


# The Future of OSCE Field Operations (Options)



# OSCE Network

OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions

**Working Group** | Wolfgang Zellner & Frank Evers (principal authors) | Gerald Aherne | Ian Anthony  
Jos Boonstra | Pál Dunay | Arjan Dyrnishi | Azad Garibov | Salpi H. Ghazarian | Tobias von Gienanth  
Samuel Goda | Volker Jacoby | Kornely Kakachia | Hakan Karaaslan | Marko Milosevic | Kari Möttölä  
Maria Radziejowska | Sergey Rastoltsev | Philip Remler | Raimonds Rublovskis | Nicolás Salmerón  
Barend ter Haar | Oleksandr Tytarchuk | Maria Usacheva

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# Purpose of the Report

The purpose of this report is to help stimulate discussions on the value and future of the field operations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/‘the Organization’). This is at a time when field operations are confronted with a new dimension of challenges, such as that which is developing at present in Ukraine, while some participating States are attempting to limit the activities of the field operations they are hosting, or to close them with the argument that they had already fulfilled their mandates. This report is not intended to provide a mainstream analysis of OSCE field operations, and put forth recommendations that would have been accepted by everybody anyhow. Rather, its aim is to present proposals that do not (yet) enjoy consensus, in order to inform and stimulate a necessary debate.

This report is the joint product of a group of twenty-one members of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions. It builds on two workshops that we arranged at OSCE headquarters in Vienna on 27 June and 4 November 2014 at the invitation of the special co-ordinator under the Helsinki +40 process for reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of the OSCE, Ambassador Philip McDonagh. This gave us the possibility to talk with many representatives of national delegations to the OSCE, OSCE officials and representatives of field operations. Our discussions have greatly profited from their insight.

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# Executive Summary

In the two and a half decades since the launch of the first OSCE field operations (FOPS) in the early 1990s, the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region has become increasingly affected by global change. The key question of this report is whether the ongoing transformation of the normative political, security and economic conditions will be conducive or prohibitive to the demand for OSCE field operations and their management in practice, and which new forms and formats of field operations will be required to assist the participating States in moving forward towards implementation of their OSCE commitments.

Although OSCE field operations are based on individual, tailor-made mandates, they share a number of common features. All of them are deployed in a host country for a long, but not unlimited, period of time. All of them operate on a consensus-based mandate and a Memorandum of Understanding between the host state and the OSCE and are, therefore, by definition welcomed by their host governments. All OSCE field operations have their own budgets. All of them are located in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus or Central Asia.

Comparing the lessons learnt from OSCE field activities during the crises in Kyrgyzstan (2010) and in Ukraine (2014), the following conclusions can be drawn: The key difference is that, in the Ukrainian case, the top political leadership of a number of relevant States – Ukraine itself, Russia, Switzerland as the OSCE Chair, Germany, the USA as well as the EU and others – have been continuously involved. This has resulted in the quick creation of new negotiation formats, the adoption of the innovative mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)

to Ukraine, the dispatch of the Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (OM), and the concerted efforts of all OSCE institutions. The lesson learnt from Kyrgyzstan is that, even in the absence of consensus, the Organization can employ useful, if limited, steps, based on the room for manoeuvre of its institutions.

The comparative advantages of OSCE field operations vis-à-vis those of other international organizations can be expressed in the triad of its political and institutional inclusivity, its regional expertise and its rapid reaction capability. Comparative deficits of OSCE field operations, as well as the whole Organization, include limited planning and implementing capacities and the limited financial sustainability of its operations.

Against a background of current political and institutional change, recent experiences, and the given comparative advantages and deficits, this report recommends considering a range of new forms of OSCE field operations. In each case, a thorough needs assessment should be done, including an examination of the proper place of the OSCE's activities in co-operation with other international organizations, and the specific added value the Organization can offer.

The report starts from the key finding that OSCE field operations are service providers in situations of crisis, transition or state-building. They cannot be established, changed or closed against the will of the respective host state. They embody common values and are tools for promoting stability and common security. To maintain and further develop them, this report formulates the following recommendations:



# Recommendations

## *OSCE principles and norms*

1. The participating States should continuously discuss, better implement and reconfirm the Organization's norms and principles.

## *Creation and adjustment of field operations*

2. The participating States should generally give a positive response to a state that is requesting the deployment of a field operation on its national territory, provided that the related financial issues can be resolved. Mongolia is a case in point.
3. The participating States should discuss options to include the territory of *de facto regimes* into field operations, since the territories of non-recognized regimes constitute a major obstacle for all kinds of international governance tasks, from arms control to crisis regulation, economic reform and the implementation of human rights. While a number of field operations have always had a status-neutral character, a new understanding of the specific opportunities and problems of status-neutral field operations could expand the inclusion of these regimes.
4. The participating States should discuss options to establish sub-regional offices for supplementing field operations, co-ordinating sub-regional OSCE activities or creating new ties between the different sub-regions of Europe.
5. The participating States should consider establishing needs-oriented OSCE field operations in Western European States, such

as (1) a thematic mission on refugees in the Mediterranean, (2) a thematic mission on Roma and Sinti, (3) an OSCE Liaison Office in Brussels, or (4) an Anti-Radicalization Network focused on young people.

