

Understanding contestations for power: security and justice in fragile environments

Erwin van Veen
Megan Price
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Madina Diallo

CRU Research Programme



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About the authors

Erwin van Veen is a Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit. He specializes in understanding the politics and change dynamics of security and justice provision, as well as modern conflict dynamics and the nature of associated peace processes.

Megan Price is a Research Fellow at Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit. She contributes research on international strategies for supporting security reform in fragile settings. Her current research focuses on security provision as a negotiated political process, and the role of informal and non-conventional actors in statebuilding.

Diana Goff is a Research Fellow at Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit. Her research focuses on understanding the dynamics that drive the organization and provision of justice in fragile environments, including access to justice, restorative, transitional and customary justice.

Madina Diallo is a project assistant at Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit. She conducts preliminary research in the area of security and justice and generally supports the research program.

About CRU

The Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' is a think tank and diplomatic academy on international affairs. The Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is a specialized team within the Institute, conducting applied, policy-oriented research and developing practical tools that assist national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations in their engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations.

Clingendael Institute
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
The Netherlands

Email: info@clingendael.nl
Website: <http://www.clingendael.nl/>

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Summary

This document outlines a research programme of the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute about the nature, organisation and provision of security and justice in fragile and crisis environments for the period 2015–2019. It is positioned against the broader question of what role violence plays in current processes of state formation and is guided by three lines of research:

- 1. How do elite interests, coalitions and pacts influence the organisation and provision of security and justice?**
- 2. How is local innovation in security and justice solutions addressing 21st-century violence?**
- 3. How can international support for security and justice development be improved?**

Whereas question 1 is more conceptual and examines the power dynamics of security and justice in the creation and mitigation of insecurity and disorder, questions 2 and 3 are more operational and look at practical possibilities in this context for improving the state of security and justice in fragile environments from, respectively, a local (question 2) and an international (question 3) perspective.

Each research question consists of three sub-inquiries that tackle a specific issue on the knowledge frontier of security and justice in fragile situations. The document also provides an overview of the practical requirements for implementation of this research programme, such as partnerships, products and funding.

Introduction: a guide for the reader

This research programme emerges from years of work on security- and justice-related matters by the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute. It differentiates itself from programmes of other think-tanks by straddling the realms of academia, policy-making and operational practice, which endows it with depth as well as practical relevance. In addition, while its research confronts politically inconvenient truths head-on, it does not just critique from the side-lines. Instead, it takes care to always offer a well-supported view on what is feasible in an imperfect world. The paper consists of three chapters:

1. *Grounding our knowledge agenda*: This chapter provides the substantive grounding for the programme by situating and exploring the meaning of the notions of security and justice in the broader context of war and violence.
2. *What we want to know*: This chapter presents the programme's key research questions in detail (section 1). It also summarises CRU's track record in the area of security and justice (section 2).
3. *Executing the research programme*: This chapter describes the type of products the programme envisages (section 1), the type of partnerships and funding it is looking for (section 2) and outlines the composition of the programme's portfolio for 2015 (section 3).

1. Grounding our knowledge agenda

This chapter discusses the notions of security and justice in the broader context of war and violence.

Present-day violence features many 'hybrid' characteristics as it mixes classic interstate force,¹ transnational conflict drivers (such as crime, terrorism and religious ideology)² and domestic struggles for power and wealth at various levels. The result is an overlapping patchwork of warfare, internationalised civil wars and transnational conflict and crime, as well as organised violence within national boundaries. Important parts of this patchwork are to some extent still shielded from the rest of the world by the veneer of sovereignty and UN-sanctioned state borders.³ However, for all practical purposes this patchwork is intimately connected with the external world, as modern-day possibilities for violence have irrevocably meshed with its age-old legacies and practices, thanks to the waves of globalisation that have greatly reduced physical, regulatory and mental barriers to communication and movement.⁴ This creates new uncertainties about the

