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The relationship between external and internal security

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Contents

Introduction

The interrelatedness of external and internal security is not a new phenomenon. A relationship between conflicts such as those that occurred in the Balkans and internal security, a relationship that manifested itself in the form of, for example, illegal immigration and an increase in cross-border crime, was also clearly visible in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001 and the attacks on civilian targets in Europe, particularly the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 London bombings of 2005, truly brought foreign-bred terrorist violence into the domestic sphere. The shock caused by these attacks made the relationship between external and internal security that much more tangible and made everyone more aware that external and internal security were part of single whole rather than separate dimensions. This is certainly true with respect to terrorism. The spillover effects of instability and conflicts elsewhere in the world are also increasingly affecting European nations, however. There is a direct link, for example, between human trafficking, drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime and volatile countries and regions, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.

National security strategies, the organisation of national security and the structures in place to maintain it, as well as the capabilities required in this regard, also in terms of civil-military cooperation, have therefore come to be seen in a different light.

The relationship between external and internal security is also being increasingly recognised at the European level. Relevant actors in the European Union (EU) have started cooperating in a range of activities that, based on the idea of dealing with an issue at its source, include military and civilian operations carried out in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in places like Kosovo and in certain parts of Africa. In addition, military assets are being used to an increasing extent to guard Europe's external borders.

The examples of practical cooperation between different actors in the field of external and internal security cannot conceal the fact, however, that there is tension or even an unwillingness to optimally support each other at times. Moreover, there are legal and organisational obstacles in the EU because of the separation of intergovernmental foreign policy/defence powers and the largely Community responsibilities for internal security.

Questions concerning the effects that developments in the relationship between external and internal security will have on the Netherlands must be considered against this background. What, for example, does the intertwined nature of external and internal security mean for Dutch security policy? What are the most relevant risks and threats? How will these risks and threats develop in the future? What are the potential consequences for policy instruments and what capabilities are required in civilian and military terms and in terms of the coordination of these capabilities? What effect is the steadily increasing Europeanisation of internal security having on these national policy components? What developments can be seen in the Netherlands' key partner countries (Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom)?

Chapter 1 of the study deals with the current situation and developments in terms of risks and threats, national and international policy, organisation and capabilities. Chapter 2 addresses future risks and threats for a period of five to ten years. Chapter 3 sets out conclusions and a list of points to note for policymakers in the Netherlands.

Chapters 1 and 2 are divided into general sections and sections about four specific policy areas in which external and internal security overlap, namely immigration, terrorism, cross-border crime and cybercrime. Developments regarding disasters, which can also have a major impact on security, are considered in a separate box at the end of this study.

In 2010, EU member states defined the four policy areas referred to plus disasters as encompassing common challenges in the context of internal security. There can at times be links between immigration, terrorism, cross-border crime and cybercrime. These links are specified to the greatest extent possible in the study. In addition, specific attention is devoted to four partner countries (Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom) in order to make comparisons with the situation in the Netherlands.

This study focuses on the interaction between external and internal actors in terms of policy, organisation and capabilities for deployment on national territory. Consequences for deployment in crisis management operations are discussed in a separate study on the future of peacekeeping operations.

This research is based on a study of the literature and data files. Figures are presented in tables and graphs to the greatest extent possible. To supplement the literature, professionals who deal with external and internal security issues on a daily basis in the four partner countries at national level or at international organisations were interviewed for the analysis of future risks and threats.

In April of this year, members of the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram kidnapped over 200 schoolgirls in Nigeria. Fighting between his group and Nigerian government forces had already claimed over 1,500 lives in the first months of 2014. In May, the UN Security Council blacklisted the terrorist movement.
Photograph: Michael Fleshman

1   Current situation

General

Current risks and threats

Security has many dimensions. In terms of internal security, terrorist threats or major crime may pose a life-threatening danger. Other risks can likewise threaten the functioning of society or parts of a society. Cyber attacks are a prime example in this regard. In a similar vein, immigration can cause problems if there is a lack of social integration, just as an interruption in the supply of energy or raw materials can disrupt an economy and undermine the well-being of the population. Environmental pollution can adversely affect health, and epidemics and diseases can become global challenges. In short, external developments affect our internal security.

The 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001 and attacks in Europe, particularly the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 London bombings of 2005, made the consequences of non-traditional military threats to internal security very tangible. Internal security became a higher priority on the political agenda in the EU as a whole and in individual member states. An EU Internal Security Strategy was adopted by member states in 2010. The action plan for implementation of this strategy defines five areas as 'common threats' that are increasing in scale and scope, namely international criminal networks, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and disasters.[1]

A 2011 Eurobarometer study surveyed the security perceptions of people living in the EU (see Table 1).[2] The threats of terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration came high on the list. Cybercrime was viewed as a threat that would rapidly become more acute.[3]

The European population did not consider wars as a major threat. This development is of course closely linked to the changed security situation. The threat of large-scale violence and armed conflict in Europe of the kind that took place in the Balkans in the 1990s has become less prominent. Greater stability and prolonged peace on the European continent have perhaps also reduced the willingness to deploy armed forces in operations far from home. Just under 60% of the Dutch population thinks that the Ministry of Defence should focus more on national duties, while less than half of the population considers it important to contribute to international missions.[4] This domestic orientation regarding security threats could explain why there is less support for Dutch participation in crisis management operations outside Europe.

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1   European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*, COM (2010) 673 final. Brussels: 22 November 2010.

2   Idem.

3   Although the percentages had dropped in 2013 for terrorism (to 2%), crime (11%) and immigration (12%), the question did not specifically relate to security threats in the 2013 Eurobarometer. See European Commission, *Public Opinion in the European Union – First Results*, Standard Eurobarometer 80, November 2013.

4   Tim de Beer and Désirée Oldenhuis, *Defensie in strategisch opzicht*, TNS NIPO report. Amsterdam: June 2013.

Table 1   Most important threats to security in the EU[5]

Threat	%
Economic and financial crises	34%
Terrorism	33%
Organised crime	21%
Poverty	18%
Illegal immigration	16%
Corruption	15%
Environmental issues / climate change	12%
Natural disasters	11%
Nuclear disasters	10%
Instability of European borders	10%
Cybercrime	9%
Wars	7%
Religious extremism	6%
Minor crime	5%
Other	6%
Don't know	11%

EU27

Current national policy, organisation and capabilities

Although the Dutch government recognises the close relationship between external and internal security, the Netherlands does not have an integrated security strategy. In addition to a National Security Strategy (2007, with later amendments), an International Security Strategy was unveiled in 2013. The latter sets out guidelines for Dutch action with respect to conflicts and instability elsewhere in the world, with an emphasis on the 3D approach of Diplomacy, Defence and Development, while the former focuses mainly on strengthening domestic security. The National Risk Assessment classifies security risks according to a grid defined by probability and effect axes (see Figure 1).

In organisational terms, there is no overarching structure in the Netherlands. The coordination of foreign and domestic aspects of the security policy tales place between the various ministries involved. Coordinating bodies are usually placed under a line ministry or the Ministry of General Affairs. There is no national security council. The Netherlands has had a ministerial crisis management committee since 2013, however. Unless the prime minister decides to chair the committee, it operates under the direction of the Ministry of Security and Justice. The purpose of this committee is to increase clout and unequivocalness in crisis decision-making at national level. There is an interdepartmental coordinating structure under the committee. This structure includes a network of operational centres that coordinate the availability and use of capabilities that are within the competence of the different ministries.

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5   European Commission, *Internal Security Report*, Special Eurobarometer 371, November 2011.

Figure 1   Positions of scenarios in the risk diagram[6]

The Dutch armed forces have supported the authorities that are responsible for national security for many years, both ad hoc and on a structural basis. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee provides support on a structural basis under the Police Act 1993.[7] Supporting civilian authorities has even been a third main duty of the armed forces since 2000. Support provided on an ad hoc basis is regulated within the framework of the Intensification of Civil-Military Cooperation project and concerns all branches of the armed forces.[8] In prac-tice, the Royal Netherlands Army makes the largest contribution in this context. A third of military personnel are permanently in a state of readiness to assist the civilian authorities that are responsible for security. In addition, actual deployment of the armed forces for the performance of national duties increased substantially in recent years. The number of ad hoc requests for military support rose from 23 in 2008 to 162 in 2012. The Strengthening Civil-Military Cooperation working group commenced its activities at the end of 2012. Although this working group originally consisted of official representatives of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Security and Justice, it was later enlarged to include representatives of other ministries, the Security Board (this board consists of the chairpersons of the 25 secu-rity regions), the Netherlands Institute for Safety, Brandweer Nederland (the network organ-isation for fire services in the Netherlands) and other stakeholders involved in crisis man-agement and disaster response. The working group identifies additional capabilities that the armed forces can provide and considers how new insights and knowledge and experience gained can be used. Work performed in the context of the Intensification of Civil-Military

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6   National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), *De Nationale Risicobeoordeling Rapport 2012*, November 2013, p. 12. Available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/11/08/nationale-risicobeoordeling-2012.html.

7   The Police Act 2012 entered into force on 1 January 2013.

8   The capabilities that the Ministry of Defence must guarantee in terms of availability are set out in the *Bestuursafspraken inzake intensivering civiel-militaire samenwerking* (administrative agreements on the intensification of civil-military cooperation) of 2007.

Cooperation project focuses primarily on deployment during the 'warm phase', whereas the Strengthening Civil-Military Cooperation working group focuses mainly on strengthening cooperation during the 'cold phase'. Activities include sharing knowledge, taking part in joint educational programmes, training and exercises, exploring new areas of cooperation, simplifying procedures and providing support for command and control and the provision of other information for deployment options.[9]

The Netherlands Coastguard is exceptional in nature. Although the organisation is under civilian authorities, the Coastguard Centre, which is located at the naval base in Den Helder, its integrated staff includes military and civilian personnel. Assets like aircraft and helicopters operate under the responsibility of different ministries and pilots are often military personnel on active service.

Situation in neighbouring countries

The countries neighbouring the Netherlands have different policies, organisational structures and capabilities.

Belgium

Belgium does not have a national security strategy. The abolition of the *Gendarmerie*, a paramilitary police force, in 2001 limited the role of the armed forces in terms of the support provided to the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, providing military expertise or capabilities to ensure the security of Belgian society is one of the duties of the armed forces.[10] Disposing of explosive ordnance from the First World War is a recurring activity. On average, the Service for the Clearance and Destruction of Explosives (DOVO) receives 3,000 requests a year. The service therefore deals with 200 to 300 tonnes of explosives each year.[11] On special request, the Belgian armed forces support the Belgian police on an ad hoc basis in search operations or in securing locations. The armed forces can also be deployed to provide civilian services in the event of disasters and other emergencies. There is no structural connection with the civilian authorities in the form of the Intensification of Civil-Military Cooperation project in the Netherlands. The navy is part of the Belgian coastguard, however. In the context of disaster response and relief, the Belgian government can deploy Belgian First Aid and Support Teams (B-FASTs), units that consist of civilian and military experts.

Germany

Germany also does not have a national security strategy, yet the federal government emphasises the importance of the whole-of-government approach with respect to security. This approach is known as *Vernetzte Sicherheit*, though this term is often used to refer to external action and is comparable to the 3D approach or the comprehensive approach. The *Bundeswehr*, the unified armed forces of Germany, is available on call to go into action in the event of threats to national security or in the event of disasters (in practice usually in the event of a flood). The division of powers between the federal level (*Bund*) and the states (*Länder*), including in terms of police forces, means specific coordination problems. The states are responsible for police duties in territorial waters, for example, while the federal

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9   Col J.P.L. (Jean-Paul) Duckers, M.S. (Marcel) van Eck, LLM, 'Versterking Civiel-Militaire Samenwerking' in *Magazine Nationale veiligheid en crisisbeheersing*, 12 (2014) 1.

10   Belgian Defence Staff, *Opdrachtverklaring van Defensie en Strategisch kader voor paraatstelling*, 1 October 2011.

11   Frigate Captain, Passed Staff College, Renaud Flamant (ed.), *De waarde van de Belgische Defensie*. Brussels: January 2014, p. 31.

police force is responsible for the exclusive economic zone. Regarding maritime security, civilian and military actors remain separated. The German navy only has a liaison officer in the *Maritimes Sicherheitszentrum*, the Maritime Safety and Security Centre.[12]

France

In France, the national security strategy is set out in the White Paper on Defence and National Security. The most recent edition was released in 2013.[13] It devotes considerable attention to modern threats to national territory. The whole-of-government approach is emphasised, in the context of which the Ministry of Defence plays a leading role. Under the ultimate responsibility of the prime minister, the Secretary-General of Defence and National Security is responsible for cooperation between all of the civilian and military authorities. Around 10,000 military personnel are permanently available for national security duties. The French coastguard consists of military personnel and, as the *Gendarmerie Maritime*, forms part of the national *Gendarmerie*.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom strongly emphasises the whole-of-government approach, which is a core element of its 2010 National Security Strategy.[14] An overarching National Security Council headed by the prime minister oversees implementation. All ministries and agencies involved in domestic and foreign security matters are represented in the council. Friction and bureaucratic conflicts about powers occur below this highest policy level, however.[15] The UK coastguard is a conglomerate of actors that, although not integrated, coordinate their activities. Shortages on the one hand, and a duplication of resources on the other, remain an issue.[16]

International developments

Both the EU and NATO recognise the increasing interrelatedness of external and internal security. The organisations differ in terms of powers, however. Whereas the EU has far-reaching responsibilities regarding internal security, NATO's responsibilities are purely military in nature (territorial defence). Cooperation with civilian authorities takes place primarily in the context of NATO crisis management operations. Internal security agencies cooperate mainly by exchanging information and knowledge.[17]

The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted in 2003 and amended in 2008, notes that external and internal aspects of security are indissolubly linked.[18] Nevertheless, the EU has separate strategies for external action (ESS) and internal security. The EU's 2010

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12   For more details see Margriet Drent, Kees Homan and Dick Zandee, *Civil-Military Capacities for European Security*, Clingendael Report. The Hague: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2013.

13   French Ministry of Defence, *Livre Blanc – Défense et Sécurité Nationale 2013*. Paris: 2013.

14   UK HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Austerity: The National Security Strategy.* London: October 2010.

15   Although it sees improvements, the UK Parliament remains critical about the lack of proper coordination between ministries in the implementation of the whole-of-government approach. See Joint Committee of the National Security Strategy, *The Work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012*, Second Report of Session 2012-2013, HL Paper 115 HC 984. London: 11 February 2013.

16   House of Commons Defence Committee, *Future Maritime Surveillance*, Fifth Report of Session 2012-2013, HC 110. London: 19 September 2012.

17   NATO's International Secretariat has an Emerging Security Challenges Division for this purpose.

18   *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.* Brussels: 12 December 2003.

Internal Security Strategy focuses mainly on improving coordination between the civilian actors that are responsible for the various areas of internal security. It does not really focus on the authorities that are in charge of external action. Coordination with the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy sector remains limited mainly to joint meetings of the two responsible committees.[19] There is no structural cooperation between the European agencies that implement policy and plan and direct activities. There is therefore a gap between the EU actors that are active in the fields of external and internal security, partly because of the legal separation of powers between the intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy and the largely communitarian internal security policy. Bureaucratic and cultural factors reinforce the separate worlds. The external security policy is dominated by diplomacy and military working methods, whereas the internal security policy is dominated by an approach based on law enforcement by the police and the administration of justice by courts. In addition, some member states are concerned about a potential 'militarisation' of internal security, also at EU level, while military personnel are sometimes excessively inclined to impose their working methods on civilian actors.

In practice, there is ad hoc cooperation in Common Security and Defence Policy operations. This cooperation is principally aimed at dealing with threats posed by extremist, criminal and terrorist groups. Military assets are likewise used on an ad hoc basis for EU agencies that operate in the field of internal security like Frontex, the agency that manages operational cooperation at the EU's external borders. Practical arrangements appear to be the best option at the present time, since there is currently no political willingness to radically amend the treaty. During its December 2013 meeting, the European Council stressed the importance of the relationship between external and internal security and called for an EU Maritime Security Strategy and an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. The council also took steps towards the development of dual-use capabilities like unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance missions. These trends, an approach for each sector and a practical focus, look set to continue in the near future. They build on the pragmatic approach originally established by the European Defence Agency, an approach aimed at creating synergy between military and civilian users through civil-military coordination based on the particular set of needs. This approach serves two purposes: it fosters civil-military standardisation and interoperability while at the same time cutting costs by increasing scale. For the same reason, the approach can help to prevent duplication of investments.

