OECD DAC FRAGILE STATES GROUP

The Netherlands and its
Whole of Government Approach on Fragile States

Case study Sudan

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I. Introduction

1.1 Background

1. The topic of fragile states is increasingly gaining ground on the international agenda. From an international geopolitical and security point of view, fragile states are considered to threaten regional stability and therewith international order. From a development cooperation perspective, there is a need to provide assistance as the governments of fragile states are not willing or not able to provide basic services to their people. From an economic trade point of view, fragile states receiving international assistance can be seen as emerging markets.

2. The fact that the problems and challenges of fragile states are myriad, complicates efforts to formulate an effective and efficient response. It requires a broad, holistic approach and policy coherence, embodied in a so-called 'whole of government approach'. This can be defined as when a government actively uses of formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to co-ordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions. It implies that successful engagement in fragile states depends on well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic, humanitarian, development and administrative domain.

1.2 Objectives

3. This study, initiated by the Fragile States Group of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), aims to assess existing so-called whole of government (WoG) approaches on fragile states to the extent to which the policies of the various government departments are consistent with each other both at headquarters level and at the field level. In accordance with this principle, this study on the WoG approach of the Netherlands as regards fragile states will focus on coherence between those agencies responsible for security, political and economic affairs, development and humanitarian assistance. In addition, attention will be paid to the extent to which this is consistent with the interests of other donor countries and recipient (partner) countries. This study focuses specifically on the Dutch WoG approach towards Sudan.

1.3 Methodology

4.   The study involved both research and a review of relevant documents and literature on Dutch integrated policies, as well as policies towards fragile states in general, and Sudan in particular. In addition, the study involved field work, i.e. interviews in The Hague and in Sudan. The interviews in The Hague involved relevant staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. During the field visit to Sudan, from 23 to 30 March 2006[1], staff from the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum was interviewed, as well as representatives from other donor countries, UN organisations and a non-governmental organisation (NGO).[2]

1.4 Structure of the report

5.   Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the Netherlands WoG approach on fragile states and the operationalisation of this approach at headquarters level. Chapter 3 offers an overview of the Netherlands involvement in Sudan and the operationalisation of its WoG approach at field level. In chapter 4, an assessment of the headquarters and field level practice in terms of WoG approaches is presented.

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[1] The consultants are grateful to the RNE for facilitating the Sudan visit.
[2] Annex A provides a list of the people interviewed.

II. Mapping the Netherlands Whole of Government Approach

2.1 Developments since the 1990s

6.   The Netherlands Government recognised the need for coherence between the political, security, humanitarian, development, economic and administrative domains in the early 1990s with the 1993 policy paper *A World of Dispute.* This paper noted that in the post-Cold War era crises had become more complex and required a growing involvement of the international community on a continuum stretching from early warning as part of preventive diplomacy, to peacemaking, peacekeeping and rehabilitation and reconstruction as elements of peace-building. It was stated that complex emergencies in particular required an integrated deployment of the instruments of foreign, defence and development policy (including humanitarian assistance), which in turn required the ministries involved to co-operate on these issues.

7.   The Netherlands Government has increasingly emphasised policy coherence and inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its foreign policy. In 1994, the Government presented a plan to review the Netherlands foreign policy[3], aiming to improve the ability of the Netherlands Government to "speak with one voice", particularly at the international level. This required some major organisational changes, specifically within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Up until that point, the MFA had been divided into departments working specifically for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and departments working specifically for the Minister for Development Cooperation.[4] The review process resulted in the so-called *de-compartmentalisation* ("ontschotting") of the Ministry; the departments were restructured along integrated lines, creating regional and thematic departments working for both Ministers. The Ministry's personnel rotation system, in which all personnel changes positions within the Ministry (also between headquarters and embassy level) every three to four years and is as such confronted with both the development and political side of foreign policy, is meant to reinforce such integration.

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[3] Review of Foreign Policy (1997)
[4] In 1965 a special Minister for Development Cooperation was installed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, creating a situation of two Ministers in one Ministry. The Minister for Development Cooperation (unlike the Secretaries of State) takes part in the Netherlands Council of Ministers.

8. As part of the review process and in order to facilitate policy coherence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was appointed co-ordinator for all foreign affairs of all Dutch Ministries. Furthermore, the Homogenous Group of International Cooperation (HGIS) was created in 1997, bringing together all foreign affairs expenses of the various Dutch Ministries in one budget overview. The HGIS aims to formulate a coherent foreign policy rather than combining the separate entities, therewith contributing to a more integrated foreign policy and stimulating inter-ministerial cooperation.

9. Such cooperation can be identified between a broad range of Ministries and on a broad range of issues. However, as this research primarily deals with the Dutch WoG approach on fragile states, it focuses on those agencies responsible for fragile states. The report will therefore elaborate only on those inter-ministerial cooperation structures which are relevant from that perspective, i.e. security, political and economic affairs, development and humanitarian assistance. In the case of the Netherlands, this means that the focus will primarily -though not exclusively- be on the cooperation between the MFA (including Development Cooperation), the MoD and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

2.2 The general strategic policy level

10. In its 2003 coalition agreement, the Netherlands Government specified that its foreign and security policy needs to be subject to an integrated and co-ordinated process of decision making, taking into account policy objectives in all relevant areas. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2005 budget of the MFA these relevant areas are identified as peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade, poverty, the environment and migration. It is stated that these are interrelated and therefore require an integrated approach and a combination of diplomatic, strategic, military, economic and developmental instruments.

11. The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2006 budget of the MFA states that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for Development Cooperation and of Defence have to work together in the promotion of stability in post-conflict areas. This includes the development of security structures in failing and fragile states, requiring the engagement of the Ministries of Justice (rule of law) and the Interior (police).

12. Various policy documents, (financial) instruments and a number of inter-ministerial (steering) committees have been established over the last years with the aim to enable the implementation of such an integrated approach on both a policy and an organisational level.

2.3 Policy framework for fragile states

13. The Netherlands has not (yet) formulated an integrated policy on fragile states. However, collectively a number of recent policy documents provide an outline of inter-ministerial cooperation for the promotion of stability, security and development, which is in particular relevant in the context of fragile states. The majority of the documents is characterised by a development focus.

Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities (2003)

14. This policy document, presented to Parliament by the Minister for Development Cooperation in 2003, reflects the main objectives of Dutch development cooperation. These objectives are linked to other policy fields as the document states that sustainable poverty reduction should be pursued by using an integrated approach in terms of combining diplomacy, political dialogue and pressure, security policy, market access and development cooperation at both headquarters and field level.

Africa memoranda (2003/2004)

15. Building on the policy framework provided by *Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities*, the Africa Memorandum *Strong people, weak states* (2003) and the regional *Horn of Africa Memorandum* and *Great Lakes Regions Memorandum* (both 2004) provide a policy framework that focuses more specifically on the issue of fragile states. The memoranda are joint policy statements from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation, for which the Minister of Defence has also been consulted. The documents integrate various policy areas by discussing a wide range of causes of the instability and stagnant development of Africa: armed conflicts, failing states, weak and corrupt governments, migration flows, the erosion of human capacity, economic decline and the depletion of natural resources, including water. The documents furthermore call for a holistic and regional approach combining political, economic, diplomatic and security instruments with the provision of aid.

Civil-Military Cooperation (2003)

16. As part of the acknowledgement that an integrated approach also requires a policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, together with the Minister for Development Cooperation, presented a joint policy statement on CIMIC. The Dutch central approach towards CIMIC is 'as civilian as possible, as military as necessary'. According to the statement, CIMIC entails the cooperation between military forces in peacekeeping missions on the one hand, and civilians and civil authorities on the other (including (I)NGOs). CIMIC activities, apart from creating a stable situation and winning the

'hearts and minds' of the local population, mainly involve small-scale reconstruction work carried out by peacekeeping forces, such as the reconstruction of infrastructure. The temporary fulfilment of governance and police tasks can also be part of the CIMIC activities. However, the aim is to have these tasks handed over to purely civil authorities as soon as possible. In practice, it is understood that the implementation of CIMIC activities requires close cooperation and coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Reconstruction After Violent Conflict (2005)

17. This policy memorandum can be considered the direct result of the objective to enhance policy coherence and stimulate a WoG approach in terms of stability, security and development. The document builds on the 2002 policy document *Reconstruction After Conflict*, which was presented to Parliament by the Minister for Development Cooperation and mainly addressed the role of development aid in reconstruction processes.

18. The need for a joined-up approach is underlined by the fact that the 2005 memorandum is jointly drafted and signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Development Cooperation, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Economic Affairs. The 2005 policy memorandum incorporates new insights and provides a broader scope for addressing reconstruction processes. It is thus far the most focused policy document as regards policy coherence for dealing specifically with fragile (post-conflict) states.

19. The Memorandum distinguishes three dimensions in a reconstruction process, which are considered to be intertwined:

a. *security and stability*, encompassing the consolidation of peace and security through a widely supported political agreement, the presence of international peacekeeping missions, demobilisation programmes, the reconstruction of security sectors, return of refugees and transitional justice;
b. *governance*, concentrating on the restoration of governance and public services, as well as the (re)construction of civil society organisations, democratic political institutions, justice and police forces;
c. *social and economic development*, defined as the reconstruction and provision of basic services, as well as the rebuilding of the economy and employment possibilities by stimulating both the private and the financial sector.

