As was the case in northern Niger, the migratory route passing through northern Mali and Libya is characterised by an increase in irregularity. For northern Mali, this is so because bus companies do not travel further than the desert town of Gao. From here to the Algerian border, migrants rely on human smugglers to transport them across inhospitable terrain. Libya does not belong to ECOWAS and does not have any bilateral agreements with sub-Saharan African countries on visa-free travel. In practice, this means that the majority of migrants transiting through, or residing in, Libya do so in an irregular fashion and their presence is considered illegal. They therefore rely on human smuggling networks to cross the country on their way to the coast and – in some cases – to set off on boat journeys to Europe. Migrants are thereby pushed into a shadow economy, i.e. the set of economic activities and services that occur outside of the state regulated framework.‍[107]

The manifestation of irregular migration differs from the northern Nigerien case, however, due to the fact that northern Mali and Libya are engaged in violent internal turmoil. In principle, the presence of a diverse array of irregular armed forces should not inhibit the human smuggling industry.‍[108] Economic markets, both formal and informal, often co-exist with armed, violent conflict and local/transnational economies precede and continue to function despite the rise of internal armed violence.‍[109] Indeed, the cases of northern Mali and Libya show that irregular migration continues unhindered despite the problematic internal security situation. The availability of exploitable commodities, such as drugs, oil, arms or humans, often forms a primary revenue source for state-affiliated and irregular armed forces alike.‍[110] This raises the question as to what extent non-state armed groups present in the region are involved in the facilitation of irregular migration and human smuggling practices and whether this contributes to the prolongation of internal conflict.

Box 4
The conflict in Mali
The political and security crisis of 2012 — composed by a swift and victorious rebellion in the north that sparked a military coup in the south — was the result. Initially, a renewed expression of Tuareg discontent towards the Malian state, the armed Islamist groups and other criminal networks that had been empowered by the profits made in the illicit trade hijacked the rebellion. The government’s inability to counter this uprising sparked popular and military unrest, leading to the fall of the government in March of that same year.‍[111] In January 2013, fears that the armed Islamist threat would spread to the capital resulted in an international intervention.‍[112] The signature of a 2013 interim peace agreement in Ouagadougou and the 2015 peace agreement in Algiers brought back some semblance of political order in northern cities such as Gao and Kidal. At the same time, a fragmented array of armed groups continues to control the region. A hybrid form of governance has emerged, with local governments, security forces and other state institutions starting to function again, albeit in a formal fashion and in urban areas only. Meanwhile, armed groups continue to fight each other and the state over territory and the spoils of peace.‍[113] Living off drug and cigarette trafficking, as well as other illicit smuggling revenues, these important stakeholders in the peace agreement have little to no interest in seeing the central state’s presence in the north enforced. ‍[114]

Source: Molenaar, F. and Van Damme, T. 2017. Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

Box 5
The conflict in Libya

In 2011, a popular uprising resulted in the fall of Qadhafi. In the immediate post-revolution period, under the auspices of Libya’s National Transitional Council, the signs that Libya would transition towards freedom and democracy were promising: the country witnessed broad political participation – as exemplified by the elections of 2012 –, an active civil society (something that had not existed in four decades of Qadhafi rule) and a general sense of optimism about Libya’s future. The revolution’s aftermath made painfully clear, however, that authority on the ground lay in the hands of the armed brigades and militias that had fought Qadhafi. These groups did not plan to lay down their arms, nor to adhere to the new governing elite and a political road map in which they were given no stake.‍[115]

In the years that followed, an intense zero-sum struggle over power and resources emerged. Political infighting and the power of the gun eventually resulted in a split between two competing governments in the country’s east and west. Full-on war broke out between these two rival camps in 2014. As Libya plunged into political chaos, its territory fragmented into a patchwork of local zones of influence, with neither of the rival sides being able to cement its hold over the entire region. As the conflict wore on, both camps also witnessed increasing internal tensions and differentiation. The struggle is no longer between two broad military-political camps, but between dozens of rival political interests that are often tied to specific regions, towns and (parts of) cities and that form manifold and fluid alliances based on ideological, tribal and social connections.‍[116]

Observers argue that in today’s Libya, and despite the 2015 formation of the Interim Government of National Accord (GNA), there are only few truly national actors. At the same time, the criminal economy is widespread, making it the only factor ‘binding Libya together’.‍[117] The absence of state control, coupled with Libya’s geography that includes vast terrains and permeable border regions, creates ideal surroundings for criminal networks to flourish and to employ all kinds of criminal activities. Throughout the post-Qadhafi transition, Libya developed into North Africa’s primary arms market and other (interconnected) illicit markets have been developing rapidly ever since – one of which is human smuggling.

Source: El Kamouni-Janssen, F. 2017. 'Only God can stop the smugglers.' Understanding human smuggling networks in Libya, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

Irregular migration and the shadow economy

As was the case in northern Niger, human smuggling in northern Mali and Libya forms part of a broader ‘shadow economy’ run by influential businessmen that operate illicit trade networks. In northern Mali, so-called passeurs run the human smuggling industry. These are generally well-connected local businessmen that put migrants in touch with relevant facilitators, such as public officials, transport companies, drivers, people that can issue them with fake documentation, etc.‍[118] Along Libya’s Western route, human smuggling is similarly organised by individual entrepreneurs, some with a historical stake in smuggling, with only limited hierarchical coordination. These muharrib, normally a Libyan national with an extensive local and foreign network, facilitate the journey and transport of migrants. They operate in collaboration with non-Libyan nationals, usually former migrants themselves.‍[119]