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- 1 This is the classic form of organised violence that dominates history books: from the Warring States Period and the Thirty Years' War to the Israeli-Arab wars. It is inhabited by statesmen like Otto von Bismarck, generals like Norman Schwarzkopf, and military theorists like Nikolai Ogarkov. Illustrative literature includes: Clausewitz, C. (1992) [1832], *On War*, David Campbell Publishers: London; Metz, S. and J. Kievit (1995), *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, US Army War College: Carlisle Barracks; Smith, R. (2007), *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, Random House: New York.
 - 2 Patrick, S. (2011), *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security*, Oxford University Press: Oxford; OECD (2012), *Think Global, Act Global: Global Factors that Influence Conflict and Fragility*, OECD Publishing: Paris; Van Veen, E. (2014), *Upgrading Peacekeeping to Counter Transnational Conflict Drivers: Five Essential Actions*, Policy brief, Clingendael Conflict Research Unit: The Hague.
 - 3 See, for example: World Bank (2000, 2002), *Voices of the Poor*, Global Studies, [online](#) (consulted 18 September 2014); Collier, P. (2008), *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, Oxford University Press: Oxford; North, D., J. Wallis, and B. Weingast (2009), *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; Kaldor, M. (2012), *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Third edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford; Simpson, E. (2012), *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics*, Hurst & Company: London; Haugen, G. and V. Boutros (2014), *The Locust Effect: Why the End of Poverty Requires the End of Violence*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.
 - 4 For example: Heine, J. and R. Thakur (eds) (2011), *The Dark Side of Globalization*, United Nations University Press: New York.

dynamics and connections between different manifestations of violence while leaving familiar questions about global anarchy and social justice intact and unresolved.⁵

Against this backdrop, 'security and justice' is a slightly amorphous term that tends to be invoked in contrast with the insecurity and injustice that are inevitable consequences of episodes of violence and conflict. The insecurity that episodes of violence create requires no explanation. The injustice they create follows from the growing dominance of might over right, which increases as a conflict persists.⁶ The connection between the nature of violence and the conceptualisation, organisation and delivery of security and justice is intimate for two reasons. First, the nature of violence, and in particular its underlying political-economic drivers and dynamics, informs how and for whom security and justice are organised and delivered. Second, the manner of organisation of security and justice can in turn bring about violence, social order, or both at the same time (but e.g. for different groups). In consequence, at the conceptual level 'security and justice' represent simultaneously – and somewhat paradoxically – the opposite of violence as well as a factor that can contribute to it. At a less conceptual level, 'security and justice' also constitute a normative aspiration and a more technical toolkit.⁷ Each of these three meanings is briefly examined below:

Security and justice as concept for establishing order in the face of violence

The organisation and provision of security and justice offers a basic, short-term solution to the problem of socio-political disorder and violence. In its simple version, compliance with customs, rules and regulations is ultimately enforced by armed agents of the dominating political power – not necessarily the state – and the threat of violence.⁸ This ensures a minimum level of safety and justice that may be profoundly illiberal and

5 As for instance discussed in: Bull, H. (2002), *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Third edition, Palgrave: London; Guzzini, S. (2002), *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, Routledge: London. The research project on non-conventional violence of Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit represents an initial effort to develop a better grasp of these uncertainties (see: <http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/non-conventional-armed-violence-new-challenges-and-responses>).

6 A striking example is how the war on terror has gradually led to severe abrogations of civil rights in developed as well as in developing nations.

7 For example: Cawthra, G. and R. Luckham (2003) (eds), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, Zed Books: London; OECD (2007), *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, OECD Publishing: Paris; Sedra, M. (2010), *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, CIGI: Waterloo.

8 For compliance to be sustainable (i.e. requiring a limited amount of security and justice resources), customs, rules and regulations must reflect prevailing social beliefs, values and attitudes.

unequal, but nevertheless allows for basic human social and economic interaction.⁹ In its more complex version, it will be combined with peaceful methods, in addition to threats and guns, to settle disputes and contain violence, relying on political dialogue, negotiation, reconciliation and civil resistance, which appeal to shared humanity, norms and beliefs.¹⁰ The trouble is that such 'softer' alternative methods of bringing about security and justice – softer compared with 'hard' enforcement – tend to be powerless in the face of the lowest-common-denominator logic of violence: those who resort to it have the power to enforce their will at the cost of the life, property and rights of those who do not.¹¹

Creating more sustainable socio-political order and ensuring the continued absence of violence requires the complex version of the organisation and provision of security and justice. In addition it requires substantive complementary features such as a measure of tolerance in social relations, productive economic development with a distribution of wealth perceived as sufficiently 'just' and an adequate measure of political inclusivity. In short, 'security and justice' need to be connected with other areas of socio-economic development to provide a longer-term, more sustainable solution to the problems of social order and violence. This was precisely what many sought to accomplish through the notion of human security: identifying and establishing such connections.