The specific areas of internal security – that is, the common challenges defined in the EU's Internal Security Strategy – are discussed in greater depth below. These areas are immigration, terrorism, cross-border crime and cybercrime. An overview of current risks and threats is first given for each of these four areas. Statistics, graphs and maps have been included to provide further clarification. The specific security area is then discussed in terms of current national policy, organisational structures and the capabilities available, after which the situation in each of the Netherlands' four partner countries, namely Belgium, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, is outlined. Finally, developments in the relevant international organisations are discussed. The emphasis in this context is on the EU because of this organisation's increasing responsibilities with respect to internal security, partly in relation to its external action. The challenges of disasters, whether natural or man-made, constitute a special category. Although disasters like major flooding or serious accidents involving nuclear

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19   The Political and Security Committee and the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security.

reactors can have a major impact on security, they differ in nature in terms of causes and the interrelatedness of external and internal security. They are therefore excluded from the in-depth analysis and considered in a separate box.

Immigration

Current risks and threats

The view that immigration is a security problem in the Netherlands and the EU is a contested one. The way in which immigration is seen has changed over the years. The 1980s witnessed a discourse in which immigrants were viewed as free riders of the welfare state. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, immigration increasingly came to be seen as a security problem. A survey of the Marshall Fund shows that in 2013 no less than 44% of the EU population viewed immigration more as a problem than an opportunity (see Figure 2). This percentage is lower in the Netherlands (41%) and Germany (32%) and has been decreasing since 2011, whereas in France, for example, half of the respondents experienced immigration as problematic, an increase relative to 2011.[20] It is striking, for that matter, that immigrant numbers are consistently estimated to be higher than they actually are by the European population.

Figure 2   Concern about immigration[21]

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20 German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013*. 2013, p. 38. Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2013/09/TT-Key-Findings-Report.pdf.

21 Idem, p. 39.

At the same time, immigration is essential to maintaining population levels in the EU. According to demographic projections, the EU population would otherwise decrease from 502 million in 2015 to 431 million in 2060. Corrected for immigration, the EU population would remain above 500 million (517) in 2060.[22]

In most cases, immigration does not pose a direct threat to national security. It can, however, be linked to stress on societal services and provisions. For example, immigrants are often associated with strains on the healthcare system, the education system, the housing stock and the social security system without much distinction being made between legal and illegal immigration. In addition, they are linked to criminal activities, an increase in unemployment among the local population and endangering the culture and social values of the receiving society. Although some groups are indeed strongly affected by immigration, it is primarily perceptions regarding excesses associated with immigration that has placed the issue high on the list of security threats. Social dislocation can therefore occur if a political and social problem is experienced by a substantial part of the electorate as being a threat. Such dislocation can in turn lead to an increase in political extremism, xenophobia and violence or the threat of violence (consider the examples in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy and Greece, for instance). To an extent, immigration can therefore be described as an indirect security problem.

There are many forms of immigration, in respect of which a distinction can be made between legal and undesirable forms. Regular migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers, for example, are of a different category than migrants who cross European borders without a status of any kind. In addition, a substantial number of people enter European territory legally with valid documents but remain beyond the permitted time (overstay) or are individuals who do not leave after their respective applications for asylum have been rejected by a final decision. Although the number of irregular migrants is difficult to determine, indicators like rejections, arrests and repatriation provide a general impression, albeit that caution must be exercised in this regard. According to the European Commission, there were a total of 930,000 irregular immigrants in 2012.[23] In 2011, most of them had come from Maghreb countries as a result of the Arab Spring, whereas most who came in 2013 had arrived from Syria and the Horn of Africa. Afghanistan, Pakistan and sub-Saharan African countries are also prominent countries of origin in terms of illegal immigration. Following a decrease in 2012, there was an increase of no less than 311% in illegal immigration to the EU in 2013, mainly via the Central Mediterranean route (from Libya and Tunisia; see Figure 3).[24]

In 2013, the large influx of immigrants, the flow of which headed to Europe's southern borders and included many refugees from Syria, was considered to be potentially destabilising to the Southern European countries. In the end, however, only 2% of the Syrian refugees applied for asylum in Europe. The rest were accommodated in Syria's neighbouring countries.

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22 European Commission, *Demographic Projections*, EU Home Affairs Background Statistics, Brussels: 2013, p. 3.
23 European Commission, *Mededeling van de Commissie aan het Europees Parlement en de Raad: Vierde jaar-verslag over immigratie en asiel* (2012). Brussels: 17 June 2013.
24 Frontex, *Illegal border crossings: Mediterranean routes Jan-Sept 2013*, October 2013.

Figure 3   Mediterranean route: investigation of illegal border crossings between border crossing points via the main irregular immigration routes[25]

Whereas immigration was previously classified as an indirect security problem, migration flows can certainly become a direct security threat if they are accompanied by forms of cross-border organised crime like human trafficking, human smuggling and exploitation. Eurostat data shows that the number of human trafficking victims increased by 18% between 2008 and 2010. Over half of the victims are being exploited in the sex industry.[26] The free movement of persons within the EU and the creation of a borderless area in Europe in 1995 under the Schengen Agreement ensure that the Netherlands has a direct interest in secure external European borders in terms of ensuring its internal security. In addition, the 9/11 attacks resulted in immigration being more closely linked with terrorism and national security. Concerns in Europe that terrorist groups can exploit weak points in EU border controls have led to more stringent border and immigration checks.[27] An explicit link between immigration, border control and terrorism was first made in 2004 following the Madrid bombings.[28] The more restrictive approach to immigration and border control was mainly driven by the fact that those responsible for the attacks were not from the EU.

The external dimension of immigration is not only about safeguarding Europe's external borders, it is also about dealing with the causes of illegal immigration. These causes include poverty, unemployment, conflicts, human rights violations, environmental degradation, poor governance and insufficient access to education and healthcare services in the areas of origin.

Current national policy, organisation and capabilities

The Netherlands is an active participant in EU policy concerning justice and home affairs. In this context, the external dimension of immigration is becoming more prominent. Although securing external borders is a national affair, the common EU policy on borders, mobility,

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25 Frontex, *FRAN Quarterly: Quarter 3 July-September 2013*, p. 15. Available at http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2013.pdf.

26 *Numbers of identified and presumed victims*, Eurostat.

27 International Organization for Migration, *International Terrorism and Migration*. Geneva: IOM, June 2010, p. 6.

28 European Council, *Declaration on Combating Terrorism*. Brussels: 25 March 2004.

asylum and immigration is playing an increasingly important role. For the Netherlands, the North Sea border is the only external one in the context of the Schengen area. The Dutch Coastguard Centre in Den Helder – which cooperates closely with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the national police force, the Netherlands Royal Navy, the customs authorities and the environmental management authorities – has the limited migration pressure in the North Sea and Dutch international ports area properly under control.[29] The international airports of the Netherlands are also important points of entry and transit for migrants. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is responsible for security at airports. In the period 2008-2011, over 196,500 foreign nationals from outside the EU were granted residence permits in the Netherlands for regular purposes of stay. The number of regular migrants from third countries initially decreased from approximately 56,500 in 2008 to 45,800 in 2010. The number rose slightly in 2011 to almost 46,700. In 2011, almost half (48%) of all regular immigrants came to the Netherlands from third countries on the basis of family migration. As groups, migrant workers and student migrants each accounted for 23% of immigration. Regular migrants came mainly from China, the US, India, Turkey and Morocco.

In relative terms, the Netherlands does not experience much pressure on its external borders because the country is geographically limited and because other EU member states on the eastern and southern side of the EU absorb most migrant flows. The Netherlands therefore has a strong interest in the proper functioning of the Schengen area's external borders. Frontex, an EU agency, promotes, coordinates and develops integrated European border management. Technological solutions are a key part of these activities. Where pressure on external borders results in problems, Frontex organises operations in which personnel and resources that have been made available by member states according to a pool system are deployed. The Netherlands has a permanent pool of approximately 200 individuals who are available for the European Border Guard Teams (EBGTs), 15 of whom can be deployed in rapid-response operations. The Netherlands is regularly involved in Frontex operations, for example at the Greek-Turkish border and off the Spanish and Italian coasts. Royal Netherlands Marechaussee personnel also assist at airports in Madrid, Stockholm, Rome, Bucharest and Milan. In 2012, the Netherlands was involved in 9 of the 22 Frontex-coordinated operations on land and at sea.

Immigration came to be seen as a security risk particularly after the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon and the attempted attack on Washington, DC. In this context, for example, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands is monitoring the possible involvement of foreign intelligence services and extremist political and religious groups in using immigration channels to smuggle agents and sympathisers into the Netherlands. In 2008, the Minister of Justice formed the National Human Trafficking Task Force to combat human trafficking. The Task Force also deals with people smuggling, which is strongly intertwined with human trafficking. The Netherlands is working to combat human trafficking in an integrated way. The Public Prosecution Service, police forces and other investigative services, municipal authorities, the Tax and Customs Administration, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, emergency organisations and private parties are therefore all cooperating to fulfil this aim. According to the Ministry of Security and Justice, the ministry responsible for combating human trafficking, criminal organisations engaged in human trafficking often operate internationally. International cooperation is therefore actively sought in criminal and financial investigations. The purpose of such investigations is

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29 The Seaport Police performs border control duties in the Port of Rotterdam area.

to expose the human trafficking chain as a whole, break it and reduce criminal assets abroad. Examples of such international cooperation include requests for assistance, parallel investigations or the formation of a Joint Investigation Team in a Europol context.[30]

As an EU agency, Frontex works to secure and control the EU's common external borders. Because of the increase in illegal forms of immigration, cooperation between member states and the role of Frontex will become even more important in the future.
Photograph: Frontex

Situation in neighbouring countries

Belgium

Belgium has been an immigration country for several decades. It is characterised by diversity because of the historical influx of migrant workers from many countries and because of the nation's linguistic and political divide. People of foreign background constitute 10.6% of Belgium's total population. Most of these individuals are of Moroccan origin, followed by those from France, the Netherlands and Italy.[31] Brussels is exceptional in terms of the figures. Sixty-two percent of the capital's residents are of foreign background. The corresponding figure for Antwerp is 38%. The influx of migrants increased particularly in the last ten years.

Immigration remains a sensitive subject despite the fact that it has been a feature of Belgian society for a long time. This is certainly the case in Flanders. The Flemish Migration and Integration Monitor (2013) shows that there are many prejudices and negative feelings about migrants. Forty percent of those questioned, for example, believe that Muslims constitute

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30 Ministry of Security and Justice, *Aanwijzing mensenhandel*, 25 January 2014, available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0033564/geldigheidsdatum_25-01-2014#CIRDIV1368290.
31 Total population by nationality in Belgium. National Statistics, population by nationality, 1 January 2011.

a threat to Flemish culture, 45% wish to have only people of Belgian origin living in their respective neighbourhoods and 47% are of the opinion that immigrants come to take advantage of the social security system. It may be noted in this context that most Flemish people (51%) never have any contact with migrants in their own neighbourhoods. Moreover, other research reveals that members of minority groups, particularly those from sub-Saharan countries, the Maghreb, Turkey and Eastern Europe, still feel discriminated against.[32]

In spite of the negative feelings that exist with respect to migrants, the immigration rules that apply to highly qualified employees and migrants from other EU countries were relaxed. It is now easier for Bulgarians and Romanians to gain access to the Belgian labour market and the European Blue Card is now also a residence permit rather than only a work permit. At the same time, however, the conditions that apply to obtaining Belgian nationality are being tightened. Applicants must now pay a fee, for example. Following the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement, Belgium started introducing an integrated asylum and immigration policy in stages. Civic integration has been a clear part of the integration process since 2013.[33]

Internationally, Belgium is an active player with respect to immigration issues. It cooperates closely with neighbouring countries, including in terms of exchanging information. A Franco-Belgian law enforcement and judicial cooperation agreement has been in place since 2013. This agreement makes joint police patrols possible and is designed to improve the coordination of police responses on both sides of the border. Belgium has concluded similar agreements with the Netherlands and Germany. Rotterdam, The Hague, Antwerp and Ghent signed an agreement in 2011 to ensure that the influx of migrant workers from Eastern Europe remained manageable, for example.

Belgium also actively contributes to the work performed by Frontex. Between 2008 and 2011, Belgian personnel took part in 30 Frontex operations or activities, all of which were aimed at securing Europe's external air, land and sea borders.[34] In 2010, for example, Belgium responded to the Greek call to make Greece's land border with Turkey a more effective barrier against refugees by taking part in a Frontex mission that was carried out specifically for this purpose.[35]

Germany

No fewer than 18 million people immigrated to Germany between 1991 and 2010. This influx included a large group of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. The federal republic is one of the largest receivers of immigrants in the world. It absorbs approximately 23% of all refugees who arrive in the EU. Nevertheless, the country has viewed itself as an immigration one only since the end of the 1990s. Since 2001, the debate and discussion about immigration acquired a new dimension, as it came to be strongly associated with the threat of extremism,

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32 Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, *Voorstelling van de resultaten van een onderzoek bij bevolkingsgroepen van vreemde origine in België*. Independent Research Bureau (IRB), November 2009. Available at http://www.diversiteit.be/sites/default/files/legacy_files/studies/2010/Hoe%20beleven%20 etnische%20minderheden%20hun%20situatie.pdf.

33 Idem.

34 Belgian Senate, Session 2010-2011. Written question no. 5-2190 from Inge Faes to the Minister of the Interior. Available at http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/Vragen/SVPrintNLFR&LEG=5&NR=2190&LANG=nl.

35 'België neemt deel aan Frontex missie', *De Wereld van Morgen*, 3 November 2010. Available at http://www. dewereldmorgen.be/artikels/2010/11/03/belgi%C3%AB-neemt-deel-aan-frontex-missie.

radicalisation and terrorism. This was partly due to the fact that some of those who had carried out the September 2001 attacks had been based in Germany, and this set the tone for the new Immigration Act which entered into force in 2005.[36] Cultural integration is increasingly coming to be seen as essential to preventing potential threats 'from within' posed by ethnically and socially marginalised immigrant communities.[37]

As part of the Schengen Area, Germany's external border, like that of the Netherlands, consists only of a northern sea border and its seaports and airports. Because of the country's federal structure, responsibilities for asylum and immigration policy are divided among the federal government, the 16 states and the municipalities. The federal service for immigration and refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*) and the federal police (*Bundespolizei*) are responsible for most of the operational enforcement. They are under the Ministry of the Interior.[38]

The German police (both federal and the forces of the states) take part in two cross-border police teams (GPTs) with the Netherlands to combat crime in the border regions.[39] The northern GPT Bad Nieuweschans, for example, consists of four Royal Netherlands Marechaussee officers and four German police officers. In the Wadden Sea region up to the Hoogeveen-Emmen/Meppel line, this team carries out joint Dutch-German patrols to combat cross-border offences like human trafficking, drug trafficking and vehicle crime more effectively. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee officers may operate in Germany and the German police officers may be deployed in the Netherlands. The first GPT was the Bad Bentheim one, which consists of 20 people and operates on a cross-border basis in a large area of the central Netherlands, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. These projects are co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund.[40]

Germany contributes around 100 personnel to Frontex each year. It is very active in the joint operations coordinated by Frontex in the air, on land and at sea. In 2012, Germany took part in 9 of the 22 joint Frontex operations. It received assistance from Frontex in its capacity as host nation of the 2006 FIFA World Cup.

France

Immigrants, mainly from Morocco, Algeria and Portugal, account for around 11% (7 million people) of the French population. A debate – one that is often critical – about the integration of immigrants has been taking place in France since the middle of the 1980s. While immigration is portrayed as a success in an economic sense, many French people also view immigration as a cause of social problems. Persistent tensions and an increase in crime, particularly among young immigrants, are often cited as examples in this regard. Partly because of these aspects, the nature of the country's integration policy has again become the subject

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36 Roland Detsch, *A Difficult Birth: The German Immigration Act*. Goethe Institut, February 2009. Available at http://www.goethe.de/lhr/prj/daz/mag/mip/en4237086.htm.
37 Anika Haverig, 'Managing Integration: German and British Policy Responses to the "threat from Within" Post-2001' in *Migration & Integration*, 14 (2013), p. 358.
38 Jan Schneider, *Die Organisation der Asyl- und Zuwanderungspolitik in Deutschland*, Working Paper 25. Nürnberg, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2012, p. 4.
39 Ministry of Defence, *Beleidsdoorlichting. De inzet van de Koninklijke Marechaussee voor mensenhandel en mensensmokkel*, March 2013, p. 28.
40 See http://de.g-p-t.eu/informationen/informationen-zum-grenz%C3%BCberschreitenden-polizeiteam-gpt. html.

of considerable public interest. In addition, like in the UK, attitudes towards immigration issues have hardened in recent years. In 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy, at the time the incumbent, drastically tightened immigration policy in the run-up to the presidential election. The effects can be seen in the figures: in that year, a total of 32,912 illegal immigrants were deported, an increase of 17% relative to 2010.[41] In spite of the restrictive immigration policy, immigration to France in the form of family reunification or for the purpose of studying or working has continued to increase in recent years. The number of asylum seekers has risen consistently by 10% in the last four years, for example.

Although François Hollande, the current President, has opted for a softer approach, drastic measures have also been taken under his leadership. In 2012, for example, the financial assistance provided to immigrants was substantially reduced.[42] In November 2013, Hollande supported British Prime Minister Cameron's plans to counter what was referred to as the 'benefit tourism' of migrants.