As a consequence of the often opportunistic and fluid social and political ties between various smugglers, human smuggling activities supersede conflict lines and, in the case of Libya, even form (part of) the glue connecting the interests of opposing actors. The country is fractured into two political military blocs – one headed by the internationally recognised government led by prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj and the other consisting of general Khalifa Haftar and his armed forces – that form largely nominal alliances with fluid members. Factions from both sides of these blocs are directly and indirectly involved in the human smuggling trade. The market is a free-for-all and smuggling networks supersede Libya’s internal divisions. In a similar vein, human smuggling networks traverse a complex terrain in northern Mali, where they have to reckon with a fragmented landscape of armed groups (see Figure 6 below for an overview).‍[120]

Figure 6
The contested route through Mali
The contested route through Mali

Source: Molenaar, F. and Van Damme, T. 2017. Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

The scope of smuggling activities and operations differs in the various networks. One structural feature that is, however, visible in Libya’s north in particular is that networks here tend to be more hierarchically organised by a relatively smaller number of “kingpins”. These kingpins do not handle the migrants themselves, but ‘finance operations, ensure access to departure sites, bribe authorities on a grand scale, manage the military and political connections necessary to execute their activities and generally create or maintain an environment conducive to carrying out their operations’.‍[121] The smuggling kingpins are often also involved in other types of illicit activity, such as the trade in drugs and weapons.‍[122] They allegedly operate with impunity, even though the authorities are usually well aware of their operations. Indeed, one Libyan smuggler described them as actors that ‘impose themselves on the state with their power and control over vital areas. The authorities have [nothing] on them’.‍[123]

While remnants of state institutions still exist, they function in a context of a defunct national government where salaries have often not been paid for over a year.‍[124] Law enforcement and security provision have taken on a different logic than might be expected of them, functioning as radars in patron-client networks. As one respondent on the ground puts it succinctly, ‘rule of law depends on who you know’.‍[125] It should therefore come as little surprise that hundreds of petty smugglers are held captive, but no smuggling kingpins have been arrested and their smuggling networks remain untouched. In a similar vein, sources suggest that Coast Guard patrols target the smaller smugglers launching boats along the coastline, but that these same patrols are off duty when smuggler kingpins launch their boats from the main ports.‍[126]

It should be noted that the line between human smuggling, slavery and human trafficking has become increasingly blurred in this fragmented terrain.‍[127] This is most clearly evident in Libya, where migrants may enter of their own volition, but where they subsequently run the high risk of becoming commodities to be captured, sold and exploited at will. A recent IOM study among migrants that had arrived in Italy, for example, revealed that ‘nearly three-quarters (71 percent) of migrants taking the Central Mediterranean routes connecting North Africa to Europe have experienced exploitation and practices which may amount to human trafficking’.‍[128]

These exploitative practices are facilitated by the end of Libya’s ‘open door policy’ to migration in 2007. In response to an economic recession and increased EU pressure to stem migration to Europe, Libya reimposed visas on both Arabs and Africans in 2007, effectively ‘turning an unknown number of immigrants into irregulars overnight’.‍[129] Nevertheless, Qadhafi allowed Libya’s southern borders to remain porous as a means to meet domestic labour needs and solidify centre-periphery relations. The main thing that changed was the migrants’ position, which deteriorated with their sudden criminalisation as they ran the increased risk of indiscriminately being thrown into one of the state-led detention facilities harnessed to garner international legitimacy.‍[130]

Aggravated by the fragmented security situation, some smuggling networks exploit the criminalisation of migration to keep migrants inside Libya as long as they can to profit from them, completely disregarding the humane treatment of migrants. Migrants travelling in, or through, Libya may ‘spend months or even years in a condition of complete isolation and at the mercy of smugglers and other exploiters’.‍[131] Migrants that reside in Libya are similarly rounded up and placed in unofficial detainment camps or warehouses (Muzra), where they are ransomed for money or earn a profit through other means such as sexual exploitation and forced labour.‍[132] The situation in Mali shows some indications of moving in a similar direction, with smugglers reportedly also detaining migrants for ransom at the border with Algeria.‍[133]

Recognition of the blurring between human smuggling and human trafficking is also relevant to understand the boat journey from Libya to Italy. Reporting on the ground suggests that a substantial share of migrants do not willingly chose to cross the Mediterranean, but are forced on boats by local bandits, soldiers or traffickers/smugglers.‍[134] Many West African migrants in particular pass through a trafficking ‘system’ that ends in them being loaded onto a boat without their consent and without them having any idea of where they are going. The same goes for Nigerian trafficking victims that are caught in a transnational trafficking web.‍[135] This once again points to the need to distinguish between different types of migratory streams, with not all migrants choosing to travel to Europe on their own account. In addition, the criminalisation of migrants in Libya and the volatile security situation emerge as important root causes of migration.

Figure 7
The contested route through Libya
The contested route through Libya

Source: El Kamouni-Janssen, F. 2017. 'Only God can stop the smugglers.' Understanding human smuggling networks in Libya, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

Irregular migration and the war economy

No indications exist that the irregular armed forces present in northern Mail and Libya control the human smuggling industry in its entirety. Indeed, no armed group has complete territorial control over the entire migratory route (see Boxes 6 and 7 below for an overview of the different spheres of influence in northern Mali and Libya that smuggling network traverse). Rather, human smuggling activities occur within a larger shadow economy comprising (local) business elites, criminal interests and armed actors that have become de facto authorities. The human smuggling economy thereby functions as a node in larger relationships between smuggling, authority and armed forces in northern Mali and Libya.