6. The participating States should discuss guiding principles and options to flexibly adjust mandates of field operations to the needs of their host countries. This should be done in agreement with host governments and in dialogue with other national partners.
7. The participating States should discuss and define criteria under which security-sector assistance, including police components, should be included in field operations.
8. The participating States should discuss, in any individual case, whether the objective of re-establishing trust in post-conflict situations can be achieved by means of investigations or through the initiation of internal reconciliation and national dialogues, and what relationship there should be between these two elements.

## *Staff matters of field operations*

9. The participating States should make modern management skills and leadership experience an important employment criterion for senior positions in field operations. Heads of Mission should be offered leadership and project-management training. The performance appraisal report system (PAR) should be applied to Heads of Mission as well.

10. The OSCE should pay more attention to its locally-hired professional staff. It should, among other things, consider that salary levels for local staff are far lower than those of their foreign colleagues.
11. The participating States should consider conducting vocational training courses for locally-hired staff in institutions such as the Center for International Peace Operations (Germany), the Crisis Management Centre (Finland) or the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) that offer participation to local staff in their courses for seconded and contracted staff.
12. The OSCE should continue to build on the progress made in implementing UNSCR 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security” and further increase the share of women in its structures and activities. It should do more to become a family-friendly employer of its field officers.
15. A designated reserve fund for responding to crisis situations should be created and be made permanently available, in the form of a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Fund.
16. The OSCE should make provisions to significantly reduce the internal administrative work in the field to give field activities more practical impact.

*Crisis response*

*Budget process, multi-year planning*

13. The OSCE should depoliticize the budget process and make it a more technical exercise. It could start preparatory budget talks in “spring consultations” before the “fall decision-making”. Another option would be to change to a biennial budget cycle.
14. The OSCE should campaign for more systematic extra-budgetary funds. Major players, such as the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union, or key participating States should think about making significant contributions to selected thematic efforts.
17. The participating States should increase the Secretariat’s crisis-management capacities and particularly strengthen the co-ordinating role of the CPC in the OSCE-wide early warning system.
18. The participating States should better enable the CPC to dispatch fact-finding visits in a timely fashion to places of emerging tensions. The Secretary General and the CPC should be authorized to have a stronger say in translating the Chairmanship’s guidance into operational advice for the field operations. The CPC mediation-support capacity should be further expanded.

*Visibility*

19. The OSCE should increase the visibility of its capabilities and activities on the ground. Concerted public relations work in Vienna and the field should target the attention of governments and other key players. The OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section (COMMS) should ensure easy and user-friendly access to and quick distribution of OSCE information.





# Background and Conditions

In the two and a half decades since the launch of the first OSCE field operations (FOPS) in the early 1990s, the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region has become increasingly affected by global change. The key question of this report is whether the ongoing transformation of the normative, political, security and economic conditions will be conducive or prohibitive to the demand for OSCE field operations and their management in practice, and which new forms of field operations might be required accordingly.

At the global level, a seemingly strong constellation of hegemonic stability has given way to a complex process of change. Western hegemony is giving way to a multilateral order with still-unclear contours. These changes exceed by far the common experience of the current generation of politicians, scholars and the broader public. Outside forces have had much more impact on the OSCE area. This is true for the whole spectrum of transnational challenges and threats, from migration to trafficking and terrorism. Heavily armed forces of the terrorist group “Islamic State” are fighting Kurdish militias close to the border of Turkey, an OSCE participating State. The OSCE area, as a whole, borders the crisis belt from Northern Africa to Pakistan. Some of these states are OSCE Partner States. Over the last decade, China has become a key economic and political player, and not only in Central Asia. Many things, which could be regulated at an OSCE level twenty years ago, can only be tackled today when interests of external actors are considered.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, despite the bloody wars in the former Yugoslavia, the assumption was that new violent conflicts in the OSCE space

would be unlikely. This has been proven wrong with the cases of Georgia in 2008, Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and Ukraine in 2014, as well as smaller upheavals, such as the crisis in Macedonia in 2001 and the simmering conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. The frequent occurrence of violent conflicts is remarkable for a region that is characterized by the highest density of security- and integration-oriented organizations and a highly developed arms control regime unknown in any other part of the world.

The assumption that any new violent conflicts would be confined to the domestic level has also proven wrong. Moreover, the 2014 Ukrainian war shows that economic interdependence alone cannot create a political security community. Rather, asymmetric mutual economic dependence can be turned into a weapon when political relations worsen.

Today, we have all kinds of conflicts in the OSCE area: domestic ones with or without interstate consequences, classic interstate conflicts and everything in between in terms of the involvement of transnational actors or “hybrid” forms of conflict. What has remained valid is the dominant, but not universally shared, assumption that conflicts in the OSCE area should be resolved at the international level rather than through unilateral or bilateral approaches.

UN missions deployed in Europe are currently limited to the ones in Cyprus and in Kosovo. As the UN is unlikely to return to Europe with larger operations on the ground, this presents a challenge for European security organizations. The current situation in Ukraine is a case in point.