The hardening of attitudes in the immigration debate is not only reflected in France's immigration policy, however. It seems that immigration is increasingly coming to be seen in a negative light also in terms of perception among citizens. Whereas 45% of those questioned saw immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity in 2010, the corresponding figure for 2013 was 50% (both percentages are higher than the European average of 44% in 2013). Around 43% of those questioned (relative to 33% in 2010) were of the opinion that there were too many immigrants living in France. Of all European countries, this percentage has risen most rapidly in France in recent years (16% since 2008).[43] The major victory of the *Front National*, a strongly anti-immigrant party led by Marine Le Pen, in the May 2014 European elections appears to underline this trend.

In a Frontex context, France worked intensively to help develop the Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE), a record designed to improve planning with respect to the control and surveillance of Europe's external borders. The French National Police has set up a specialised branch that directs and coordinates interministerial action against illegal immigration. France has been involved in 19 Frontex operations and activities since 2009. In addition, it was involved in 16 of the 32 joint return operations that were carried out and in 8 operations at 200 airports in Europe. Working with other member states, France also exerts pressure on EU countries at the periphery of the Mediterranean region for the purpose of getting these countries to tighten their immigration policies and increase the security of external borders.

In spite of the intensification of international cooperation, the French government currently does not see a need for further regulations at EU level. It is of the opinion that other international laws adequately provide for relevant matters.

United Kingdom

Although the United Kingdom has traditionally seen itself as a multicultural society in light of the immigration that it has experienced and continues to experience in a postcolonial context,

41 Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/french-election-blog-2012/2012/apr/19/immigration-forefront-french-election.

42 Available at http://www.amren.com/news/2012/12/french-government-cuts-immigrants-welfare-by-83/.

43 *Transatlantic Trends*, see footnote 20, p. 38.

this state of affairs, once taken more or less for granted, has been strongly questioned in recent years. British society has become more sensitive to the negative effects of immigration, especially since the large-scale riots in a number of northern English towns in 2001 and the terrorist attacks by home-grown Muslims in July 2005. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission plays an important part in assessing whether immigrants can be deported, particularly when they may be linked to terrorist activities. A survey shows that a sizeable majority of the British population, namely 64% (68% in 2011) views immigration as a problem. This is the highest percentage of all countries in which the survey was carried out.[44]

The United Kingdom does not form part of the Schengen Area and therefore cannot participate in Frontex regulation. Subject to the approval of the agency's management board, however, the United Kingdom is involved in Frontex activities on an ad hoc basis. Because of its exceptional position, the United Kingdom concludes a wide range of bilateral and multilateral agreements with neighbouring countries regarding the exchange of information and cooperation. It regularly participates in Frontex's joint return operations.[45] It is also active in joint operations coordinated by Frontex. In 2012, it took part in six of these joint operations in the air, on land and at sea. In addition, British border control relies heavily on technological solutions. An example in this regard is the 'e-Borders' programme. Those applying for a visa, for example, must provide biometric data.

The UK is struggling to manage its borders efficiently. The UK Border Agency (UKBA) used to be responsible for border control. Because it was failing to function properly, it was abolished and its work was returned to the Home Office in 2013. The agency was split and superseded by UK Visas and Immigration and Immigration Enforcement. Since the reorganisation, however, the backlog of visa applications has increased and the queues at airports and other border crossings have only become longer. The Border Force, formerly part of UKBA, was demerged and made a law enforcement command within the Home Office in 2012. This force patrols the British coasts and is responsible for immigration and customs checks at seaports and airports. The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) also focused on combating organised crime in the context of immigration. In addition, it was the foundation for the national British Europol unit and the INTERPOL, Schengen and bilateral liaison officers' network. This combining of units within SOCA ensured a single point of contact for requests concerning international cooperation. SOCA also managed the UK Liaison Bureau at Europol. With ten officers, the bureau is the largest of any country represented at Europol headquarters. SOCA's operations were merged into a larger National Crime Agency, which became fully operational in October 2013.

International developments

The EU has adopted rules to deal with employers that use the services of human traffickers and has issued a Directive that was drafted first and foremost to improve the assistance provided to victims of human trafficking.[46] In 2011, the European Commission appointed an anti-trafficking coordinator who is responsible for improving coordination between EU institutions, agencies, member states, third countries and international actors in the fight against

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44 *Transatlantic Trends*, see footnote 20, pp. 37-38.

45 European Commission, *Country Factsheet: European Migration Network: UK 2012*. Available at http://ec.europa. eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/country-factsheets/ united-kingdom-emn-country-factsheet_en.pdf.

46 European Parliament and Council, *Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims*. Brussels: 5 April 2011.

human trafficking.[47] A website was also launched to gather information about the problem at a single location.[48]

The International Office for Migration (IOM) is calling for a new approach to illegal immigration because the repressive one of recent years has not reduced immigration flows. If anything, it seems to be increasing the number of human trafficking networks. The European Union updated the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2011. To prevent immigration flows, the EU engages in political dialogue with countries of origin and in 'Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security' aimed at establishing 'Mobility Partnerships' with the EU's Southern and Eastern Mediterranean neighbours which serve as transit countries. Such dialogues are being held with Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt, for example. A Seahorse Mediterranean Network between the EU's Mediterranean member states and North African countries will be established in 2015. The network's purpose will be to exchange information about patrols and incidents. In practice, this approach means that the transition countries will be expected to prevent immigration flows on their own respective territories. Because of what are usually unstable internal situations, however, there may not be enough local support and capabilities in these countries for a firm approach to immigration.

The instrument of the Common Security and Defence Policy, civilian and military operations, is used with a view to managing borders. The EU Border Management mission (EUBAM Libya) is helping to build up capabilities at the Libyan border to manage immigration flows, for example. Just how much immigration is a priority to the EU is evidenced by the EUR 4 billion spent on immigration projects in the period 2007-2013 to ensure that the costs associated with the integrated management of the external borders and the implementation of common asylum and immigration policy were equally divided among member states.[49] The Stockholm Programme, which provides a strategic policy framework in the field of justice and home affairs for a period of five years, will have to be renewed in 2014.[50] The main purpose of a 'post-Stockholm Programme' would be to consolidate the results achieved in recent years and reduce the amount of new legislation required. Achieving greater consistency between the internal and external dimensions of freedom, security and justice is also an aim that is being increasingly recognised.

Technology is a key area of focus with respect to Europe's external borders. The European External Borders Surveillance System (EUROSUR) is one of the most important. Other examples are Smart Borders with the Entry-Exit System (EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). These new systems are augmenting the current information systems like the Schengen Information System (SIS I and SIS II) and the Visa Information System (VIS). Frontex is playing a central role in promoting the introduction of EUROSUR, an information exchange system of which the 'backbone', according to the agency's website, is a network of National Coordination Centres (NCCs). EUROSUR's purpose is to improve the surveillance and intervention capabilities EU member states in the context of preventing irregular migration and cross-border crime at the external and maritime borders of the EU. The main focus in this regard is on the southern maritime and eastern land borders. EUROSUR consists of

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47 Myria Vassiliadou assumed office in March 2011.

48 EU anti-human trafficking website: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking.

49 European Commission, *EU Solidarity in Action: EU Funding for Home Affairs*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/index_en.htm.

50 The Stockholm Programme (2009) provides a roadmap for EU work in the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010-2014.

new surveillance technologies and the linking of 24 national surveillance systems at NCCs. The NCC of the Netherlands is at the Coastguard Centre in Den Helder. The first phase of EUROSUR implementation started on 2 December 2013. EUROSUR will form part of the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE), which will enable EU authorities interested or active in maritime surveillance to exchange information and data and thereby make surveillance cheaper and more effective. Other actors like police forces and national navies will be involved. In light of the recent increase in illegal forms of immigration and the cross-border nature of immigration, European cooperation is becoming more important. The expectation is that cooperation between member states and the role of Frontex in this context will increase in the future.

Of particular importance on the interface between immigration and border control on the one hand and countering terrorism on the other are cooperation in the field of granting visas, sharing advanced passenger information (API) and border checks at the EU's external borders.[51]

Whilst border control remains a national competence, Frontex coordinates the deployment of experts and technical equipment from other member states to countries whose borders are under pressure. Although a Regulation of October 2011 provides for cooperation with third countries, it has not yet been implemented in full. Frontex's operational cooperation with third countries (Article 14) like those in North Africa is therefore still limited. The Task Force for the Mediterranean, formed following the death of many immigrants when the boat carrying them sank off the island of Lampedusa in October 2013, recommended that Frontex liaisons be placed in third countries for the purpose of establishing cooperation projects. The task force's other proposals included using the CSDP in the Mediterranean Sea. Italy had also asked for this to be done. The proposal was rejected by the other member states. The reason given was that border control is a task of civilian organisations. Because of the Lampedusa tragedy, a Regulation has been established that imposed clear rules of engagement for joint operations at sea, with due regard to ensuring protection for those in need who travel in mixed flows, in accordance with international law. The Regulation obliges participating units to save lives and prohibit what are referred to as pushback tactics.

Terrorism

Current risks and threats
It is difficult to present exact data on terrorist incidents. There is no internationally accepted definition of 'terrorist attack', for example. Another problem is the secrecy associated with the subject of terrorism. Not all attacks or attempted attacks are made known. The University of Maryland has maintained a terrorism database since 2001. This database includes information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 up to 2013 and annual updates are planned. Although the necessary caution must of course be exercised, the database indicates that the number of terrorist attacks increased sharply in the past decade (see Figure 4).

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51 Sarah Leonard, 'The Use and Effectiveness of Migration Controls as a Counter-Terrorism Instrument in the EU', in *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 4 (2010) 1, pp. 33-50.

Figure 4   Number of terrorist incidents worldwide[52]

Present-day terrorism is characterised by a strong relationship between activities beyond the Netherlands' borders that pose security risks to Dutch interests both within and outside the nation's borders, and activities within the nation's borders that are linked to risks and threats outside the Netherlands. Developments in North Africa and the Middle East have a major impact on the threat level as determined by the Netherlands. In the wake of the Arab Spring, a range of jihadist groups manifested themselves in countries in which the democratisation process was in difficulty. Although the contact that these groups have with Al-Qaeda's central leadership varies in intensity, extremist jihadist ideology is a common bond. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an extremist group, is engaged in a violent campaign in both countries. Jabhat al-Nusra is also active in Syria. As a result of the unrest in this region, which stretches to Somalia and Kenya, Western nationals have been victims of attacks and kidnappings. Dutch nationals are therefore also at risk. Exact statistics on the number of kidnappings are not available, partly because secrecy is sometimes opted for to increase the likelihood of release. The data that is available indicates a sharp increase in the number of kidnappings in Africa from approximately 14% of all kidnappings in the world in 2008 to over 20% in 2012. The number appears to have risen further in 2013. Kidnappings in which Europeans have been held prisoner have been carried out mainly by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the *Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO), Boko Haram and groups in Yemen. Recent threats against embassies in Yemen and attacks and threats in Egypt, including against air traffic above the Sinai desert, indicate that Dutch representatives and citizens are also at risk of terrorist attacks when abroad (see Map 1).

The issue of foreign fighters – that is, individuals who travel to Syria from other countries to fight in there – is one that is becoming more acute and shows how the internal and external security threats posed by terrorism are becoming more intertwined. Indeed, in the spring of 2013, the threat level for the Netherlands was substantially increased (second highest level) by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism in connection with possible

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52 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD). University of Maryland, consulted on 16 April 2014: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=terrorism&sa.x=0&sa.y=0.

attacks in the Netherlands or abroad. The threat level and scope of the problem has since only increased in the Netherlands (see the recent '*Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland*' quarterly report, which provides a general analysis of national and international terrorist threats to the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad) and the authorities appear to be losing control of the situation. The concern is that individuals who have returned from Syria are traumatised and radicalised and, moreover, have been trained to carry out attacks. Radical youth who have been prevented from leaving also constitute a threat. In addition, there are increasing indications that young people who travel to Syria join extremist jihadist organisations like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. The Islamic radicalisation of small groups of young people is on the rise in the Netherlands. This is occurring through internet propaganda and social media particularly with respect to the conflict in Syria. The security services believe that open expressions of support for jihadist activity among young people in the Netherlands reflect a growing self-awareness and belligerence. There are also indications that radicalisation can very rapidly lead to a willingness to commit acts of violence.

Risk assessment: increasing from 1 tot 5

1 ▮▮▮▮▮ 5

Map 1   Risk of terrorist attacks[53]

The Netherlands remains a target for terrorist attacks because of its involvement in military missions (military participation in MINUSMA, for example) and because of the alleged discrimination of Muslims in the Netherlands and perceived insults to Islam and the Prophet.

In addition, there is always the risk of attacks being carried out by lone wolves at major public events. Groups on the extreme left oppose the asylum policy and attitudes are hardening. A number of separatist organisations like the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) also operate from the Netherlands and are being closely monitored by the authorities.

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53 Aon, *Aon's Interactive Risk Maps Database 2014*, available at http://www.riskmap.aon.co.uk/Terrorism_Risk_Map.aspx.

The threat of terrorism in neighbouring countries, also in terms of the extent to which this threat has an internal and an external component, varies. The problem of young people travelling to Syria is pronounced in Belgium and the United Kingdom.[54] Right-wing extremists are the main threat in Germany, whereas they are hardly a factor in other European countries. In spite of the current economic crisis, left-wing or anarchist violent extremism is not on the rise in the EU. The number of left-wing extremist and anarchist terrorist attacks actually fell from 37 in 2011 to 18 in 2012. A total of 219 terrorist attacks, most of them separatist, were carried out in the EU in 2012. Most of the attacks occurred in France (125) and Spain (54). Only six attacks were religiously motivated.

Current national policy, organisation and capabilities

The national policy framework in place to counter the threat of terrorism in the Netherlands consists of a range of instruments that are implemented by different actors. A multidisciplinary approach in which interventions are based on the individual case and can vary in terms of intensity, form and degree of coercion is taken to reduce the threat. The different actors carry out the interventions on the basis of their respective areas of expertise. The main tasks performed are detection, intelligence and investigation, tracking down and prosecuting and taking administrative measures. Intelligence work is carried out by the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Regional Intelligence Service (RID). In addition, community police officers, the national criminal investigation agency and the Public Prosecution Service are involved in surveillance, tracking down and prosecution. At municipal level, the local authorities, neighbourhood communities, mosques and families play an important role in preventing violent extremism. At national level, several ministries are involved in countering terrorism. The Ministry of Security and Justice coordinates these ministerial efforts. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism plays a key role in this regard, also in terms of providing information. Important information about individuals linked to terrorism is included in a counterterrorism database ('Counterterrorism Information Box') for purposes of comparison and assessment. The policy in place to counter radicalisation and recruitment focuses on prevention and early identification, and on containing any problems identified. In major cities, the broad approach is further refined on the basis of the specific problems and circumstances that have to be dealt with. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) also has a special task in terms of screening foreigners who may have links with terrorist activities. The IND sometimes works in concert with the customs authorities and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee to perform this task.

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54   At the end of February, the Belgian police arrested 25 individuals who were allegedly involved in the recruitment of young Muslims for the war in Syria. Three of those arrested had allegedly set up a network for indoctrination, training and transport to Syria. See *De Volkskrant*, 4 March 2014. The United Kingdom is taking the possibility of attacks by individuals who have returned from Syria (approximately 250 as at the time of writing) into account. See *Elsevier*, 16 February 2014.

Tuareg fighters in northern Mali. In spite of the efforts of France and a number of West African countries to restore stability in the region, violent clashes continue to occur between the Tuaregs and Mali's armed forces.
Photograph: Magharebia

The Dutch International Security Strategy refers to areas of conflict and weak states that can be classified as breeding grounds of terrorism, extremism and cross-border crime. The number of countries in this category, countries mainly located close to Europe, is on the rise. Terrorist organisations tend to thrive in places where central authority is weak or absent altogether. The International Security Strategy therefore states that policy support must be given to democratisation and stabilisation in the region immediately to Europe's south in order to limit terrorist threats. Efforts must be aimed at preventing conflicts and dealing with the causes of terrorism. The Dutch military deployment in Mali is in keeping with the aims set out in the strategy. The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) is of course involved when military operations take place abroad. The intelligence gathered is used to track down and eliminate terrorists and prevent the use of, for example, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks. Dutch involvement in MINUSMA (Mali) is aimed primarily at gathering intelligence. In addition, the MIVD analyses the dynamics of situations like the cooperation between al-Qaeda's core and regional terrorist organisations affiliated with al-Qaeda in, among other places, Afghanistan, Yemen, North Africa, the Horn of Africa and Syria.

