Migrant travel that takes place between West Africa and the migration hubs of Gao and Agadez is generally of a licit nature. This is the case because the majority of West African origin countries belong to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which maintains a free-movement protocol.‍[50] The legality of West African intraregional travel means that most migrants entering Niger and Mali do so using commercial bus companies that service the West African region. Depending on their country of origin, ECOWAS migrants pay between €50 and €100 to reach Agadez or Gao in a safe and comfortable manner, on a direct, air-conditioned bus from the main origin counties’ capitals. Two qualifying statements that apply are that: 1) this regular migration turns into irregular migration when migrants cross into Algeria or Libya without proper documentation; and 2) many ECOWAS migrants are unwilling or unable to produce proper documentation within Mali and Niger itself as well, which consequently makes their travel illicit.‍[51]

The commercial bus companies navigate this grey territory very aptly. According to eyewitness accounts, for example, the companies have developed a system to cross border checkpoints unhindered while still being able to transport undocumented migrants. They do so by stopping before the border to unload the undocumented migrants travelling on board. These migrants are directed to irregular taxi services that help them cross the border along uncontrolled points. They are met on the other side of the border by the same bus, which waits for its irregular passengers to board again before it continues its journey.‍[52] In some instances, bus companies even designate totally separate services for migrants – allowing other passengers to travel without this hassle.‍[53]

Eyewitness accounts also relate how bus companies pass several police checkpoints on the way to their final destination. These checkpoints, instituted because of the threat of terrorism in the region, allow police and other security officials to levy a toll on undocumented migrants before the latter are allowed to continue their journey.‍[54] To speed up the process, it has become common practice for bus drivers to collect the necessary funds from migrants beforehand and to distribute these to the police at each checkpoint.‍[55] This is indicative of the institutionalisation of police corruption, both in terms of the regularity of the interactions between bus drivers and police officials and the apparent stability of the fees that are levied at these checkpoints.

Source: Molenaar, F. 2017. Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Niger, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.

At the national level, an even more collusive relationship exists between national political elites, criminal networks and bus company owners. Clear indications exist, for example, that bus company owners use transport proceeds to fund presidential elections and to enter political life (see Box 2 below). Clear indications also exist that the bus company owners are linked to criminal groups that use the buses to transport drugs and arms.‍[56]

As a consequence of this funding of Nigerien and Malian politics through all types of trafficking money, it is believed that organised criminal interests influence the government, such as by setting the parameters for certain security initiatives.‍[66] This clearly complicates efforts to target the role that bus companies play in the facilitation of irregular migration through state-sponsored initiatives. Indeed, although the 2015 Nigerien law related to irregular migrant smuggling contains an entire chapter devoted to the transport companies’ servicing of undocumented migrants, no investigations have been opened into the bus companies’ facilitation of irregular migration.‍[67]

These financial relationships are also indicative of a larger pattern of corruption of public authority by particularistic interests. In the long run, such practices hollow out the state from within. In the case of Mali, for example, the use of personal support networks and particularistic interests to become elected to parliament has been shown to result in a dynamic called ‘unanimism’. Under ‘unanimism’, consensus becomes the key norm of governance, as representatives rely on informal networks with the executive to obtain the resources needed to satisfy their support bases’ demands. In the process, dissidence forms a sure-fire way to commit political suicide – ultimately undermining the ability of elected officials to ‘scrutiny matters of national interest’.‍[68] In the case of Mali, unanimism contributed to rising levels of popular discontent that politicians failed to accommodate within the formal political process, ultimately resulting in the 2012 coup.‍[69]

Although the financial proceeds introduced in political life at the behest of the bus company owners facilitating irregular migration constitute only part of these dynamics, they are a pressing concern nevertheless given the current state of both Mali’s and Niger’s political systems. Genuine democratic opposition parties have disappeared in both countries due to their governments’ reliance on day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism to build governing coalitions.‍[70] These practices can only be rooted out through a more general focus on issues of good governance and the funding of politics and elections. Targeting such issues should be based on more systematic efforts to track the loops connecting criminal activities with pre-existing routes of patronage and influence trafficking. At the same time, such efforts would require a shift away from development policies aimed at border control and countering human smuggling towards longer-term institution building efforts.

Source: Molenaar, F. 2017. Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Niger, CRU report, The Hague, Clingendael.