In the case of Mali, the number of migrants passing through the northern region is currently not high enough to make migrant smuggling an attractive economic opportunity for irregular armed forces to become actively engaged in the smuggling trade itself, especially when compared with drug and arms smuggling.‍[136] Ties between human smugglers and armed groups are generally of a more indirect nature, with influential local businessmen involved in human smuggling typically also occupying leadership positions within armed groups. One well-known transport company owner and passeur operating in Gao – who shall remain unnamed here – also holds a leadership position in GATIA, for example.‍[137] Armed groups earn money from the smuggling trade more indirectly by instituting roadblocks where migrants have to pay a toll and/or by offering migrant convoys against attacks from other armed groups.‍[138] The armed groups have thereby instituted an effective protection racket in the region.

Figure 8
The contested route’s political dynamics - Mali
The contested route’s political dynamics - Mali

Source: Molenaar, F. and Van Damme, T. 2017. Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

Box 6
Libyan spheres of influence

The trans-Saharan human smuggling route traverses various spheres of influence within Libya. These can roughly be divided between: 1) the border with Niger and the southwestern Fezzan; 2) Sebha; 3) Ghat and Gadames; and 4) Tripoli and the northwestern coastline. In addition, the armed groups controlling these areas can roughly be divided between Haftar-allied groups and GNA-allied groups.

The border with Niger and the southwestern Fezzan: Since 2011, when Tebu leader Barka Wardougou chased pro-Qadhafi forces out of the Murzuq oasis,‍[139] Tebu control over Libya’s south-western Fezzan region has increased steadily.‍[140] The African-ethnic Tebu tribe was marginalized under Qadahfi, in contrast with the Arab Tuareg which was a favoured tribe of the regime. After Qadhafi was ousted, the Tebu made good use of the Tuareg’s diversion of attention to the separatist conflict in North Mali and moved to take over oil fields and consolidate their hold over the region. Wardougou also led the Murzuq Military Council, the de facto governance body in the area, as well as at least two Murzuq based militia groups including Libya Shield.‍[141] Tebu tribesmen, who control the Tumu border crossing with Niger, profit from this regional dominance to drive migrants northwards: the Tebu have monopolized the smuggling industry in south Libya up to around 20 kilometers from the desert town of Sebha.

Sebha: Sebha is located some 770 kilometers south of Tripoli and forms the capital of the Fezzan region. The desert town is a central hub in the web of historical trade routes that stretch northwards towards the borders of the Mediterranean and southwards into Sub Saharan Africa.‍[142] The area around Sebha is also known for its agriculture, where a large percentage of farm workers have long been seasonal migrants from Sub-Sahara Africa. Nowadays, Sebha is the undisputed heart of the human smuggling industry in southern Libya. Although members of the Tuareg and Tebu also live in Sebha, the city is dominated by the Arab Awlad Suleiman tribe, a sedentary clan who has long controlled smuggling routes through the area and has earned an immense fortune through its ownership of 80 per cent of the petrol stations in Sebha.‍[143] Since the fall of Qadhafi, the Awlad Suleiman run the local council of Sebha, meaning that they basically have sovereign control over the area. The Awlad Suleiman is one in a patchwork of (rivaling) Arab tribes – including the Warfalla, Magarha and Qadhafa – which control the areas north of Sebha and are in charge of smuggling migrants to the coast.‍[144] The Magarha tribe plays a particularly prominent role in transporting migrants north.

Ghat and Ghadames: Alternatively, migrants enter Libya across the Algerian border at Ghat or Ghadames. Ghat is controlled by ethnic Tuareg militias linked to those that operate in North Mali and Niger. From here, smugglers transport their human cargo on to Sebha. Ghadames which is situated more north close to the border with Tunisia, falls under the control of the Zintani brigades. Initially one of the ‘strongest, non-Islamist, Arab militia groups in the country’‍[145], the militias from Zintan – which used to be one of Qadhafi’s strongholds – lost control of key strategic sites to rival Misratan forces between 2011 and 2014. Zintani brigades extended their presence to Ghadames area to profit from the human smuggling networks running through that territory and thereby re-claim political and territorial control.‍[146] The Zintani brigades transport migrants up to the coastline.

Tripoli and the northwestern coastline: Libya’s northwestern coastline (roughly spanning from the town of Zuwara eastwards to Tripoli) is the heartland of human smuggling to Europe as it is the area where most of Libya’s embarkation points are located. It is also the area where historically most migrants arrived in search for work.‍[147] At present, significant parts of the coastal strip fall outside of the control of the national government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). Even the capital Tripoli from where the GNA currently operates has been carved up into the spheres of influence of various militias like the Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade of Haithem Tajouri (commonly referred to as Tajouri brigades, consisting of over 600 men) and the Special Deterrent Forces of AbdelRaouf Kara (also known as the Kara militias).‍[148]

Source: El Kamouni-Janssen, F. 2017. 'Only God can stop the smugglers.' Understanding human smuggling networks in Libya, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

Box 7
Northern Malian spheres of influence

The road from Bamako to Gao crosses zones that are (partially) controlled by armed groups. A rough divide can be made between self-defense militias, armed groups belonging to the separatist Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the more government-oriented Plateforme[149], and armed Islamist groups. The relations and alliances between these groups are very fragmented and subject to continuous de- and realignment.

Central Mali: According to several observers, the centre of the country - consisting of the triangle Segou, Nampala and Mopti – forms an “epicentre of jihadism”.‍[150] The terrorist group Ansar Dine Macina, the southern katiba of Ansar Dine, one of the main actors of the armed Islamist offensive in 2012, has conducted numerous attacks in the region of Segou and Mopti and has established itself as one of the main armed groups of the centre of the country. Local Fulani and Tamasheq communities, feeling left out of the peace agreements and threatened by the armed Islamist wave, have also taken up arms in the region.‍[151] Their composition, objectives and the extent of their military power are, at the moment, the subject of much speculations.‍[152] North of Mopti, the localities of Douentza and Boni are the zones of influence of the Plateforme members GATIA, the Ganda Izo and the Ganda Koy, all pro-government militias.‍[153] However, this region has recently been the theatre of attacks by an unidentified armed Islamist group, highlighting the fragile nature of territorial control in Mali.‍[154]

The region of Gao mainly falls under the control of the MAA (Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad) divided into two sub-groups, one part of the Plateforme and the other of the CMA.‍[155] The MAA is heavily involved in drug trafficking and operates mainly in the area between Timbuktu and Gao, despite having some presence in Kidal. Due to the high number of former MUJAO members in the ranks of the MAA, analysts have speculated on the ties between the movement and other armed Islamist groups such as Al-Mourabitoune (the result of a fusion between MUJAO and The Signed in Blood Battalion of Belmokhtar), also present in the region.