The Netherlands cooperates internationally in the field of counterterrorism. An example of this cooperation is the campaign that the Netherlands is carrying out together with Morocco in the context of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) for a new initiative to identify the risks posed by jihadists and handle these risks as best as possible. Within the EU, close cooperation is taking place with Belgium and the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator in an initiative aimed at dealing with jihadists. In addition, the Netherlands is supporting the establishment

of the International Institute on Justice and the Rule of Law, which will focus on capacity building in the North African region in the field of tracking down and prosecuting terrorists. With Dutch support, the UN is working with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) to organise meetings in different African regions aimed at strengthening cooperation between social organisations and government authorities in preventing terrorism. The Netherlands is also financially supporting a study into the use of evidence collected by military personnel in terrorism criminal cases.

Situation in neighbouring countries

Belgium

As is the case in the Netherlands, Belgian counterterrorism policy focuses on many aspects: cooperation between the police and the judiciary, bringing down terrorist financial networks, increasing the protection of citizens and infrastructure against terrorist attacks, countering radicalisation and assisting victims of terrorism. Although the Belgian Ministry of the Interior coordinates efforts aimed at countering radicalisation, there is no coordination between the different services with respect to investigation and intelligence. As a result, information on terrorism and extremism in Belgium is fragmented. This was the conclusion drawn in the secret report of the Standing Police Monitoring Committee (P Committee), which was leaked in the summer of 2013.[55] Together with other government agencies, the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment drew up an anti-radicalisation plan aimed mainly at countering the consequences of violent extremist messages.

Belgium actively contributes to the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE in the fight against terrorism. It has made trainers and expertise available to the EU for capacity building in the context of the counterterrorism assistance programmes in the Sahel countries. In addition, the Belgian federal police force has implemented training programmes for police forces in the Maghreb. Belgium has been a member of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre's advisory body since 2012.

France

French anti-terrorism legislation dates from the end of the 19th century. Terrorism has had a special place in French criminal procedure since 1986. However, France does not have a special programme or specific strategy aimed at countering violent extremism. It considers its immigration policy to be an important instrument against radicalisation and violent extremism. The Ministry of the Interior has special programmes that focus on specific areas, districts and regions that have high crime rates, particularly in terms of crimes committed by minors. The Ministry of Justice has a special programme aimed at the rehabilitation and reintegration of convicted criminals, in the context of which more imams are being engaged to counter radicalisation.

France was one of the founders of the GCTF. As a member of the UN Security Council, France also plays an important role in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and the UN Security Council's 1267/1999 Sanctions Committee. France was also one of the countries that drew up the counterterrorism strategic action plan for the European Council. It also carries out

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55 The P Committee is a fact-finding committee of the Belgian parliament that monitors the functioning of the Belgian police.

bilateral anti-terrorism operations with countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Germany
Germany's anti-terrorism policy is based on five pillars: (1) dismantling the infrastructure of terrorist organisations through investigation and research aimed at prevention, (2) countering the causes of terrorism by preventing radicalisation, (3) protecting the population and reducing the vulnerability of the state, (4) ensuring that the consequences of attacks remain manageable, and (5) using the opportunities made available by European cooperation. Since 2012, Germany has maintained a database of violent neo-Nazis and other groups that incite violence. The Joint Terrorism and Defence Centre, which focuses on politically motivated violence, was formed in the same year. In addition, there are different programmes in place at federal and state levels to counter violent extremism. They focus on promoting dialogues in communities, cultural and educational issues, sports and specific policies for cities. The Federal Ministry of the Interior recently set up a help centre for parents and friends of violent extremists.

Germany is also a founding member of the GCTF. It considers the UN to be the central international forum for efforts aimed at countering terrorism. In addition, Germany contributes to G8 and NATO activities. It supports NATO's Centre of Excellence – Defence against Terrorism (COE-DAT), which was established in Ankara, financially and in terms of personnel.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom introduced an update of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) in 2011. The CONTEST programme is based on four pillars: (1) arresting and prosecuting terrorists, (2) preventing individuals from becoming or supporting terrorism, (3) increasing the level of protection against terrorism, and (4) preparing for attacks in order to limit their effects. Different ministries are responsible for the various parts of the programme's prevention strategy. The Department of Communities and Local Government is responsible for activities in the field of integration. The Home Office focuses on countering the ideology of violent extremism by, among other things, identifying groups at risk. The British government also has a policy under which organisations that propagate an extremist ideology do not qualify for prevention programme funding.

The United Kingdom is also a founding member of the GCTF and, in addition, chairs the Countering Violent Extremism working group. It also cooperates with other countries in a range of international forums and organisations like the UN, the EU, NATO, the G8, the IAEA, the IMF, the World Bank, INTERPOL and the Council of Europe.

International developments
There is also a focus on countering violent extremism in a European and a wider international context. The EU even has a strategy to Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. The strategy is aimed at promoting democracy, dialogue and good governance, and tackling the causes of radicalisation. Prevention is also shaped in strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, in the context of which specific attention is devoted to the relationship between security and development because of, among other reasons, the nexus between internal and external security. At the request of the European Commission, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was set up in September 2011. This network focuses on issues concerning the role of community policing in countering violent extremism, the role of victims of terrorism in countering violent extremism, the role of the internet and social media in communicating counter

narratives, the impact of preventive interventions on individuals and groups that are vulnerable to radicalisation, the mechanisms of disengagement and deradicalisation, the role of the prison system in the rehabilitation and reintegration of convicted extremists, raising awareness in the healthcare sector with respect to signs of radicalisation and the problem of foreign fighters. Regarding foreign fighters, the focus is on the nexus between the internal and external dimensions of violent extremism.

In the context of reducing vulnerabilities, the EU is working on joint border control and measures aimed at other cross-border infrastructure. States use the Schengen Information System II and the Visa Information System, and cooperate in Frontex. Europol and Eurojust play an important role in investigation and prosecution. The European arrest warrant and European evidence warrant are likewise important in this regard. One of the Stockholm Programme's aims is to establish cooperation between Europol and the CSDP police missions in order to improve coordination with respect to prosecution also with countries outside the EU. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon contains a solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) that provides for mutual assistance in the event of a terrorist attack. This assistance includes the military resources made available by the member states. The details of the clause suggest that the military option is less likely.[56] The mandates of CSDP operations refer to counterterrorism tasks only sporadically and minimally. An exception in this regard is the EUCAP Sahel/Niger mission, the mandate of which focuses specifically on strengthening the capabilities of Niger's security institutions in the context of countering terrorism and organised crime. Crisis management operations are of course aimed at preventing the collapse of a state and its governance system, and such operations therefore contribute in a general sense to preventing breeding grounds of terrorism.

In addition to Security Council instruments, the UN has a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which focuses on four areas of policy, including tackling conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and ensuring respect for human rights while countering terrorism. Recent UN Security Council resolutions place a greater emphasis on preventing the payment of ransom for the release of individuals taken hostage by terrorist organisations, since amounts paid could be used to fund terrorism. The GCTF, an informal multilateral platform, was launched in 2012. Its areas of focus include strengthening the legal infrastructure for the prosecution of terrorists, supporting victims of terrorism, countering kidnapping for ransom and other methods of funding terrorism, supporting initiatives against violent extremism and improving prison policies aimed at rehabilitation and reintegration.

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept confirmed that countering the threat of terrorism remains one of the priorities. NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism were adopted during the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012. This document refers to three key areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement. Awareness concerns sharing experiences and intelligence and continuous strategic analysis and assessments in support of national authorities. These activities are aimed at enabling members of the alliance to prepare effectively and to take possible mitigating action in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks. In terms of capabilities, NATO's focus is on countering asymmetric threats by, among other things, considering capability developments, innovative technologies and methods that address asymmetric threats in a more comprehensive way, including through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work. NATO is also ready to make capabilities available in support of

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56 See *Civil-Military Capacities for European Security*, footnote 12, p. 19-20.

national emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure. The aim of NATO's engagement strategy is to ensure regular consultations with partner countries and international and regional organisations. The strategy includes cooperation on technological innovation for improved security. NATO is cooperating with Russia, for example, in a project for the Stand-Off Detection of Explosives (SRANDEX) on suicide bombers in mass transport, a capability of particular importance in counterterrorism operations.[57] Several capabilities are of course used for the early detection of roadside bombs during operations. Although the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is not explicitly viewed as a counterterrorism one, it is helping to dismantle the refuge that Afghanistan offered to terrorists. The training mission in Iraq was aimed at strengthening the capabilities of local security troops also with a view to countering terrorism. Through a combination of maritime patrols, escorting and on-board checks, Operation Active Endeavour is helping to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea.

Cross-border crime

Current risks and threats
Cross-border crime[58] can be seen as a many-headed monster that has multiple forms:[59] from human trafficking to cybercrime and from money laundering to trade in counterfeit products. There is an unmistakable link between transnational crime and factors like instability, corruption, geopolitical issues and regional or internal security issues. Failing states tend to provide fertile ground for transnational organised crime and terrorism. Instability, for example, tends to cause substantial flows of refugees, individuals who are a relatively easy target for human traffickers and smugglers. Criminals often base themselves in countries with a corrupt or weak state apparatus because it is easier to engage in criminal activity in such environments. For instance, it has been known for some time that South American drug dealers use a number of fragile West African countries as temporary storage and transhipment locations for the transit of drugs to Europe,[60] where there is a market for their products.

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57 As at the time of writing, all cooperation between NATO and Russia had been suspended until further notice because of the crisis in Ukraine.

58 This study uses the definition of the *UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000: '(…) a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.'*

59 A comprehensive list of the different forms of cross-border crime is provided in Appendix 1 to *Criminaliteit, corruptie en instabiliteit: Een verkennend advies,* a report on crime, corruption and instability published by the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) of the Netherlands, no. 85, May 2013.

60 UNODC, *Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment.* Vienna: UNODC, February 2013, p. 7.

US Coast Guard personnel impound quantities of cocaine estimated to have a total street value of approximately USD 78,000,000 in the Caribbean Sea during Operation Martillo.
Photograph: Official US Navy Imagery

More generally, it can be said that transnational criminality is flourishing[61] and is a real threat particularly to fragile states and in areas where conflicts are frequent.[62] The focus of criminals is usually on increasing and/or consolidating power and accumulating assets, which are often invested in immovable property and luxury goods or laundered abroad before being invested.[63] To achieve their goals, criminals are quite willing to infect legal structures like law firms and banks through corruption and abuse of power. There is also evidence that money earned in transnational crime is used to fund or support political and/or terrorist organisations.[64] Criminal activities like drug trafficking, the illegal trade in raw materials or taking hostages (piracy) are often used as sources of funding for other illegal activities or to support insurgents or separatist groups. In addition, the American report Global Trends 2015 notes that transnational criminal organisations abuse information and financial networks and attack computer systems that are globally linked.[65]

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61 According to a report of the Italian association of SMEs and SOS Impresa, profits of Italian organised crime amounted to EUR 100 billion in 2011. *Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese*. Rome: Aliberto Editore, SOS Impresa, 2012.

62 See http://www.millennium-project.org/. Cross-border crime is listed as one of the 15 global challenges: How can transnational organized crime networks be stopped from becoming more powerful and sophisticated global enterprises?

63 The damage caused by transnational organised crime is usually divided into four categories: political damage, economic damage, environmental damage and physical damage.

64 Examples in this regard are the FARC (Colombia), which obtains its funding through kidnapping, drug trafficking and opium cultivation in Afghanistan, which is used by al-Qaeda as a source of funding.

65 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: *A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*. Washington, NIC: December 2000.

The preceding considerations underline the fact that, in the context of cross-border crime, globalisation and internationalisation can be seen as criminal market accelerators.[66] The increase in globalisation has created new opportunities in trade, communication, travel and other areas that criminals are only too happy to make use of.[67] According to Europol, 40% of organised crime groups that are active in Europe constitute an international, network-like structure.[68]

In the Netherlands, crime and insecurity are important subjects that have dominated politics for many years. Dutch citizens view a lack of security as being one of the largest social problems. Apart from the question as to whether this perception is accurate in an objective sense, the public is very sensitive to problems associated with crime and insecurity. At the same time, the effects of organised crime are generally less visible to citizens because most do not experience these effects directly on an individual level. Nevertheless, organised crime can have a major impact on society.[69] In the context of organised crime, the Netherlands is very much a transit country in the sense that it is where people, money and goods cross borders. Organised crime in the Netherlands is characterised by the smuggling of people, drugs, weapons and stolen vehicles, underground banking and the evasion of levies and excise duties.[70] Cross-border illegal trade, such as the trade in cannabis and counterfeit goods, is the main source of financial profit.[71]

Current national policy, organisation and capabilities

The fight against organised crime in a national context is based on an integrated approach in which the government, Public Prosecution Service, police, tax authorities and other partners use instruments under criminal, administrative, tax and private law in joint efforts to combat crime that undermines society.[72] This integrated approach includes intensive information sharing and cooperation with public and private parties.

Fighting international organised crime is primarily the responsibility of the National Public Prosecutors' Office and the National Investigation Service, while other police forces, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the Special Investigation Services focus on criminal groups that operate on a regional or national scale. The Special Investigation Services and the National Public Prosecutors' Office for Financial, Economic and Environmental Offences are responsible for criminal enforcement in the areas referred to.[73] In addition to action aimed at

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66   This terminology evokes an analogy with commercial markets, which are largely regulated by supply and demand. Nevertheless, criminal markets cannot be equated with regular markets.

67   Research and Documentation Centre, *Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland: vierde rapportage op basis van de Monitor Georganiseerde Criminaliteit*. The Hague: 2012.

68   Europol, *EU Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment*. The Hague: 2013, p. 33.

69   Already in 2004, residents of the Netherlands were of the opinion that society and the economy had been infiltrated by transnational organised crime long before that year. Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), 2004, p. 247.

70   *Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland*, see footnote 67, p. 17.

71   National Police Force (formerly the KLPD, or Netherlands Police Agency), *Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld 2012-Georganiseerde Criminaliteit*. Zoetermeer: December 2012, p. 238.

72   Undermining by organised crime concerns weakening or abusing society's structure such that its sociocultural, economic, political, democratic, technological and environmental foundations are adversely affected or the system that protects society is adversely affected. See Police Academy of the Netherlands, *Administratieve lastendruk bij opsporing Zware en Georganiseerde Criminaliteit*. Utrecht: 18 April 2012.

73   The many forms of crime range from investment fraud, fraud in the care sector, insolvency fraud, human trafficking (in the sense of other forms of exploitation) and illegal employment to organised, illegal trade in endangered animals.

dismantling criminal networks, efforts are also made on the basis of a 'phenomenon-oriented' approach in which barriers are raised for the purpose of making it difficult or impossible for criminals to continue their operations. Financial investigations are also carried out and criminal funds and illegally obtained goods are seized if financial crimes have indeed been committed. The main objective of the Ministry of Security and Justice with respect to these priority areas is to bring down twice as many criminal groups in 2014 as it did in 2009.

The Board of Procurators General and National Police Force Management Team explain the ways in which organised crime is being tackled and the results achieved in an accountability report. The content of the report is determined by the police priority areas[74] specified by the government (see Table 2).[75] These priority areas are based on the National Threat Assessment[76] and the Organised Crime Monitor.[77]

The Dutch government's fight against cross-border crime is not based on an integrated strategy.[78] From a national perspective, the Minister of Security and Justice sets the political and administrative frameworks for international police cooperation. In outline, these frameworks provide for operational police cooperation, non-operational police cooperation, information exchange and international legal assistance. Within the frameworks set, the chief police officer of the National Police Force is ultimately responsible for the results achieved in these areas. In operational terms, combating cross-border crime involves assistance requests,[79] joint and parallel investigations, cooperation with INTERPOL, Europol and Eurojust, and non-operational cooperation with priority countries.[80] Priority countries are ones with which the Netherlands maintains significant relations in the field of combating crime. Dutch police officers cooperate with their counterparts in priority countries in a proactive, coherent and result-oriented way[81] to improve operational cooperation and reduce crime between the Netherlands and these countries.[82]

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74 The smuggling of or cross-border trade in cocaine or heroin, the production of or national and international trade in synthetic drugs, large-scale cannabis cultivation, the smuggling of or cross-border trade in people, money laundering or illegally acquired assets, serious environmental crime, financial and economic crime that is dealt with by the National Public Prosecutors' Office for Financial, Economic and Environmental Offences and the Special Investigation Services, ideologically motivated crime, including terrorism and extreme forms of activism, the smuggling of or cross-border trade in firearms and explosives, Dutch networks and dealing with the most important operators in Dutch organised crime. *Verantwoording aanpak georganiseerde criminaliteit 2012*, July 2013, p. 9.

75 Lower House of the States General, *Prioriteiten Politie 2011-2014*, Parliamentary Paper 29628 no. 256, 2010-2011 Session Year. Among other things, this document, which sets out the national priorities for the police for the period 2011-2014, states that at least half of the criminal youth groups must be brought down. The document also refers to taking action against robberies, burglaries, violence and sex crimes. The offensive against organised crime is based on an integrated approach to tackling cybercrime and more intensive investigation into, among other crimes, human trafficking, money laundering and drug trafficking. The national priorities include taking action against foreign criminals.

