EU and NATO institutions, the member states of both organisations, prominent among which is the United States, as well as a great deal of different instruments, funds and programmes.

The aim of this Report is twofold: firstly, to identify, map and analyse the roles that various actors play in improving military mobility and, secondly, to analyse how the EU and NATO have been working together in general and more specifically on military mobility so far and which obstacles they have been faced with. This Report concludes with policy recommendations on how these might be overcome and what lessons can be drawn for improving EU-NATO cooperation in general. In order to arrive at these recommendations, the authors have not only relied on extensive desk research, but have conducted a number of interviews with relevant policy makers in The Hague and in Brussels in the period April-May 2019.²

1 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

2 The authors would like to express their gratitude to the respondents for their time and the information they were willing to share. As agreed, their names and affiliation will not be listed in the Report.

2 Mapping the stakeholders

In June 2017, Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert wrote to both the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini insisting that the "obstacles to cross-border military transport in Europe must disappear". Hennis-Plasschaert urged NATO and the EU to step up cooperation on this matter.³ Military mobility featured on NATO's agenda after the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the decision to position an enhanced Forward Presence of approximately 4,500 troops in the Baltic States and Poland. The US military presence in Europe has been upgraded in the context of the European Deterrence Initiative. Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges in his role as Commander of US Army Europe (USAREUR) also picked up on the issue and called for a 'military Schengen'.⁴ Interestingly, the political pressure to turn the matter into a priority came from the EU via predominantly PESCO. Military mobility is nowadays very prominent on the EU-NATO joint agenda and the issue made it into a new set of common EU-NATO cooperation proposals on the implementation of the Joint Declaration in December 2017.⁵

The field of military mobility, including its various actors and activities, comes across as a complicated spider's web. Many actors are involved in improving the possibility of moving defence forces and their materiel efficiently across Europe, including private parties, municipalities and governmental organisations. However, a total of five main EU and NATO stakeholders can be identified: the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), including the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), and the European Council on the EU-side and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)⁶ together with various committees and so-called 'tiger-teams'⁷ on behalf of NATO.

3 Teri Schulz, '[NATO in Europe needs 'military Schengen' to rival Russian mobility](#)' *Deutsche Welle*, 12 September 2017.


4 Jen Judson, '[Outgoing US Army Europa Commander pushes for Military Schengen Zone](#)', *DefenseNews*, 28 July 2017.

5 [Common set of new proposals on the implementation of the Joint Declaration; European Council, European Commission and NATO](#), 5 December 2017.

6 NATO's highest military commander, currently General Tod D. Wolters.

7 Tiger-teams are a form of cooperation between a couple of NATO member states in several areas. This predominantly includes the countries that are most involved.

Figure 1 Graphic overview of stakeholder involvement



At the beginning of 2018 the EDA presented a Roadmap on Cross-Border Military Transportation, based upon which the Commission and the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, representing the EEAS, launched the Action Plan on Military Mobility.⁸ This document lists numerous activities and the corresponding responsible actors and it functions as a guideline for all stakeholders involved in the military mobility field.

⁸ [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility](#), 23 March 2018.

The main reason as to why the Commission started to take action to allow the TEN-T network⁹ to comply with military requirements was the momentum and political attention created by PESCO in December 2017.¹⁰ The issue of military mobility was included in the binding commitments: “Simplifying and standardising cross-border military transport in Europe for enabling rapid deployment of military materiel and personnel”. In addition, improving military mobility was the goal of one of the projects launched in March 2018. Whereas the actual tasks are outlined in the Commission/EEAS Action Plan, the member states’ PESCO project functions as a political platform which keeps the member states aware of the work that needs to be done. This characterises the added value of the PESCO Military Mobility project: grabbing the political attention and providing pressure on the member states.

In line with EDA’s Roadmap and the Action Plan, EDA’s role has been to develop two Category-A projects¹¹: one on harmonising customs-related military requirements and one on cross-border movement permission by looking at surface movement in the air and land domains (all member states, except Malta, and Ireland in the former, are involved). The latter project was set up within four months, due to the political momentum created by PESCO. In the framework of the project on harmonising customs requirements, EDA is working on creating one digital form that will be used by both NATO and the EU. Before this, there was only a so-called ‘302’ form, which is used by NATO military to cross borders. One of the advantages of these projects is that the Commission has been actively engaged from the beginning and has helped to make the rapid organisation of the Category-A projects possible.¹²

The Commission’s involvement in the Action Plan ensures the availability of funds through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). For the new MFF (2021-2027) the Commission has proposed an envelope of 6.5 billion euro for military mobility needs. It can finance actions supporting the TEN-T infrastructure (with a strict dual-use mobility objective), including the earlier mentioned adoption of military mobility requirements and the enablement of a civilian-military dual-use of European infrastructure.

