

Appendix 1 Theoretical choices and frameworks

This appendix accounts for the main theoretical choices underlying the Clingendael Strategic Monitor. Two elements are central to the Strategic Monitor: a threat assessment and an analysis of the international order.¹ Both of the concepts concerned raise many questions: what exactly is security? When do we speak of threats? What do we mean by 'international order'? And when is the international order in 'good' shape and when is it in 'bad' shape?

To answer these questions transparently, it was necessary to make a number of theoretical choices. These choices are explained and justified in more detail in this appendix.

1. Threat analysis

Threat or security analyses are generally plagued by at least three problems.²

1. It is not always clear whose security is central: is European or Dutch security the main focus? Does security concern citizens' interests (human security) or states' interests (national security)?
2. It is often unclear when a problem is a real security problem. For example, are fragile states a direct security threat to the EU? When does a trade embargo on an economic power become a security issue? And are epidemics a security problem? Who decides?
3. Thirdly, there is an instinctive tendency to narrow security down to defence issues.

1 These are two subjects that were also dealt with separately in the *Future Policy Survey Final Report*, an interdepartmental and interdisciplinary study on the future of the Dutch Armed Forces. Ministry of Defence, *Future Policy Survey Final Report: A New Foundation for the Netherlands Armed Forces*, 2010, 53-54.

2 Williams, P. 2008. *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Routledge. [bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016442777&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA](https://www.vub.be/bvb/de/8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016442777&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA).

The most important scientific discussions in international relations (IR) over the past 25 years have concerned one or other of these questions. The insights from these discussions have proved helpful in this analysis.

The first two problems are considerably more complicated than they appear at first glance: the answer depends on who you ask. According to citizens in a recent Eurobarometer survey, terrorism is the biggest threat, followed by poverty, corruption and theft. Insecurity at Europe's external borders – regarded by policymakers as one of the most urgent issues – has a much lower priority.³ Strikingly, the security problems mentioned by European citizens do not traditionally fall within the scope of security policy. If one asks the various political actors such as NATO, the EU and the US, they disagree on what is meant by security (see Table 1). In these actors' most important strategic documents, different security interests are defined; what is more, conceptions of these change over time. Where there is uncertainty about whose security is the concern, reference is often made in IR to a 'referent object'. In addition, with regard to the content of the identified threats, the term 'securitisation' is often used; security interests are defined by political actors.

In light of these two points, the CSM has made a number of clear choices. Europe is the referent object of this study, and the securitised topics on the European agenda are the main focus. This choice has been made because Dutch security is very strongly embedded in European security and the European legal order. As a result of this choice, the CSM is based on the security interests defined by the EU in the most important strategic documents, in combination with the Dutch security agenda (see Table 1). The most recently published EU strategy in the field of security and foreign policy, the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (2016), is the CSM's main starting point. European security is broadly defined: alongside issues such as territorial security and the importance of free trade, cybersecurity and tensions between groups are also treated as security interests. The Global Strategy is supplemented where necessary with the European Agenda on Security (2014) and recent sub-strategies on terrorism, cyber, conflict prevention, energy, climate change and weapons of mass destruction. This has led to the selection of ten security interests, which form the core of the CSM 2017: territorial integrity, CBRN, terrorism, transnational organised crime, crises on Europe's periphery, energy, free trade, tensions between the EU and its citizens, cyber and climate change. This list overlaps to a large extent with the Dutch security agenda.

3 European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer Survey: Europeans' Attitudes Towards Security*, 28 April 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/20150408_1_memo_eurobarometer_april_2015_v2_en.pdf.

One important consequence of this choice is that some international security problems, however serious, fall outside the scope of this study, as they do not directly affect European security. An outbreak of a severe pandemic on the African continent or a civil war only becomes part of this threat analysis if it is a potential security concern to the EU and/or its member states.