20. The Memorandum argues that sustainable reconstruction requires an approach which integrates various policy instruments (political, humanitarian, development cooperation,

economic and military). The operationalisation of such an integrated approach requires specific policy, organisational and financial structures. At field level, an adequate reconstruction strategy should be pursued by the national authorities, donors, the UN and NGOs and should involve the national and international business communities. The reconstruction strategy may also involve military activities related to peace and security. In the Netherlands, the integrated approach to reconstruction implies close cooperation and coordination between the main Ministries involved: Foreign Affairs (including Development Cooperation), Defence and Economic Affairs. The Ministries of Justice and the Interior are expected to contribute to the reconstruction process in specific areas, such as EU civilian crisis management, aiming to rebuild or reform police forces and judiciary systems. The private sector and civil society are also considered to play an important role in the integrated policy.

21. The Memorandum states that the Ministries involved will develop integrated approaches for a limited number of countries. Specific country strategies will be developed for countries in the selected priority regions (the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans) and Afghanistan. The level of involvement of the various Ministries is expected to differ per country.

22. Special mention should be made here of a request by the Netherlands Government to the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) on the problem of failing states. The request focused on four guidance questions concerning: (1) a definition of failing states; (2) the tools available to the international community to prevent or help failing states; (3) the conditions and circumstances for military deployment; and (4) the possibilities to hold non-state actors to account.[5] The request resulted in an advisory report, *Failing States: A Global Responsibility*[6] that was presented to the Dutch Government in May 2004. In its response to the AIV, there was one specific section on integrated policy. The AIV report stresses the need for an integrated and coherent approach. This is acknowledged by the Netherlands Government, and the reaction refers to the establishment of the Stability Fund (see below) as one of the answers to this need and announces the policy memorandum on Reconstruction after Violent Conflict in which it will address this need more in-depth.

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[5] See the letter *Request for advice on failing states*, DMV/VG-47/03, 28 May 2003.
[6] Advisory Council on International Affairs, *Failing States: A Global Responsibility*, Advisory Report No. 35, May 2004.

2.4 Operationalising the WoG approach at Headquarters level

2.4.1 Actors

23. The main actors involved in the Dutch WoG approach on fragile states, specifically the reconstruction in post-conflict states, are the MFA (including Development Cooperation), the MoD and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. These Ministries are not only faced with the challenge of inter-ministerial cooperation, but also have to deal with intra-ministerial issues. In particular the MFA is faced with the challenge of providing an integrated policy taking into account the political, security, development and humanitarian aspects for which the two Ministers within the Ministry are responsible. The MFA has established a Policy Coherence Unit (PCU) to identify possibilities for an integrated approach for content as well as strategy.[7]

24. The MoD is faced with the challenge of balancing the overall foreign political interests of the Netherlands with its operational (military) capacity. The Ministry of Economic Affairs faces the challenge to balance overall Dutch interests with those of the Dutch business community. As indicated, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior are expected to contribute as well. They face yet different problems, as their involvement in terms of deploying staff will require people being taken out of their operational setting in the Netherlands, thus creating gaps.

2.4.2 Instruments

25. Several instruments – financial, institutional, personnel – have been created to implement the above mentioned policies and inter-ministerial cooperation for the promotion of stability, security and development.

Financial instruments
26. The majority of the funds supporting the implementation of the previously discussed policy documents are part of the Development Cooperation budget. In terms of the provision of assistance to fragile states, this results in two challenging consequences. The first is that the majority of the Development Cooperation budget is assigned to bilateral development partners, and that the majority of the Development Cooperation instruments are designed in light of these specific partnerships. As fragile states characteristically do not comply with the

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[7] The PCU was established in 2002. The Unit is positioned directly under the MFA's Director General for International Cooperation and functions as a focal point for coherence of the Netherlands development policy. The PCU operates in project teams with key players from the MFA (including Development Cooperation) as well as from other Ministries. As the issues addressed by the PCU are not yet directly linked with stability and security issues, the Unit is not yet very much involved in the Dutch WoG approach on fragile states.

eligibility criteria for such a partnership (i.e. good governance and good policies of the recipient country), the majority of the Development Cooperation funds and instruments can not be directed towards fragile states.

27. Second, the expenditure of the Development Cooperation budget is restricted to the Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility criteria as drafted by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Legal difficulties arise when activities are supported that fall outside these criteria, as can be the case with certain activities related to the promotion of security and stability. The Netherlands has advocated to broaden the ODA criteria in order to allow the funding of such activities from the Development Cooperation budget, but has not succeeded thus far. Therefore, the integrated approach that the Netherlands strives for on the nexus stability, security and development, requires integrated funding, i.e. combining ODA and non-ODA funds.

The Stability Fund (SF)

28. In order to deal with these challenges, a separate budgetary entity within the budget of the MFA was established in 2004: the Stability Fund (SF). The SF combines ODA and non-ODA funds in order to provide rapid and flexible support for activities (including CIMIC) at the juncture of peace, security and development. The Stability Fund is the joint responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation, both politically and financially.

29. The Fund is primarily - though not exclusively- aimed at the Dutch priority regions (Horn of Africa, Balkan, Great Lakes Region) and Afghanistan.[8] Activities that are eligible for funding should focus on operational conflict prevention[9] -as opposed to the longer-term structural conflict prevention- or peace building. Activities in the latter category should be aimed at the direct enhancement of the (immediate) transition from war to peace and be demonstrably related to the formal peace process at hand.[10] The SF does not finance related activities in the post-conflict phase such as good governance, social basis services, infrastructure nor the support for economic activities. On the basis of these criteria, peace keeping operations executed by military officials from DAC I countries are eligible for funding

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[8] The distribution of the Fund's budget concentrates on developing countries (on the OECD/DAC lists I and II). However, exceptions to these guidelines are allowed as 25 % of the budget can be used in other countries, as long as Dutch involvement in terms of foreign policy can be identified.
[9] In practice this entails small scale and ad hoc interventions, such as the deployment of an expert in order to immediately reduce the rising tensions in a particular country or region.
[10] Examples of such activities are support for peace negotiations, security sector reform activities (reconstruction of the national police and armed forces); demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration; and civil control over the security sector.

from the Stability Fund, as is the support of activities such as training and assistance.[11] Unlike the name would suggest, the Stability Fund is not a 'fund' but rather a programme budget. Only governments of other countries and international organisations (such as ECOWAS, UN and AU) are eligible for funding from the SF. Civil society organisations (including NGOs) are not eligible for SF funding[12]

30. In its first year (2004), € 64 million was made available to the SF, while in 2005 some € 82 million was spend. Part of the budget for the SF was transferred from existing programmes that were placed under the SF: the de-mining fund; the small arms fund; demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR) funds; peace dialogue and peace building funds; and the Peace Fund.

31. The Stability Fund is steered by an inter-ministerial committee which consists of the MFA and the MoD. Although the MoD is a permanent member of the committee, it does not contribute financially to the Fund. The SF is managed by the MFA, where activities are divided between the Human Rights and Peace-building Department and the Security Policy Department along thematic lines.[13] Embassies and the other representations in the countries concerned are asked to offer advise and report on the content and financial aspects of each activity.

The Fund for Theme-based Co-Financing (TMF)
32. It is the Netherlands' objective to include the civil society organisations in the integrated approach towards post-conflict reconstruction. Therefore, a special reconstruction component was established under the Fund for Theme-based Co-Financing (TMF). This Fund was created in 2003, allowing Dutch civil society organisations to request funding for activities that contribute to the strengthening of their partner organisations in developing countries. The TMF Reconstruction is geographically limited to Afghanistan, Burundi, DRC and Sudan. Activities are only eligible for funding when they focus on the reconstruction of local governance or the reconstruction of local civil society. Given the fact that the Stability

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[11] Examples of such activities are the deployment of AMIB in Burundi, the enhancement of the peace keeping capacity of developing countries such as South Africa and Nigeria, as well as sub-regional organisations such as the African Union.
[12] Except for mine clearance and small arms activities.
[13] The Human Rights and Peace-building Department is particularly involved in the facilitation of peace processes, the strengthening of democratic control of the security sector, demobilisation and reintegration, clearing of land mines and the deployment of observers and advisors. The Security Policy Department is primarily involved in the reorganisation of the armed and police forces, disarmament, non-proliferation of small weapons and the promotion of military peacekeeping activities for developing countries.

Fund is not open to civil society organisations, the TMF Reconstruction can be seen as complementary to the SF.

Taskforces

33. In order to organise the Dutch response to certain complex reconstruction situations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs establishes taskforces. These taskforces consist of relevant staff of the various departments within the MFA, and possibly from other ministries, who are temporarily seconded to a taskforce.

34. The decision to create a taskforce is a high level one, usually in response to a direct request from the Ministerial level. Thus far, a taskforce has been created for the Western Balkans, Sudan and Afghanistan. These are all high profile reconstruction situations, bearing political importance and requiring integrated approaches.

35. Usually, taskforces will include the relevant regional department, the Security Policy Department and the Human Rights and Peace-building Department. By creating a separate entity outside the Ministry's bureaucratic structures, the Ministry aims to enhance coordination and cooperation and to enable rapid responses. The placement of taskforces in relation to the Ministry's regular structures can differ: the seconded staff can either be physically placed outside their own departments (as is the case for the Taskforce Sudan), or they can remain with their own departments, meeting with the other members of the taskforce on a regular basis (as is the case for the Taskforce Afghanistan).

36. Taskforces are meant to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Ministry's response. In addition, taskforces function as a clear focal point for other Ministries and as such enable inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination. Taskforces are temporary in nature; once the response process is set up and operational, the process needs to be institutionalised in the Ministry's regular structures.