9 The trans-European transport network (TEN-T), which is a European Commission policy directed towards the implementation and development of a Europe-wide network of roads, railway lines, inland waterways, maritime shipping routes, ports, airports and rail-road terminals.

10 [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2017/2315](#) establishing PESCO and determining the list of participating member states, 11 December 2017.

11 [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action Plan on Military Mobility](#), 23 March 2018; [Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy](#), 19 November 2018; ‘[EDA outcome of Ministerial Steering Board](#)’, EDA, 5 May 2018.

12 Category-A projects or Joint Investment Programmes follow a top-down approach: all member states are involved, unless they explicitly state that they do not want to be.

In contrast to the plethora of stakeholders, projects and programmes on the EU's side, NATO's part of the story is much less complicated. In 2018, the Alliance introduced the NATO Readiness Initiative¹³, or the so-called 'Four Thirties', which aims to increase the readiness of existing national forces and their ability to move within Europe and across the Atlantic. Concretely, this includes the Allies' commitment to having 30 mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels ready to use within 30 days or less, by 2020.¹⁴ In addition, NATO has adopted the Enablement Plan for SACEUR's Area of Responsibility (AoR).¹⁵ The Enablement Plan has the purpose of improving NATO's logistical capabilities by adjusting legislation and procedures to facilitate border crossing, enhancing command and control to direct logistics, increasing transport capabilities, and upgrading infrastructure that is able to cope with large quantities of heavy military transport in Europe.

Moreover, a new NATO command structure (NCS) was initiated to contribute directly to the SACEUR's Enablement Plan.¹⁶ It includes logistic elements at all levels and aims to be able to cooperate and coordinate with the relevant national civilian actors. The NCS comprises two new headquarters in Norfolk (US) and in Ulm (Germany). Also part of the wider NCS is 'Rapid Air Mobility', a project to improve short-notice, cross-border air movement in Europe.¹⁷ An Enablement Taskforce was created that incorporates, amongst others, the logistics and resource committees, but overall the responsibility to implement military mobility lies with the SACEUR.

To sum up, Europe has woken up from its post-Cold War slumber with NATO returning to its focus on collective defence and deterrence and its ability to strengthen its frontlines at short notice. This is in the interest of EU member states as well. The mobility scope of the EU is much broader than NATO's, but in recent years the abilities and interests of the two organisations have been overlapping more than before. Actually, the EU can be seen as the key generator of the progress on military mobility in the last two years. Current activities are driven mainly by the Action Plan and facilitated by the activities of EDA, all in cooperation with NATO.

13 [The NATO Readiness Initiative](#) was first agreed upon during the North Atlantic Council meeting (Defence Ministers) on 7 June 2018 and officially adopted in the Brussels Summit Declaration on 11-12 July 2018.

14 [Brussels Summit Declaration](#), 11-12 July 2018.

15 Ibid.; European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs [Report on military mobility](#), 21 November 2018.

16 [Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council \(NAC\) in Defence Ministers' session](#), 7 June 2018; [Brussels Summit Declaration](#), 11-12 July 2018.

17 [Brussels Summit Declaration](#), 11-12 July 2018.

3 The EU-NATO conundrum

The NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 marked the turning point in EU-NATO relations. In a Joint Declaration the leaders of both organisations stated that the unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and the East required

“*new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face, and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources.*”¹⁸

Later that year, a list of 42 measures to advance EU-NATO cooperation in seven areas was agreed: hybrid threats; operational cooperation; cyber security; defence capabilities; the defence industry and research; exercises; and capacity-building.¹⁹ Later on, the list was extended to 74 concrete actions. Progress reports and a new Joint Declaration of July 2018 are conveying the message that EU-NATO cooperation is progressing well.²⁰

The changing strategic environment to Europe’s East and South is the driving factor for the step-change in the EU-NATO relationship: the complex security challenges require close cooperation as neither of the two organisations is capable of dealing with both the military and the non-military security threats. The best proof of this lies not in the list of 74 measures – mainly consisting of enhanced staff-to-staff contacts, information exchange, joint seminars and workshops, in short “largely bureaucratic stuff”²¹ – but in the complementary actions undertaken by both organisations in politically important real-life issues and concrete projects such as Military Mobility. NATO’s measures to

18 Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Press Release (2016) 119*, 8 July 2016.