Kidal: The region of Kidal near the Algerian border has been the scene of many battles since the signature of the intra-Malian peace agreement. The CMA and the Plateforme have engaged in violent conflicts over the control of trafficking routes, endangering the implementation of the peace agreement in the process. Within the CMA, the MNLA and the Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) appear as the two main active groups while the GATIA has mainly represented the Plateforme in the latest fights. Analysts tie the MNLA and HCUA to armed Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine – one of the militant organizations that played an active role in supporting the early stages of the 2012 rebellion before hijacking it.‍[156] The CMA controls the city of Kidal itself.

Source: Molenaar, F. and Van Damme, T. 2017. Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

In the case of Libya, different types of illicit trafficking are more prone to overlap – profiting from the general situation of lawlessness. In the words of one human smuggler, ‘the human smuggling trade in Libya has nothing to fear but the weather and other armed groups’.‍[157] The irregular armed forces that are engaged in these trades make a good profit and ‘are becoming more powerful every day’.‍[158] The many examples outlined in Box 6 above show that such practices are common along routes passing through Libya and that both state- and non-state affiliated irregular armed forces engage in human smuggling practices. Other irregular armed forces are not directly involved in the smuggling networks, but contribute more indirectly by maintaining a favourable smuggling and trafficking environment such as by offering the protection needed to operate within these lawless contexts.‍[159]

In the border regions of Libya, such as the coastal strip bordering the Mediterranean Sea and the Fezzan desert on the southern border with Niger, irregular armed forces have also become involved in migration-mitigating measures. This involvement is particularly visible in and around the state- and non-state-run detention centres where migrants are being held captive. The state-run detention centres fall under the control of the Department for Control of Irregular Migration (DCIM).‍[160] These centres survived the fall of Qadhafi in 2011 and the resultant turmoil, albeit in hybrid forms, because they are usually located in areas where government control is absent and where militias call the shots. As a consequence, militias provide the guards that run these centres, while the DCIM handles the administrative side of detention.‍[161] In addition, militias have also set up their own detention centres, for example in southern Libya, where the DCIM’s Investigation and Arrest department is unable to operate. In Sebha, the Third Force – a powerful brigade from Misrata – is in charge of securing the area and enforcing law and order on behalf of the government. This means that the government is unable to control the conditions under which migrants are arrested and held captive.‍[162]

The most obvious reason for irregular armed forces’ involvement in both these state- and militia-run detention facilities is that migrant detention has become ‘a valuable commodity and a political bargaining chip.’‍[163] Detention centres offer a financial profit by allowing armed groups to extort migrants, to sell detainees to third parties such as employers and smugglers and also to align themselves with power holders at national level and to pick up state revenues. In the north, for example, migrant eyewitness accounts relate how smugglers bribe detention guards ‘with cars full of goods’ to release detainees just so they can get them to pay for another sea crossing.‍[164] Irregular armed forces also try to become involved in the fight against irregular migration for the purpose of acquiring international legitimacy and resources. The Tebu militants that control Libya’s border with Niger, for example, continuously seek to position themselves as potential partners in the international community’s fight against irregular migration, and all the international security (and legitimacy) rents they expect this to entail for them.‍[165]

Beyond these financial reasons, involvement in migration-mitigating measures forms part of a course of action to gain control over strategic sites, such as detention centres, that provide a legitimate reason for militias to concentrate armed forces within an area. The same goes for prisons, ports, airports and oil refineries.‍[166] Controlling these sites provides the militias with access to key existing infrastructures and reconfirms their de facto authority position on the ground. Allowing other groups to control these sites is unthinkable, as this would allow the build-up of armed forces in the militias’ spheres of influence. Indeed, reports from the ground indicate that the strategic importance of controlling smuggling networks is such that militias are willing to accept low profits – and even losses – to prevent rival militias from gaining influence and taking over their part of the smuggling market.‍[167]

Ultimately, armed groups’ involvement in both human smuggling and anti-smuggling enterprises are thus two sides of the same coin and are not contradictory as such. These groups’ control over local zones of influence allows armed groups to tax, protect and/or actively control human smuggling and trafficking operations, while their control over detention centres provides them with an additional source of income and contributes to the consolidation of their influence sphere.‍[168] Or as one smuggler put it succinctly, ‘the armed groups assist the government in combatting illegal migration, for example by guarding detention centres, but at the same time they are in cahoots with people smugglers’.‍[169] Rather than seeing this as a double game, this overlap in activities is a reflection of the way in which power operates on the ground: the fragmentation of authority in Libya has resulted in an intricate web of power relationships driven by personal connections, in which the distinction between state and irregular armed forces is often an artificial one.

