Cracks in the once very enthustiac integration supporter
At first glance, there is nothing remarkable about support for the European Union in Italy. Public opinion consistently displays level of support that are more or less in line with the average figures elsewhere in the EU and elite support for European integration, while fraying, remains robust.
However, cracks in the once very enthusiastic supporter of integration began to appear even before the economic crisis began to sting. The European project has lost its lustre and while few can imagine an Italian government openly hostile to the EU, support for integration is no longer a political resource that political leaders can rely upon; they may now find it to be a liability. Moreover, as a recent Pew Research Center survey on Euroscepticism confirmed, there is a growing polarization in Italian public opinion and amongst political elites over perceptions of the EU.
European integration as an unanimous strengthening capacity for Italy is under pressure
There has never been a problem of reconciling notions of national sovereignty and European integration in Italy. There has been a broad and deep consensus amongst political elites since at least the 1960s that European integration was the key to the country’s modernization. The EU was not a problem but the means with which to strengthen the capacity of the Italian state to address policy challenges, from regional development to economic competitiveness.
What has changed and what is reflected in the declining support for the EU, is that this consensus around the link between modernization and integration has begun to erode. On the left of the political spectrum, integration promotes a version of modernization that is seen as threatening the welfare state and promotes economic inequality. On the right, the modernization embodied in the European project is seen as too socially liberal and cosmopolitan, undermining social and cultural solidarity.
The narrative that European integration would be the bulwark against global economic and social pressures is increasingly challenged by one that presents the EU as their handmaiden. This feeds the sense that it is not Italy that has begun to abandon the EU but that the EU has abandoned not only Italy (especially in the case of migration) but also the ideals of solidarity and unity that were at the heart of the project.
From an anti-politics response to public disputes with the EU
The political response and consequences of this changing landscape of support for the EU have been two-fold. On the one hand, the Five Star Movement has emerged as the largest opposition party on the back of an anti-politics rhetoric that has also targeted the EU and, particularly, the single currency. While its support is due partly to Italy’s laggard economic performance in the last decade and there are limits to how much political mileage they can get out of anti-EU positions, it would be a mistake to dismiss them as a flash in the pan.
On the other hand, mainstream political parties have begun to be more forceful in their critique of EU institutions and policies. They do not object to a fiscal union that would have the capacity to transfer resources to deal with asymmetric shocks. However, there is no consensus on having a political or even fiscal union that would subvert the capacity of national governments to make policy choices.
The real fear is that a fiscal and political union would lead to policy preferences and choices at the European level that would have little support in Italian public opinion. This would help explain the current government’s actions, which have ranged from proud association with Italy’s role in pushing for ever-closer union and its very public disputes with what it sees as a politicised Commission and with the German government.
Italy’s attempts for an influential European strategy
The current Italian government has tried hard to have Italy assume a more influential role in European decision-making than it has had in the last two decades. Its efforts have been hampered by three factors.
First, Italy’s poor economic performance, essentially since its entry into the single currency, and its high level of public debt are a severe constraint on its capacity to shape the economic policy agenda. While it can claim victory for being granted some greater flexibility in fiscal policy, it still remains under close scrutiny by international financial markets and vulnerable to periods of instability that could result from events such as Brexit or Grexit.
Second, the Renzi government claimed proudly in 2014 that it had won a sweeping electoral mandate in the European Parliament elections to lead a change in policy direction at the European level. Any wind that may have been in the government’s sail has died down as declining support for his party in domestic politics along with persistent anti-EU sentiment in a significant part of public opinion have made his claim to have strong domestic backing ring a little hollow in Brussels and national capitals.
Third, Italy’s claim to be at the centre of Europe continues to contrast with what could be called the “least of the great powers” syndrome. There is the perception that it does not punch its own weight, in part because of its high debts levels and domestic politics but also because it has never clearly defined its strategic position in Europe and how it was to achieve it.
Italy is faced with some difficult choices. Does it continue to push for an ever-closer union even if this leads to policy choices and reforms that are increasingly a odds with public opinion? Can it assume a central place in the EU’s future construction if it does not share the policies that come with it? The choices will not be easy and they are certain to shape domestic politics and Italy’s European policy in the next few years.
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Vincent Della Sala is professor of political science in the Department of Sociology and Social Research at the University of Trento and adjunct professor of SAIS Europe in Bologna. He currently holds a Jean Monnet Chair for Narratives for a New Europe.