The Ukrainian crisis reflects the institutional change in the OSCE space and beyond. We are witnessing elements of division, competition and confrontation in the OSCE space. The European Union stands *versus* the Eurasian Economic Union, and NATO *versus* the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Attempts to achieve a deeper institutional integration in the OSCE space, which have been half-hearted from both the Western and the Russian sides, have stalled. The 2014 Ukrainian war has made clear that the situation has shifted from a basically co-operative environment with confrontational elements to a confrontational environment with residual elements of a co-operative culture. At the moment, Russia has almost no structured relations with the EU and NATO. This shows how fragile and crisis-prone the constructions that should have safeguarded the ties to Russia at any time – such as the NATO-Russia Council – actually are.

The political confrontation is accompanied by mutually exclusive perceptions. From a Western perspective, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and its intervention in Eastern Ukraine represent gross violations of international law and basic OSCE principles. In the Russian view, these acts are legitimate measures to defend the rights of Russians against the background of a putsch in Kyiv. More complicated processes of interaction and escalation, usually promoted by several sides, are no longer taken into account. As long as these black-and-white views prevail, a real dialogue will be difficult to achieve.

The OSCE of 2014 is a different organization from the OSCE of a year ago. Governments have again started to use it as the key regional platform for discussion and joint action. In particular, the

agreement on the adoption of the mandate of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine has shown that neither Russia nor the West want to close off the option of using the OSCE and its instruments. While there is readiness to use the OSCE as a framework for inclusive dialogue and co-operation, the roles of the Geneva Four (EU, Russia, Ukraine, US), Weimar Three (France, Germany, Poland) and Normandy Four (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine) demonstrate a degree of pragmatism in political contacts despite and beyond the Russian/EU/NATO gridlock.

Within the OSCE space, the Organization's normative *acquis* has not yet been challenged officially. On the contrary, the OSCE key commitments were reconfirmed at summit level by the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration. However, in a number of OSCE participating States, key OSCE obligations are no longer implemented. There is also more talk about a "clash of values" and the proclamation of values alien to the OSCE's normative world. The OSCE has always been a somewhat hybrid organization. Thus, there is a constant need to discuss, better implement and reconfirm the Organization's norms and principles.

All of these developments have more or less impacted on the OSCE and its field operations. The latter represent a co-operative effort *per se*, but co-operative policies as such have been seriously undermined and violated.

As the comparison between the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan and the 2014 Ukrainian war shows, the participating States have displayed an uneven readiness to invest in crisis response in political and financial terms. Whereas the OSCE response

to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, which from a Western perspective is a rather peripheral state, was quite limited, the response to the Ukrainian war has been much more fundamental and comprehensive. This is despite the fact that the conditions for achieving consensus were and continue to be much more difficult.

From another perspective, the host states' attitude towards their field operations is quite different: Whereas most host states in South Eastern Europe have a relatively positive attitude, the South Caucasian and Central Asian states are, to different degrees, much more sceptical. A few host states have demonstrated their desire to close their field operations or downgrade them. This is happening particularly in resource-rich countries where the opinion that the contacts and services of the OSCE are not needed sometimes prevails, based on the idea that the field operations' mandates have already been fulfilled.

However, there have also been indications of a reverse phenomenon during the Ukrainian crisis, with some states possibly coming to the conclusion that an OSCE field operation could possibly offer a certain degree of protection against attempts to violate the domestic stability of a state and its sovereignty and integrity. The one clear consequence of all these partially contradictory trends is that running OSCE field operations must become an even more co-operative venture than it has been in the past. Any notion of imposing a field mission on a participating State has become completely impossible.



# Forms and Mandates

## 2.1 Basic Features of OSCE Field Operations and Other Field-Related Activities

*Definition of field operations.* There is no officially agreed-upon definition of the term ‘OSCE field operation’. However, a look at the OSCE website and into the “Survey of OSCE Field Operations” authored by the Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre<sup>1</sup>, reveals that 17 or 18 activities called “OSCE field operations” can be found.<sup>2</sup> These 18 field operations carry different designations:

- Eight “missions”, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, the OSCE Mission to Serbia, the OSCE Mission *in* Kosovo, the OSCE Mission to Skopje, the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the newly established Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, along with the similarly new Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk.
- One “presence”, the OSCE Presence in Albania.
- Two “offices”, the OSCE Office in Yerevan and the OSCE Office in Tajikistan.
- Three “centres”, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat,

the OSCE Centre in Astana, and the OSCE Centre in Bishkek.

- Three “project co-ordinators”, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Baku, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan.
- And the “Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference”.

Closed field operations include:

- A number of missions - the OSCE Mission of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the OSCE Mission to Ukraine, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, the OSCE Mission to Estonia, the OSCE Mission to Latvia, the OSCE Mission to Croatia, and the OSCE Mission to Georgia.
- The OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus and the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya.
- Two centres, the OSCE Centre in Tashkent and the OSCE Centre in Dushanbe.
- Two offices, the OSCE Office in Minsk and the OSCE Office in Zagreb.

1 OSCE, The Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Survey of OSCE Field Operations, Date of print: 7 May 2013, SEC.GAL/84/13, 7 May 2013.