Figure 9
The contested route’s political dynamics - Libya
The contested route’s political dynamics - Libya

Source: El Kamouni-Janssen, F. 2017. 'Only God can stop the smugglers.' Understanding human smuggling networks in Libya, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

This distinct institutional logic is reminiscent of security arrangements in Afghanistan after the Bonn agreement.‍[170] Amidst the fragmentation of political authority, political settlements among powerful national and local power elites are constantly renegotiated to control local and regional governance and authority.‍[171] ‘Licit and illicit resources and revenue extraction are central to these bargaining processes’.‍[172] In such a context, collaboration with security forces and armed groups – be they state-affiliated or not – is an inherently political endeavour that introduces the international community as yet another source of rents in the political market place and that creates the potential of allowing some irregular armed forces to strengthen and/or consolidate their control over the smuggling industry to the detriment of others.‍[173]

If the Afghan case tells us one thing, it is that failure to recognise this risk may result in heightening corruption, with all its debilitating effects on the state, in creating more exclusive internal negotiation dynamics and in undermining state legitimacy and the social contract.‍[174] This warning is particularly relevant given the recent focus the EU has put on the Libyan Coast Guard in the fight against migration. As discussed in the section on EU policies above, EU NAVFOR MED Operation Sophia focuses on disrupting human smuggling networks operating out of Libya. In June 2016, the European Council extended the Operation’s mandate until 27 July 2017 and added two tasks to its mandate: the training of Libyan coastguards and navy and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.‍[175]

To date, the collaboration has mainly focused on capacity building, which shows that the EU is mindful not to provide the Libyan Coast Guard with money or equipment.‍[176] This remains an ineffective strategy at best, however, as the Coast Guard hands over its captured and rescued migrants to the detention centres, from which migrants are either sold off to smugglers or earn their own way out – only to embark on another boat journey. More importantly, and given the assertions that the Coast Guard disproportionally targets the operations of lower-level smugglers, the question remains whether this policy plays into the hands of high-level smugglers and irregular armed forces that are able to consolidate their control over the trade through their ties to the Coast Guard.‍[177]

Irregular migration and the coping economy

Although human smuggling is most prominently located in a shadow economy, where illicit economic activities flourish due to the absence of central state authority, human smuggling activities also drive a ‘coping economy’, allowing populations to deal with the consequences of conflict undermining their livelihoods. This dynamic is visible most clearly in Libya, where the fall of Qadhafi and the subsequent internal conflict provided opportunities for the empowerment of communities that share a history of systemic marginalisation, like the Amazigh community in Zuwara and the Tebu in the Fezzan. Many Zuwara residents, who were fishermen before, now use their boats for the much more lucrative business of smuggling people.‍[178] In the Fezzan, which is mainly a transit area, involvement in human smuggling similarly functions as an empowerment tool, with many smugglers stepping ‘in and out’ of the business.‍[179] In the current chaotic Libyan polity, smuggling is the only form of economic opportunity available to these communities, and a historically accepted way of earning a living at that.‍[180]

Looking beyond these previously marginalised tribes, it should be noted that many Libyans do not necessarily see human smuggling as an illegal business. To such local, and often young, ‘entrepreneurs’, smuggling is a way of coping in a tumultuous environment and thereby forms a livelihood strategy.‍[181] There are many accounts of smugglers who state that they turned to smuggling because they were unable to find work or because they had to drop out of university when the state stopped paying scholarships.‍[182] Obviously, the argument is quickly made that such plights are a mere excuse for their involvement in organised crime. Indeed, numerous people smugglers also argue that they ended up in the business because it is fast money with relatively little effort and risk.‍[183] Nevertheless, in many places in Libya, smuggling is an alternative source of income for people that were confronted with civil war and a government that cannot deliver. If anything, human smuggling is an income-generating activity.

Taking away such livelihood schemes would not logically contribute to more stability in the areas where human smuggling is entrenched in the local political economy. Indeed, one important lesson from counter-narcotics policies repeated across Asia and Latin America is that it is often marginalised local communities that end up bearing the brunt of these policies, while local powerbrokers and powerful elites are able to bribe or coerce themselves out of interdiction’s way – often resulting in multiple power gains in the process.‍[184] Evidence from Afghanistan also suggests that such strategies ultimately result in the delegitimisation of state authorities in the eyes of local communities, impede effective collaboration with these communities for intelligence gathering purposes and may even drive local populations into the arms of extremist groups that offer them access to protection and livelihoods.‍[185]

At the same time, it should be recognised that local communities do not necessarily support all irregular migration and human smuggling – for myriad reasons. The coastal town of Zuwara, a historical smuggling hub dubbed the epicentre of coastal human smuggling in the post-Qadhafi years, presents a case in point.‍[186] Over the course of 2016, a number of developments resulted in the smuggling trade moving further eastwards to Sabratha, Garabulli and Khoms.‍[187] The capsizing of a boat and the subsequent drowning of 183 migrants off Zuwara’s coast sparked an initial wave of public outrage.‍[188] This further empowered local vigilante movements that set about arresting smugglers in Zuwara in what was reportedly a turf war over control of the area.‍[189] As a result, smuggling operations have largely ceased in the region, although some smugglers remain operational.‍[190]

Regardless of the power dynamics undoubtedly at play, the Zuwara case also illustrates that local communities can play a role in the fight against human smuggling and human rights abuses. A similar dynamic was visible in the case of Zawiya, where four migrants were killed and 20 injured after guards at the local detention centre opened fire on them during a mass escape.‍[191] The incident garnered international and local attention, with both the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and local human rights groups calling for the improvement of conditions within the detention centre.‍[192] In response, the local government successfully put pressure on the centre to clean up its act.‍[193] These examples highlight that local communities might provide an important ‘in’ for policy makers looking to identify partners in the fight against irregular migration and human rights abuses in a conflict-sensitive manner. This is particularly relevant given that both state- and non-state-aligned irregular armed forces are tied to the human smuggling trade and therefore not the most appropriate partner to work with in addressing irregular migration. The literature on countering violent extremism and state fragility offers important lessons on policy design that focuses on people and communities – rather than states – as the receiving end of mitigating measures. These lessons would be well applied in current efforts to stem trans-Saharan irregular migration.