Security and justice as normative aspiration for how order should be maintained

Security and justice as basic conceptual solutions to the problem of socio-political disorder do not tell us how such order will be maintained or for whom. It can just as easily take the form of a repressive security apparatus under a dictatorship, rough-and-ready security and justice provision on the basis of tribal customary practice, or accountable neighbourhood policing. Hybrids are also imaginable – and indeed prevalent. In short, security and justice are not absolute notions, but matters of degree.

9 The civil wars in Syria and Iraq serve as a stark reminder that the normatively imperfect maintenance of socio-political order can be far preferable to disorder as its alternative. The violence associated with disorder can acquire such gruesome characteristics and vast proportions, gradually transforming beyond recognition the aims for which it was originally mobilised, that even a repressive dictatorship comes to be seen as the lesser evil.

10 See for example: Chenoweth, E. and M. Stephan (2011), *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, Columbia University Press: New York; Odendaal, A. (2013), *A Crucial Link: Local Peace Committees and National Peacebuilding*, United States Institute for Peace Press: Washington, DC.

11 This logic is the core of many processes of state formation that seek to centralise and monopolise such capabilities. See: Tilly, C. (1992), *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992*, Blackwell: Oxford; Fukuyama, F. (2011), *The Origins of Political Order*, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux: New York.

They are a public good by design, not by necessity.¹² The notions of civil–military relations, democratic control over security forces and accountability under the law reflect the normative ambition of expanding the – in many cases – limited provision of security and justice on the basis of criteria such as impartiality and accountability.¹³ Both historically and today, this expansion is controversial. Even when there is abstract acceptance of such normative notions, their practical application in a particular context tends to be both unique and highly contested.¹⁴ In consequence, local variations of security and justice solutions have their own morality, are diverse and can hardly be measured against a single standard. This raises the questions of what norms are locally appropriate, what functionality is acceptable and what constitutes progress.

Security and justice as a set of institutional tools with a certain functionality and legitimacy

Providing security and justice requires organisation and, in consequence, ‘security and justice’ has become a shorthand reference for the entire set of institutions and organisations that enable the delivery of security and justice as private, public or private/public goods with their different policies, rules, capabilities, accountability mechanisms and client or target groups. The variety of institutional manifestations of the concept of security and justice is huge, reflecting not only historical path-dependencies, geography and custom, but also elite interests, public preferences and recent policy choices. The upshot of this is that the normative question of how and for whom order is maintained must be considered in the context of complex bureaucratic and customary systems that have their own administrative logic and organisational interests. This suggests that, at least in the short run, the security and justice make-up of most contexts is highly determined and therefore resistant to any efforts to introduce change.

The preceding discussion suggests that, in the face of 21st-century violence, providing security and justice remains an important basic method for (re)establishing and maintaining social order while simultaneously representing a heavily contested notion about how this should happen in highly context-specific, change-resistant organisational realities. Figure 1 below demonstrates how these reflections on the meaning of security

12 Kaul, I. et al. (eds) (2003), *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*, Oxford University Press (OUP): Oxford.

13 For example: Huntington, S. (1957), *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA; OECD-DAC (2005), *Security System Reform and Governance*, OECD Publishing: Paris.

14 See for example: Schroeder, U., F. Chappuis and D. Kocak (2014), ‘Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance’, *International Peacekeeping*, 21:2, pp. 214–230.

and justice in the broader panorama of social disorder and violence shape and inform the central research questions of CRU's Security and Justice Research Programme. These central research questions are further detailed in the next chapter.




Figure 1 From analysis to research questions

2. What we want to know

This chapter presents the programme's key research questions in detail (section 1). It also summarises CRU's track record in the area of security and justice (section 2).