Table 1 Definition of security of different actors in strategic documents

	NL* 2007	NL** 2012	NAVO 2010	US 2015	EU 2003	EU 2008	EU*** 2014	EU 2016	CSM 2017
1 Territorial integrity	X	X	X	X				X	X
2 CBRN	X		X	X	X	X			X
3 Terrorism	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4 Organised crime	X	X		X	X	X	X		X
5 International crises	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
6 Scarcity of resources	X	X							
Energy security	X		X	X		X		X	X
7 Free trade		X	X					X	X
Free investment markets		X	X	X				X	X
Transport (routes)		X	X	X				X	X
Severe economic downturn				X					
8 Vertical societal security – democracy	X							X	X
Vertical societal security – EU unity	X							X	X
Horizontal security – tensions	X						X	X	X
Horizontal security – extremism	X								

		NL* 2007	NL** 2012	NAVO 2010	US 2015	EU 2003	EU 2008	EU*** 2014	EU 2016	CSM 2017
9	Climate change	X		X	X		X		X	X
	Flooding	X		X			X			X
	Extreme heat and drought	X		X						X
	Management of Arctic region	X		X	X					X
10	Cybersecurity	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
	Cybercrime	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
	New technologies			X	X					
X	Pandemics	X		X	X					
	Zoonoses	X								

Security benchmarking

A third problem with threat analyses is the instinctive tendency to narrow security down to defence issues. For this reason, the CSM uses various techniques to make a selection of security interests. Firstly, for reasons described above, a political consensus has to be expressed in strategic documents (in particular the EU's Global Strategy). There must also be a threat to fundamental security interests, which are determined on the basis of five threshold definitions. These definitions are more or less consistent with the five vital interests as set out in the Dutch National Security Strategy (2007), adapted in order to be applicable at the European level (see Table 2). A security threat is thus only a genuine threat if it harms one of these security interests.

The impact on security interests is specified in more detail, and a complete assessment table is presented separately in Appendix 3. The idea is as follows: for each security interest, various ascending levels are distinguished, from 'a nuisance, but not damaging' (Level 1) to 'major impact' (Level 5). The number of EU member states that are affected partly determines the size of the impact. A threat to territorial security is defined as a military or terrorist attack. The ascending staircase thus goes from the verbal threat of a military or terrorist attack (Level 1) up to the occupation of one or more member states (Level 5). The other security interests are defined in the same way. Economic security concerns varying degrees of economic damage or diminished trade. Societal security relates either to variations in tensions and conflict between groups (horizontal), or to variations in the confidence of citizens in national and/or European politicians (vertical). Ecological security is about degradation of the living environment or deaths due to natural disasters and loss of biodiversity. Technological security relates to variation

in damage to vital information and critical digital infrastructure (see Appendix 3 for a detailed description of the impact criteria).

Table 2 Security interests

Security interest	Definition (threshold value)
Territorial	A fundamental threat to European member states' monopoly on violence and/or territorial integrity.
Economic	Harm to the economic foundations of the EU and its member states.
Societal	Harm to the foundations of a peaceful European social climate and the democratic rule of law in the member states and/or European institutions.
Ecological	Fundamental harm to the European living environment.
Technological	Harm to the integrity and openness of essential information or information systems of the EU and/or its member states.

New security challenges

One disadvantage of this approach is its close adherence to the existing strategic agenda. This may make it difficult to identify new security problems. Security threats may arise that are not yet mentioned in the strategic documents, as the process of arriving at such a strategy is time-consuming. Another possibility is that some security issues have not been included because there is no agreement about them between the member states. In order to detect new security problems, use is made of horizon-scanning methods. First, this is done by using so-called wikis.⁴ Second, it is done by means of a survey of European security experts in which they are asked to supplement the European security agenda, and to indicate any new security threats (see also Appendix 2 Methodology). On the basis of the survey carried out in 2016 (for the Monitor 2017), no new threats have been identified and added.

2. The international order

Besides issues relating to threat and security analyses, there are also a number of questions about the international order. To make matters worse, the examination of the international order is plagued by still further uncertainty: the term may refer to the way in which states but also non-state actors interact, to a hierarchical or an anarchical order, and to an amoral or a normative order. In this complex field, the quadrant chart of the Future Policy Survey has provided a useful framework since 2012. In this, the

⁴ Wikis are online knowledge networks in which knowledge can not only be shared, but also edited and modified by anyone. Strong verification mechanisms are incorporated into them, however.

degree of (non-)cooperation is shown on the horizontal axis and the main actors are represented on the vertical axis. The result is four quadrants: fragmentation, network, multilateral and multipolar. The chart provides a considerable insight into the international order, but in recent years it has been found to be in need of further development to address two 'theoretical' problems:

1. The realisation that there may be both cooperation and non-cooperation between the same actors.⁵
2. The difficulty of indicating variation within the quadrants. It proved very difficult to indicate the difference between varying degrees of cooperation: when was there more and when was there less cooperation?