Policy recommendation 4: use peace process to reduce human smuggling

Illicit smuggling and trafficking proceeds empower irregular armed forces that act as de facto authorities on the ground, enabling them to act as spoilers in larger conflict resolution processes. Even in those cases where formal state authorities still exist, collaboration with such actors in the fight against irregular migration is an inherently political enterprise that may end up entrenching the interests of state-aligned smugglers and irregular armed forces. Amidst fragmented sovereignty, neutral interlocutors do not exist. The only way forward is to realise that irregular migration (and other trafficking) mitigation and peace-building efforts should form part of a larger, comprehensive strategy targeting instability in the region. Based on insights from peace-building programmes,‍[194] the following practical recommendations present themselves:

Put more weight behind peace processes which have clearly defined components and dimensions that lend themselves to focused interaction: These peace negotiations should be as inclusive as possible to ensure that all relevant state and non-state armed actors end up around the negotiating table to discuss all drivers and dimensions of conflict – including human smuggling and trafficking networks. They should also explore what could incentivise armed groups to compete politically or economically for their interests in a peaceful manner. The fact that irregular armed forces have a lot to gain from international collaboration as a legitimisation strategy can be used as leverage. In addition, bringing economic incentives into peace-building discussions can serve to depoliticise the discussion and hence ease the process;

Use the buy-in to the peace process as a carrot to create incentives for groups and communities engaged in human smuggling activities to look for alternative sources of development, income and authority: Armed groups could be pushed, for example, to stop the worst human rights abuses in the areas under their control. Evidence in this report suggests that human rights abuses often increase as the level of state presence decreases. It follows that if non-state armed actors want to be treated as state authorities, they should start acting as such by making measurable improvements in the treatment and protection of migrants;

Maintain a steady focus on human smuggling activities in the follow-up to peace agreements: As demonstrated by the Malian case, it should be recognised that peace agreements are not the end of instability and that the irregular economy generally picks up during the transitional period. ‘[A] major challenge is how the personalised, vested interests of the present can be complemented by institutionalisation that gradually enables a future broadening of access to services and rights at various levels of governance, with firm guarantees for elite groups that it will not result in a zero-sum game for them.’‍[195] Mindful of these dynamics, continuous efforts should therefore be made to monitor and counter the influence of irregular migration and other trafficking resources on local and national political life amidst these larger processes;

Reduce the availability of spoils: The criminalisation of migrants in Libya plays an important role in the commoditisation of humans – up to the point of them being forced onto boats against their will. Pressure on Libya to decriminalise and protect temporary migrant labour in the country might undercut the intricate relationship between human smuggling and trafficking proceeds, the funding of irregular armed forces and the prolongation of the internal conflict. Re-establishing Libya as a safe destination country for migrants would undercut the streams currently being forced into Europe through sheer force or due to a lack of alternative options. To this end, policy makers should push for an amendment of Libyan legislation in order to decriminalise irregular migration;

Invest in civil society engagement; Local populations play a major role in both the facilitation of, and the fight against, organised crime and corruption. The Libyan case has shown that both sides of the coin are visible in the human smuggling industry, where local populations condone human smuggling as a practical and accepted way of life but where civil society organisations and Facebook groups also actively speak out against organised criminal activities and human rights violations. Efforts should focus on strengthening such civil society groups by identifying key individuals in them, strengthening their key communications and building on their strengths to raise awareness of the dangers and institutional costs of human smuggling.