Both the threat and the occurrence of disorder and violence are most pronounced in fragile and crisis situations and states. This is in part because many are embroiled in episodes of recurrent conflict and in part because they feature fewer restraints on the exercise of violence, including in its more naked forms.¹⁵ It is in these situations that the legacies of conflict are strongest, the possibilities for positive change slimmest and the provision of security and justice of almost any kind most urgent. It is also in these situations that power is contested, marginalisation is common and corruption rife. Finally, it is in these situations that many of the world's poor continue to live and where a significant percentage of the world's violent deaths occurs.¹⁶ For these reasons, CRU's Security and Justice Research Programme filters the questions contained in figure 1 above through the lenses of fragility and crisis.

Geographically, this introduces a focus on *Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia*.¹⁷ Thematically, it introduces a focus on *violence* at the sharp edge of development considered as a process of social contestation. Simply put, the research programme focuses on countries where levels of organised violence (or the threat thereof) are structurally high – whether the violence is political, terrorist, criminal or hybrid in nature – and where violence has become a part of daily life, of methods of rule or of competition for power, and where mistrust is high.

15 However, fragile situations should not be equated with low-income countries since middle-income countries feature in a significant number of today's conflicts. See: Fearon, J. (2010), *Governance and Civil War Onset*, World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC. On the recurrence of conflict: World Bank (2011), *Conflict Security and Development*, World Development Report 2011, World Bank: Washington, DC.

16 See, for example: World Bank (2011), *op.cit.*; OECD (2015), *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting post-2015 Ambitions*, OECD Publishing, Paris; Human Security Report Project (2013), *Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation*, Human Security Press, Vancouver.

17 One can use, for example, the Fragile States Index of the Fund for Peace, or the OECD's annual report on resource flows to fragile states, as rough gauges for assessing the main geographical areas involved.

Key research questions

Research question #1 – How do elite interests, coalitions and pacts influence the organisation and provision of security and justice?¹⁸

Where political authority is severely contested and/or central enforcement is absent, strong incentives exist to maintain the ability to wield violence as necessary. Elites typically have the means to do so and therefore are likely to use security and justice organisations – through which this ability manifests itself – to protect their interests, whether these are defined at the individual, group or national level.¹⁹ They generally do so as part of processes of coalition formation and deal-making with other elite sub-groups.²⁰ As narrower coalitions will tend to increase the profitability and lower the transaction cost of maintaining such deals, these pacts are often exclusionary and tend to partially privatise security and justice. This typically widens the gap between the ‘heart of power’ and the general population, which can lead to significant – if not violent – social contestation. In consequence, a key dilemma is how elites can be incentivised to take a more public-goods-based approach to the institutionalisation, organisation and delivery of security and justice. On this basis, three more detailed research questions will guide this part of the programme:

- What are typical interests that elites seek to protect through security and justice organisations? Which factors influence whether such elite interests clash, overlap or align with broader public interests?
- How do such interests influence how security and justice are organised and provided? What are the mechanisms through which this happens?
- Under what conditions do elites decide / can elites be nudged to provide security and justice in a manner that gravitates more towards a public good? What role can social contestation play in precipitating such shifts?

18 This research question is examined in close collaboration with CRU’s Political Economy Research Programme.

19 Elites can be defined as: ‘the small group of leaders – rarely more than 3% in any unit of analysis – that occupy formal or informal positions of authority and power in public and private organisations or sectors and that take or influence key economic, political, social and administrative decisions’ (Leftwich, A. (2009), *Bringing Agency Back In: Politics and Human Agency in Building Institutions and States*, Synthesis and Overview Report, Developmental Leadership Program (DLP): York).

20 See: North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), *op.cit.*; Khan, M. (2010), ‘Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions’, working paper, unpublished; DLP (2011), *Politics, Leadership and Coalitions in Development*, Workshop Findings 10–11 March, Developmental Leadership Program: Frankfurt.

Research question #2 – How is local innovation in security and justice solutions addressing 21st-century violence?