On the basis of these questions, the quadrant chart has been further developed for CSM 2017 in order to reflect the layered international order more accurately (see Figure 1). The two axes are precisely calibrated, and present concrete options. The most significant decision is to arrange the chart more closely on the basis of 'regime theory'.

Problem 1: cooperation and non-cooperation between the same actors

In both policy circles and academic debate, there is agreement that different types of order can exist in different areas. There is nothing new about this insight. During the Cold War, for instance, there was a bipolar order that was largely characterised by conflict, yet in which a multilateral cooperation system was set up. In light of the observation that there may be both cooperation and non-cooperation (sometimes between the same actors), reference is often made to regimes. Regimes may be variously organised, sometimes demonstrating a strong focus on cooperation and sometimes being more conflict-prone. The dominant actors depend on the theme, and each theme is characterised by its own power relations.⁶ The CSM builds on this and opts for a disaggregated approach to the analysis of the international order: all subsystems together make up the international order. This also ties in with a major methodological starting point for forecasting: reducing the scope of the problem as much as possible.

5 See the 'fusion scenario' in: Clingendael Institute, *Strategic Monitor 2015*, https://www.clingendael.nl/pub/2015/clingendael_monitor_2015/.

6 Keohane, R.O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press; Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Little Brown and Company; Buzan, B. and Little, R. 2000. *International Systems in World History*, Oxford University Press; Haggard, S. and Simmons, B. 1987. 'Theories of International Regimes', *International Organization*, 41 (3), 491-517, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3117934/Simmons_TheoriesInternational.pdf?sequence=2; Hasenclever, A., et al. 1997. *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations.

Problem 2: the degree of cooperation

The need for variation within the quadrant chart is also a complicated matter. Within IR-theory, there are multiple views on what is meant by international order and who or what determines it. We can start with the way actors are regarded. One group argues that states, especially large states, determine the structure of the international order.⁷ Others argue that the totality of international institutions regulates the behaviour of states.⁸ A third group of theorists believes that international relations are above all a social construct, and therefore emphasises the importance of the development of norms.⁹ All three theoretical approaches assume the importance of non-state actors (NGOs, businesses, transnational public movements, etc.) to the international order.

Part of the problem is that actors have different roles within the international system: they can stimulate debate, criticise the existing order, set the agenda, make the rules, conclude treaties, lobby, provide information or form a threat. Only the main actors are distinguished in the quadrant chart in its developed form. Therefore the focus is on two specific roles: which actors take decisions and which actors set the agenda?

Although each approach takes a different view of important actors, all three approaches agree that regime theory provides a tool to describe the degree of order in the international system (although each of the dominant theoretical schools of thought assigns different value to it).¹⁰ Regime theory originated in the 1980s in order to provide a better understanding of the growth of international institutions, cooperation between states and the emergence of non-state actors.¹¹ In other words, questions that also affect the quadrant chart. Although there are several definitions of 'regime', the most common one was given by Sebastian Krasner: 'a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which the actors converge in a particular area of international relations' (see Table 3).

7 Strange, S. 1982. 'Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis', *International Organization* 36(2), 479-496.

8 Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. 1973. 'Power and Interdependence', *Survival* 15(4), doi:10.1080/00396337308441409.

9 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. 1998. 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917.

10 Hasenclever, A., et al. 1996. 'Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40(2), 177-228; Hasenclever, A., et al. 1997. *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations.

11 Krasner, S.D. 1982. 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', *International Organization*, 36(2), 186.

Table 3 Definitions used in the CSM

Term	Definition
Actors	This covers both state and non-state actors (companies, NGOs, public movements, etc.).
Norms	Principles concerning the fundamental structure of the international order.
Rules	Concrete actions and agreements on how to act (e.g. the rules of the game).
Decision-making procedures	Procedures for making and implementing decisions (electoral systems, bureaucracies, etc.).


Regime theory is able to look at the degree of cooperation (or non-cooperation) in the international system. The CSM seeks to identify long-term and fundamental principles of international cooperation. Regime theory compels experts to look beyond short-term and *ad hoc* cooperation, and aims to identify more stable and long-term patterns.¹² To that end, it considers the principles that govern actors' behaviour, and specifically the underlying norms and rules. Norms address the principles by which the international order is structured (they prescribe expected behaviour). Rules, on the other hand, are concrete actions that parties implement.