Deployment of armed forces, police forces and juridical advisors

37. The Council of Ministers decides on the participation of the Netherlands in international peace missions, through the deployment of armed or police forces, or juridical advisors. In the preparation of such a decision, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is first responsible, taking into account the Netherlands' foreign policy and interests.

38. In case participation would entail the deployment of armed forces, the MFA would cooperate with the Minister of Defence, who is responsible for the military planning and the

actual deployment of contingents. The deployment of Dutch armed forces is bound by strict criteria that have been laid down in the Dutch Review Framework ("Toetsingskader") for participation in peacekeeping missions. Key for this framework are the new Constitutional articles 97 en 100. They indicate that the Dutch armed forces have the obligation to defend the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as well as to promote the international legal order (art.97). Article 100 requires timely information to Parliament on plans to send troops. On the basis of this framework, a number of aspects of a mission are covered, such as: feasibility of a mission, risks, availability of adequate expertise, duration, financing and security for participants. In addition, an assessment is made of the political context, the aims of parties involved, the character of the conflict and the risk of regional spill-over, the role of the military peacekeeping mission in the overall political strategy, and the overall humanitarian, political and economic situation (including IDPs, reconstruction, disarmament, elections, et cetera). In order to assess whether or not the required safety conditions for deployment have been met, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs can execute joint fact finding missions.

39. In case participation would entail the deployment of civil police forces, the Ministers of the Interior and Foreign Affairs are responsible, whereas the Minister of Justice would have joint responsibility in case of the deployment of Justice personnel.

Secondment of advisors

40. Inter-ministerial exchange of advisors is used to enhance inter-ministerial cooperation. In terms of cooperation on the nexus security, stability and development, the Minister for Development Cooperation and the Minister of Defence have exchanged advisors. Since 2004 a Military Advisor (MILAD) is seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and positioned directly under the Director General for International Cooperation. One of the tasks of the MILAD is to provide advise on the military aspects of peace and reconstruction processes, to be taken into account in the Foreign Affairs decision making process. Subsequently, an Advisor for Development Cooperation (OSAD) was seconded to the Ministry of Defence (January 2006) to provide advise on the development aspects of peace and reconstruction processes to be taken into account in the Defence decision making process. The OSAD is positioned directly under the Deputy Chief Commander.[14] Both the MILAD and the OSAD participate in overall coordination mechanisms in the field of stability, security and development (see 2.4.3 below). These secondments are not (yet) institutionalised in the structures of the Ministries.

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[14] Chef Defensie Staf (CDS).

41. Another example of secondment of advisors is the secondment of Defence Attachés (DefAts) from the MOD to the embassies and representations of the MFA. Although the role of DefAts traditionally has been to promote Defence interests abroad (provision of military resources, training, etc.), their role has shifted gradually towards that of a military advisor and observer with the growing involvement of the MoD in reconstruction processes. The decision to which embassies and representations a DefAt is seconded is made at Headquarters level between the MFA and the MoD. The embassies and representations are not part of this decision making process.

Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) Team[15]

42. In 2005, the inter-ministerial Security Sector Reform (SSR) Team has been set up in response to the observation that the reconstruction of the security sector (including armed forces) in a post-conflict country is often a bilateral activity since multilateral organisations are often limited by their mandate and their lack of expertise. The main tasks of the SSR Team are to identify SSR interventions, to provide SSR advisors (through the SSR Expert Pool, as described below), to facilitate SSR training, to advocate SSR to international organisations and to prepare the evaluation of SSR activities. The Team is aimed to provide rapid solutions in response to complex and politically sensitive situations.

43. Physically located at the MFA, the SSR Team consists of two staff members: one MFA employee and one MoD employee. The team is furthermore supported by three MoD staff members in the School on Peacekeeping Missions ("School voor Vredesmissies"). The Team is coordinated by the Steering Committee Security Cooperation and Reconstruction (see below). Activities initiated by the SSR Team will be funded by Stability Fund.[16] The team works on the basis of requests from embassies and (regional) directorates. These actors also remain responsible for the execution of, in this case, SSR policies.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) Expert Pool

44. In line with the framework provided in the policy document *Reconstruction After Violent Conflict* (2005) the Minister of Defence established in 2005 a so-called 'expert pool'[17] of people from the MoD (both military and civilian) who can be send on missions from several

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[15] Also referred to as the SSR Unit.
[16] But the salaries of the two full time staff members and deployed staff are paid by their respective Ministries.
[17] Also referred to as the 'defence pool'.

weeks to two months (maximum). [18] The people of this pool will keep their normal positions in the MoD. A review of the Pool's performance planned for the end of the year 2006. Currently the list consists of 60 available military experts who can be sent abroad on an ad hoc basis for the support of SSR activities.[19] The MoD is responsible for the composition and deployment of the pool, while the SSR Team is responsible for the overall coordination. The SSR Team is also responsible for the preparation of training programme for the pool by experts on SSR. Civil society will be involved in this training in order to develop a broad understanding of the local problems involved, such as community reintegration.

45. It was noted that the pool is just one of the options for support in the field of SSR. It is foreseen that SSR will also require financial support, as well as training. As regards planning, it was also mentioned that the pool operates on a demand-driven basis. The aim is also to coordinate Dutch activities where possible with other international actors.

Analytical Tools

46. The Dutch Government has developed a set of analytical tools in support of further development of integrated strategies at the juncture of peace, security and development. These tools are to support the Dutch embassies and representations abroad in the implementation of an integrated approach.

Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) (2005)

47. The SAF offers a general analytical tool for stability analysis and strategic, joint-up planning for a particular country. It provides an analysis of trends on a number of stability indicators and helps to identify options improving these trends by taking into consideration a large number of sectors (development cooperation, politics, military, economics). The SAF has thus far been piloted in Mozambique (2002), Rwanda (2002) and Kenya (2003), and used in Rwanda (2003), Afghanistan (2005), Bolivia (2006) and Burundi (2006). An assessment for Sudan was prepared but a workshop aimed at discussing the findings and policy suggestions did not take place.

Security Sector Governance Assessment Framework (SSGAF) (2003)

48. The SSGAF is designed to assist governments in identifying priorities and strategies for strengthening democratic governance of the security sector. As a sector specific instrument

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[18] The military experts of the pool will be deployed on the basis of official instructions but personal background and circumstances will be taken into consideration. Civilian experts will be deployed on a voluntary basis.
[19] The Ministry of Defence aims at 90 experts for the pool, of which it can deploy experts within one month and is able to deploy a maximum of 30 experts abroad at once for a maximum period of 2 months.

the SSGAF concentrates on countries that, in the larger context of democratisation, are willing to engage in SSR. The SSGAF has not been piloted or used until now by the Netherlands, but has provided guidance to other international actors.

49. As regards the SSGAF and the SAF it should be noted that these instruments are being used at the instigation and request of embassies. Where the SAF was executed at the request of embassies, the findings have been used by the embassies in their annual or multi year plans. For 2006 the development of a Governance Assessment Framework (GAF) is planned. This GAF is supposed to be used on an annual basis by embassies.

Economic reconstruction

50. Economic development programmes are also of specific interest in the context of (the reconstruction) of fragile states. One example is the joint Ministry of Economic Affairs and MFA Programme for Cooperation with Emerging Markets (PSOM), which aims to facilitate business cooperation with emerging markets in developing countries. The PSOM includes all bilateral development partner countries, but also non-partner countries can be placed on the PSOM-list, including post-conflict states (as has recently been the case with Sudan). The PSOM is of interest for the MFA (specifically Development Cooperation) as the programme can contribute to sustainable poverty alleviation. For the Ministry of Economic Affairs PSOM is of interest to position Dutch businesses in emerging markets.

51. The Development-Related Export Transactions Programme (ORET/MILEV) is another joint programme of the Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs. Its objective is to promote sustainable economic development and to improve the business climate in developing countries by facilitating investment in their economic and social infrastructure. Eligibility criteria used are financial and economic impact, technical sustainability, environmental impact and social impact. The programme awards grants for the purchase of capital goods, services or works. The MFA bears the final responsibility of the programme, whereas the commercial feasibility and accountability at the OECD and the EU level are the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

52. In addition to ORET and PSOM, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is active in Sudan through instruments such as the Programme on Economic Cooperation Projects (PESP). The Ministry of Economic Affairs has executed five feasibility studies as regards Sudan, of which three were executed in 2005 and 2006. The projects involved had specific relevance for post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. a project on rehabilitation of the Nile for the purpose of North-South transportation). The Ministry has also noticed increased interest of Dutch

business, more than 82 information requests in 2005, which may result in specific Sudan information on its website.

2.4.3 Coordination mechanisms

53. The Dutch WoG approach is supported by coordination mechanisms that can be found at several governmental levels. At the highest level, the weekly Council of Ministers is ultimately responsible for decision-making and arbitration of differences of opinion among Ministries. In addition, there are the Coordination Commission for International Affairs (CoRIA)[20], and the Cabinet Committee on European and International Affairs (REIA).[21] These official inter-ministerial consultations at headquarters level, ensure institutional coordination of the Dutch foreign policy – including development aspects.

54. Next to these more general coordination structures, a number of more specialised coordination mechanisms can be identified aimed specifically at the implementation of the Dutch integrated foreign policy on stability, security and development.

Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Reconstruction (SVW)[22]
55. The SVW has been set up to further develop a WoG approach and policy integration in terms of security and development. The Committee focuses on a broad range of issues, ranging from security assistance to problems related to SSR, including topics such as DDR, small arms and the clearance of mines. The policy documents *Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities* and more specifically *Reconstruction After Violent Conflict* provide basic guidance for its work.