It is clear that providing security and justice in fragile environments solely through the central state – or what is left of it – is as fraught with difficulties as is providing security and justice through customary and sub-state providers. While any efforts made by the state are very likely to be hampered by its orientation towards elites, poor accountability and limited reach, customary providers often suffer from a limited scale and level of sophistication, as well as the perpetuation of existing social hierarchies. To this challenge must be added the phenomenon of inter- and transnational influences on security and justice provision, such as organised crime and franchised terrorism, and the question of what can be done to counter their effects through regulatory and enforcement action across borders. The need to weld together elements of these three dimensions of security and justice provision – state, customary and transborder – in cogent responses, makes their provision difficult in the best of circumstances but especially so in fragile ones. Local innovation is likely to be critical. Three specific research questions will guide this area of the programme:

- Can customary and informal security and justice actors develop and be supported in ways that create a manageable ‘patchwork’ of providers, which is compatible with parallel state-building efforts that seek an increasing role for the state in the provision of security and justice?
- What are effective security and justice responses at the (sub)national level to reduce or mitigate transnational conflict drivers (such as crime, radicalisation and terrorism) that increase local insecurity and injustice? For example, how do militarised approaches compare with police, justice and intelligence approaches in terms of keeping the peace and maintaining social order?²¹
- Would it make sense to prioritise the mediation, reconciliation, truth-seeking and community restoration aspects of justice over its punitive aspects, in the face of the sheer scale of violence, victimhood and destruction of social capital in many fragile states?

21 This research question is examined in close collaboration with CRU’s Politics & Crime research programme.

Research question #3 – How can the quality of international support for security and justice development be improved?

International support for security and justice development retains strong notions both of social engineering and of exporting blueprints, with OECD countries implicitly used as models and a Weberian monopoly on the use of violence as desired end-state. Neither international political thinking about development nor the international toolkit has been able to develop much in the way of operating modalities that can come to terms with the realities of power politics, patronage and legal pluralism in fragile settings. This has perpetuated relatively technical approaches that leave local systems of patronage-based governance undisturbed and legacies of violence unaddressed. The specific research questions that will guide this area of the programme include:

- What type of results can be achieved by international initiatives that support security and justice development, given the gap between international norms and principles and the opaque operating realities of fragile environments? How should such international initiatives be scoped and monitored to have a reasonable chance of success?
- What innovations in international criminal justice mechanisms could make international attempts to restore security and address impunity more effective?
- How can UN peacekeeping, arguably the international community's most effective way to temporarily provide security in fragile environments, be improved to deal with the political logic and economy of contemporary violence?²²

Our track record in security and justice research

Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit can demonstrate a credible track record for generating innovative research approaches and rigorous analysis and impactful outreach in the area of security and justice. We present selected work below and briefly discuss its results and impact.

22 Research into this question will build on the productive collaboration between CRU and the Knowledge Platform on Security and the Rule of Law (KPSRL).

Table 1 Projects that have advanced our conceptual understanding of security and justice

<p><i>'Mapping' the future of Security Sector Reform</i></p>	<p>This policy brief outlined the key developments and open challenges with the concept of Security Sector Reform. It informed discussions in the Stabilization Leadership Forum (an informal body that brings together government representatives of a number of Western countries), as well as the Dutch Foreign Ministry's policy development on the subject.</p>
<p><i>The Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform: A pragmatic approach to addressing the security and justice spectrum</i></p>	<p>This policy brief identified potential pathways for establishing an inclusive framework to address issues of security and justice in post-conflict areas. It served as strategic input to inform the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations as it engaged in discussions on the relationship between Rule of Law (RoL) Reform and Security Sector Reform (SSR).</p>
<p><i>Engagement with non-state actors in fragile states: Narrowing definitions, broadening scope</i></p>	<p>This report provided a framework for identifying various kinds of non-state actors, and outlined the main challenges for engagement with such actors in fragile and conflict-affected situations. It provided input for discussions within Dutch civil society on flexible aid modalities and partnering with local actors.</p>

Table 2 Projects that have focused on understanding local solutions to 21st-century violence