2 The Survey of OSCE Field Operations lists “The Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference “ as a field operation, whereas this activity is not mentioned in the list of field operations on the OSCE website. We follow the ruling of the Survey of OSCE Field Operations.

For the most part, the different designations and mandates reflect the varying attitudes of host states towards the OSCE and its norms. Countries with “missions” are those with strong European

aspirations, and/or strong hopes that the OSCE will resolve conflicts on their territories. Other designations, reflecting limitations on mandates and sizes, are generally used in the context of countries that have felt a sense of humiliation from the perceived “need” to have a mission.

Some of the closed field operations have been replaced by others, i.e. the Mission to Ukraine by the Project Co-ordinator, the Kosovo Verification Mission by the Mission in Kosovo, the Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus by the Office in Minsk, and the Centres in Dushanbe and Tashkent by the Office in Tajikistan and the Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan. Others, such as the missions to Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia were said to have fulfilled their mandates, although not all participating States have shared this view. Another group of field operations had to be closed because of disagreements with the governments of the host states. This was the case with the OSCE Mission of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, and the OSCE Office in Minsk. And finally, the closure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia was necessary because it was impossible for the Greek Chairmanship in 2009 to negotiate a status-neutral mandate for this mission (see para. 2.4.1).

*Common features of field operations.* Although OSCE field operations are based on individual, tailor-made mandates, they share a number of common features. All of them (with the current exception of the SMM and the OM) are deployed in a host country for a longer, but not unlimited, period. All of them are based on a mandate that has to be extended after an initial duration of, usually, one year. All field operations (again with the exception of the SMM and the OM) have a budget that is part of

the OSCE’s Unified Budget. All of them are located in South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus or Central Asia and are based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the host state and the OSCE. Therefore, all field operations are, by definition, activities welcomed by their host governments, who have to agree three times to the establishment of a field operation: on the mandate, on the budget, and on the Memorandum of Understanding.

From the perspective of international law, OSCE field operations are not diplomatic representations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations from 8 April 1961. The OSCE has no legal personality and is, therefore, an employer that provides international and locally-hired mission members only the protection and immunity that derive from a given field operation’s mandate or Memorandum of Understanding, in addition to what is provided to them individually by their home governments.<sup>3</sup>

OSCE field operations are service providers that deal primarily with governance support or conflict management. Examples of the former are the Offices and Centres in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, but also the Missions to Montenegro and Serbia. Conflict-related field operations include the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, and, most recently, the SMM and the OM. However, specific field operations may change their characters over time. Thus, the former OSCE Mission to Tajikistan was clearly conflict-related, whereas today’s OSCE

<sup>3</sup> For further details, see: OSCE, Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, DOC.SEC/3/03, September 2003, updated 17 July 2014.



Office in Tajikistan is about governance support. On the other hand, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek was and is primarily focused on governance support, but in 2010 found itself in a rapidly developing conflict environment and therefore performed related functions.

Conflict-related field operations work along the entire conflict cycle. The OSCE Mission to Skopje and the former Missions to Estonia and Latvia were operations on conflict prevention. The former Mission to Tajikistan, the former Mission to Georgia in its early phases, and the SMM are examples of activities related to conflict management, whereas the former Mission to Georgia in its later phases, the Mission to Moldova and the Special Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference deal with unresolved conflicts. Finally, the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Mission in Kosovo deal with post-conflict rehabilitation situations.

OSCE field operations are understood to serve the whole country; not only the government, but also opposition forces and non-governmental actors. What sounds self-evident can be a highly sensitive issue in societies under authoritarian rule. Field operations should also serve the whole government and not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Experience from a number of host states has shown that ministries other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have formulated different and sometimes more extensive needs in co-operating with an OSCE field operation. The experience in Tajikistan has shown that an annual planning conference, involving a number of governmental agencies and the OSCE field operation concerned, represents a good

instrument for consulting with the government on the field operation's work.

OSCE field operations represent a collective and co-operative effort of the whole Organization. Therefore, it is logical that a field operation's mandate can only be adopted in consensus by all participating States. Along this line, we recommend that a country such as Mongolia, which wants to deepen its co-operation with the OSCE through the deployment of a field operation on its national territory, should be granted a field operation, provided that the related financial issues can be resolved.

*Other field-related activities.* Apart from field operations with longer mandates, the "Survey of OSCE Field Operations" defines the category of "other field-related activities". Here, it lists the Minsk Group, the High Level Planning Group (open-ended mandate to make recommendations to the Chairperson-in-Office on developing a plan for a possible peace-keeping operation in Nagorno Karabakh), the OSCE Representative to the Latvian-Russian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners, and the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office for Article IV, Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Moreover, an even broader range of OSCE activities can be identified in all three dimensions that are implemented in the "field". These include temporary activities, such as election observation missions in various formats, all kind of seminars, workshops, training and assessment missions, permanent institutions, such as the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and the OSCE Border Management Staff College

in Dushanbe, as well as visits by the Chairperson-in-Office, the Secretary General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM), and Personal Representatives. A number of synergies exist between these activities and the long-term field operations.