56. The SVW provides policy guidelines for the purpose of specific countries, that are used by the embassies and (regional) directorates of the Ministries involved. In addition, the SVW provides policy guidelines for the Stability Fund Steering Committee as well as for the SSR Team.

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[20] The CoRIA is chaired by the Director General for Regional Policy and Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All ministries are member of the CoRIA
[21] Chaired by the Prime Minister, the REIA's main task is to prepare the decision-making process of the Council of Ministers. The REIA has two different settings, divided into meetings for European Affairs and for International Affairs. The latter consists of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Defence and Economic Affairs, as well as the Minister for Development Cooperation. Furthermore, the Secretaries of State for Economic Affairs and Internal Affairs, as well as the State Secretary for European Affairs are members. The Minister of Foreign Affairs bears the final responsibility for the REIA and co-ordinates its preparatory committees.
[22] Stuurgroep Veiligheidssamenwerking en Wederopbouw (SVW).

57. The SVW is logistically positioned within the MFA, but falls under the joint political responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Development Cooperation and the Minister of Defence. The Committee consists of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence[23] and is chaired by the MFA and the MoD alternatively.

Stability Fund Steering Committee

58. The inter-ministerial Stability Fund Steering Committee is responsible for the coordination and management of the Stability Fund. As the Stability Fund is fully financed by the MFA, the Steering Committee consists mainly of representatives of this Ministry[24]. The Ministry of Defence is represented by various participants with an advisory role and veto right in case of direct involvement of the MoD in the implementation of projects. The Committee is chaired by the MFA's deputy Director Generals for Political Affairs and for International Cooperation.

Steering Committees on the deployment of military and civilian staff

59. The deployment of military and civilian staff in the context of international peace missions is advised upon, and co-ordinated by steering committees. First, the Steering Committee Military Operations (SMO)[25] deals with the deployment of armed forces. This Committee consists of high level representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Second, the Steering Committee Police deals with the deployment of police forces. This Committee consists of representatives of the Ministries of the Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Military Police (Marechaussee). Third, the Steering Committee Rule of Law deals with the deployment of juridical advisors. This Committee consists of representatives of the Ministries of Justice, the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Steering Committees Police and Rule of Law are chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas the Steering Committee Military Operations is chaired alternatively by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

60. In all cases, the Steering Committees prepare a joint advise on deployment. The members of the Committees present this advise to their respective Ministers, who all have to approve it.

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[23] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is represented by the deputy Director General for International Cooperation, the deputy Director General for Political Affairs, the Human Rights and Peace-building Department (which also provides the secretariat), the Security Policy Department and the Military Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MILAD). The Ministry of Defence is represented by the deputy Director for General Policy Affairs, SCIMS and the Development Advisor to the Ministry of Defence (OSAD).

[24] Represented are the Human Rights and Peace-building Department, the Security Policy Department, the United Nations and International Financial Institutions Department and the Financial and Economic Affairs Department (in an advisory function).

[25] Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties (SMO).

Inter-ministerial consultation committee CIMIC [26]

61. The inter-ministerial consultation committee CIMIC, consisting of representatives of the MFA and the MoD,[27] was established in response to demands from Parliament to enhance the coordination and cooperation between the MFA and the MoD on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The committee meets at least twice a year and is consulted for the preparation of each new peace mission. The activities are financed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation.

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[26] Interdepartementaal Overleg (IO) CIMIC.
[27] The MFA is represented in this committee by the Security Policy Department and the Human Rights and Peace-building Department. The MoD is represented by the Department of General Policy Affairs, the Defence staff, and OSAD.

III. The Netherlands Involvement in Sudan

62. Conflict has been part of most of Sudan's history. Currently, Sudan is facing all phases of the conflict cycle: part is post-conflict (the South), part is facing conflict (Darfur) and part is on the verge of conflict (the East). Sudan's problems are myriad, and cannot be dealt with easily. Part of the country is relatively well developed compared to national and regional standards, parts are relatively backward in terms of development, and yet other parts are totally underdeveloped. The overall scope of problems requires donors to focus on conflict prevention, stabilisation, peacebuilding and long-term development at the same time.

3.1 Dutch involvement in Sudan prior to the CPA

63. The Netherlands has been involved in Sudan since 1974, when the country was added to the list of countries where Dutch development cooperation was active. Up until 1989, Dutch involvement focused on aid for bilateral structural development projects. Interestingly, a first WoG activity was its humanitarian/military operation in Darfur in the 1970s, when the MoD contributed a transport battalion for the delivery of humanitarian food aid. From 1990 onwards, bilateral projects were phased out and support was channelled through multilateral organizations and (I)NGOs. In that same period, the emphasis of Dutch assistance to Sudan shifted towards assistance of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD, before Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification, IGADD) peace initiatives and humanitarian aid to the South through the Operation Lifeline Sudan framework (OLS, 1989). From 1994 onwards, the Netherlands gradually disengaged from IGAD peace initiatives, but re-engaged when Minister Van Ardenne took office in 2002. Dutch support to OLS continued throughout the 1990s towards the end of the conflict, when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005.

3.2 Dutch policies on Sudan in the post-CPA era

64. The Netherlands Government has not entered into a regular, bilateral development cooperation relationship with Sudan. However, the Netherlands Government is contributing to the peace process in Sudan as part of its regional strategy. The *Memorandum for the Horn of Africa* (2004) identifies the key general policy areas for the region in the period 2004-2007 that need to be operationalised: enhancement of peace, security and stability; good

governance and policy; improvement of organizational and human capacity; pro-poor economic development; and sustainable water- and environmental management. The operationalisation of these general policy priority areas is proposed to take place by means of a regional approach, as well as through partnerships with other countries in the region, civil organisations in the Netherlands and the civil society in the countries themselves.

65. In February 2005, the MFA presented an integrated reconstruction strategy for Sudan, focusing on the implementation of Dutch foreign policy instruments to support the reconstruction process in the medium-long term. This internal document states that the situation in Sudan requires an integrated approach, in which political, military, economic and development instruments are tuned to each other. Dutch activities are aimed to support the implementation of the CPA and as such, should be in line with the military, political and socio-economic components of the CPA. Consequently, the priority areas presented are security and stability, governance and socio-economic development. The financial modalities presented to support this strategy are all coming from the MFA budget.

66. The strategy is in line with the 2005 policy memorandum *Reconstruction after Violent Conflict.* As such, implementation of the strategy would require involvement of the MFA (including Development Cooperation), the MoD and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. However, the strategy is not a joint document. The MFA did consult with the MoD, but the Ministry of Economic Affairs has not been involved. As the document does not identify the different roles of actors involved, it is not clear if and how operational tasks will be divided.

3.3 Operationalising the WoG Approach towards Sudan

3.3.1 Policy: objectives and trade-offs

67. The overall objective of the Dutch policy on Sudan is to support the implementation of the CPA and to do this in an even-handed manner: 50% of the assistance for the North and 50% for the South. In addition to implementing the CPA, Dutch attention also focuses on the situation in Darfur. The Netherlands is involved in providing humanitarian assistance as well as supporting peace negotiations. In order to be successful, the Dutch strategy towards Sudan needs to be carried out in close cooperation with other donors and partners.

68. For the moment, guidance comes from the *Reconstruction after Violent Conflict* memorandum and the 2005 country strategy. These provide conceptual directions, but leave room for flexibility, with a risk of *ad hoc* approaches. In order to come to a more operational

strategy on Sudan, a stability assessment (SAF) was prepared for the first quarter of 2005. However, the process was stopped just before the findings could be discussed with the actors in Sudan. For 2006, the Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Reconstruction (SVW) has requested that a new country strategy is developed to provide an assessment framework for funding requests from the Stability Fund, as well as to provide a framework for joined-up working.

69. As is the case for all Dutch embassies, the annual work-plan of the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in Khartoum refers to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Budget of the MFA as its guideline for selecting operational objectives. The work-plan covers all the thematic areas of the Dutch WoG approach. The plan focuses on improving security and stability, effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and good governance. Key areas for engagement are conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction; poverty reduction and enhancing the quality and effectiveness of development cooperation; human rights; improving the conditions for investments and trade; providing humanitarian assistance, and improving regional stability. It is not clear how other Ministries were involved in the discussions on the annual work-plan.

70. This reflects a wide range of areas of engagement and suggest a lack of prioritisation of objectives. Furthermore, given the volatile situation in Sudan and the myriad of problems, priorities set may be overtaken by events or due to developments, revised or expanded. As a result, the ambition level and policy objectives may not always match the capacity and capability of the Dutch representation on the ground.

3.3.2 Actors

71. The main actors involved in the WoG approach towards Sudan are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is not actively involved, i.e. the Ministry is informed on relevant issues by the MFA, but does not take part in meetings or programmes.

72. At headquarters level, the MFA established the Taskforce Sudan (TFS) in 2005 in response to a request from the Minister for Development Cooperation. The TFS reports directly to the Director-Generals for International Cooperation and for Political Affairs. This is to ensure an efficient provision of information to the Ministers. The TFS is coordinated by a special envoy[28] who is responsible for the external representation of the Dutch Sudan policy.

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[28] A so-called Ambassador at Large (AMAD).

The TFS consists of 6 operational staff, temporarily seconded from the Africa Department and the Human Rights and Peace-building Department. Additionally, staff of the Security Policy Department and the Humanitarian Aid Division are part of the TFS, but not physically placed outside their own departments. They participate in the TFS when this is considered relevant from the point of view of their particular areas of expertise. The division of labour within the TFS covers the broad range of issues involved in the Dutch response to Sudan. The staff is divided to cover political issues, peace processes, security and stability issues, socio-economic development, humanitarian and reconstruction issues.