19 Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Press Release (2016) 178*, 6 December 2016.

20 Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Press Release (2018) 095*, 10 July 2018.

The Progress Reports endorsed by the NATO and EU Councils were released in June 2017, November 2017 and June 2018.

21 According to a senior NATO official, quoted in: Nicole Koenig, EU-NATO Cooperation – Distinguishing Narrative from Substance, *Jacques Delors Institute*, Berlin, 20 July 2018, p.8.

reinforce its deterrence and defence posture and the EU's complementary sanctions policy in response to Russia's annexation of the Crimea and its interference in Eastern Ukraine together form the best and most relevant example of the new EU-NATO strategic relationship.

Formally, the EU-NATO relationship is still governed by the 2003 Berlin-Plus arrangement. It covers predominantly EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management operations, as practised in the EU take-over of NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia since 2003. The current EU-NATO cooperation agenda is very different. Not only is the EU working towards being capable to fulfil its level of ambition for crisis management operations, but both organisations want to intensify their cooperation in 'new fields' as outlined earlier. Just from that perspective, Berlin-Plus is de facto dead. Most probably, negotiating a new Berlin-Plus would be a waste of time and could even damage the EU-NATO relationship because the Turkey-Cyprus issue would poison the diplomatic process right from the start. There is simply no alternative to the current way of conducting EU-NATO coordination in an informal way, through extensive staff-to-staff contacts and, in applicable cases, by providing 'national' solutions. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, established in 2017, has shown the way forward in this respect. It is neither an EU nor a NATO Centre and it is open to participation by all EU and NATO member states.

The positive rating by the EU and NATO of their 'partnership new-style' relationship does not mean that frictions between the two organisations are absent. They continue to exist. Some stem from the past, others have popped up more recently. The Turkey-Cyprus issue continues to block the formal exchange of information between both organisations. This has a negative impact on staff-to-staff work in order to have both organisations 'singing from the same song sheet'. The NATO classification culture, on the one hand, and the EU's more legalistic approach, on the other, also impact on the information exchange problem. It should be noted, however, that Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have recently been more cooperative in agreeing on informal solutions to progress in EU-NATO relations. Moreover, there have been two successful examples regarding information sharing between NATO and the EU: NATO shared both its military requirements for infrastructure and its standard for the transportation of dangerous goods with the EU.²² Military mobility could provide the way forward in elaborating the information exchange between both organisations.

The changed environment also causes new problems. In particular, the EU's ambition level of 'strategic autonomy' as mentioned in the 2016 EU Global Strategy has been interpreted by many across the Atlantic as a plea for an alternative to NATO. Statements by several European political leaders in favour of a European Defence Union and a

22 This standard is called the Allied Multi-Modal Transportation of Dangerous Goods Directive (AMOV P-6).

European Army – as hollow as they are in terms of content – have further damaged the trans-Atlantic relationship which has already entered troubled waters under President Trump.²³ EU initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund (EDF) in particular have drawn criticism with regard to the proposed conditions for third state participation which are considered as very restrictive. Although these issues affect primarily non-EU NATO countries (not the Alliance as an organisation), they are bound to have a negative impact on EU-NATO relations if they are not satisfactorily solved. Solutions can only be found by a pragmatic approach while recognising the specific characteristics of the other organisation. The EU is a law community, NATO is not. Therefore, setting up EU arrangements for third country participation is a more complicated process than establishing partnership frameworks in the Alliance context. EDA has already shown the way forward by third party Administrative Arrangements with countries such as Norway which allow for participation at the project level. A comparable set-up could be chosen for PESCO and EDF projects. Finally, there is an inherent logic that stepped-up European efforts in military capability development will also lead to strengthening the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB). When the trans-Atlantic burden sharing in defence spending becomes more balanced, the US will have to accept that not only European influence in NATO will increase but also that defence procurement and the defence trade relationship has to become more balanced.

23 See: Dick Zandee, *NATO in the Trump Era – Surviving the Crisis*, Clingendael Report, September 2018; Dick Zandee, *70 Years of NATO: the Alliance in Troubled Waters*, Clingendael Spectator, January 2019.