<p><i>Political economy analysis of the state of justice in Yemen</i></p>	<p>This report analysed the major recent developments and strains on Yemen's state-based and customary justice systems, and investigated how its 'state of justice' has influenced the several episodes of violence that the country has suffered since 2004. It served as input into the multi-annual strategic plan, and associated programming, of the Dutch embassy in Sanaa</p>
<p><i>Putting governance at the heart of Security Sector Development: Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development programme</i></p>	<p>This report assessed the strengths and weaknesses of an innovative Security Sector Reform programme to showcase how the quality of programming can be improved and offered some reflections on the new challenges that inevitably accompany efforts at innovation. It informed a high-level meeting between several members of Burundi's cabinet and the Dutch government.</p>
<p><i>Local justice and security providers in South Kivu: going local to support youth-neighbourhood watch-community development groups</i></p>	<p>This report was a component of a larger research project examining the role of non-state actors in security and justice service delivery, and the options for donors to support such actors. The project culminated in a conference that brought together relevant experts, policy-makers and practitioners for discussion and reflection.</p>
<p><i>Local justice and security development in Burundi: workplace associations as a pathway ahead</i></p>	<p>This paper also contributed the above-mentioned research project. It provided input to the development of a research programme investigating the broader role of informal economies in fragile and conflict-affected settings, helping to highlight links between livelihood development, social organisation and security.</p>

Table 3 Projects that have contributed to improving the quality of international support for security and justice development

<p><i><u>Review of the UN's Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections</u></i></p>	<p>This project conducted an organisational performance assessment of a recent UN initiative from the dual perspective of UN HQ and seven UN field operations with the aim of offering the initiative fresh food for thought for further improvement. It informed high-level managerial discussions in the UN on the way forward, stimulated stronger donor engagement and underpinned a high-level UN retreat on the issues.</p>
<p><i><u>The EU's Support to Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo</u></i></p>	<p>This report reflected on EU support for SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), both through its Defence Reform mission (EUSEC) and its Police Reform mission (EUPOL). Findings were shared at a strategic policy workshop, organised in Brussels by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, convening 20 European policy-makers and member states' representatives to discuss lessons to be learned from the EU CSDP missions in Guinea-Bissau and DRC.</p>
<p><i><u>Upgrading peacekeeping to counter transnational conflict drivers</u></i></p>	<p>This policy brief discussed what actions are necessary to enable peacekeeping operations to come to terms with an important dimension of 21st-century violence, namely transnational conflict drivers. It enjoyed broad circulation among senior staff of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and members of the Knowledge Platform Security and the Rule of Law.</p>
<p><i><u>The EU and Rule of Law Reform in Kosovo</u></i></p>	<p>This report presented findings from a case study carried out in Pristina in January 2010. The field mission's objective was to investigate the challenges and opportunities that the EU faces when supporting the reform of the rule of law in Kosovo. It was included as input for the Dutch Foreign Ministry's strategic plans for support for the rule of law in Kosovo in 2012, and for the European Court of Auditors' Report on EU assistance in Kosovo related to the rule of law (2012).</p>

3. Executing the research programme

This chapter describes the type of products the programme envisages producing (section 1), the type of partnerships and funding it is looking for (section 2) and outlines the composition of the programme’s portfolio for 2015 (section 3).

Products

A brief overview of the types of products the research programme will deliver is given below.

Table 4 Overview of intended products of the research programme

Product	Description
Its own blog	The research programme will set up its own blog on www.clingendael.nl/cru halfway through the programme (in the course of 2017), i.e. when capacity and findings have accumulated sufficiently to produce an 800-word post every two weeks.
Blog posts elsewhere	Whenever salient findings emerge that can be briefly articulated and can provocatively influence debate, the programme will find opportunities to do so. Primary target blogs include: Open Democracy, the Global Observatory, the JSRP’s blog, Insight in Conflict and the ETH’s security blog.
Policy briefs	Typically provocative ‘think pieces’ of 5–10 pages that conclude with action-focused recommendations to stimulate policy reflection and development. Lightly referenced but solid in their argumentation.
Consultancy advice	Tailor-made advice on sensitive questions where discretion is required. The programme retains its independent research focus and critical analysis, but products and findings remain confidential.
Research reports	Typically thorough analyses of deeper questions pertaining to a particular theme or country. These will typically seek to generate a narrative in the form of a research story and run at 40–60 pages with dense referencing of both academic and policy literature as well as online media (blogs, Twitter, newspapers).