A second strength of regime theory is that it considers not just formal agreements such as concluded treaties, but also informal interactions within the international system. It is important to look beyond what has been formally agreed on paper; regime theory considers not just institutionalised ways of working together, but also how states and non-state actors behave in practice.

The quadrant chart

The further development of the quadrant chart in the Future Policy Survey is based on these insights. The horizontal axis represents a continuum from non-cooperation to comprehensive institutionalised cooperation. The vertical axis describes which actors determine the structure of the international order. This results in the following quadrant chart:

12 Jervis, R. 1982. 'Security Regimes', *International Organization*, 36(2), 357.

Figure 1 The quadrant chart

On the horizontal axis, a distinction is then made between fundamental norms (principles regarding the structure of the international order, such as non-proliferation) and practical rules (such as the resolution of trade disputes within a multilateral setting). The primary reason for this is that the distinction improves our understanding of the extent to which there is conflict (or cooperation). Conflict about practical rules (for example, about the voting ratio in the IMF) is usually less serious than conflict about the fundamental structure (for example, disagreement about non-intervention norms or norms of free trade). The discussion about the rise of China has taken place at this level: does the country want to change the rules of the game (fundamental norms), or is it primarily about a realignment of power relations and representation (practical rules)?

In short, the closer one tends towards the left side of the axis (the non-cooperation side), the more disagreement there is about the fundamental structure of the international order. Similarly, this distinction helps to provide a more accurate picture of the degree of cooperation in the international order: normative agreement between actors is important in itself, but less significant than additional agreement on concrete practical rules. In other words, the closer one tends towards the right side of the axis (the cooperation side), the more there is agreement and a concrete set of measures to realise that agreement. Table 4 describes the six options.

Table 4 The (horizontal) conflict-cooperation axis

Axis label	Meaning
No cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No cooperation at all. • Negative norm of conflict (e.g. anarchy). • Maximisation of short-term interests.
Disagreement about norms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fundamental conflict about the organisation of the international system. • Implicit and explicit, open and hidden conflicts about norms.
Disagreement about rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors disagree about the means to be used and seek to make changes. • Actors largely disregard the rules of the system (withdrawal is also a compliance problem).
Change (norms and rules)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors formulate and/or reformulate norms and/or rules for new or existing problems. • There may be a mild form of non-compliance.
Norms and rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors agree on both the norms (how to organise the system) and the rules. • There may be occasional non-compliance with the rules. • There may also be (some) formal institutions.
(Complete) cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actors agree on the norms and rules. • Actors generally comply with the rules. • Interaction takes place within institutions and is not organised bilaterally.

The vertical axis represents a continuum from state to non-state actors. The distinction of more precise categories reflects one of the major debates within IR, which is about which actors are dominant within the international system (see also above). Whereas (neo-)realistic theory takes the state as the primary actor (with the great powers determining the degree of order), approaches such as (neo-)liberalism/functionalist theory emphasise the importance of other actors such as corporations and international organisations. There even are approaches that use a completely non-Westphalian conception in which transnational actors such as protest movements or elite groups determine the international order. To prevent bias, the vertical axis helps to clarify which actors are important in which areas. The extent to which actors are 'important' is measured by the extent to which they set the agenda or take the key decisions. Five groups are distinguished: right at the top are the great powers (Russia, China, the US, the EU, India, Brazil and Japan), followed by a larger group of heterogeneous states, followed by more hybrid forms in which states operate through non-state actors, or in which states are important along with non-state actors, or in which non-state actors almost exclusively call the shots. This is summarised in Table 5.

Table 5 The (vertical) actors axis

Axis label	Meaning
Great powers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The actors that make the decisions and/or set the agenda in the system are the great powers (Russia, China, US, EU, India, Brazil, Japan).
Heterogeneous group of states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The actors that make the decisions and/or set the agenda in the system are a large number of states.
Hybrid – states (or state I(N)GOs) are dominant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A hybrid system in which the actors that make the decisions and/or set the agenda are diverse, but in which states or state-dominated I(N)GOs are still prevailing.
Hybrid – equilibrium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A hybrid system in which both state and non-state actors take the decisions and/or set the agenda.
Hybrid – dominated by I(N)GOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A hybrid system in which mainly non-state actors take the decisions and/or set the agenda.