4 Military mobility: the silver bullet for EU-NATO cooperation?

Military mobility has turned into a flagship of improved cooperation between the EU and NATO. Not all is well, obviously, as the above-mentioned political logjams remain in place, but reports on how the cooperation has progressed so far are largely positive. This section will discuss the extent in which EU and NATO have been able to work together on military mobility, the obstacles they still encounter and what is needed to overcome them.

One of its first successes is the formulation of common EU-NATO military requirements for military mobility. The EU's Action Plan tasked the EEAS (EUMS) with developing military requirements for infrastructure within Europe. This was carried out in cooperation, albeit informally, with NATO. The latter provided the EU with its own military requirements, which the member states validated and adjusted in order for the EUMS to create a final list, accepted by both organisations. NATO and the EUMS both carefully avoided emphasising the different priorities of both organisations, such as NATO's much larger need for 'throughput capacity' (brigades instead of EU Battlegroups) and its focus on the West-East corridor. The Commission's DG MOVE, assisted by the EUMS and EDA, is now tasked to identify the gaps between these military requirements and the TEN-T parameters. Furthermore, DG MOVE is working on determining at which level the dual-use of the network for civilian and military purposes would be possible. For example, to what extent should the height or the weight capacity of bridges be upgraded to allow for military use?

The process was not easy, among others because of the reluctant attitudes of a number of EU and NATO member states. The deadlock around Turkey and Cyprus has been discussed above, but reportedly, the traditionally neutral EU countries, Ireland and Austria, were also voicing their objections. The non-NATO EU member Austria has a very challenging geography and was hesitant in having to adjust its infrastructure for military purposes. However, Austria's geographical position at the core of a number of strategic corridors make it a crucial country for credible rapid deployment. Another issue is the strained Austria-Turkey relationship, with Turkey blocking cooperation between Austria and NATO. If not carefully managed, the souring of the Austria-Turkey relationship could become another thorn in the side of successful EU-NATO cooperation.

The reasons as to why EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility is progressing well so far could be that there is no established rivalry over the issue between the EU and NATO. It is for both organisations a relatively new priority (or a revisited one, in the case

of NATO). Moreover, Turkey and Cyprus' relative tolerant stance could be explained as they do not take part in the strategic corridors and therefore do not have a vested interest in military infrastructure matters. Cyprus is however interested in taking part in the Commission's TEN-T programme and Turkey has been receiving EU funds²⁴ to better connect its railway system to the TEN-T network.²⁵ This contributes to their tolerance on EU-NATO cooperation in this area. Conducive to its success is also that it is a tangible, concrete issue to which the EU has at least as much to offer as NATO has.

Obstacles and solutions

Despite relative successes, the EU-NATO cooperation on military mobility still meets with a number of challenges and obstacles. When the EU and NATO work together on military mobility it is only possible to work in an informal staff-to-staff setting. There are no formal forums available in which the two institutions can discuss these matters. This lack of formal structures does not make an informal working method impossible but it does make it much more complicated and time consuming. The PESCO project on military mobility includes the membership of Finland and Sweden (two countries who can boast 'best practices' on military mobility), but also allows the European Commission, EDA, EUMS and EEAS to have a seat at the table. After meetings, non-EU NATO members are informally briefed and vice versa after NATO meetings where non-NATO EU members are concerned.

Moreover, with the large number of actors involved in improving military mobility across the various institutions there is a need for a coordinating mechanism. Current informal staff-to-staff relations hinge too much on personalities, the extent to which they have a good relationship, and the temporality of people serving in the posts. At the moment, there is no forum in which all stakeholders are represented, which means a great deal of duplication in meetings and therefore considerable more effort. There is a so-called 'Friends of Military Mobility Group' or 'the Group of 8' comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Germany, France, Finland, the Netherlands and Norway which makes sure that the non-PESCO countries Norway, the US and the UK as well as the non-NATO country Finland are taken on board. It is clear, however, that this once more informal and complex set-up of institutions is sub-optimal.

The broad range of stakeholders involved in cross-border military movement stem from different worlds. This has implications within the member states as well as between the EU and NATO. There is no single entity coordinating what needs to be done to

24 From January 2007 onwards the [Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance \(IPA\)](#) replaced a series of European Union programmes and financial instruments for candidate countries or potential candidate countries (incl. Turkey).