## *2.2 Lessons Learnt in Recent Times – the Examples of Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and Ukraine in 2014*

Both in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and in Ukraine in 2014, the OSCE was facing the challenge of de-escalating and containing crises and stabilizing the situation in the period immediately afterwards. To do this it used its existing field operations and created new ones. In Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the conflict was almost entirely of a domestic nature and was seen as peripheral and difficult to influence from the perspective of major Western States. The conflict in Ukraine in 2014 had both domestic and trans-/international elements and was perceived as a key issue for the whole of European stability and security. In Kyrgyzstan in 2010, this led to the consequence that only a small number of the instruments available to the OSCE for regulating crises could be used, while greater steps were not taken because of a lack of political will. By contrast, in Ukraine in 2014, the OSCE has not only used its quite modest presence in Ukraine – the Project Co-ordinator – but has quickly framed completely new instruments, in particular the SMM. Accordingly, whereas the 2010 Kyrgyzstan crisis was mainly managed at the working level – with the exception of the Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Kazakhstani Foreign Minister

Kanat Saudabayev –, the 2014 Ukraine conflict is characterized by heavy involvement of the top political leadership of a number of states. We can draw, in more detail, the following lessons learnt from these two examples of the involvement of OSCE field operations in actual crisis management.

*Lessons learnt from Kyrgyzstan in 2010.*<sup>4</sup> The mediation efforts by the Kazakhstani Chairmanship in April 2010 that included convincing the incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to leave the country, worked well. The election-related support provided by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) – election observation of the constitutional referendum, as well as of the parliamentary elections in 2010, and the presidential elections in 2011 – also worked well. The same is true for the legal consultancy provided by the ODIHR. For all of these measures, no consensus was needed. In stark contrast to these positive experiences, any more far-reaching steps of the OSCE were blocked by the lack of political will among the participating States and within the Kyrgyzstan government. This became particularly evident during the crisis in June 2010. Thus, the lesson learnt from Kyrgyzstan is that even in the absence of consensus, the Organization could employ useful, if limited, steps based on the room to manoeuvre of its institutions. Therefore, we recommend giving the OSCE institutions more freedom of action in crisis situations and tasking them in this respect.

In addition, two specific problems that might also be relevant for other OSCE field operations must be mentioned. The first concerns police assistance,

<sup>4</sup> For this section cf. Frank Evers, OSCE Conflict Management and the Kyrgyz Experience in 2010: Advanced Proposals, Lack of Will, Limited Options, Hamburg, 2012 (CORE Working Paper 24).

more specifically the Community Security Initiative (CSI) that was initiated after the June 2010 crisis. The CSI was never fully accepted by the Kyrgyz sides, neither by the capital nor by various ethnic and other groups. The basic rationale of Kyrgyzstan's government is that foreigners should only have limited access to the activities in Kyrgyzstan's south. Thus, it might be advisable for the OSCE to define clearer criteria under which police components should be included in field operations. The second problem concerned the "OSCE's call to re-establish trust between the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan via thorough investigations [that] did not meet with a positive response in many Kyrgyz quarters."<sup>5</sup> As a consequence, awareness must be raised concerning, in any individual case, whether the objective of re-establishing trust among the population should be achieved primarily by means of investigations or through the initiation of a process of internal reconciliation or national dialogue. A further consideration is what relationship should exist between these two elements.

*Lessons learnt from Ukraine in 2014.*<sup>6</sup> The key difference between Ukraine in 2014 and Kyrgyzstan in 2010 is that, in the Ukrainian case, the top political leaderships of a number of relevant States – Ukraine itself, Russia, Switzerland as the OSCE Chair, the EU, Germany, the USA and others – have been continuously involved. This has resulted in the adoption of the innovative mandates of the SMM and the OM. The SMM was not conceptualized as a result of lengthy reform discussions. Rather, its creation happened under huge pressure to agree on something meaningful. Initially employed as a conflict prevention mission, the civilian SMM

soon had to switch to conflict resolution in an increasingly unsafe environment. Since the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum of September 2014, this has included such tasks as monitoring the cease-fire and the withdrawal of weapons from certain areas for which military peacekeeping units are usually employed.

So far, there has been significant support for the SMM by many participating States. More than 40 participating States have seconded observers. And, equally important, funding of the SMM has not been a major obstacle, but was achieved pragmatically by the use of leftovers from the past fiscal year and by voluntary contributions. However, everything depends on whether the consensus to continue with the SMM can be upheld.

The mandate of the SMM has created a number of synergies. *First*, the existence of the SMM, which is explicitly mandated with co-ordinating and supporting "the work of the OSCE executive structures" including the HCNM, the ODIHR and the FOM, has greatly facilitated the work of these institutions. *Second* and simultaneously, this synergy between actors spurred a synergy between various thematic areas, from monitoring the general situation through military verification to election monitoring and human rights assessment. *Third*, the existence of the SMM also facilitated the Chairperson's efforts to mediate through his own efforts and through his Personal Envoy in the Tripartite Contact Group. *Fourth*, the SMM is co-operating with a range of international governmental and non-governmental organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the UNHCR and the ICRC.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Evers 2012: 41.

<sup>6</sup> On OSCE activities in Ukraine cf.: OSCE response to the crisis in Ukraine, as of 1 August 2014, at: <http://www.osce.org>.