76 A National Threat Assessment is prepared once every four years by the Central Unit, part of the National Police Force, on the instructions of the Board of Procurators General.

77 The Monitor makes the nature of organised crime clear by means of an in-depth analysis of completed criminal investigations.

78 It should be noted that such a strategy, about which information was not available at the time of writing, will be developed.

79 In 2012, foreign police agencies asked the Dutch police to cooperate in over 300 foreign investigations into organised crime. *Verantwoordingsrapportage Aanpak Georganiseerde Criminaliteit 2012*, see footnote 74, p. 19.

80 Examples include neighbouring countries of the Netherlands and other countries like Morocco and China.

81 This cooperation is included in what are referred to as Strategic Countries Programmes.

82 *Letter of the Minister of Security and Justice to the Lower House dated 9 October 2013*, reference 424679.

Table 2   Priority areas[83]

| Priority area	Launched in 2012	Com-pleted	Launched in 2011	Com-pleted	Launched in 2010	Com-pleted	Launched in 2009	Com-pleted
Cocaine and heroin	31	25	41	26	47	47	43	38
Human trafficking/ people smuggling	26	22	23	15	32	28	13	12
Synthetic drugs	34	26	20	14	24	23	19	13
Money laundering	56	29	41	9	16	10	13	7
Ideological	18	11	18	18	18	18	22	15
Large-scale cannabis cultivation	3	2	4	-	1	1	0	0
Firearms and explosives	1	1	2	2	6	4	3	1
Dutch networks/ national interest	9	7	2	5	10	2	10	9
Total	178	123	151	89	154	133	123	95

The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee provides support to the police and judiciary on a regular basis under the Police Act 2012, as it already did under the Police Act 1993. In addition, the Dutch armed forces provide military assistance and support at the request of the government and judicial authorities to maintain public order and perform criminal enforcement tasks for the purpose of maintaining the rule of law. The armed forces can also provide assistance in the public interest and in the event of a disaster or crisis. This ad hoc support has increased considerably in recent years (see Figure 5).

Criminal enforcement accounts for most of the increase in the number of requests for military support, which rose from 10 in 2008 to 94 in 2012. The support provided included the deployment of specialised search teams and the use of unmanned aircraft.[84] In addition, the number of requests for military support in the public interest increased sharply in the last two years from two in 2008 to over forty in 2011 and 2012.[85] Other examples of ad hoc military support include the searching of premises (call shop/spy shop in Amsterdam, February 2014), the tracking down of cannabis farms and missing persons or suspects using F-16 fighter aircraft equipped with infrared cameras and assistance in investigating burglaries (Amsterdam, January 2014).

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83 Public Prosecution Service and police, *Verantwoording aanpak georganiseerde criminaliteit 2012*, July 2013, p. 9. Table 2 shows the number of investigations launched and completed in the priority areas in 2012 under the authority of the National Public Prosecutors' Office. The figures for 2009, 2010 and 2011 are also given to enable comparison. The number of investigations tactically launched and tactically completed in the priority areas is shown.

84 Idem.

85 In many cases, the requests were for the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee to guard cash transports of *De Nederlandsche Bank* (DNB). The level of assistance provided in the context of maintaining public order remained the same in the past four years. The assistance was provided mainly by the riot police of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.

Figure 5 **Provision of assistance by the armed forces on an ad hoc basis**[86]

Structural cooperation between the police and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee also seems to be increasing. This cooperation is based on Section 4 of the Police Act 2012. The section referred to states that the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee has a duty to assist and cooperate with the police in combating cross-border crime, people smuggling and fraud with respect to travel and identity documents. Structural cooperation between the police and the Ministry of Defence also takes place within the Special Intervention Service.[87]

Situation in neighbouring countries

Belgium

Belgium does not have an integrated approach to combating transnational crime. Priorities in this area are set out in the 2012-2015 National Security Plan, which makes a distinction between the integrated police and the federal police. This plan shows that the Belgian police focus on international police cooperation, which they view as a means to foster security in Belgium itself.[88] As regards combating transnational crime, the focus in the coming years will be on:

– heroin, cocaine, synthetic drugs and cannabis;
– trade in firearms;

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86 Ministry of Defence Audit Service and Inspectorate of Security and Justice, *Civiel –militaire samenwerking eindmeting 2013*. The Hague: 14 April 2014, p. 20. Available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2014/04/15/civiel-militaire-samenwerking-eindmeting-2013.html.

87 Part of the National Unit of the National Police Force.

88 Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice, Nationaal Veiligheidsplan 2012-2015, p. 17 and 29.

- mobile banditry;[89]
- human trafficking and people smuggling;
- laundering illegally acquired assets;
- cybercrime.

Germany

In Germany, combating cross-border crime and terrorism is the responsibility of the Federal Criminal Police Office (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA), which defines the national priorities in coordination with the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The tasks and role of the Federal Police (*Bundespolizei*) are similar to those of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Germany's domestic policy with respect to combating cross-border crime is based on analyses of crime produced by the BKA in cooperation with the states, customs authorities and Federal Police. In addition to the more general analyses of crime, analyses of specific areas, such as human, drug and arms trafficking, are also carried out. Because of the federal structure, translation into concrete priorities and action plans occurs in a decentralised way. Responsibility for action plans therefore rests with the states:

The BKA has identified the following threats for the coming five years:

- cybercrime;
- mobile banditry;
- the emergence of fragile states (in the Middle East and weak states that were formerly part of the USSR) that can rapidly become a base for criminal gangs that engage in, for example, human trafficking;
- extremist political groups[90] that commit crimes to, for example, support themselves or purchase weapons;
- criminal groups that change in terms of organisational form (ad hoc, fluid, virtually adaptive partnerships that operate within a particular branch of crime for a relatively short period of time before focusing on a different criminal activity), which makes it exceedingly difficult for investigative authorities to take effective action against such groups.

The expectation is that, in the coming years, German society will be most vulnerable in the virtual domain. According to the BKA, the chance of being caught in this domain is very small and criminals can earn a great deal in a short time. Open borders as a result of the Schengen Agreement are also mentioned as a weakness. Illegal aliens who are engaged in crime can cause major problems, especially when they regularly relocate within the Schengen area. Germany is working to strengthen the position of Europol, which currently does not have investigative powers, to deal with these problems.

France

In France, the police is divided into the *Police National* and the *Gendarmerie*. They jointly perform tasks in priority areas with respect to combating transnational organised crime. These priority areas are defined by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice. Although there is no overarching national strategy to combat transnational crime, there is an

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89 This term refers to mobile, i.e. itinerant, criminal groups that systematically enrich themselves through all kinds of crime in a wide, transnational area.

90 An example in this regard is the National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, NSU), a far-right group that was broken up in 2012.

integrated strategy for national and international action in each priority area, such as human trafficking, for example. Nationally and internationally operating agencies have been set up for the purpose.

France expects the following threats to be the main ones in the time to come:

– cybercrime;
– mobile banditry;
– drugs (cannabis, heroin and cocaine);
– money laundering;
– human trafficking.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the fight against transnational crime is led by the National Crime Agency (NCA). The Home Secretary determines the strategic priorities and informs the agency. The NCA's activities are based on the British National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. It has translated the strategic priorities into a Strategic Annual Plan 2013-2014[91] that contains objectives defined in terms of the four Ps: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare.[92] The NCA focuses on the following threats, which are not described in great detail but, rather, ranked according to domains:

– organised crime (not cross-border);
– cybercrime;
– economic crime;
– child sexual exploitation;
– serious and organised crime (cross-border).

International developments

The EU's priorities with respect to fighting organised crime for the period 2011-2014 were included in the Stockholm Programme and subsequently detailed for the Netherlands in the Stockholm Programme Implementation Plan.[93] This Implementation Plan includes long-term policy priorities that were formulated based on Europol's Organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). The implementation plans focus in the main on improving information exchange between the member states and Europol, increasing the number of investigations carried out by several member states working together, preferably in the form of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), combating money laundering and seizing illegally acquired assets. Operational action plans are prepared in the context of the Stockholm Programme.[94] The Netherlands contributes to the action plans in the areas of illegal immigration, synthetic drugs, mobile banditry, cybercrime and human trafficking.

Currently, European cooperation is largely aimed at strengthening the coordinating role and tasks of existing European institutions like Europol and Eurojust and intensifying investigation-related information exchange between national police and judicial systems. In spite of

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91 National Crime Agency, *NCA Annual Plan 2013-2014*. London: NCA, October 2013.

92 Idem, p. 8.

93 *Letter of the Minister of Security and Justice to the Lower House dated* 17 July 2012 *regarding the progress with respect to implementation of the 2010-2014 Stockholm Programme action plan, CJBZ*.

94 Referred to as EMPACT projects. EMPACT stands for European Multidisciplinary Platform against Crime Threats.

the shift in policy on the Freedom/Security/Justice area from the original intergovernmental structure to mainly communitarian cooperation, no efforts are being made to set up a European police service or a European Public Prosecution Service. Initial steps have been taken, however, such as the European arrest warrant by which a member state is requested to extradite a suspect of a crime or a convicted person to another member state. In addition, considerable synergy can be achieved by better harmonising policy[95] and legislation, funding for combating cross-border crime, the exchange of information and actual cooperation between police services, especially in the border regions.[96]

In 2013, the Advisory Council on International Affairs advocated the setting up of a European Public Prosecution Service for the coordination of lawsuits that harm the European Union's financial interests. The government rejected this recommendation. Nevertheless, the formation of a European Public Prosecution Service that focuses mainly on dealing with fraud in the context of EU subsidies is being considered.[97] At present, there is not enough political support for abandoning national autonomy in this specific field in favour of a broad, supranational approach. The eventual adoption of a supranational approach to combating cross-border crime would appear to be the preferable option, however, not least because internationally operating criminal networks will continue to exploit the weaknesses of national police and judicial systems that are operating alongside each other rather than in concert. The expectation is therefore that the pressure to establish a European police system that can act independently of member states will increase.

Cybercrime

Current risks and threats

Cybercrime has been one of the most rapidly growing security threats of recent years. There are now approximately two billion internet users worldwide. Rapid growth in the number of internet users has been paralleled by an increase in misuse of the internet. Millions of attacks take place each day (see Map 2).

European citizens are therefore increasingly concerned about cyber security. According to the latest study commissioned by the EU, 76% of Europe's citizens believe that they could be victims of cybercrime. Sixty-four percent of them are concerned that public authorities are not keeping information secret. Approximately half of all internet users are concerned about identity theft and banking fraud. Internet use varies within the EU. Inhabitants of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden use the internet more than inhabitants of Hungary, Portugal and Romania, for example.

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95 An example in this context is the fact that, up to the present time, there has been considerable discussion within the EU about the concept of cross-border crime: 'It has ultimately been left to member states to fit their definition into EU's conception; it is not clear what constitutes a serious offence, an organized crime offence or a predicate offence.' F. Allum and M. den Boer, 'United we stand? Conceptual Diversity in the EU Strategy against Organized Crime', in *Journal of European Integration*, 35 (2013) 2, p. 146.

96 See http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Contentnavigation/Events/Eventsoverview/tabid/1187/EventType/EventView/EventId/1244/EventDateID/1257/PageID/7010/CrossbordercrimeandcorruptioninEuropeWhatnextaftertheStockholmProgramme.aspx.

97 *Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 20 January 2014*, which contains the reply to the advice of the Advisory Council on International Affairs regarding crime, corruption and instability.

Map 2   Actual cyber attacks on 30 April 2014, 17:13[98]

The third Cyber Security in the Netherlands Survey (CSBN) states that a 'range of incidents have made the potential consequences of cyber threats increasingly clear in recent years.'[99] States (espionage) and professional criminals are the greatest threat in the cyber domain. Cyber vandals, script kiddies and hacktivists also constitute a threat, albeit a less acute one. The attribution issue, the inability to always identify the type of actor that is carrying out an attack, remains a problem.

States are a threat mainly in terms of theft of confidential or competition-sensitive information from companies, government authorities and citizens (cyber espionage). In 2012, the AIVD established that espionage attacks were being carried out against Dutch civilian organisations or through Dutch ICT infrastructure from, among other countries, China, Iran, Russia and Syria. In addition, the MIVD established that the defence industry is a popular target of cyber espionage. There are indications that parties with which the defence industry cooperates are also targets of cyber espionage. In addition to spying, states can misuse the internet to disrupt vital infrastructure of other states. The first large-scale cyber attacks were carried out against Estonia (April 2007). The immediate cause was the controversial relocation of a Soviet monument from the centre to a suburb of the capital Tallinn. The cyber attacks originated from servers of the Russian government. They were carried out by individuals and directed against the parliament, ministries, banks and media organisations in Estonia.[100]
A cyber attack also took place during Russian military operations in Georgia in August 2008. Russia disrupted internet traffic and communication systems, as a result of which the Georgian armed forces were 'blind' and 'deaf'. In other words, the cyber attacks were a force multiplier, since they were carried out to support an offensive of conventional armed forces.[101]
The Stuxnet computer virus, which was discovered in June 2010 and was probably directed against Iran's nuclear programme, also caused quite a stir. Stuxnet proved to be capable of spreading rapidly in specific industrial systems. Although thousands of computers in different

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98 Security dashboard, *Sicherheitstacho Deutsche Telekom AG*, consulted on 30 April 2014. This map provides an overview of actual cyber attacks recorded by 180 sensors.

99 National Cyber Security Centre, *Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland – CSBN-3*. The Hague: NCSC, June 2013. The NCSC publishes the CSBN, which is prepared in close cooperation with public and private parties, each year.

100 Ian Traynor, 'Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia', *The Guardian*, 17 May 2007. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.

101 Laura Starink, 'Reconstructie van de vijfdaagse oorlog in Georgië', *nrc.nl>archief*, 11 Oktober 2008.

countries were infected, computers in Iranian nuclear installations were particularly affected. There is a suspicion that Stuxnet was the outcome of a joint US-Israeli operation.[102] China has also grabbed headlines in this area. The Obama administration has accused the Chinese armed forces of cyber attacks on computer systems of the US government and defence contractors.[103] Various attacks were identified in the Netherlands in 2012. The characteristics of these attacks suggested that they had been launched in China. In terms of such attacks on the Netherlands, Russia, Iran and Syria are also countries of origin.[104] International organisations like the EU and NATO are also regularly targeted by cyber attacks. These attacks may also originate from private hackers, however.

The greatest threat of criminal cyber attacks mainly concerns financial fraud and the theft of information. Such criminal acts are carried out by altering online transactions, usually after the theft and abuse of login data (for example: fraud in the context of internet banking).

Sympathisers in Berlin show their support for Edward Snowden, the former CIA employee who leaked sensitive information to the media in June 2013.
Photograph: mw238

Despite the policy in place and the measures taken to increase awareness and the ability of citizens to protect themselves, Dutch society is becoming more vulnerable. The outcomes of the CSBN are important, however, in terms of the risk analysis used and the approach adopted to ensure cyber security. The risk is determined on the basis of three related factors: interests, threats and the level of protection against these threats.[105] The first factor

102 Albert Benschop, 'Cyberoorlog – Slagveld Internet', *De Wereld*, p. 219-232.
103 David E. Sanger, 'U.S. Blames China's Military Directly for Cyberattacks', *The New York Times*, 6 May 2013.
104 *Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland* – CSBN-3, see footnote 99, p. 60.
105 Idem, p. 17-43.

concerns personal, organisational, chain-related and societal interests that require cyber security. In connection with the first factor, the threats and measures in place to counter them (protection) must be analysed to improve cyber security.

Current national policy, organisation and capabilities

In the Netherlands, the Lower House adopted the National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) 'Strength through Cooperation' in February 2011.[106] The strategy's purpose is to establish a safe, reliable and resilient digital domain and use the opportunities provided by such a domain in Dutch society. An integrated cyber security approach based on public-private cooperation is required for this purpose. Based on the NCSS, a National Cyber Security Council, an independent advisory body of the Dutch government, was formed on 30 June 2011. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which is based on cooperation between public and private parties, was established on 1 January 2012. The NCSC's purpose is to provide expertise and advice, monitor threats and take action in the event of a crisis. The centre has prepared a security checklist for monitoring and checking and data collection for industrial control systems.

In June 2012, the Dutch Ministry of Defence published its cyber security strategy (*Defensie Cyber Strategie*), which focuses on the role of the armed forces in the digital domain.[107] The strategy's specific priorities include developing offensive military capabilities and further expanding domestic and international cooperation. The increasing interrelatedness of military and civilian, public and private, and national and international actors in the digital domain is a key factor in this regard. The Defence's Cyber Task Force, which was formed at the beginning of 2012, will become part of the new Defence Cyber Command in 2014. In the event of an emergency and at the request of the civilian authorities, the Minister of Defence can provide support in terms of cyber capabilities in the context of ICMS. The opposite is also the case. The relationship between the National Cyber Security Centre and the Defence Cyber Security Command is still unclear. The Ministry of Defence joined the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE), a NATO military organisation located in the Estonian capital Tallinn, in 2012. The Netherlands can therefore pool its resources and improve its knowledge.