73. The TFS organises and chairs a weekly inter-ministerial Sudan meeting, which is attended by representatives from the MoD. Depending on the agenda, other actors within the MFA can participate as well. The meetings provide an opportunity to exchange information and to come to a joint decision making process. Eventually the TFS is responsible for the policy formulation on Sudan, as well as the implementation of this policy at field level. The TFS functions as a coordination mechanism to integrate the policies of the different Ministries involved and the implementation at field level.

74. Key actor at the field level is the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in Khartoum. With a policy staff of six, and three local policy staff, the Embassy is small compared to some of the other larger donors in Sudan such as the UK, the US and the EU. The staff limitations are related to the fact that Sudan is not a bilateral development partner country. In addition to the staff of the RNE, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and Sweden are now setting up a Joint Donor Office and Team in Juba.

75. The RNE Khartoum is not directly involved in the Darfur peace negotiations. These fall under the responsibility of the Special Envoy for Sudan, and are attended by the RNE Abuja. As the outcomes of the peace process effect the operations of the Embassy in Khartoum, Abuja reports to Khartoum, but through the Task Force Sudan in The Hague.

76. Although the Special Envoy for Sudan is based in The Hague, he is a key actor at field level. The envoy formally represents the Netherlands in the CPA Assessment and Evaluation Committee. This Committee consists of a limited number of donors and the two main actors involved in the CPA: the southern SPLM and the northern NCP. The Committee monitors, evaluates and assesses the implementation of the CPA.

77. The WoG representation available at the headquarters level through the various commissions, steering groups and in particular the TFS, is not reflected at field level.

Although the Netherlands uses Defence Attachés, no such attaché is seconded to the RNE in Khartoum. Instead, the Defence Attaché stationed at the RNE in Cairo is accredited for Sudan. As such, the MoD is *de jure* represented in Sudan, but not *de facto*.

3.3.3 Instruments

78. An important instrument in implementing the Dutch WoG approach at field level is the participation of RNE staff in various forums and structures. As mentioned above, the Netherlands is for instance a contributing member of the CPA Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), where it coordinates the politically sensitive "three areas" part of the CPA. In addition, the Netherlands is co-chair of the national Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), through which donors co-finance development initiatives of the Government of Sudan. The Fund is managed by the World Bank. Dutch financial participation in UN OCHA's Common Humanitarian Fund and the Strategic Partnership with UNDP should also be mentioned (see below for further details).

79. Another type of instrument is the deployment Dutch nationals: military, civil police and civilian advisors. The Netherlands has seconded staff to the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) for the Nuba Mountains peace agreement. In preparation of new deployments in Sudan (15 military observers, 2-5 staff officers, and 15 police officers for UNMIS), two joint fact-finding missions of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs have taken place, facilitated by the RNE Khartoum. The aim was to assess the conditions for deployment, in particular of the police officers and the military observers. The staff-officers were deployed in the beginning of March 2006. The deployment of the military observers starts in April, while the deployment of the police officers will most likely start in June.

80. As far as financial instruments are concerned, a first observation is that all Dutch funding available for Sudan stems from the MFA budget. As such, there is no integrated financial approach. The MFA funding is used for all activities, including those in the area of expertise of the MoD and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

81. The fact that Sudan is not a bilateral development partner country has implications for the funding mechanisms. As stated above, the majority of the Development Cooperation funds and instruments can not be directed towards fragile states such as Sudan. Therefore, key funding instruments for Sudan are 'non-traditional' funding instruments, i.e. the Stability Fund

and the Humanitarian Assistance budget. In addition, the Minister for Development Cooperation has allocated funding for reconstruction processes. The fact that the funding for Dutch activities in Sudan originates from different funds and budgets, each with different reporting and accountability requirements, as well as different funding cycles, challenges the tuning of the different activities and as such the integrated approach of the Netherlands. Furthermore, it may affect the swiftness of the decision-making process on the funding of activities.

82. The strict distinction in policy guidelines and rules for disbursement of funding for humanitarian aid on the one hand and for development assistance on the other makes it furthermore difficult to finance peace dividend type of activities and to quickly respond to early recovery needs. Specifically the ODA-eligibility criteria are a limiting factor to financing integrated activities at the juncture of security, stability and development. The funds made available from the Stability Fund are less restricted and are used to finance (participation in) e.g. IMAT.

83. Another point is that the bulk of the budgets for Sudan are centralised and managed from The Hague. This means that the Embassy has an advisory role in the selection of activities, but that the final responsibility lies at headquarters level.[29] This again may affect the swiftness of response, as the Embassy has to consult with headquarters on most funding decisions. This has resulted in the perception amongst respondents at field level, that the Embassy is limited in its flexibility to quickly respond to needs and developments.

3.3.4 Management and coordination mechanisms

Embassy and Task Force Sudan
84. The TFS – in close cooperation with the Embassy in Khartoum, coordinates overall policy development and advises the political leadership. The TFS also takes the lead in representing the Netherlands in donor meetings at headquarters level. Policy coordination at the field level is done by the Embassy, within the framework of the general strategy set out by the TFS.

85. Given its overall coordinating role, the TFS is involved in, and consulted on, all activities. This bears the risk of overlap and duplication of tasks. However, it does not mean that the Embassy is merely an executing office for TFS decisions. Embassy and TFS consult mutually on a continuous basis, and their relationship could best be characterised as a

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[29] As of April 2006, part of the reconstruction funds will be transferred to the RNE Khartoum.

partnership. Nonetheless, whereas mutual consultation is taking place, it is not always clear how things are picked up by the TFS in the various discussions at the headquarters level. In real terms, and on a day-to-day basis, the division of tasks is that the TFS takes the lead on issues which are also discussed at headquarters level in other countries, whereas the Embassy follows and monitors developments at field level. This includes the AEC, notwithstanding the formal, more strategic role of the Special Envoy.

86. The TFS is planned to be discontinued by mid-2006. This means that the tasks and responsibilities of the TFS will be transferred back into the bureaucratic structures of the MFA. Given its central role in the Dutch WoG approach towards Sudan, this raises questions as to how tasks will be divided in the future. The TFS currently maintains close contact with the political leadership of the MFA (the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation), coordinates with the various departments within the MFA, the ministries involved in Sudan, and the Embassy. Discussions on the transfer of TFS responsibilities have not yet fully started, but when they do, it would be recommendable to closely involve the Embassy and other relevant Ministries in these discussions.

WoG coordination at the field level

87. At headquarters level, there are various instruments for initiating a WoG approach. However, at the field level, these instruments cannot directly be operationalised. As indicated, the implementation of the Dutch WoG approach is limited by the absence of representatives from other ministries at the field level. The absence of a Defence Attaché at the Embassy in Khartoum is most remarkable given the level of Dutch ambitions and (military) involvement in various UN, AU, DDR and SSR activities. In practice this means that a civilian officer in the Embassy has to cover this policy field on a daily basis.

88. With a Defence Attaché accredited for Sudan based in Cairo, the lines of communication are not as direct as they could or should be. Embassy staff reports on a weekly basis to the TFS (and copy messages to the MoD). The Defence Attaché in Cairo in turn reports directly to the MoD. In real terms this means that there are two reports going to different ministries in The Hague on the same issues. The absence of formal guidance for joint-up reporting does not facilitate a joint-up approach at field level. In practice, the level of coordination depends mainly on individual initiatives. In the case of the RNE Khartoum and the Cairo based Defence Attaché messages to respective headquarters are coordinated.

89. Dutch participation in IMAT results in yet another line of communication between the field and headquarters (here again MoD). The IMAT structure calls firstly for its members to report

to the Head of Mission of IMAT. This Head of Mission then will report to the so-called Friends of IMAT (a group of donors consisting of the UK, the US, Norway and the Netherlands). However, the fact that one of the Dutch MoD staff members deployed in IMAT is also the senior national representative in the country means that he has to file a separate report to the MoD. These weekly situation reports to the Operations Centre of the MoD are formally not coordinated with the Embassy. Guidelines for such coordination do not exist, nor are they called for in another way. In practice, and on the basis of personal contacts, the seconded officer at IMAT visits the RNE frequently. They exchange information on a regular basis, which means that he receives their weekly reports, and that the Embassy receives copies of the situation reports that are sent to the MoD.

90. As regards coordination of the TFS with the MoD, it should be noted that the TFS does not participate in all discussions at headquarters level on military operations and activities (i.e. TFS is not part of discussions in the SMO). This may limit direct input into decisive operational decision-making at headquarters level, as well as (indirectly) limit involvement of the Embassy in such decisions. Overall, there seem to be loopholes in the coordination, reporting and communications systems between the MFA, the Embassy, and the MoD. Such loopholes should ideally be closed.

91. As regards the Ministry of Economic Affairs, there are have been several activities at the headquarters level. Feasibility studies have been executed, and increased business interest calls for Sudan specific information on the EVD website. At the field level in the terrain of Economic Affairs, e.g. a Holland Pavilion at the Khartoum Trade Fair for promoting Dutch business was organised. However, there have been no secondments of staff to the Embassy. Funds that are being used for the Trade Fair are MFA funds, and activities are carried out by staff of the TFS and the Embassy, temporarily supported by an intern. As regards the overall level of cooperation and information sharing, it was noted that there is no direct reporting to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This may need to change if Dutch business interest and investments increase.