Another experience from Ukraine in 2014 is that the OSCE was extremely quick in deploying the SMM. Two reasons seem to have contributed to this achievement: *First*, with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, the OSCE already had a bridgehead in the country. *Second*, in the follow-up to the 2011 Vilnius MC decision on the conflict cycle (MC.DEC 03/11), the Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) had significantly improved the Organization's crisis reaction capability.

The activities of the SMM are imbedded in a set of efforts by other OSCE officials, institutions and structures. These include, first of all, the political mediation of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office – Swiss President and Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter –, his Personal Envoys on Ukraine, Tim Guldemann and Heidi Tagliavini, OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier, HCNM Astrid Thors and RFOM Dunja Mijatović. They also include hosting the Tripartite Contact Group (OSCE, Ukraine, Russia), assisting the three roundtable meetings of the Government's National Dialogue Project (March – April 2014), dispatching OSCE observers to two Russian Checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian Border (24 July 2014, ongoing), providing a platform for conducting military verification activities under the Vienna Document 2011, observing presidential and parliamentary elections (May and October 2014) and conducting human rights assessment missions. They also include the activities of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, while the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has convened an Inter-parliamentary Liaison Group on Ukraine.

It is remarkable that, under extremely difficult political conditions, the OSCE has developed one of the most complex field operations in its history

and, at the same time, one that closely resembles peacekeeping. However, the SMM has stretched the OSCE's leadership capacity to its limits.

## 2.3 Comparative Advantages and Deficits of OSCE Field Operations

The comparative advantages of OSCE field operations *vis-à-vis* those of other international organizations can be expressed in the triad of inclusivity, expertise and rapid reaction. The OSCE's approach is inclusive and comprehensive in three respects.

*First*, in a political sense, it includes all participating States. For the acceptance of the SMM in Eastern Ukraine, it has been of substantial relevance that the SMM is also supported by Russia and includes Russian observers. *Second*, in an institutional sense, it includes all OSCE structures and related issue areas, which allows for a comprehensive approach with a number of cross-cutting synergies. And *third*, there are also synergies between short-term and long-term activities under the roof of the OSCE.

The *second* comparative advantage of OSCE field operations lies in its local and regional expertise that results from its long-serving, locally-hired staff members in the field operations, who embody institutional continuity. This is the case although the OSCE's ten-year-rule – after ten years of employment each international staff member in the professional category has to leave the OSCE – deprives the Organization of many of its most talented employees. This rule has the unintended, but welcome consequence of raising the profile and relevance of locally-hired professional staff, even if

their employment is also connected with problems, as will be shown below.

*Third*, the OSCE often acts more quickly than other international organizations, due to its comparatively small size and its still relatively low level of bureaucratization, as well as its familiarity with local conditions. Finally, the Organization is more cost-effective than others with a larger bureaucracy. All three of these comparative advantages worked quite well in the design and deployment of the SMM.

The comparative deficits of OSCE field operations as well as of the whole Organization include limited planning and implementing capacities and the limited financial sustainability of operations. Both deficits reflect the comparatively weak structures of the OSCE both at central levels (particularly of the Conflict Prevention Centre) and in the field, and the comparatively low Unified Budget of the OSCE that has been further reduced for years by the so-called “zero nominal growth” policy.

## 2.4 Possible New Forms of OSCE Field Operations

Formats and mandates of field operations are usually developed as a reaction to pressing political needs rather than as a consequence of deliberate reform discussions. Nevertheless, it makes sense to discuss the option of creating new field operations in cases where long-standing obstacles are blocking the deployment of much-needed international assistance, where new threats are emerging or where innovative forms of field operations would produce welcome gains in co-operation. In each case, a thorough needs assessment should precede the establishment of any new field operation. That

should include an examination into the proper place of the OSCE’s activities in relation to co-operation with other international organizations and the specific added value the Organization can offer. In the following paragraphs, we develop suggestions about status-neutral field operations, regional offices, and some options for field operations in or including Western states.

### 2.4.1 Status-Neutral Field Operations

The existence of so-called *de facto regimes* constitutes a major obstacle for all kinds of international governance tasks, from arms control to crisis regulation, economic reform and the implementation of human rights. *De facto regimes* are *regimes* that exert effective control over a certain territory and population, but are not internationally recognized as states and consequently are not members of international organizations.

The position of *de facto regimes* in international law is described as follows: “State practice shows that entities which in fact govern a specific territory will be treated as partial subjects of international law. They will be held responsible, treaties may be concluded with them and some sort of intercourse is likely to take place with States.”<sup>7</sup> On this basis, states interact with *de facto regimes*: “It is quite common for States to enter into relations with *de facto régimes* although such relations will frequently be kept on a level below that of normal treaties. [...] Sometimes *de facto régimes* become members of multilateral treaties.” (Ibid.: 967). And finally: “The exchange of other missions may also be agreed upon with *de facto régimes*. This is true for trade missions,

<sup>7</sup> Jochen Abr. Frowein, De Facto Regime, in: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law under the Direction of Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Amsterdam/London/New York/Tokyo 1992, p. 966.



*ad hoc* delegations, etc.” (Ibid.: 967). Following from this, OSCE field operations could include areas controlled by *de facto regimes*, if there is a willingness of and agreement with the participating State hosting the conflict.