Facilitated workshops	Usually workshops will complement substantive research products and seek to engage clients on their findings in a dynamic and focused manner. They aim to distil and discuss research implications for operational practice to facilitate transition from paper to reality. Their duration can range from a half-day to two full days.
Short trainings	Trainings are knowledge-focused (i.e. not about the transfer of practical skills) and will usually be designed as complementary to, and on the basis of, substantive work.
Conference contributions	Typically keynote speeches, panel contributions, workshop facilitations or brief discussion notes to stimulate reflection and trigger debate on the basis of the programme's research findings.

Partnerships and funding

Implementation of this programme will require continuous acquisition and innovative partnerships. There are three general ways to engage with the programme:

- *Core:* An external entity engages the research programme for about 25% of its annual cost. In return, the entity's preferences will be taken into account in the annual research plan and it can make requests for urgent research throughout the year in accordance with its immediate priorities (within the programme's parameters). All non-confidential research findings will be shared with the entity and, if required, presented during more in-depth engagements.
- *Project:* An external entity engages the programme on a particular research question and specific terms of references will be drawn up to execute the request in project form. The programme subsequently delivers the agreed results within time and on budget, including possibilities such as workshops and trainings in addition to written products.
- *Partnership:* An external entity and the programme engage on matters of direct mutual benefit such as joint events, sharing findings/lessons and the like whereby funds do not necessarily come into play but both partners enrich each other's experiences.

CRU is specifically looking to strengthen its connections with cutting-edge research initiatives elsewhere that are relevant to its work. The purpose of such partnerships is to create mutually beneficially learning by building strong relations with key research(ers) and streams. In addition, CRU is looking to engage in network partnerships that can strengthen its ability to reach out for reflection and discussion on relevant research findings. The purpose of such partnerships is to share learning and knowledge through larger stakeholder forums.

The portfolio of the CRU Security and Justice Research Programme in 2015

This section provides an overview of the projects that constitute CRU's Security and Justice Research Programme in 2015. The findings of these projects will be used to further refine the research programme. They also provide a flavour of the range of research that Clingendael's Conflict Research Unit is capable of conducting with excellent results.

Table 5 Projects currently being executed within the CRU Security and Justice Research Programme

CRU SECURITY AND JUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAMME		
Research question #1	Research question #2	Research question #3
<i>How do elite interests, coalitions and pacts influence the organisation and provision of security and justice?</i>	<i>How is local innovation in security and justice solutions addressing 21st-century violence?</i>	<i>How can the quality of international support for security and justice development be improved?</i>
Current projects		
<p>1 - Elites, security and justice</p> <p>An exploratory project that analyses the dynamic between elite competition and behaviour, and security and justice provision (multiple case studies starting with Lebanon and Ethiopia)</p> <p>(2015: Dutch MFA, Swedish FBA, KPSRL)</p>	<p>4 - Analysis of the state of justice in Mali</p> <p>A project that analyses the state of justice in Mali and what feasible approaches to its many challenges might look like</p> <p>(2015: Nationale PostcodeLoterij)</p>	<p>7 - Community security</p> <p>A project to improve the design of INGO-funded projects and activities that seek to increase security as perceived and experienced by communities in fragile environments (case studies Afghanistan and South Sudan)</p> <p>(2015: Cordaid, Dutch MFA, KPSRL)</p>

<p>2 - The nature and meaning of progress in post-conflict security</p> <p>A project that examines how progress in security in post-conflict states has come about, with a focus on Liberia and Timor-Leste</p> <p>(2015: ODI)</p>	<p>5 - Analysis of the state of justice in the Ukraine</p> <p>A project that examines the political economy of Ukraine's justice system as enabler and barrier to political-administrative reform</p> <p>(2015: Dutch MFA)</p>	<p>8 - International courts in The Hague</p> <p>A project that stimulates constructive reflection on how the capacity of international criminal law judges can be increased</p> <p>(2015: tbd)</p>
<p>3 - Contribution to a Palgrave Macmillan handbook on crisis and conflict analysis</p> <p>A project that includes several chapters of critical analysis of existing peace- and state-building paradigms</p> <p>(2015-2016: Palgrave Macmillan)</p>	<p>6 - Plural security provision in the city</p> <p>A project that looks at how municipal authorities can effectively engage with the array of (in)formal security actors operating in their localities</p> <p>(2015-2016: KPSRL, NWO)</p>	