A second version of the NCSS was published on 28 October 2013.[108] Among other things, NCSS2 states that international efforts are becoming more important. Agreements must be made regarding cooperation, standards of conduct and standards more generally in both a European and a broader international context, for example. NCSS2 considers the EU Cyber Security Strategy to be an important step towards a safe digital environment within Europe. According to NCSS2, the Dutch strategy is in line with the starting points of the EU strategy and builds upon this strategy. Concepts like regulation and self-regulation, transparency and knowledge development have been incorporated into the strategy in different forms. The strategy refers to transparency, for example, as a precondition for strengthening trust between the actors.

NCSS2 confirms that cyber security is inextricably linked to international cooperation and that therefore the national public-private approach to cyber security must be promoted

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106 *Nationale Cyber Security Strategie: Slagkracht door samenwerking*. The Hague: 22 February 2011.
107 Ministry of Defence, *Defensie Cyber Strategie*, 27 June 2012.
108 National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, *Nationale Cyber Security Strategie 2: Van bewust naar bekwaam*. The Hague: November 2013.

also beyond national borders. The Netherlands wishes to play a leading role, for example, in looking for new coalitions in which all of the parties involved are represented for the purpose of establishing internationally accepted standards of conduct in the cyber domain. NCSS2 states that the Netherlands is therefore working to promote international cooperation and is clearly acting as a cyber security intermediary and hub. The Netherlands takes an integrated approach in this context, which means that all relevant parties are represented in the consultative process aimed at establishing internationally accepted standards of conduct in the cyber domain.

Situation in neighbouring countries

Belgium

Belgium's federal government approved a cyber security strategy on 21 December 2013.[109] This strategy was designed to guarantee cyber security in Belgium and, to this end, has three principal strategic aims: making cyberspace reliable with respect for the fundamental rights and values of modern society, achieving the best possible security and protection of critical infrastructures and government systems against cyber threats, and developing national cyber capabilities for an independent security policy and appropriate responses to security incidents.

Cyber attacks on the Belgian government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a range of large communications companies led to the approval of a Belgian Cyber Security Centre (CCB) on 19 December 2013. Expected to be operational in March 2014, the CCB will have federal status and oversee interdepartmental cooperation.

As a national authority, the CCB has the following policy, methodological and coordinating tasks: ensuring cyber security compliance, including crisis management in the event of a cyber incident, providing a consultation platform for all partners involved (public and private sectors and the scientific community), and increasing the awareness of users of information systems.

The CCB's task in international terms is to coordinate Belgium's participation in international forums and formulate and take action in the context of Belgium's position on the matter at hand, and develop and monitor the implementation of standards, security standards and guidelines for the government's information systems.[110]

The Belgian Ministry of Defence has been investing in national cyber defence capability since 2006. This investment focuses particularly on systems that process classified information and systems that are used to support military operations. The cyber defence capability cooperates closely with the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) in identifying vulnerabilities and handling security incidents.[111]

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109 Cyber Security Strategy.be Securing Cyberspace, 18 December 2012.
110 Sarah Delafortrie and Christophe Springael, 'Oprichting van het Centrum voor cybersecurity België', PRESSCENTER.ORG, 19 December 2013.
111 *Written question no. 5-4320 from Karl Vanlouwe (N-VA) dated 28 December 2011 to the Minister of Defence*, p. 4.

Germany

Germany has had a new cyber security strategy since March 2011.[112] This strategy focuses on ten strategic areas that can be arranged into five groups: 1. the protection and security of German critical networks and systems, 2. the creation of a National Cyber Response Centre and a National Cyber Security Council, 3. effective control with respect to cyber-crime, 4. international cooperation, and 5. the cyber-related training of personnel employed at federal institutions. The National Cyber Security Council is led by a state secretary of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The council focuses on coordinating preventive cyber security measures.

Germany makes a distinction between civilian cyber security, which encompasses all ICT systems for civilian use in German cyberspace, and military cyber security, which includes ICT systems for military use. Within the *Bundeswehr*, the Strategic Reconnaissance Unit's Department of Information and Computer Network Operations is responsible for developing cyber capabilities. This 60-man unit based in Rheinbach works in secret to prepare for an electronic emergency, including digital attacks on servers and networks abroad.[113] Germany has offensive capabilities of its own that it can use to respond to such attacks.[114]

France

The Network and Information Security Agency (ANSSI), established in 2009, is France's main cyber defence authority. It operates under the prime minister and is part of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security. The agency published the official French cyber strategy in 2011.[115]

The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, which was released in 2013, devotes considerable attention to cyber security in its 'The fight against cyber threats' section. It states that a major cyber attack on French state institutions could constitute a genuine act of war.[116]

Across the board, France considers gathering information and ensuring cyber security, including in terms of detecting and identifying perpetrators, to be measures of national sovereignty, as a result of which French legislators can take sterner measures in the context of monitoring the cyber domain.

French doctrine regarding the national response to a major cyber attack is based on two complementary components. The first concerns the protection of information systems and resources at national level. These protective operations are coordinated under the responsibility of the prime minister. The second component concerns an active response, i.e. taking action against an attack that is appropriate in terms of intensity to the nature and scope of the attack, starting with diplomatic and legal or police measures. If national strategic interests are threatened, assets of the Ministry of Defence can also be used.

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112 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Cyber Security Strategy for Germany*. Berlin: February 2011.

113 J. Goetz, M. Rosenbach and A. Szandar, 'National Defense in Cyberspace', *Der Spiegel Online International*, 11 February 2009. See www.spiegel.de.

114 Michael Fischer, 'German Armed Forces Equipping for Cyber War', *Atlantic Council*, 24 May 2013.

115 French Network and Information Security Agency, *Information Systems Defence and Security: France's Strategy*. Paris: 2011.

116 French Ministry of Defence, *French White Paper – Defence and National Security 2013*. Paris: July 2013, p. 100-103.

As regards international cooperation, the French White Paper states that an ambitious cyber defence policy requires the development of close relations between international partners and that relations with privileged partners, in the first place the United Kingdom and Germany, need to be strengthened therefore. In addition, at European level, France supports the implementation of a European policy aimed at strengthening protection against cyber attacks.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom updated its Cyber Security Strategy in November 2011 and set out a vision for 2015. That vision is about deriving huge economic and social value from cyberspace in which individual actions are guided by the core values of liberty, fairness, transparency and the rule of law. The overall aim is to enhance prosperity, national security and a strong society.[117] The strategy therefore considers a cyber attack to be a threat to national security. The United Kingdom stresses the importance of international cooperation with the United States, Australia, France and emerging powers and, in addition, with international organisations like the Commonwealth of Nations, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the EU and NATO. It will work internationally to develop international principles or 'rules of the road' for behaviour in cyberspace and confidence-building measures.

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review called for the creation of a Defence Cyber Operations Group, due to be fully operational by March 2015.[118] The intention is for it to be a federation of cyber units across defence that will mainstream cyber security throughout the Ministry of Defence and ensure the coherent integration of cyber activities across the spectrum of defence operations. The new Joint Forces Command will lead the development and integration of cyber defence.

International developments
The EU and NATO are both important actors in the field of cyber security. This part of the study focuses primarily on the EU because of its role with respect to the interrelatedness of internal and external security. NATO concentrates mainly on protecting its own systems against external threats.

The EU Cyber Security Strategy was unveiled at the beginning of 2013.[119] The European Commission has also proposed a directive concerning network and information security. It has yet to be accepted by the Council and the European Parliament.

The EU vision presented in the strategy is articulated in five strategic priorities:

– achieving cyber resilience;
– drastically reducing cybercrime;
– developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the CSDP;

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117 Cabinet Office, *The UK Cybersecurity Strategy: Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World.* London: November 2011.

118 UK HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review.* London: 2010.

119 European Commission, *Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace*, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels: 7 February 2013.

– developing the industrial and technological resources for cyber security; and
– establishing a coherent international cyber space policy for the EU and promoting core EU values.

In addition, the strategy is accompanied by a proposal for legislation with respect to the following:

– The member states must adopt a strategy for network and information security and designate a competent national authority for network and information security.
– The member states and the Commission will enter into a partnership to share early warnings about risks and incidents via a secure infrastructure, cooperate and carry out peer reviews on a regular basis.
– Operators of essential infrastructure in a number of sectors, providers of services to the information society and government authorities must introduce risk management arrangements and report serious incidents concerning their core services.

The European Council conclusions of December 2013 also devote attention to cyber security. The Council calls for an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, on the basis of a proposal by the High Representative, in cooperation with the Commission and the European Defence Agency.[120]

Regarding cyber issues, the Council welcomes the development of a roadmap and concrete projects focused on training and exercises, improving civil-military cooperation on the basis of the EU cyber security strategy and the protection of assets in EU missions and operations. The Council also welcomes the improvement of civil-military cooperation on the basis of the EU cyber security strategy.

The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence was adopted in June 2011. This policy focuses mainly on protecting NATO's own systems and on minimum requirements for the protection of national networks to the extent that such networks are linked to NATO's systems or process NATO information. Assistance can be provided in this regard by, among other organisations, the aforementioned CCDCoE in Tallinn, the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the NATO CIS School. In his 2013 annual report, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that the 51 NATO locations that make up NATO headquarters, the NATO command structure and NATO agencies are under comprehensive 24/7 surveillance and protected by enhanced sensors and intrusion detection technologies.

All NATO activities with respect to digital security, information technology and missile defence will be carried out by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) in The Hague. NATO activities in these fields will therefore cease to be spread across several locations. NCIA will develop all software for operations (command and control) and to repel cyber attacks. Fifty to a hundred additional employees will join the agency to ensure that it can perform these tasks.

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120 European Council, *European Council Conclusions 19-20 December 2013*. Brussels: 20 December 2013.

Conclusion

The relationship between external and internal security has been made much more visible and tangible in recent years, especially by terrorist attacks, internationally operating criminal networks and an increase in immigration flows. In addition, the number of cyber attacks has also increased rapidly in recent years, just as the number of natural disasters is on the rise. The Netherlands' open society is vulnerable as it is closely intertwined with the outside world. This applies to all of the four dimensions on which this study focuses.

The external-internal security nexus is closely linked to conflicts and instability in countries and regions outside Europe that cause security risks within Europe. The greatest challenges arise in the 'Belt of Instability', which stretches from northern Latin America and the Caribbean via North Africa to the Middle and Near East. This is not to state, however, that terrorism and organised crime always have an external origin. In 2012, for example, most of the terrorist attacks carried out in Europe were linked to separatism, just as cross-border crime includes activities carried out by networks operating at intra-European level. Nevertheless, there are direct links between the 'Belt of Instability' and internal security. Risks and threats to internal security like terrorism, extremism and immigration problems may originate from or be amplified in areas of conflict. Instability gives criminal networks the opportunity to engage in their activities if there are no properly functioning structures of order and authority. The drug routes from South America via West and North Africa are an example in this regard.

The policies of countries and international partnerships like the EU are aimed at better harmonising external and internal security strategies, organisational structures and available capabilities. This is problematic in practice, among other reasons because of the separation of powers of the actors (ministries, institutions) responsible for external and internal security policies. As shown by the analysis of the situation in the Netherlands and its four partner countries, the nature of this problem differs per country. The Netherlands seeks solutions mainly in practical cooperation, which is more difficult to achieve in large countries like Germany and the United Kingdom simply because of the larger scale and variety of agencies involved.

Moreover, the EU has to contend with the issue of the legal separation of powers between the external and internal spheres of activity. While external security is handled on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation between member states, internal security is largely a supra-national or communitarian matter. This separation of powers based on the treaties impedes cross-pollination and coordination, and certainly far-reaching cooperation in this area and the integration of external and internal security policies. For the time being, it would arguably be better for the EU to focus on the phased intensification of coordination between the actors responsible for the external and internal policies, since a major step forward based on amendments to the treaties is politically unrealistic.

2 Future risks and threats

As stated, the 'Belt of Instability' is an important source of external threats that can affect internal security. The expectation is that instability and fragility in this belt will increase in the coming years. The most important hot spots are in Europe's immediate neighbourhood, particularly the MENA region and sub-Saharan Africa. A very diverse range of hybrid, cross-border conflicts are taking place in these regions, conflicts that can serve as a potential breeding ground for extremism, terrorism, criminality and immigration, phenomena that can easily spill over into European territory. The following sections deal with the developments expected in the coming five to ten years with respect to the four dimensions discussed in this study.

Immigration

Immigration is a phenomenon that is affected by internal and external factors through all layers of society. The further development of the issue therefore depends on social, economic, political and cultural factors.

Demographic trends suggest that there will be a labour shortage in Europe of approximately 40 million people by 2050. Without immigration, this shortage could even be as high as 55 million. This problem is already manifesting itself, in spite of the high unemployment rates in many European countries. It is caused by a mismatch between the type of skills required and those that many unemployed people actually have. If this shortage is not remedied, the EU will have to deal with new immigration challenges in the future for which it will have to develop a common policy. The sometimes extremely unequal rates of development in the world will generate strong push and pull factors that will drive immigration flows from regions that are poor, densely populated and affected by conflict to Europe.

If there is no open, public debate about both the challenges and opportunities of immigration, opposition to it, especially in the case of immigration from outside the EU, will increase. Current populist tendencies and widespread anti-immigrant sentiments are encouraging restrictive policies in the form of tighter immigration rules, the criminalisation of irregular migration and high-tech border security, also referred to as the paramilitarisation of borders. Politicians respond and adapt their policies to public opinion. Immigration will in any case be on the agendas of the EU and the Netherlands.

Immigration experts point out that restrictive policy tends to exacerbate rather than reduce problems. Immigrants will continue to travel to Europe and the Netherlands. If tighter regulations make entry through regular channels more difficult, they will look for alternative, often illegal routes (from the Middle East via Turkey and the Balkans, for example, while Italy, Malta and Greece will remain under pressure) and illegal methods. Increasing demand will be met in terms of supply by criminal groups. In addition to making immigrants more vulnerable, this development will further strengthen criminal networks, also in terms of arms trafficking and human trafficking and people smuggling, and increase their influence in the regular circuit. The risk of regular and irregular migration becoming intertwined is therefore increasing. The greatest risk in this regard is not posed by migration itself but by those who control the migration flows.

Different factors underlie the threats posed by migration. Poverty and instability, as well as other factors like terrorism, climate change and other risks in the countries of origin, can lead to migration. Political unrest, a lack of economic development, population pressure, ethnic and religious conflicts, oppression and instability in countries and regions outside Europe will therefore play an important role. Regarding driving forces of migration, the risks are greatest in the Middle East (Syria and Yemen) and, if instability increases further after 2014, will also be great in Afghanistan, North Africa, the sub-Saharan region and the Horn of Africa. What is referred to as South-South migration may also affect Europe.[121] Further afield, political instability in emerging economies like those in Asia may result in new migration flows. There are also weak spots closer to home. Unrest in countries and areas that border the EU (Ukraine, Turkey, and Transcaucasia) may likewise result in migration to the EU.

In addition to political tensions and conflict in countries of origin, governance is often poor or there is no unambiguous migration policy. The EU must continue concluding partnerships with countries outside the EU and the transit countries to limit or prevent irregular migration. Dealing with the causes of migration will have the greatest effect in the long term.

In addition to external threats, problems also arise from within. Xenophobic tendencies, the rise of extreme right groups, economic developments in Europe and inadequate integration policies also play an important role. If they continue, for example, bleak economic prospects in EU member states may intensify the migration problem, whereas an economic recovery from which everyone in society benefits could relieve pressure. Strong political leadership is required to counter these negative developments and, in particular, to also highlight the opportunities of migration and thereby increase understanding within society. It should be noted that migration is often linked to economic opportunity, which means that immigration to Europe may increase if the European economy improves.

Migration pressure from the Mediterranean Sea on Europe's southern external borders is expected to go up in the coming years, as will the risk of dying while making this voyage. Arrangements for this kind of mobility will increasingly be made by criminal organisations. In practice, people smuggling will therefore become more and more intertwined with serious crime and human rights violations. Further globalisation is also expected to make people more mobile. Europe's southern countries continue to bear a disproportionate burden in terms of accommodating migration flows and preventing humanitarian disasters in the Mediterranean Sea. A sustainable solution that relieves countries in Southern Europe, countries that are struggling to deal with acute economic problems as it is, will have to be implemented in the coming years. The Netherlands will also have to contribute to international efforts in this regard.

Terrorism

Terrorism will not have a clear-cut cause in the future. On the contrary, the expectation is that many factors will continue to determine the nature and level of the threat. The source of this security risk has both internal and external dimensions that are usually interrelated. In terms of terrorism's external source, the risk of further geographic spread is high. Moreover, the action taken by government authorities (both in the Netherlands and in third countries) is likely to be significant in terms of the extent to which latent problems develop into actual

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121 The World Bank defines 'South-South migration' as migration between low and middle-income countries.

security risks. The degree and success of effective international cooperation are therefore of vital importance.