Intergovernmental coordination at the field level: harmonisation and alignment
92. The Dutch WoG approach on Sudan does not seem to limit the possibilities to harmonise and align Dutch activities with other donors and the Sudanese Government. Alignment for instance takes place through political dialogue between the Embassy and Government officials, through EU dialogue with Government officials and through participation in the AEC.

93. A specific instrument for both donor coordination *and* alignment is the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The alignment part is guaranteed through the co-financing mechanism. This means that for every donor-dollar in the MDTF the Sudanese authorities will add two from their budget. This creates local ownership. Donor coordination is guaranteed through the fact that donors co-decide on the investments of the MDTF, which is financially managed by the World Bank. The MDTF is criticised for being too slow in financing recovery activities and creating peace dividend. Even though donors, including the Netherlands, have contributed early recovery funds to the MDTF, these funds cannot be used as such because the Fund is set up as a traditional development fund, involving time-consuming processes as joint needs assessments, co-financing mechanisms and tender procedures. This limits the flexibility and swiftness of the MDTF.

94. Another instrument of importance for harmonisation and alignment in which the Netherlands participates is the Strategic Partnership (SP) with UNDP. The SP is an attempt by donors to pull funds together for two specific sectors: governance and rule of law (RoL). The aim is to enhance donor coordination and at the same time strengthen the operational capacity of UNDP. By not earmarking the funds for specific activities, the SP creates a flexible funding mechanism. Non-earmarked funding also decreases the administrative burden on donors. Furthermore, the SP aims to work with *one* reporting mechanism, therewith also decreasing the administrative burden on UNDP. For the purpose of continuity and in order to be strategic, the SP aims to have a longer term perspective and therefore requires long term funding. In the current plans, the SP will be up for renewal by the end of 2007.

95. Yet another instrument for donor coordination, this time in the field of humanitarian assistance, is the Common Humanitarian Fund. This fund is also faced with a number of problems. At field level, it is felt that the CHF lacks the resources to really make a difference (it was stated that only 10% of the funding needed for 2006 was provided). Second, and as a result of the lack of funding, the CHF is limited in its ability to coordinate between the different humanitarian UN organisations. There seems to be a tendency amongst these organisations not to cave in or give up their won independence, which in practice results in a somewhat stove-piped approach.

96. In addition to these funds and partnerships, the Netherlands – together with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom – has embarked upon an innovation in donor coordination with the establishment of a Joint Donor Team for the South. This Joint Donor Team (JDT) will be based in Juba. Legally, the office falls under the responsibility of the

Embassy in Khartoum. However, in practice, the JDT operates independently, representing the five countries involved. The five parties to the JDT will jointly coordinate and execute the development cooperation activities of their respective countries in the South of which they consider the MDTF to be the core.

97. Together, the five can exert more influence by coordinating and improving coherence. A challenge is that the JDT formally will not focus on political issues. However, in practice it will be impossible to exclude the political issues from the development agenda. This could lead to problems in the cooperation between the five partners. The JDT does not work on the basis of a formal joint assessment of conditions, challenges and opportunities. However, through the Memorandum of Understanding for the JDT and a joint response document, there is agreement among the partners what the priorities are. The JDT will furthermore develop its own annual work-plan.

98. The idea to establish a Joint Donor Team was developed at headquarters level. The TFS has worked out the details for the Netherlands. The Netherlands is host for the JDT, which means that the Netherlands has the lead in implementing the JDT, e.g. building the office. The JDT concept is received positively by the Sudanese authorities.

IV. Assessment of the Headquarters and Field Based Practice

99. On the basis of the headquarters and field based practice, a number of observations can be made that are relevant for the Netherlands, and that, additionally, can provide input for the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.

4.1 Conceptual (policy) level and objectives

The limitations of starting from a Development Cooperation perspective

100.   At a more general, conceptual level, the issue of fragile states traditionally stems from the Development Cooperation agenda. The problem of weak and fragile states manifested itself most prominently on the African continent, which predominantly was the domain of Development Cooperation. However, in the shifting geopolitical order as a result of the end of the Cold War, fragile states are considered to be of increasing importance for regional stability and international security. Strengthened by the War on Terror, diplomatic and security related departments in the MFA, as well as ministries such as the MoD, are increasingly involved in discussions on fragile states. Nevertheless it was noted that the role and involvement of the latter departments is still guided by the importance of a fragile state in terms of risks for (inter)national security, whereas the discussions on fragile states are predominantly initiated from a development cooperation point of view.

101.   One of the consequences of the prominent role of Development Cooperation in discussions on fragile states is that at the conceptual level, the fragile states issue is largely couched in development cooperation terminology. It was noted that this creates hurdles for other actors to get more actively involved.

102.   Furthermore, due to the lack of a clear definition of what fragile states are, an overall document on how to deal with fragile states from a WoG perspective has not been produced. Some respondents questioned whether developing such a document is possible or even desirable. Partly because of the difficulties to define what a fragile state is (and to draw up a list of fragile states), and partly because each fragile state requires a specific policy. Universal documents would be too general for the field level. Others however, considered

such a document to be useful for the headquarters level, where specific knowledge on fragile states may not always be available.

103.   Notwithstanding the lack of an overall policy paper, the documents written and published over the last five years demonstrate a general approach on fragile states incrementally taking shape with increased involvement of other actors in the discussions. The memorandum *Reconstruction after Violent Conflict* (2005), is the latest and most outspoken in terms of requirements and objectives, be it that it focuses on fragile states in a post-conflict setting. What is more worthy of note, however, is the fact that this document was written in a joined-up approach by the MFA (including Development Cooperation), the MoD, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The document is therefore important in terms of setting the tone for more policy coherence and joined-up approaches.

The need for more guidance in order to make trade offs

104.   As regards Sudan, it was noted that although several guidance documents exist – the general reconstruction note, the integrated reconstruction strategy on Sudan and the annual plan of the Embassy in Khartoum – these documents were considered too general to provide concrete directions at the field level. In particular the prioritisation of objectives proves to be a challenge. This is partly a coordination and management issue, but it also indicates that an operational guidance document on Sudan is still perceived to be lacking. In an environment where there is a risk of having too many priorities, there is a need to make trade-offs and to find a balance between ad-hoc and structural approaches. Furthermore, it was noted that there was a need to balance priorities as regards Sudan with the capacity to implement at the field level. On the one hand, one could question whether these problems can be solved with a policy note. The political realities of Sudan change continuously and affect the ambitions of the Netherlands. This requires a certain degree of flexibility. On the other hand, the risk of an approach that lacks strategic clarity is that it may become too ad hoc. There is a need for clear political objectives that provide guidance to decisions. In addition, such clarity on objectives and ambitions may lead to a better match with the capacity to implement. Country assessments and analyses could provide guidance on setting objectives and ambitions. If done in a joined-up manner, they can also provide an important input for an integrated approach or strategy. If a fully integrated strategy is not possible, such analyses can at least provide clarity as regards where the added value of the various departments can be expected, i.e. is needed.

4.2 Instruments and implementation arrangements

105.   One of the challenges for donors engaging in fragile states is that such countries require specific approaches and policy instruments. A first observation is that they should not be treated as traditional development cooperation countries. A second observation is that where development actors do engage, they should adapt their instruments and implementation arrangements in such a way that they are more flexible and allow for working in complex and difficult political settings. A third observation is that it will be necessary to develop instruments and implementation arrangements that allow for joined-up approaches. For this purpose, the Netherlands has developed specific instruments and arrangements. Yet, it was noted that in terms of development cooperation there still is a strong focus on instruments related to working with structural, bilateral development partners. Below, developments in terms of instruments and implementation arrangements used will be assessed from the perspective of what is required for dealing with fragile states.

Financial Instruments

106.   The Stability Fund is an important, first step towards making a WoG approach possible. However, there are limitations to this Fund in terms of contributing actors and the size of the Fund. For instance, the MoD is involved in the decision-making process of the Fund, but is not contributing financial resources. They also draw on the resources of the Fund. It would be recommendable to extend the Fund in terms of increasing the number of contributing ministries (pooled funds). The advantage of such an approach would be that it would strengthen a joined-up approach as regards spending the money – i.e., in support of an integrated fragile states strategy – compared to having separate funds per ministry. In view of the scale of the fragile states issue, it would furthermore be recommendable to increase the size of the Fund. This, however, would involve a decision at the highest political level.

107.   A second observation concerns the use of an instrument like the MDTF in reconstruction processes after violent conflict. One of the criticisms as regards the MDTF in Sudan was that it can not meet the requirement for rapid disbursement of funds for early reconstruction and peace dividend. This is mainly due to the fact that the MDTF is set up as a traditional development fund, involving time-consuming processes as joint needs assessments, co-financing mechanisms and tender procedures. It would be recommendable to create funds that do allow for quick impact projects. This lesson seems to have been learned for Darfur, where a two-track response is being prepared, combining quick impact projects with structural development projects.

108. Related to this, there is a need to create a separate budget category for early recovery activities, as these seem to fall into the gap between humanitarian assistance budget and the structural development assistance budget. It was noted by respondents that the clear division between these two budget lines does not reflect the reality at field level, where this transition is more gradual.

109.   Another reality at field level, that respondents felt should be taken into account at headquarters level, is the fact that the implementation structures at the field level are not integrated. The UN agencies for instance, are mostly dealing with one specific issue. In order to create an integrated approach, there needs to be a strong Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator present at field level.