Goodhand, J. 2004. ‘From War Economy to Peace Economy? Reconstruction and State Building in Afghanistan,’ Journal of International Affairs, 58:1, 157.
Irregular armed forces are ‘actors who wield coercive capacity that either parallels or challenges that held by the state, and whose deployment of violence undermines the state’s monopolitisation of the means of coercion. In this sense, one may think of armed bandits, separatist groups, jihadist groups, militias and armed brigades. Davis, D. 2010. Op. cit., 398.
Taylor, M. 2013. Conflict Financing: What’s Wrong with War Economies? NOREF Report, Oslo, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
Le Billon, P. 2012, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources, New York, NY, Columbia University Press.
Among these groups were Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement of Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). For more information on the topic, see Chauzal, G. and Van Damme, T. op. cit.; Guichaoua, Y. 2014. Op. cit. These groups also capitalised on the many Tuareg fighters that migrated back to Mali from Libya after the fall of Qadhafi. See: Tinti, P. and Reitano, T. Op. cit.
Chauzal, G. and Van Damme, T. Op. cit.
Guichaoua, Y. 2014. Op. cit.; Jouve, A. 2016. ‘Forces et groupes armés au Mali: qui est qui?’, Jeune Afrique, 24 March.
Smits, R., Janssen, F. and Briscoe, I. 2013. Op. cit.; Janssen, F. and Abdo, I. 2015. Op. cit.; Lacher, W. 2015. Op. cit.
European Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. ‘A Quick Guide To Libya’s Main Players’, link (accessed August 2016).
Shaw, M. and Mangan, F. 2014. Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses, Washington, DC, USIP, 3.
Personal interview, three members of the international community working in the field of migration, 2016. Bamako, Mali, 29 July. Telephone interview, migration expert in Gao, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 30 July.
Malakooti, A. 2013. Op. cit., 52. Also see: Tinti, P. and Reitano, T. 2016. Op. cit., 114-115.
International Crisis Group. 2016. Mali Central: la fabrique d’une insurrection? Africa report n. 238, Brussels, International Crisis Group; Carayol, R. 2016. ‘Carte: au centre du Mali, une constellation de groupes armés’, Jeune Afrique, 17 June, Political section.
Tinti, P. and Reitano, T. 2016. Op. cit., 114.
There are strong rumours that the figureheads behind criminal (human) smuggling networks in Libya can be linked to the Italian mafia as well, although such stories remain unconfirmed. Telephone interview, member of the international community working in the field of Libyan migration, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 13 September.
Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September.
See, for example, Westcott, T. 2016. ‘All at sea: Libyan detention centres at crisis point’, Irinnews, 1 June. Also: Personal interview, member of the international community running good governance projects in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 21 September.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November.
Ibid. Also see: Vice News, 2015, ‘Libya’s migrant trade: Europe or Die’, Vice News, documentary posted on 17 September 2015, link (accessed November 2016).
The difference between human smuggling and human trafficking is that the first requires the consent of the individuals that are being moved whereas the second does not. Compare Art. 3(a), UN Protocol to Prevent, Supress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 and Art. 3(a), UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.’
Abuse, Exploitation and Trafficking: IOM reveals data on the scale of the danger and risks that migrants face on the Mediterranean routes to Europe, IOM, London, 2016 link (accessed December 2016). Also see: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), New York, 2016, link (accessed December 2016).
Migration Policy Centre Team. 2013. Op. cit., 8.
Toaldo, M. 2015. ‘Migrations Through and From Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge’, in: Changing Migration Patterns in the Mediterranean, ed. Kamel, L., Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 80-81. The only way for migrants to get out of a detention centre is to buy their way out, to find a local sponsor who they can work for, to get deported (voluntary repatriation), or to die.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November. Also see Tinti, P. and Reitano, T. 2016. Op. cit. and Amnesty, 2016. Refugees and migrants fleeing sexual violence, abuse and exploitation in Libya, news report posted on 1 July 2016, link (accessed November 2016).
Telephone interview, member of a local migrant NGO in Gao, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 10 November.
In one MHub Survey, this is the case for 39 percent of surveyed migrants. Italy, Survey Snapshot August 2016, Mixed Migration Hub, Cairo, link (accessed November 2016). A second MHub survey reports that 21 percent of surveyed migrants were forced onto boats. Italy, Survey Snapshot September 2016, Mixed Migration Hub, Cairo, link (accessed November 2016). Also see: Fraser, C. 2016. ‘‘Push’ factor drives migrants away from Libya to Europe’, BBC, 17 May, Africa section.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November.
Confidential documents obtained from an intelligence officer. Personal interview, intelligence officer, 2016. Bamako, Mali, 25 July. In addition, it has been suggested that the presence of international peacekeepers prompts these forces to keep their arms and drug trafficking operations separate from human smuggling, which typically requires larger convoys, to avoid attracting law enforcement attention. Personal interview, member of the international community working in the field of peacekeeping, 2016. Bamako, Mali, 27 July.
Confidential documents obtained from an intelligence officer; Personal interview, intelligence officer, 2016. Bamako, Mali, 25 July.
Ibid. Also see: Mali, Survey Snapshot April 2016, Mixed Migration Hub, Cairo, link (accessed November 2016). It goes without saying that armed groups often constitute these armed bandits. Personal interview, member of the international community working in the field of peacekeeping, 2016. Bamako, Mali, 27 July.
Carayol, R. 2016. ‘Libye: le chef de guerre Barka Wardougou vaincu par la maladie’, Jeune Afrique, 27 July.
Bousbouvier, C. 2012. ‘Libye: quand les Toubous se réveillent’, Jeune Afrique, 16 May, Political section.
Tinti, P. and Reitano, T., op. cit.; Landinfo, 2014. Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, Oslo, Landinfo.
Paton, C. 2015. ‘Libya: Inside Sabha the heart of Libya’s smuggling and human trafficking network’, International Business Times, July 24.
European Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. ‘A Quick Guide To Libya’s Main Players’, link (accessed August 2016).
Paton, C. 2015. ‘Libya: Scores Killed in Ethnic Clashes for Control of South’s People-trafficking Routes’, International Business Times, 23 July; Tinti, P. and Westcott, T. op. cit.; Cole, P. and McQuinn, B. eds., 2015, The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, New York, Oxford University Press.
Tinti, P. and Reitano, T., op. cit.; Landinfo, 2014. Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, Oslo, Landinfo.
Lewis, A. and Elumami, A. 2016. ‘Dangerous Migrant Smuggling Routes Flourish in Lawless Libya’, Reuters, 3 June, World News section.