As regards the key sources of the problem, analyses show that instability caused by unrest, uprisings and conflict in countries in North, East and West Africa, as well as in different countries in the Middle East, is used by extremist, jihadist, al-Qaeda-like organisations to expand their respective power bases. There is also a real danger of extremist terrorist organisations exploiting certain situations in such a way as to make a country totally ungovernable, resulting in the complete collapse of political, social and economic structures. Such organisations therefore tend to try to disrupt national administrations. Moreover, increasing religious intolerance in communities makes it more likely that situations will be exploited to advance a violent extremist agenda.

Even after the situation in Syria normalises and its power to attract young people from the West wanes, the issue of foreign fighters will remain an acute internal and external security problem. The problem will probably relocate to other countries and regions in which internal unrest and instability make it possible for extremist groups to establish themselves and be joined by foreign fighters. Such extremist groups currently adhere primarily to local or regional agendas, and in some cases are even competitors. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to maintain the 'al-Qaeda brand' and the overall trend is one of cultivating more international links and a more internationally shared jihadist objective. Financial support from wealthy individuals based in Qatar and Saudi Arabia who are committed to the Wahhabi or Salafi movement is a factor that will affect the threat posed by these networks in the coming years. This factor will also affect processes of radicalisation both in other regions and within Western countries. The degree to which government authorities and social organisations prove capable, through education and social and conventional media, of countering propaganda and recruitment will be decisive in terms of effectively resisting this silent trend.

Moreover, the large quantities of small firearms circulating in the MENA region and the Sahel are contributing to local instability. The arms trade, also as engaged in by Western powers, can therefore affect the development of conflicts in these regions. Although the power and strike capability of al-Qaeda's main branch are currently estimated to be limited, it is possible that this main branch may recover its power in Central Asia following the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.

In terms of countermeasures, there is a concern that governments in parts of Africa and the Middle East, out of fear of the risks posed by the destabilising activities of extremist jihadist organisations will 'overreact' in their efforts to counter the risks before the danger actually manifests itself. Such overreactions can lead to further polarisation and oppression of a society and a very repressive policy, which contribute to circumstances that are seen as causes of radicalisation and terrorism. They therefore have a catalysing effect. In this connection, it is important to underline that limiting the political room for manoeuvre in which NGOs may operate also affects the ability of societies to cope with radicalisation and violent extremism.

As a result of the developments referred to above, it will be necessary for Western countries to protect their national security interests at distant locations. Western countries may therefore become more involved in internal conflicts in third countries where terrorism and insurgency are intertwined. This involvement may be experienced as a modern form of colonialism and may lead to increasing tensions between great powers about the necessity of such

interference. At the same time, is seems inevitable that the fanning out of the foreign fighters problem in Africa and the Middle East and the proliferation of al-Qaeda-like regional and extremist organisations will eventually constitute a greater threat to Europe's internal security. Moreover, developments in Africa and the Middle East may create an internal climate in the Netherlands in which violent attacks by radicalised groups or lone wolves are more likely. Factors that play a role in this regard are stronger anti-Western sentiment as a result of, among other things, dissatisfaction about the foreign policy being conducted, a growing divide in society as a result of an 'us and them' mentality, growing problems within a multicultural society that may become more pronounced if certain groups continue to suffer from the economic crisis for longer than others, an increase in anti-jihad groups and anti-immigrant and anti-multicultural sentiments, possibly strengthened by extreme right and neo-Nazi groups (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe), and increasing populism. The trend of individualisation within societies and the pressure to be successful are also seen as factors that affect the way that individuals develop, also in terms of vulnerability to radicalisation that leads to violent extremism. Overreaction to this combination of threats on the part of Western governments may needlessly make the problems more acute if such overreaction leads to imbalanced perceptions, stigmatisation and the wrong policy choices. In other words, overreaction may ultimately make society less resilient, undermine the rule of law and erode the right to privacy. Using the greater range of technical capabilities available for investigation and protection without having a critical discussion about the value system by which the use of such capabilities must be assessed in terms of necessity and effectiveness can lead to policy choices that can be counterproductive in the context of fighting terrorism.

In geographic terms, the threat of terrorism in the West will probably be concentrated in large cities, particularly in districts in which there are ethnic tensions as a result of, among other things, societal polarisation and dissatisfaction in certain ethnic groups about the foreign policy being conducted. In addition, Europe will remain vulnerable to attacks by lone wolves and extremists who have returned from conflict areas or by home-grown groups who have an extremist jihadist ideology and sympathise with those engaged in a jihadist struggle elsewhere. Countries in Africa and the Middle East will remain sources of this problem. Other main areas in terms of the threat of terrorism are located in Central and South Asia.

Cross-border crime

The threats posed by transnational crime are unlikely to recede in the coming decade. There are two dominant factors in this regard: increasing flexibility and mobility and a further shift from the physical to the virtual world.

Cross-border crime will continue to be characterised by flexibility in terms of form, composition, allocation of roles and area of activity. Vulnerability to organised transnational crime will remain and possibly increase because of the continuing mobility of people, money and goods. Although individual states are making efforts to monitor these flows at national level, there is no adequate and coherent picture of flows of people and/or goods at the European or global level. People smugglers, for example, take advantage of these omissions.

In addition to physical mobility, the expectation is that transnational crime will continue to shift from the physical world to the virtual one. Although this development will manifest itself in a number of areas, it will be most apparent in terms of international financial flows through virtual channels. It is virtually impossible to monitor the nature and number of these flows. Since contact with the physical world is not required or is required only to a minimum extent,

it is more difficult to establish that a financial transaction or money laundering has actually taken place, which also makes it more difficult to gather evidence.

Regarding the priorities of neighbouring countries, it is striking that, in addition to traditional ones like combating drugs, cybercrime and mobile banditry are key areas of government action. These are also key areas to Europol and INTERPOL. Both organisations have made considerable efforts to counter cybercrime at European and global levels. In 2013, Europol formed the European Cybercrime centre, while INTERPOL will open the Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore in 2014. In addition to the threats posed by criminal offences, all neighbouring countries refer to the security risks posed by fragile states and the rapidly changing forms in which criminal partnerships manifest themselves as priorities.

Furthermore, it is striking that the size[122] and geographic reach of internationally operating criminal gangs are increasing, whereas efforts to bring them down remain fragmented across individual states that may or may not be fighting transnational crime in the context of joint projects.[123] Smaller countries in particular are unable to adequately deal with organised crime. Relatively new states usually struggle to find supranational responses to transnational crime.

Criminal networks will continue to exploit the absence of a European approach. Since a European Public Prosecution Service will not be created in the foreseeable future, national approaches will continue to dominate for the time being. In addition, the action taken by most police forces is reactive, i.e. action is taken in response to a given situation. Such action is of course required. Because of social dynamism and the rate of change and innovations, however, the police are in many cases overtaken by events. Most European police organisations do not act proactively or anticipate crime-related developments.[124] The police and judiciary must therefore respond to and anticipate new, modernised or future forms of crime more rapidly than is currently the case.

Cyber issues

Cyber espionage, cyber terrorism and cybercrime will inevitably increase. Growing internet dependency is becoming more of an issue in this context. The value of information is increasing without being paralleled by an increasing level of protection. This problem is not given enough attention in ICT education, as a result of which there are not enough specialists who can guarantee ICT security. A continuing lack of awareness of basic cyber threats (more advanced polymorphic malware, for example) in the public, private and civil sectors is making societies more vulnerable.

The different target groups each have their own threats and vulnerabilities. The impact of cybercrime or a cyber attack is probably greatest when it disrupts national systems/vital infrastructure. Although the government is usually involved as a regulator, systems are often owned and managed by private parties. A key vulnerability in this sense is a lack of awareness among individual ICT users in combination with the growing number of ICT platforms.

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122 Europol, *EU Organized Crime Report 2003*. Brussels: 2003. In 2002, Europol estimated that 2,000 criminal groups were active in the EU. In 2013, the organisation stated that this number had increased to at least 3,600. See Europol, *Serious Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2013*, p. 34-36.

123 Often shaped by means of *European Multidisciplinary Platform against Crime Threats* (EMPACT) projects. See also under EU policy in this regard.

124 J. Hogeboom, *Toekomstonderzoek voor de Nationale Politie, Focus op feiten of Fictie?*, January 2014.

Although the business sector is the most vulnerable one in financial terms, it is also the one in which there is an awareness of the risks and the level of security is higher. The government depends on the performance of private companies for its security. This dependency is likely to increase in the future. In a sense, threats in the private sector are therefore also threats to the government, which may even be at greater risk because of the sometimes very limited cooperation between departments at government level.

International trade and the international monetary and financial system remain targets for cyber attacks. The same applies to critical infrastructure like national and European power grids and payment systems.

At interstate level and more generally, the issue of attribution, i.e. the inability to establish the origin of a cyber attack, remains a problem that limits possibilities in terms of taking offensive countermeasures. The probability of cyber capabilities being used as a weapon by, among other actors, rogue states that can take advantage of the ICT vulnerabilities of other countries will probably increase. The possibility of state-organised cyber attacks of the kind carried out against Estonia in 2007 must therefore be taken into account. In addition, the risk of rapid spreading in the event of an attack will increase as networks within and between states and between states and international organisations like the EU and NATO become more interconnected. The cyber domain will become increasingly important in military operations, both defensively and offensively for the purpose of disrupting an adversary's systems and activities. Regarding military use of cyber capabilities, national interests will probably delay progress with respect to international regulation, as a result of which vulnerability will remain needlessly high.

Continued rapid growth towards the 'Internet of Things' (a development in which everyday objects have network connectivity and can therefore be used for functional communication, which means that the internet will provide more than just access to websites, email and the like to users) is opening up new territory for cyber criminals. The growing number of sensitive platforms – that is, infrastructure and services that are linked through the internet – are a particular challenge because many of them are secure only to a limited extent. The increasing complexity of direct machine-to-machine communication ('man-out-the-loop') related to this development may have unintended consequences like incidents, disruptions and misuse.

The privacy of citizens seems to be at greater risk because of the possibility, for example, of linking their online behaviour with different areas/sectors. The unlawful use of data of private individuals and governments, obtained by using the sensitivities of operating systems, will therefore remain a danger. In other words, while increased dependence on connectivity on the part of private individuals, government authorities and companies has its benefits, it is also a danger in that all aspects of daily life are connected to the network, including home automation systems or medical equipment.

Conclusion

Risks and threats will remain in the future in all four of the areas discussed (immigration, terrorism, cross-border crime and the cyber domain). As explained above, these risks and threats will in all likelihood increase. This increase will not be linear, however. In each area, changes will occur in the nature and scope of the security risks. In addition, the four areas are linked. One risk area can be directly or indirectly linked to another. The international criminalisation of immigration may increase as a risk, for example. Immigration flows may give

extremist groups the opportunity to increase the range of their activities. In a similar vein, many cyber attacks are criminal in nature. These links between the risk areas are of particular importance in terms of countermeasures, which require close cooperation and coordination between different actors.

Immigration

The immigration issue is closely linked to broader developments in society. Europe is having to grapple in this regard with what are ostensibly two opposing problems, namely limiting what is experienced as being undesirable immigration on the one hand while, on the other, attracting suitable employees to make up for a labour shortage that is increasing as a result of declining birth rates. In terms of limiting immigration, there is a risk of growing criminal involvement as regulations and technology-based border control make it more difficult to enter Europe. This would also increase the risk of regular and irregular migration becoming intertwined.

Regarding the relationship between external and internal security, it is important to bear in mind that unstable areas and countries outside Europe remain key drivers of migration. In geographic terms, the main areas at present are in the Middle and Near East and the whole of North Africa. A further eastward shift of migration flows towards Asia is possible. Instability in the immediate environment (Ukraine, Turkey and Transcaucasia) may also result in migration to Europe.

EU member states along the Mediterranean Sea remain the main points of entry into Europe. In the future, they will continue to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, which means that solidarity between EU member states will remain under pressure.

Terrorism

The breeding ground for jihadist extremism in the Middle East and the whole of North Africa will continue to exist and may spread to countries that have a poorly functioning government. Funding from wealthy Arab countries and the proliferation of small firearms increase the potential for extremist networks. The MENA region will continue to attract foreign fighters. European countries, including the Netherlands, must take continuing propaganda and the recruitment of these fighters, as well as the risk of attacks by jihadists who have returned, into account.

Involvement in conflicts on the basis of foreign policy, contributions to international operations and domestic political developments may increase the risk of violent attacks by terrorist groups or lone wolves. There is also the danger of overreaction on the part of Western governments. Such overreaction may heighten a Western population's sense of security and undermine the rule of law and the privacy of individuals, certainly if technological means dominate in the fight against terrorism. The greatest danger will be in large cities, particularly in districts in which there are ethnic tensions as a result of polarisation between population groups.

Cross-border crime

Security risks arising from international crime will remain high in the future. Criminal networks will adapt to changing circumstances and their opportunities will even increase as a result of the continuing mobility of people, money and goods. In addition, a further shift will occur from the physical to the virtual world, which means that financial crime in particular will increase.

Links between cross-border crime and fragile states outside Europe will remain. The size and geographic reach of internationally operating criminal gangs will probably increase, which will make countering their activities more difficult, especially for smaller countries. Although the need for a centralised European approach will therefore also increase, national approaches will remain dominant. Internationally operating criminal networks will continue to take advantage of this situation.

Cyber issues

Because of increasing dependence on the internet, the risks of cyber espionage, cybercrime and cyber terrorism will likewise increase, certainly if cyber security continues to receive insufficient attention in ICT education. Another problem is that governments largely rely on the private sector for their ICT security, and the private sector often does not make security enough of a priority. The rapidity of internet-related developments make this situation more challenging.

In the context of cyber attacks on government infrastructure, attribution will remain a serious problem in terms of taking possible offensive countermeasures. The danger of state use, including by rogue states, will remain and may even increase.

The increasing interconnectedness of all kinds of internet functions, the Internet of Things, is also giving rise to new challenges. Sensitive platforms, infrastructure and services linked through the internet are particularly vulnerable. The privacy of citizens will be at greater risk, mainly because of the increasing interconnectedness of private individuals, government authorities and the business community. In a military context, it seems that international arrangements are slowly being established because of predominant national interests.

3 Conclusions and points to note for the Netherlands

General

Although the relationship between external and internal security is not new, it is changing drastically as a result of the increasing spillover effects of conflicts in unstable parts of the world. In addition, while conflict areas are further away than they were in the 1990s (the war in Yugoslavia), the effects of conflicts have become more apparent within Europe. The increased mobility of refugees, the internationalisation of terrorism and criminal networks, rapidly increasing misuse of the internet and other negative effects of globalisation have changed the European population's perception of security. The lack of security sensed in an individual's own environment dominates in this regard. Security risks elsewhere in the world are experienced as being less threatening. A paradoxical reversal has occurred: during the Cold War, the external military threat was considerable but the danger that it posed to internal security was limited because of 'frozen' East-West relations, whereas now the external military threat is limited but instability elsewhere in the world directly affects internal security. Illegal immigration, terrorism, organised crime and cyber issues are examples in this regard. These security risks cannot be classified as being either entirely external or internal. They are transnational in nature from both a national and a European perspective. The interrelatedness of external and internal security is therefore not a question, it is a reality. However, this reality does not seem to be fully recognised by the public: the wish to have greater security 'in my own neighbourhood' is usually not linked to the desirability of achieving greater security in distant regions afflicted by instability and conflict. This perhaps explains the loss of public support for armed interventions elsewhere in the world for the purpose of crisis management.

Point of interest 1: the relationship between external and internal security is one that does not appear to be sufficiently recognised by the Dutch public. Greater awareness may help to strengthen support for the deployment of the armed forces in areas of conflict.

International organisations like the EU and NATO and, at national level, many member states, including the Netherlands, acknowledge the external-internal security nexus. Actual 'translation' into policy, organisation and capabilities is much more difficult, however. There are usually separate internal and external security strategies. The EU, for example, has a European Security Strategy and an Internal Security Strategy. The former focuses on foreign security issues while the latter focuses on security issues within Europe. The situation in the Netherlands is similar in that it also has a National Security Strategy and an International Security Strategy. This strategic divide is not in keeping with reality, which requires the best possible integration and harmonisation of the security policy's objectives, organisation and capabilities. Arguably, the first requirement is therefore an integrated security strategy that provides a single, coherent framework for actors involved in external and internal security.

Point of interest 2: optimising the approach to interrelated external and internal security issues requires an integrated security strategy that serves as a guide for all actors involved in domestic and foreign activities.