*De facto regimes* which are “partial subjects” of international law usually participate with the tacit consent of the state from which they are trying to secede – as part of an attempt not to alienate the population and to maintain traditional trade and cultural links. Transnistria is the prime example of this. By contrast, Azerbaijan has been insisting on maintaining the isolation of Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories until the resolution of the conflict or any meaningful advancement in the peace process, claiming that the non-recognized regime’s international participation will foster the continuation of the current status quo which is considered unacceptable by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. Between those two extremes are Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This leads to the conclusion that a status-neutral field operation cannot be established against the will of the corresponding state.

*Communications and negotiations with representatives of de facto regimes* are quite common practices in the OSCE. The OSCE runs its largest field operation in Kosovo. The Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, is in frequent contact with Nagorno Karabakh authorities, who, as of yet, do not have a status in the Minsk process. Representatives of *de facto regimes* are part of the official 5+2 format in Moldova and also the Geneva International Discussions that address the consequences of the 2008 Georgian conflict. The spectrum of issues discussed ranges from an “Incident Prevention and

Response Mechanism” (Georgia) to non-military confidence-building measures and status questions (Moldova). In this sense, several OSCE field operations mediating between *de facto regimes* and states have always had a status-neutral character.

*The OSCE Mission in Kosovo – a status-neutral mission.* After the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo by the Kosovo parliament on 17 February 2008, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on Kosovo remained in force, because the members of the Security Council could not agree on another resolution. UNSCR 1244 reaffirms “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and, on this basis, tasks the Secretary-General “to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.<sup>8</sup> Since the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which had been established in 1999, remained based on UNSCR 1244, its further existence and operation after February 2008 remained acceptable for the Serbian government.

Despite its legal position, after the Kosovar declaration of independence, the UN Secretary-General came to the following conclusion: „The Kosovo authorities frequently question the authority of UNMIK in a Kosovo now being governed under the new Constitution. While my Special Representative is still formally vested with executive authority under resolution 1244 (1999),

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999.



he is unable to enforce this authority.”<sup>9</sup> In order to continue with UNMIK in a way acceptable for the Kosovar authorities, the UN had to change two things: UNMIK was re-structured and downsized, and the UN moved towards a status-neutral position: “UNMIK has moved forward with its reconfiguration within the status-neutral framework of resolution 1244 (1999). The United Nations will continue to adopt a position of strict neutrality on the question of Kosovo’s status.”<sup>10</sup> According to a factsheet of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, this mission also operates from a “status-neutral position”.<sup>11</sup> A status-neutral solution for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo became possible, because both sides rated the further operation of the Mission as more important than insisting on their status positions.

*The failure to create a status-neutral Mission to Georgia.* After the 2008 Georgian-Russian war, the 2009 Greek Chairmanship negotiated over the continuation of the OSCE Mission to Georgia based on a “‘status-neutral’ formula”.<sup>12</sup> However, after almost half a year of negotiations, the talks were discontinued due to the fact that the sides rated their status positions more highly than the continuation of the Mission. Since then, some efforts have been undertaken to establish a status-neutral Mission to Georgia, though so far without success.

In summary, the status-neutral option is no miracle cure for establishing field operations, including those on the territory of *de facto regimes*. The establishment of status-neutral field operations only

becomes possible, if *all sides* rate the running of a field operation more highly than standing by their status claims. The fact that the status question is, by nature, the ultimate concern of *de facto regimes* as well as the affected states, shows how high the stakes are for establishing this type of mission. We suggest introducing the category of “status-neutral” field operations in the debates of the OSCE and creating a common awareness of the opportunities lying with them.

#### 2.4.2 Sub-Regional Offices or Co-ordinators

The only sub-regional OSCE office was the OSCE Liaison Office in Central Asia located in Tashkent from 1995 to 2000. It worked at a time when no other OSCE offices or centres existed in the region, with the exception of the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan. In 2000, parallel to the creation of OSCE offices and centres in the other Central Asian states, the Liaison Office was transformed into the OSCE Centre in Tashkent that was focused on building relations with the Uzbek government.

Today, sub-regional offices would, in most cases, not replace OSCE field operations in areas where they exist, but would, rather, supplement them. They would only be created in cases of concrete need and not as an additional structural element. The idea of such offices can be described as co-ordination tools that are needs-oriented, inter-regional, small and flexible.

- *Issue-oriented co-ordination.* The key task of a sub-regional office is the co-ordination of sub-regional OSCE activities in certain issue areas over a certain period. Regional Heads of Mission meetings and staff meetings also contribute to this objective, but usually lack

9 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2008/692, 24 November 2008, p. 7.

10 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/2009/300, 10 June 2009, p. 9.

11 OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Fact Sheet.

12 OSCE Chairmanship, Press Release, OSCE Chairmanship suspends talks on continued OSCE presence in Georgia, 14 May 2009.

the necessary continuity. Issue-oriented co-ordination can be done by a person, such as the co-ordinator of the “Inter-State Dialogue on Social Integration and National Minority Education” of the Central Asian States, an OSCE structure, such as the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, or a small sub-regional office to be established. Sub-regional offices should not divert funds from existing field operations.