Telephone interview with a member of the international community working in the field of Libyan migration, 2016. The Hague, The Netherlands, 13 September.
Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September.
For more detailed information on the groups that constitute these coalitions, see Jouve, A. 2016. ‘Forces et groupes armés au Mali : qui est qui ?’, Jeune Afrique, 24 March.
See for instance Sangare, B. 2016. Le Centre du Mali: epicentre du djihadisme, Note d’analyse, Brussels, Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité.
Carayol, R. 2016. ‘Carte: au centre du Mali, une constellation de groupes armés’, Jeune Afrique, 17 June.
For a better overview of the latest thoughts on such groups see International Crisis Group. 2016. Mali Central: la fabrique d’une insurrection ? Africa report n.238, Brussels, International Crisis Group.
Carayol, R. 2016. ‘Carte: au centre du Mali, une constellation de groupes armés’, Jeune Afrique, 17 June.
RFI. 2016. ‘Des jihadistes s’emparent de la localité de Boni, au centre-est de Mali’, Radio France International, 3 September.
Personal interview with a Malian journalist with a track record in migration stories, 2016. Bamako, Mali, 27 July.
For a timeline of event, see Chauzal, G. and Van Damme, T. Op. cit.
Personal interview, member of the international community running good governance projects in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 21 September.
Ibid.
Ibid.; Tinti, P. and Reitano, T. 2016. Op. cit., 107-108.
Malakooti, A. 2013. Op. cit.; Aziz, N. et al. 2015. Op. cit.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in the field of Libyan migration, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 13 September. The detention centres are overburdened and migrants fall prey to maltreatment, extortion and human rights abuses. Although the international community has not been able to access the militia-led sites, anecdotal evidence suggests that human rights abuses are even more rampant here. Also see: Vice News. 2015. Op. cit.
Ibid.
Amnesty International. 2015. ‘Libya is Full of Cruelty’. Stories of Abduction, Sexual Violence, and Abuse from Migrants and Refugees, London, Amnesty International; Tinti, P. and Reitano, T. 2016. Op. cit., 112-113.
Westcott, T. 2016 ‘An open secret: The people-smugglers of southern Libya’, Middle East Eye, 18 March. Also: Personal communication, Western diplomat, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 22 September. Such rents may take the form of ‘security cooperation agreements, promises of development projects, … the creation and support of specialised security units and other forms of technical assistance’. Sandor, A. 2016. ‘Assemblages of Intervention: Politics, Security, and Drug Trafficking in West Africa’ , PhD diss., University of Ottawa, 147.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November.
Personal interview, international migration expert working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 December.
The smuggler we interviewed was quick to admit that he regularly bribes members of state-affiliated armed groups: ‘when they catch me, I have to pay them in cash. When migrants are caught, they have to pay them too. Smugglers have to pay 10,000 to 100,000 Libyan Dinars to be released, whereas migrants pay 200 to 2,000 Libyan Dinars.’ When we asked whether the authorities were aware of this, the smuggler replied ‘of course’. Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September.
Ibid.
Felbab-Brown, V. 2009. ‘Peacekeepers Among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention’, International Peacekeeping, 16(1), 100-114; Goodhand, J. and Mansfield, D. 2010. Drugs and (Dis)order: A Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlements and State-Making in Afghanistan, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper no. 83.
Parks, T. and Cole, W. 2010. Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice, Asia Foundation, Occasional Paper no. 2, 18.
Ibid., 2-3.
Waal, A. de, 2009. ‘Mission without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace,’ International Affairs, 85(1), 99-113.
Felbab-Brown, V. 2009. Op. cit., 106; Parks, T. and Cole, W. 2010. Op. cit., 29; Veen, E. van. 2016. Mistakes, Means and Opportunities. How Donors Understand and Influence Legitimate and Inclusive Politics in Afghanistan, CRU Report, The Hague, Clingendael.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in the field of Libyan migration, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 13 September; Also see: Van Es, A. 2016. ‘Gesteggel over besteding Nederlands geld voor migrantenproject Libië’, Volkskrant, 13 September, Buitenland section.
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November; Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September; Also see: Vice News, 2015, ‘Libya’s migrant trade: Europe or Die’, Vice News, documentary posted on 17 September 2015, link (accessed November 2016).
الصالحي, ع. 2015 ‘تجارة الموت في مقبرة المتوسط’ Al Araby 22 April; Kingsley, P. 2016. Op. cit., 74.
Aziz, N. et al. 2015. Op. cit.
Members of local communities report how they work as smugglers with the aim of earning money to start a business. Westcott, T. 2016 ‘An open secret: The people-smugglers of southern Libya’, Middle East Eye, 18 March.
Bøås, M. 2013. ‘Youth Agency in the “Violent Life-worlds” of Kono District (Sierra Leone), Voinjama (Liberia) and Northern Mali: “Tactics” and Imaginaries’, Conflict, Security & Development, 13(5), 611-630.
Westcott, T. 2016. Op. cit.; Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September
Malakooti, A. 2013. Op. cit., 54.
Felbab-Brown, V. 2009. Op. cit., 108.
Felbab-Brown 2009; Goodhand, J. and Mansfield, D. 2010. Op. cit.
Sommerville, Q. 2015. ‘Inside Zuwara, the heart of Libya’s people-smuggling trade’, BBC, 4 September, Africa section.
Personal interview, international migration expert working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 December; Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September; Bühler, A., Koelbl, S., Mattioli, S. and Mayr, W. 2016. ‘Following the Money. On the trail of African Migrant Smugglers’, Der Spiegel, 26 September.
O’Carroll, L. 2015. ‘Libya, 183 bodies now recovered after capsize of boat in Zuwara’, The Guardian, 7 September; Stephen, C. 2016. ‘Libya faces influx of migrants seeking new routes to Europe’, The Guardian, 9 April.
Kamel, F. 2016. ‘The masked crusaders trying to restore law and order in Libya’, The Guardian, 1 January; Zurutuza, K. 2015. ‘Libya’s Dark Knights: Vigilantes take on the people-smugglers’, The Guardian, 3 December; Micallef, M. 2016. ‘Libyan Smugglers Import Rubber Boats from China’, Migrant Report, 19 February.
Telephone interview, Libyan smuggler operating from Zuwara, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 16 September; Also see: Migrant Report Geo Portal, Migrant Report, 2016, link (accessed November 2016).
Micallef, M. 2016. ‘Libya: Four Migrants Dead, 20 Injured After Detention Centre Escape’, Migrant Report, 2 April.
Humanitarian Coordinator Calls for Independent Investigation into Migrants’ Deaths in Detention Centre, UNSMIL, Tripoli, 2016, link (accessed November 2016).
Telephone interview, member of the international community working in Libya, 2016. The Hague, the Netherlands, 14 November.
Mancini, F. and Vericat, F. 2016. Lost in Transition: UN Mediation in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, New York, International Peace Institute; Veen, E. van. 2016. Op. cit.
Veen, E. van. 2016. Op. cit., 33.