110.   In terms of financial instruments, it is noted that these are largely MFA managed. Even though this does establish a centrally led approach, a downside is that it may limit the involvement of other ministries: they remain executors and subcontractors. In order to create more ownership and involvement it would therefore be recommendable to consider new funding arrangements and instruments aimed at involving other ministries as more equal partners. For instance, as regards the corporate sector it was noted that all actors consider its involvement an important aspect in reconstruction activities. It would be advisable to investigate ways to promote involvement of the corporate sector in the most effective way. Relevant financial arrangements and instruments should be managed by the ministry with the best contacts and the most functional expertise for corporate sector involvement. In case this is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, its expertise should be strengthened where necessary. Currently, its involvement is rather limited. If the Ministry of Economic Affairs is to become more involved in dealing with fragile states, the Concordat should be reviewed and brought up to date with the challenges of engaging in fragile states.

111.   The concept of promoting more direct involvement and leadership of the basis functional expertise can be seen as an important incentive for strengthening joined up approaches. Ideally, such functional expertise should result in a specific mandate, as well as supporting instruments to achieve goals that are set. However, this recommendation comes with two notes of caution. First, creating more arrangements and involving more actors requires more coordination. Hence, there should be a clear central coordinating body. Second, broadening the scope of actors involved and the range of arrangements and instruments requires a (country) strategy that provides clear objectives for (operational) guidance.

Other Instruments

112.   Here, the focus is on deployment and secondment of staff, the establishment of an SSR-Team and Pool, and the use of analytical tools.

113.   Notwithstanding the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2006 budget of the MFA, to engage the ministries of Justice and Interior more actively in the promotion of stability in post-conflict states, these ministries have not been involved in the case of Sudan. Given the fact that the Netherlands is involved in civil police missions in Sudan, it would be recommendable to reassess their involvement.

114.   As regards the criteria for deployment of staff, it was noted that the criteria for military staff differ from those for civilian staff. This could become a challenge for future integrated deployment. It would be recommendable to review and harmonise these criteria.

115.   With regard to secondment of staff, innovative steps have been taken at headquarters level with the creation of an OSAD and MILAD position. By adding their specific expertise to respectively the MoD and the MFA, these advisors can help bridge the (cultural) gap between their institutions. However, it appears that the headquarters level is moving ahead of the field level in terms of promoting a joined-up approach. For instance, it was noted that Defence Attachés are not only a useful, but even a necessary addition to embassy staff in fragile states. Adding Defence Attachés and representatives from other ministries to the embassy staff, however, should not result in problems in terms of reporting and accountability. Management and accountability would have to be brought in line with such new approaches. In any case, it would be recommendable to involve embassies in the decision-making procedures for such secondments.

116.   The Dutch decision to establish an SSR-Team and Pool is laudable. It increases the possibilities of the Netherlands to engage in a critical aspect of fragile states, i.e. the security system. The focus of the Team and Pool is mainly defence oriented, and the MFA and MoD are still discussing what aspects of the SSR concept they would like to add. In the meantime, the Netherlands also has ambitions to engage in police and rule of law missions. Given the various ambitions and missions, it would be recommendable to see how they all relate to each other. In particular a clear concept covering the wider range from military to rule of law and civilian police, including issues of democratic oversight, in line with e.g. the OECD-DAC guidelines, should be adopted. In terms of the SSR-Team, and the SSR Pool, it would be advisable to see how the various steering groups dealing with missions relate to the SSR-Team. Such coordination has not yet been established. In practice, this results, for instance,

in police missions with civilian police next to deployment of Dutch military police, both being coordinated in a different way. It is not clear how the aimed-for demand-driven approach is being operationalised.

117.   As regards the Dutch participation in IMAT it was noted that this had not been coordinated with the SSR-team. This was due to the timing of participation and establishment of the SSR-Team. However, it would be advisable to coordinate this activity with the SSR-Team now that it has been established. In terms of deploying staff to embassies, it would also be recommendable to relate the deployment of staff to the level of Dutch policy ambition. In terms of deploying staff to embassies, it would also be recommendable to involve the SSR-Team in selecting candidates, e.g. in close cooperation with embassies. Such cooperation would help in making certain that candidates live up to the requirements from the perspective of Dutch policy objectives related to SSR.

118.   Analytical tools that would enable joint assessments are available, but are not being used efficiently. Here, there would also be opportunities to establish closer collaboration between the MFA, the MoD and the Ministry of Interior, e.g. by joining forces and sharing information from the intelligence services during the assessment and analysis phase. Such information sharing is not yet taking place, but would be helpful for defining objectives, strategies and identifying entry points for country strategies. It would also be recommendable to consider information sharing with other international actors (bilateral, UN, NGOs, as well as research institutes) active in terms of assessments, analysis, policy development and implementation in a specific country. In order to accomplish such levels of cooperation, it would be necessary to have more clarity on overall Dutch policy guidelines on objectives regarding fragile states, and in particular what fragile states to focus on from the perspective of Dutch interests.

4.3 Organisation, management and coordination

119.   Management and coordination require clear priorities and objectives. For an integrated approach to take shape, it is therefore important to have a clear understanding of why various actors should take part. It was noted that such clarity is not always available. In practice, the key to solving this problem would be to have the political leadership provide guidance. In particular, the reasons for involvement from the perspective of security interests are not always clearly defined. It was noted that the lack of strategy and strategic options often is related to the need to act swiftly. The consequence of such ad hoc approaches is a focus on the short-term: dealing with what comes up next. The longer-term seems to become

of second importance, whereas this is where the real objectives are to be found. The lack of a more clear-cut strategy is also felt here.

120.   This focus on the short-term also has consequences for the way in which the WoG approach is organised, managed and coordinated. In the case of Sudan, the Embassy noted that the focus seems to shift quite swiftly. It was also noted that the Embassy is not always directly involved in these decisions, while it has the best contacts at field level.

121.   At a more strategic level, it would be advisable to discuss strategies and objectives e.g. in the REIA and the CORIA. These coordination councils are now not used for Dutch engagement in fragile states. However, it could be relevant to do so, as it would provide the Prime-Minister and the MFA with ample opportunities to provide leadership and guidance. However, there are also limitations to such leadership. First and foremost, there is the Dutch political system that is characterised by coalition governments and the typical political give-and-take customary to this system. In this context, it is not as easy to achieve strategic decisions as compared to countries where one political party can provide the Prime-Minister and all Cabinet Ministers. The maximum achievable outcome in the Netherlands seems to be a joined-up approach in which all ministries develop their own policies, but ideally in a well-coordinated way.

122.   In the case of the Netherlands, much has been done to improve this coordination. What has been achieved can to a large extent be attributed to the change in strategy opted for by the Minister for Development Cooperation who displayed an open minded and unprejudiced approach to cooperation. Other ministers reacted positively to this approach. This indicates the importance of (political) leadership. However, structures are a necessary element as well. It is therefore noteworthy and important that since the late 1990s, a number of initiatives have been taken to establish new structures and steering groups.

123.   However, notwithstanding these new coordination structures, one could still question how effective they really are in terms of achieving a joined-up approach. On the one hand, it was noted that there may be too many structures. On the other hand it was noted that some overlap may not be so bad at this stage where the search for a joined-up approach is still ongoing. In spite of that, the challenge is to avoid a situation in which potentially important coordination mechanisms become yet another layer where departmental politics take the upper hand. In this regard, it was commented that it is not always clear what the mandates of participants from the different Ministries are in terms of being able to take decisions. Another challenge is that relevant actors sometimes are not involved in key coordination mechanisms

where decisions are taken. An example is the TFS not being part of the deliberations in the SMO. Finally, it was commented that there should be a clearer division of tasks, with clearer guidance structures. It seems as though much has been achieved, but a balance still has to be found.

MFA, Task Force and Embassy

124.　It is laudable that the Netherlands has introduced the TFS in order to coordinate the Dutch response on Sudan. The TFS contributes to policy coherence at the level of the MFA, as well as to a WoG approach as regards Sudan. The fact that the TFS is placed outside the bureaucratic structures of the MFA makes that it has direct communication lines with the political leadership, that it is output oriented, and that it can react swiftly to new developments. It was commented however, that the fact that the staff of the TFS is physically placed outside their own departments creates a risk of a lack of institutional memory once the TFS is discontinued. The fact that the staff of the task force on Afghanistan, which is the most recent task force, remains within their own departments indicates that the MFA is still searching for a 'perfect solution'.

125.　A comment made as regards the TFS, is that there is no clear division of tasks and responsibilities with the Embassy. Given its overall coordinating role, the TFS is involved in and consulted on all activities. Notwithstanding this overall role of the TFS and their good working relationship, the field office has the impression that Dutch involvement in Sudan would profit from involving the Embassy more, or from delegating more activities and decisions to the Embassy. The current structure seems to bear the risk of creating overlap whereas there could be more complementarity in terms of responsibilities and activities (e.g. the TFS could typically focus on coordination with MoD on the deployment of armed forces, Dutch input in EU and UN meetings). In particular, it was felt that the dynamic environment on the ground is better monitored, understood and responded to at the field level than from the headquarters level.

126.　The level of tasks and responsibilities at the Embassy level was mentioned as a problem given the limited staff capacity. The fact that other embassies work with up to four times the staff of the Netherlands Embassy raises the question as to whether there is a risk to create a mismatch between ambitions on the one hand, and capacity to implement on the other. In this regard, it was suggested to investigate the concept of a "surge capacity", consisting of experts who can be deployed to embassies whenever there is a need to do so. In line with the "political advisor pool" the MFA has started to create, it would be advisable to establish a pool of "(post-)conflict" or "fragile state" experts and advisors. Such advisors

would be deployed on a temporary basis, and should be relieved by regular embassy staff. However, here too, it would be advisable to increase knowledge on the problems and the complexity of fragile states. One of the main obstacles for finding more qualified staff for hard-ship postings, such as fragile states, is that they – for a number of reasons – are less interesting and rewarding than postings such as New York or Brussels. More should be done to reward the quick learning curve of working in fragile states, as well as the willingness to opt for such postings.