25 IPA funds among others the [Transport Operational Programme](#) that aims to complete missing links of the Turkish rail transport network connecting to TEN-T.

facilitate European cross-border military movement. The PESCO project contributes to this coordination by raising awareness at the level of the EU member states that this is a whole-of-government and even a whole-of-society issue and helps with setting the agenda, but it does not have the ambition or the ability to coordinate this across Europe.

Different rules and cultures concerning the classification of documents is a recurring obstacle in EU-NATO relations and it also plays a role in the field of military mobility. NATO has a tendency to consider information to be classified while the EU has a much more open culture concerning the sharing of information. The Commission's DG MOVE, for instance, does not have any classification for its documents at all and Commission officials usually do not have security clearance. SACEUR's military requirements for military mobility were initially not available to the EU as they were classified. Eventually, these requirements were given the status of 'unclassified' and were given to the EUMS (which could only share it with the member states after being processed and 'EU-ised'). Still, the Enablement Plan for SACEUR's AoR has a 'NATO secret' status and is therefore officially not available to the EU.

What is needed is an overall new security agreement between the two organisations which allows a more extensive exchange of information. The current one was concluded in 2003, a year before Cyprus became a member of the EU. However, the Turkey-Cyprus political issue is blocking progress on revising it. What could help is if the NATO system is able to ease off on classifying almost all documents that it produces and take steps in altering its culture of secrecy to facilitate working relations between NATO and the EU, as well as other institutions. However, even if Turkey would agree to it, the current tense security situation and heightened awareness of information theft are not particularly conducive to progress on this matter. Exploring what is possible is however an issue that should be addressed by the NATO member states as it is a political problem as well.

US interests

Without the clear American interests in driving forward improving military mobility in Europe there would be less urgency to the matter. When military mobility became the subject of a PESCO project within the realm of the European Union, the US was concerned at first that it would be sidelined and that efforts would be a duplication of the efforts in NATO. As the US is central to transporting defence personnel and equipment across Europe, they should be included to a maximum extent in all initiatives. The diplomatic spat in May this year between the State Department and the Pentagon on the one hand and the EU on the other hand on 'third country participation' in EU defence initiatives, such as the EDF and PESCO, does not help matters and could actually derail EU-NATO cooperation just when it is on the upturn.²⁶

26 Gerald Traufetter & Matthias Gebauer, ['USA attackieren EU-Pläne für Verteidigungsfonds'](#), *Der Spiegel*, 14 May 2019.

Trident Juncture: lessons learned

Last year NATO organised its largest operation since the Cold War: 'Exercise Trident Juncture'. Its aim was to test an Article 5 situation by moving roughly 50,000 personnel from 31 NATO and partner countries from the United Kingdom, through the Netherlands to Norway. Despite the fact that the ability to move personnel and materiel quickly was one of the main issues to be exercised, no representatives from the EU were invited to take part. The exercise showed that there is still much to improve on military mobility. Training in NATO doctrines and programmes, such as LOGFAS²⁷, should be stepped up. More clarity should be created between national processes for paperwork concerning the movement of forces and equipment across borders, accompanied by timely directions on strategic communication to local government and the general public. Moreover, NATO's compliance with national customs regulations needs to be cleared up. Next year NATO will organize an even larger exercise, 'Defender 2020', as a test-case for military mobility. Besides incorporating the lessons learned from 'Trident Juncture', this operation should also provide a platform to practice integrated exercises with the EU.



Source: [NATO Trident Juncture / Flickr](#)

27 Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS) software: NATO's Planning Tool.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

EU-NATO cooperation on the issue of improving cross-border military movement is a relative success story. It is not, however, the silver bullet for solving the EU-NATO cooperation conundrum. It is clear that it is part of a more general trend of better EU-NATO cooperation as a result of the increase in threat perception by the member states, whether part of the EU or part of NATO, or both. A well-functioning cooperation between the EU and NATO is of the utmost importance in the light of the level of threats to Europe, but also to offset implications of the UK leaving the EU. Still, some aspects of military mobility contribute to its specific success. The nature of the issue of military mobility requires a whole-of-government and even a whole-of-society response, which makes it a matter in which both organisations are dependent on each other. This helps to push the sense of rivalry between NATO and the EU to one side. Reaching concrete results helps in fostering this better atmosphere and paves the way for closer and better cooperation. However, the case of military mobility shows that the traditional obstacles of the Turkey and Cyprus blockage still hamper cooperation. This does take place in an overall more open and positively developing experience of increased contact among staff, leading to better cooperation. Some practices from the 'military mobility' case are also worth noting and could be replicable in other EU-NATO cooperation cases. This leads to the following recommendations:

1. Through 'best practices' such as military mobility, the EU and NATO can show that they are able and willing to work together and that the sum of the EU and NATO parts is more than what the EU and NATO can do separately or even complementarily. This can be conducive to a more sophisticated debate on the roles that both organisations can have in providing Europe's security.
2. EU-NATO cooperation on 'new' subjects such as military mobility, but also hybrid threats, works relatively well because Turkey and Cyprus tolerate informal staff-to-staff cooperation. This is still a suboptimal situation and concerted political pressure should be exerted to formalise the setting of this cooperation. The relative success of the EU-NATO cooperation in these fields lies in the added value that both organisations bring to the issue. In the case of hybrid threats the EU has a broad civilian toolbox, including in the cyber field, its role in building societal resilience and (dis)information campaigns. The added value of NATO lies in its wide range of military capabilities that are needed to counter hybrid threats. Various issues that link internal and external security are eligible for EU-NATO cooperation, such as counter-terrorism, space security and maritime security.

3. Different rules and cultures concerning the classification of documents is a recurring obstacle in EU-NATO relations. A new security agreement between both organisations would require NATO to adjust its classification system. This is a political problem and it is therefore up to the NATO member states to take a critical look at the possible excessive classification of documents by NATO to facilitate working relations between NATO and the EU, as well as other institutions.
4. Third party involvement in EU programmes is another difficult bone of contention. EDA has shown the way forward by third party Administrative Arrangements with countries such as Norway which allow for participation at the project level. A comparable set-up could be chosen for PESCO projects, thereby for instance considerably easing cooperation on military mobility with non-EU NATO countries.
5. To cater for the different memberships of both organisations, consultation forums outside the EU and NATO (such as the 'Friends of Military Mobility' group) can play a role in ensuring that all relevant countries are involved. However, this is not a long-term solution and is not a viable substitute for EU-NATO cooperation on all levels.
6. There is a plethora of stakeholders involved in cross-border military movement, from private companies, local governments, armed forces to the European Commission and SACEUR. All are required to contribute, but there is not a single entity coordinating what needs to be done and providing an overall overview. A 'Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility' as it was launched in November 2018 could be a good format for the strategic level. So far, two meetings have been held (in February and March 2019), which brought together key stakeholders from both organisations. The Structured Dialogue format should continue to be used to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of efforts to improve military mobility as well as to achieve synergies wherever possible and to avoid unnecessary duplication.
7. To include more stakeholders than the EU and NATO, the Centre of Excellence (CoE) formula as it now exists for hybrid threats in Helsinki could work for military mobility as well. The Centre in Helsinki is not an EU nor a NATO centre, but both organisations are members and membership is open to EU and NATO member states. Two of the functions of the CoE on hybrid threats can be applied to military mobility as well:
 - To be a platform for nations to come together to share best practices, build capability, and test new ideas;
 - To be a neutral facilitator between the EU and NATO through strategic discussions and by developing and running exercises.

A third function could be added:

- To be a clearing house where information on initiatives, practices and research on improving military mobility comes together.

So far, the Netherlands has taken an active role in enhancing military mobility, among others through leading the PESCO project on the subject. Creating a new 'Centre of Excellence on Military Mobility' in The Hague or Rotterdam along the lines of the CoE on hybrid threats in Helsinki could be considered.

8. After 'Trident Juncture' in 2018, 2020 will see NATO's even larger exercise 'Defender 2020' as a test-case for military mobility. Besides incorporating the lessons learned from Trident Juncture, the opportunity of this exercise should not be missed to practise integrated exercises with the EU's institutions and member states. At the same time, a further development of the EU's Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) to also include military mobility aspects and more NATO staff and NATO member states would improve practical implementation among all stakeholders.
9. If not carefully managed, the souring of the Austria-Turkey relationship could become another thorn in the side of successful EU-NATO cooperation. This matter should receive urgent attention and more effort in mediation.
10. Lastly, on a more practical note, NATO and the EU employ a different set of terms and definitions around military mobility. Creating clarity and consistency on these could help cooperation between the various stakeholders.