In organisational terms, there is also the legacy of a time when policy sectors for external security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Directorate-General for International Cooperation and the Ministry of Defence) and internal security (Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations) were essentially separate domains in functional terms. Although there are coordination structures in the Netherlands at ministerial and senior civil service levels, with the exception of the Dutch Coastguard, the organisations are separate at operational level. Practical coordination is horizontal (between ministries and the agencies involved) rather than vertical (centrally directed). Moreover, at EU level there is a legal separation of responsibilities: cooperation in the field of external security is intergovernmental, whereas internal security is largely a communitarian matter. Fortunately, there are many examples of effective practical cooperation. The best example in the Netherlands is the Coastguard, in which civilian and military elements have been integrated. In addition, the judiciary/police and the armed forces cooperate closely on both a structural and an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, in other areas and in other countries, and certainly at European level, there is often a yawning gap between the various actors and their organisations and working methods. It will take time to bridge this chasm. For this purpose, more systematic and structural working relationships between the external and internal security actors are required. Countries can learn from each other in this context. The experience gained can also be communicated and shared more within the EU.

Point of interest 3: a deepening of cooperation between external and internal security actors is required at both policy and operational levels, and also in terms of organisational structures.

Closer civil-military cooperation has been a trend for some time with respect to capabilities. The armed forces are supporting the authorities responsible for internal security to an increasing extent. In the Netherlands, doing so is a main task of the armed forces and one for which a substantial part of the total military workforce is permanently available. Numerous arrangements and agreements are in place between the Ministry of Defence and other ministries. The situation is similar in countries that neighbour the Netherlands, even though there are differences in terms of the degree of cooperation and integration of capabilities. Although most progress is required at EU level, there is increasing practical cooperation and coordination in the context of internal and external needs. The focus is on areas of overlapping capabilities for intelligence and reconnaissance (like unmanned aircraft), transport, maritime security and other areas. The primary aim is to better coordinate the capabilities of civilian actors and the armed forces. Logically, dual-use assets are given priority, since they virtually guarantee interoperability and standardisation. In addition, the coordination of civilian and military capabilities enables the best possible use to be made of limited budgets. The coordinated and/or joint development, purchase and operation of dual-use assets creates potential for reducing double costs in technological research, education and training, maintenance and the replacement of parts.

Point of interest 4: strengthening civil-military capacity planning, purchasing and operating at national and European levels to improve interoperability and achieve standardisation and reduction in expenditure.

Immigration

Migration is an age-old phenomenon that will increase in the future because of the growth of the world population, the increasing mobility of people as a result of technological developments and global social changes. The world will remain within reach because of easily accessible means of communication. The phenomenon presents both challenges and opportunities.

Irregular migration in particular is seen as a security threat. As a response to negative sentiments among the population, European countries are conducting increasingly restrictive policies with respect to illegal immigrants and economic migrants. The number of checks are rising and immigrants are increasingly being abused by organised crime networks. Human trafficking and people smuggling are attractive sources of income to criminal groups. Restrictive policy alone will not reduce immigration flows. Such policy is indeed more likely to increase the involvement of criminals. Dealing with the causes of immigration in the regions of origin is the only way that immigration flows can structurally be reduced. A national and international policy aimed at the stabilisation and normalisation of conflict areas would go a long way towards resolving the immigration issue. Greater emphasis must be placed on this link between immigration policy and external security policy.

Point of interest 5: in addition to provisions to better regulate the entry of immigrants, reducing the pressure of immigration requires an active national and international policy aimed at resolving conflicts and achieving stability in regions of origin.

Europe is also making efforts to place the opportunities of migration on the right track at European level. Based on the idea that immigrants play a key role in preventing labour shortages, national governments and the EU, for example through the Stockholm Programme, are trying to promote or make labour migration easier from other member states and non-EU countries. In light of the growing mismatch between vacancies and suitable employees, this point must be given considerable attention.

Point of interest 6: migration for the purpose of preventing labour shortages requires more intensive cooperation and coordination between member states at European level.

Developments of the last 15 years indicate that there is a growing need for intensive cooperation between member states, because of the continuous immigration flows to Europe and the associated criminality. Immigration to Europe from and through the periphery will continue in the future because of instability and conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Internationally operating criminal networks are playing an increasingly important role in this regard. The Netherlands' external borders are limited within the Schengen Area and a disproportionate part of the burden is in the first instance borne by Southern European countries. Dealing with the issue therefore requires solidarity with respect to border control and taking action in regions of origin. Such solidarity is also in the interest of the Netherlands, since illegal immigrants can move freely within the Schengen Area.

Point of interest 7: although immigration from the Middle East and North Africa primarily affects Southern European countries, it is a European issue that requires solidarity with respect to border control and preventing or limiting large flows of immigrants from areas of conflict.

The commitment of a large number of countries to Frontex shows the willingness to contribute to the security of external borders, even if these are far from a given member state's national borders. The use of military assets on an ad hoc basis is accepted in this context. The expectation is that Frontex's activities will increase. High-grade technological assets, including unmanned aircraft, will be used more frequently. Frontex will regularly have to call on member states to provide both civilian and military capabilities. While expectations regarding Frontex are high, this agency has only a coordinating role and member states remain responsible for their own borders.

Point of interest 8: Frontex's role in guarding the Schengen Area's external borders will increase and member states will be asked more frequently to provide both civilian and military capabilities.

Border management is playing an increasing role in CSDP-operations and, in this context, Frontex expertise and specialist personnel from member states will be called in. In addition, the emphasis is increasingly on assisting transit countries in managing their borders, especially in North Africa. Migration will increasingly become part of the external security domain. Despite this development, irregular migration will for the time being remain a national rather than a European subject. This 'fragmentation' is evidenced by the lack of a European asylum policy.

Point of interest 9: regarding border control, Frontex and national specialists should be involved in the planning and execution of CSDP operations.

Terrorism

The threats of terrorism will remain and manifest themselves in different ways. Kidnappings have increased in recent years in crisis and conflict areas and this risk will remain in such areas. Foreign fighters and the problems that can arise following the return of these fighters (radicalisation and pro-jihad sentiment) will spread from Syria to West Africa and the Sahel zone. Al-Qaeda will continue to play a significant role in the future. There is reason to believe that Salafist ideology is becoming more influential. This trend suggests the insidious strengthening of radicalisation's breeding ground.

Point of interest 10: terrorism and radicalism continue to pose risks to internal and external security. Further spreading across North and West Africa, including the Sahel, is likely. The problem of radicalised foreign fighters will remain.

Populism and uncontrolled countermeasures can amplify the problem of terrorism and radicalism. Equally, this problem can give credence to and generate support for far-right groups. Governments then have to deal with a heightened security risk in a situation in which overreaction is a risk. As a result, a sense of fear and insecurity may increase among the people, which can in turn cause society to enter a negative spiral. The increased use of technological resources for investigation and protection can likewise heighten the sense of insecurity if the use of such resources is not governed by adequate conditions.

Point of interest 11: an overreaction to terrorist and extremist threats can worsen the security situation by unintentionally increasing a sense of fear and uncertainty among the people.

In cases where terrorism is directly linked to areas affected by instability, conflict and a lack of development, an approach that is coordinated between internal and external security actors is required to counter it effectively. In geographic terms, the main areas at present are in the Middle and Near East and North Africa. Participating in military and/or civilian crisis management operations and other activities in such areas increases the risk of becoming a target of terrorist attacks both in the area of conflict concerned and in the Netherlands itself. This risk is greater when monitoring and tracking down terrorist and radical groups in conflict areas is part of the operation (the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA in Mali, for example). The regular exchange of intelligence and other relevant information between external and internal actors is essential to the early identification of risks for the purpose of taking appropriate measures.

Point of interest 12: participating in operations in conflict areas in which terrorists are active, such as in Mali, increases the risk of becoming a target of attacks both in the area of conflict concerned and in the Netherlands itself, which highlights the need for intensified exchange of intelligence information between the external and internal actors.

International cooperation in the field of counterterrorism is given shape in, among other organisations, the UN, the EU and NATO. Criticism has been levied that not many results have actually been achieved. The Global Counterterrorism Forum is trying to mobilise expertise and resources for the international cooperation required and achieve concrete results. Efforts are being made in the EU to improve links between the internal and external actors. Progress is slow, however. Counterterrorism is included as a task in the mandates of CSDP operations and missions as an exception. In addition, new options made available by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the solidarity clause, have not yet been used. Closer cooperation between the actors in the EU Freedom/Security/Justice Area and CSDP actors remains necessary.

Point of interest 13: the link between EU counterterrorism activities and CSDP operations and missions remains limited, as a result of which not enough use is made of opportunities to gather information and build up knowledge about internationally operating terrorists.

Cross-border crime

Cross-border crime will increase because of two key factors: the increasing mobility of people, money and goods and a further shift from the physical to the virtual world. This development makes greater international cooperation necessary, both between countries and at European level. In an EU context, the focus at present is on intensifying cooperation between member states and with organisations like Europol and Eurojust, mainly in terms of information exchange in the context of investigations. Transnational criminal networks will continue to exploit the weaknesses of national police and judicial authorities that are operating alongside each other rather than in concert. Ultimately, the solution is the creation of supranational European police and judicial agencies.

Point of interest 14: cross-border crime will continue to increase, which makes more intensive European cooperation between national police and judicial authorities necessary. In the more distant future, this cooperation will have to take place on a supranational basis.

Unstable regions and fragile states, where government control is limited and where criminal networks are less likely to be exposed and dismantled, will remain breeding grounds for transnational crime. Such crime is often linked to rebel groups, terrorists or insurgent elements. There is a direct link between transnational crime, instability and conflict elsewhere in the world. They must therefore be seen as facets of a single whole. Moreover, in both cases, prevention is better than cure. Closer and more structural cooperation (information exchange, planning, the coordination of activities, and so on) is therefore required between the agencies responsible for external and internal security.

Point of interest 15: cross-border crime is closely linked to fragile states and conflicts in unstable regions. Fighting it effectively therefore requires proactive, structural coordination and cooperation between the internal and external security actors at national and EU levels.

In the coming years, the civilian authorities in the Netherlands will continue to call upon armed forces to provide specialist support on an ad hoc basis. The increase in the number of requests is likely to continue, mainly in terms of requests for support in criminal enforcement. The experience gained by the armed forces is very useful to the National Police in complex criminal investigations or in the maintenance of law and order. This support will not necessarily remain limited to the territory of the Netherlands. It may be requested in the context of international law enforcement or fighting cross-border crime as well.

Point of interest 16: The Ministry of Defence must take a further increase in the number of requests from the civilian authorities for support in fighting cross-border crime, particularly in terms of the specialist capabilities of the armed forces, into account.

Cyber issues

Espionage and criminals pose the greatest threats in the cyber domain. Cyber espionage is carried out mainly by state actors seeking to obtain information of governments, companies or private citizens. Cybercriminals focus primarily on financial gain. Despite improvements in cyber security, a further increase in cyber attacks must be taken into account. The policy continues to require public-private cooperation at national and international levels. Vulnerability appears to be increasing as a result of the growing presence of ICT platforms. This growth is not being paralleled by a greater awareness of cyber security risks on the part of individual users, however.

Point of interest 17: there will be a further increase in the number of cyber attacks. Espionage will be the greatest threat to governments. Public-private cooperation remains necessary to improve cyber security. Greater awareness of cyber security risks is not keeping pace with the growth of internet use.

The risk of state attacks directed against other states or international organisations, including the EU and NATO, will remain. Links between networks of national governments and international organisations mean that the level of vulnerability is increasingly being determined by the weakest link in the chain of connected networks. In the context of military operations, the cyber domain will be used to disrupt an adversary's capabilities or blind an adversary. Such attacks may also be carried out outside the military sphere and affect other parts of national

and international networks. This challenge requires close cooperation between the armed forces, government institutions and international organisations for the purpose of protecting their networks.

Point of interest 18: dealing with the danger of attacks by state actors on the networks of other states and international organisations, whether or not in the context of military operations, requires close cooperation between national and international institutions for the purpose of taking effective countermeasures.

Although the Ministry of Defence is able to make cyber capabilities available to civilian authorities and the civilian authorities can make such capabilities available to the Ministry of Defence based on the agreement regarding the intensification of civil-military coopera-tion, there is no clarity about the relationship between the Cyber Security Centre and the Defence Cyber Command that will be established this year.

Point of interest 19: the relationship between the National Cyber Security Centre and the Defence Cyber Command.

The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (a development in which everyday objects have network connectivity and can therefore be used for functional communication, which means that the internet will provide more than just access to websites, email and the like to users) will open up new territory for criminals and therefore make usually poorly secured sensi-tive platforms, infrastructure and services increasingly vulnerable. Increasing connectivity between government agencies, companies and private individuals is increasing vulnerability. The privacy of citizens is therefore increasingly at risk.

Point of interest 20: cyber security is increasingly being threatened by the Internet of Things and the growth of internet links between government authorities, companies and private individuals.

EU member states take different approaches to cyber security. To achieve binding coherence in this regard, the European Commission proposal for a Directive on Network and Information Security must be approved and implemented as soon as possible.

Point of interest 21: approval of the European Commission proposal for a Directive on Network and Information Security.

Other

The four risk areas of immigration, terrorism, cross-border crime and the cyber domain are linked, often in terms of the conflict area of origin. Terrorist and criminal networks use migra-tion flows for their activities. Cyber risks are intertwined with criminality, which is inevitably translational in nature because of the internet's worldwide reach. The interrelatedness of the four risk areas also requires coordination with respect to the policy and countermeasures of the actors in the four sectors.

Point of interest 22: the links between risks and threats of immigration, terrorism, cross-border crime and cyber issues require close cooperation between the actors involved in countering these risks and threats.

Regarding the relationship between external and internal security, there are differences in policy, organisation and capabilities in the countries that neighbour the Netherlands. Of the three largest partners, the United Kingdom seems to be the most advanced, even if there are problems in terms of execution, mainly as a result of power struggles. In Germany, the main difficulty is the division of powers between the *Bund* and the *Länder* in the field of internal security. In France, the Ministry of Defence plays a leading role in internal security to a greater extent than in other countries. Belgium is most behind, mainly in terms of working arrangements between civilian agencies and the armed forces. Given the openness of the Netherlands' borders with its immediate neighbours, expanding practical cross-border cooperation with the judicial and police authorities of Belgium and Germany would be both logical and desirable. The extensive experience of the Dutch armed forces in supporting the civilian authorities could be used in the deepening of defence cooperation with Germany and the Benelux partners.

Point of interest 23: intensifying practical cooperation in the field of internal security with Belgium and Germany would be logical given the shared borders. Civil-military cooperation could also be used to deepen defence cooperation between the Netherlands and Germany or the Benelux partners.

The four interrelated areas of external and internal security and disasters as a fifth area are officially recognised by the EU. The sphere of activity of EU ministers of internal affairs and justice, who are responsible for internal security, has to a large extent therefore been determined. There are more interrelated areas in the context of external and internal security, such as maritime, environmental and energy security. Currently unforeseeable developments in these areas may affect priorities with respect to the external-internal security nexus. A sudden interruption in the energy supply as a result of external conflicts, for example, could cause a shock in terms of internal security.

Point of interest 24: the security agenda currently focuses on areas that are the responsibility of the Ministry of Security and Justice. New security risks may arise in areas like energy supply, however.

Box 1   **Disasters**

Disasters can be natural ones like earthquakes and floods or technological ones like serious industrial or transport accidents. Natural disasters affect a considerably higher number of people. The figures for each year are very different because of the effects of major natural disasters like the tsunami that occurred at the end of 2004. The average number of people affected for the period 1980-2007 is 243 million per year.[1] Fatality figures also vary. In the last decade, the peak was in 2010: almost 300,000 fatalities, mostly caused by the earthquake in Haiti. Technological disasters result in considerably fewer affected people and fatalities. In terms of financial damage, estimates of the recent past range from USD 48 billion (2009) to USD 374 billion (2011) with respect to natural disasters and from USD 1 billion to USD 21 billion per year with respect to technological disasters.

According to many studies, most natural disasters like floods, storms and droughts are the result of climate change. The expectation is that natural disasters will increase in number and scale in the future, though there will be major differences on an annual basis. The UN panel on climate change considers it 'likely' that there will be an increase in heat waves and heavy rainfall.[2] In a recent report, the panel expressed the opinion that climate change may also cause an increase in migration, civil wars and other forms of violence.[3]

The frequency with which military personnel were deployed following a disaster increased in the past decade. Since 2004, the American armed forces have been deployed on 40 occasions in different parts of the world to support humanitarian operations following a disaster. In the period 2008-2012, the Dutch armed forces were requested to assist in disaster relief within the Netherlands on 24 occasions.

The expectation is that the role of regional organisations in disaster relief will increase.[4] Civil-military cooperation in humanitarian operations will therefore become more important. Clear structures and mechanisms for coordination, leadership and the use of available capabilities are therefore required.[5]

1   Data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Although the CRED database is recognised worldwide, data prior to 1980 is considered to be less reliable.
2   Climate Change 2013 – The Physical Science Base, Summary for Policymakers, Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, October 2013.
3   Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, IPCC WGII AR5 Summary for Policymakers, 31 March 2014.
4   Elizabeth Ferris and Daniel Petz, In the neigborhood: the growing role of regional organizations in disaster risk management, Brookings Institution, February 2013.
5   Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon, Trends and Challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination – A review of the literature, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, May 2012.