127.   Another issue related to the headquarters and field level concerns the fact that the field level lags behind in terms of establishing an integrated approach. Hence, in terms of coordination, monitoring and evaluation much could be gained from expanding the staff of the Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum. It would, for instance, make sense to add a specialist for the security sector to the Netherlands Embassy (e.g. a Defence Attaché) in order to improve coordination, monitoring and evaluation, as well as to strengthen the involvement of the MoD. The same could apply to having the ministry of Economic Affairs more involved at the Embassy level, e.g. through (temporary) secondments.

Reporting structures

128.   What also could be improved is the reporting structure and the overall communication system. The fact that the Embassy staff does not reflect the level of integrated approach as found at the headquarters level has consequences for the reporting structure and the overall communication system. In principle, reporting takes place on the basis of normal accountability structures, i.e. MFA-MFA and MoD-MoD. Reporting, therefore, is not necessarily integrated or coordinated. Rather, coordination at field level is often the result of personal interests and relationships. Deployment of Defence Attachés or staff from other Ministries does not necessarily improve this situation. Improvement of integrated reporting structures is therefore another field of attention for the future.

Lessons learned and institutional memory

129.   There is not yet a mechanism for applying lessons learned. However, it is clear that the sequence of developments (Balkans, Sudan, Afghanistan) is providing ample input for lessons learned that are relatively quickly applied. The fact that structures are created and institutionalised also helps in creating institutional memory. The relatively fast turnover of staff within the MFA remains a problem.

130.   Sharing lessons with other Ministries that are part of a joined-up approach is also important. This applies in particular to those Ministries that are new to working in developing

countries and that have a strong output orientation. Valuable lessons in development cooperation that have been learned over the years should be shared with staff from such Ministries in order to make clear why short term approaches may not be the solution to problems, and why longer-term and process oriented approaches may be necessary. This will also provide ways to address the cultural differences between the various Ministries.

4.4 Perception by partner country and major donors [30]

131.   Due to the Arab Summit, the visit to Sudan provided the consultants with little opportunities to interview other donors and partner country representatives. However, the interviews indicated that the Netherlands is perceived as a very active donor with a holistic approach towards Sudan. However, respondents at field level perceive the Embassy as limited in its flexibility to quickly respond to needs and developments, due to reporting and accountability structures.

4.5 Critical factors for success and key challenges

132.   There is general agreement amongst the various actors involved that there is a need to broaden the scope of activities, and to have a more integrated approach with more Ministries involved. Developments to achieve such an integrated approach have moved fast over the last years, and much has been accomplished. However, it is also clear that there are still some problems. The most important challenges and lessons for success are summarised below.

- It is important to have clarity on the objectives for getting involved in a fragile state. This does not necessarily mean that one needs a general fragile states policy. However, it does mean that answers to the questions of why to get involved and for what purpose should be very clear for all Ministries involved, i.e. provide clear guidance and objectives. In the absence of such guidance, policies run the risk of becoming ad hoc, too short term oriented and therefore less effective for long-term stability.
- A specific lesson for joined up approaches is that they should be integrated in nature from the start. This could involve joint assessments and joint fact-finding missions, joint planning, joint implementation, and (where possible) joint evaluations. This requires not only fine-tuning of assessment methodologies, the use and sharing of existing (intelligence) information, et cetera. A major remaining challenge, however, is finding a

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[30] Unfortunately, the consultants were not able to interview representatives from the partner country government.

common language to address the problems of fragile states. A number of major remaining challenges, however, relate to coordination and leadership, the level of detail aimed for, as well as to finding a common language to address the problems of fragile states.

- In order to create an integrated joined-up approach, communication between the different actors involved should evolve from information sharing to a constructive dialogue on planning and execution of activities.

- In order to enhance and deepen cooperation and coordination, all Ministries involved should be able to share in the successes.

- The fine-tuning of the mandates and obligations of the various ministries involved remains a challenge in the absence of an overall fragile states strategy.

- At the country level, specific country strategies need to be further developed.

- The availability of flexible funding is a key success factor.

- Broadening of the ODA criteria should be considered in order to allow funding of activities on the nexus of security and development, therewith facilitating joined-up approaches more easily.

- Although the general feeling is that barriers of mistrust and wrong impressions are slowly but surely disappearing between different ministries, the problem of different cultures remains. Differences in culture manifest themselves e.g. in terms of planning mechanisms, level of detail, specific points of attention (e.g. risk analysis), and different opinions in relation to management and responsibilities. Addressing these issues of different cultures should be taken, and addressed, more seriously.

- New structures for coordination and consultation are important if a joined-up approach is to become effective. However, too much overlap may not be helpful. Another challenge is the risk that without clear stakes for all actors, new structures for coordination may become the next line of defence for protecting departmental and Ministerial interests. In the case of the Netherlands it was commented that things could become leaner and meaner in the future.

- The headquarters level moves more swiftly than the field level when it comes to developing joined-up approaches. A challenge, therefore, is to transplant joined-up approaches at the headquarters level to the field. The objective is not to simply duplicate the headquarters level, but to make certain that expertise and capacity is matched at the level where policies have to be implemented.

- At the field level, it remains a challenge to find a balance between strategic ambitions and policy objectives on the one hand, and capacity to implement on the other. It should be considered seriously to set up a surge capacity in terms of (post-)conflict advisors or

fragile state advisors that can be deployed on the short term to reinforce Embassy capacity in hard times.

- The potential information, expertise and role of field offices should be taken more seriously. As local representation they can, and should, play a critical role in strategy development and planning. Tasks should be devolved to the field office where possible, with the headquarters level focusing on aspects of policy and coordination. This may require upgrading of Embassy staff in terms of numbers as well as quality and expertise. It may also require a different approach toward selecting and rewarding staff that is posted in fragile states.

- When dealing with fragile states, it is important to engage with all countries that play a role in these countries, even if they are not part of the donor community. In the case of Sudan, it is remarkable that China as a key player in economic (and therefore political) terms, is not involved in donor debates.

Annex A. Interviews

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Joost Andriessen	Head Humanitarian Aid Division, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV/HH)
Ms. Louise Anten	Head of Peacebuilding and Good Governance Division, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV/VG)
Colonel Antoine Beukering	Military Advisor to the MFA
Mr. Hans Docter	Deputy Coordinator, Task Force Sudan
Mr. Pieter de Gooijer	Deputy Director-General Political Affairs
Ms. Naroesha Jagessar	Policy Advisor (trainee), Task Force Sudan
Ms. Hester Jonkman	Policy Officer, Conflict Prevention, Peace Operations and Military and Civil Cooperation Division, Security Policy Department (DVB/CV)
Mr. Martin Koper	Policy Unit, Sub Saharan Africa Department (DAF/BE)
Mr. Pim Kraan	Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid Division, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV/HH)
Ms. Christa Meindersma	Policy Advisor, Task Force Sudan
Mr. Rob de Vos	Deputy Director-General International Cooperation
Mr. Jelte van Wieren	Deputy Head of Peacebuilding and Good Governance Division, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV/VG)
Ms. Astrid Zonneveld	Policy Advisor, Conflict Prevention, Peace Operations and Military and Civil Cooperation Division, Security Policy Department (DVB/CV)

Netherlands Ministry of Defence

Ms. Jet van der Gaag-Halbertsma	Advisor Development Cooperation, Defence Staff, International Military Cooperation
Mr. Hans Mulder	Brigadier General of the Royal Dutch Army
Mr. Boudewijn Revis	Senior Policy Advisor, General Affairs Directorate
Mr. Jan-Geert Siccama	Deputy Head General Affairs Directorate

Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs

Ms. Tanita Nieuwenhuizen	Policy Advisor, Director General for Foreign Economic Relations, International Business Department

International Business and Cooperation (EVD)

Ms. Laura Ooms	Policy Advisor Sudan

Interviews Field Level

Mr. Gösta Grund	Police Chief of Staff, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
Ms. Ulrika Josefsson	First Secretary, Head of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Affairs, Swedish Embassy Office Khartoum
Mr. Erik Kastlander	Donor Liaison Officer, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
Ms. Corina van der Laan	Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum
Mr. Jonathan Lingham	DFID Country Representative & Head of Development Section, British Embassy Khartoum
Mr. Gemmo Lodesani	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator North Sudan, UN OCHA
Mr. Ivor Morgan	Country Director, Medair Sudan
Mr. Jens Odlander	Minister and Head of Office, Swedish Embassy Office Khartoum
Ms. Armelle Prade	Policy Officer Strategic Partnership Programme, UNDP Sudan
Mr. Jan Pronk	Special Representative of the Secretary General, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
Mr. Ruurd van Rooijen	Captain Royal Netherlands Navy, deployed to the International Military Advisory Team Sudan, Deputy Head of Mission/ Chief of Staff
Ms. Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen	First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy Khartoum
Dr. Jerzy Skuratowicz	Country Director, UNDP Sudan
Mr. Sjoerd Smit	Second Secretary Peace Building, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum
Mr. Lars Tummers	Head of Political Section, Royal Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum
Ms. Karen Wermester	UN-World Bank liaison, UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS

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