- *Inter-regional linkages.* Sub-regional offices have the potential to create new ties between the different sub-regions of Europe, as long as they are designed in such a way that they integrate states from Western, South Eastern and Eastern Europe.
- *Small and flexible tools.* In a number of cases, one co-ordinator is enough; in others a small group might be required. This person/group can be attached to an existing field operation for a certain period. Budgets can come from the Unified Budget, but also from projects funded by voluntary contributions.

This type of flexible co-ordination tool is easy to handle, to start and to close. It seems that in some cases no formal mandates would be necessary to start this kind of co-ordination tool.

#### *2.4.3 Field Operations in or Including Western States*

OSCE field operations are deployed in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. However, there are also problems in Western Europe that would warrant the establishment of OSCE field operations. The following arguments speak for the establishment of

needs-oriented OSCE field operations that operate in Western European States or include them:

- Transnational threats and challenges concern all participating States without exception and can only be addressed jointly. Specific threats are focused on certain sub-regions creating specific needs.
- The implementation of OSCE commitments, including human dimension commitments, is confronted with a number of difficulties, some of which also exist in a number of Western states.
- Field operations, also active in Western states, might represent an important bond of co-operation among all kinds of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

The following options for field operations in Western states or including Western states are conceivable:

- *Option 1: A thematic mission on refugees in the Mediterranean.* More recently, some Mediterranean OSCE participating States have asked for more OSCE work on migration or have proposed a centre for police training in a specific state. The background for these proposals is clearly the refugee crisis in these countries that could be directly addressed by a mission on refugees. Such a mission would comprise a number of Mediterranean participating States as well as Partner States. A head office in the Secretariat would co-ordinate small offices in the States participating in the mission. These offices should include civil society actors. The mission would be mandated

with the development of norms, policy co-ordination, exchange of views and lessons learnt. The mission would not replace, but would rather supplement EU efforts. It would work in close consultation and co-operation with the EU and other governmental and non-governmental organizations. It could be budgeted in a flexible manner combining the Unified Budget and voluntary contributions.

- *Option 2: A thematic mission on Roma and Sinti.*

The plight of the Roma and Sinti is one of the most grossly neglected European problems. An OSCE Mission on Roma and Sinti could raise awareness, contribute to policy co-ordination and start exemplary projects. Such a mission would consist of a network of small offices and contact points in a number of states co-ordinated by ODIHR's Sinti and Roma Adviser. The Mission on Sinti and Roma would bring together Western, South-Eastern and Eastern European states. It would also bring together state and non-state actors as well as international organizations. Budgeting for such a mission could be as flexible as the structure itself: Many of the mission's elements could finance their activity from domestic sources. Others could be budgeted by a joint fund.

- *Option 3: An OSCE Liaison Office in Brussels.*

Currently, there is an EU Delegation to the International Organizations in Vienna, including the OSCE, but no OSCE Office currently exists in Brussels. An OSCE Liaison Office in Brussels would maintain contacts with the EU and NATO, co-ordinate with these two organizations and explore joint activities. Such an office could be small with two or three staff members.

- *Option 4: An Anti-Radicalization Network.*

In view of rising levels of radicalism and extremism, concerted efforts in the field of Anti-Radicalization, with a focus on young people, are more important than ever. While the OSCE provides good commitments and decisions in this field, it largely lacks the means for broader public awareness campaigns. A European Anti-Radicalization Network could become such an instrument. Through a head office in the ODIHR, the Network would co-ordinate a wide network of contact points in as many participating States as possible. The contact points would be anchored in state as well as in non-state structures. Such a network could develop the capacity necessary for larger Europe-wide campaigns and for key events in particular states.



# Structural and Managerial Challenges

## 3.1 Caring for Staff Matters

The Heads of Mission (HOMs) enjoy a high level of political and executive independence. This is a clear advantage that ensures reactivity and the ability to act in sensitive situations. This independence should not be questioned. At the same time, field operations that have no political mandate, but provide assistance through project implementation, depend a lot on their leadership's managerial qualifications, complemented only by political skills and diplomatic judgment. Therefore, modern management skills and leadership experience should be important employment criteria for headship and senior positions in these missions. We suggest offering the HOMs leadership and project-management training. Good examples can be taken from training courses the OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section (COMMS) offers to the HOMs on how to deal with the media. We suggest applying the performance appraisal report system (PAR) not only to the field operations' general staff, but to HOMs as well.

Experiences with managing the crisis in Ukraine have shown that the OSCE would be well advised to improve the cross-country mobility of mission members. We therefore suggest that administrative provisions should be made to enable international field officers to work in different duty stations successively within their maximum ten years of service. So far, there is little structure behind the change of jobs within the organization. While this happens for the most part on an *ad hoc* basis, the OSCE could capitalize systematically on the experience and availability of its mission members.

There is some good experience with job rotation programs that encourage people to change duty stations within a field operation and move from head office to branch offices and *vice versa*. We understand this to re-energize personnel, retain key staff in the team, give them a better idea of the mission's full operation and help alleviate the risk of staff gaps that occur with a possible personnel cutback. Exchanging lessons learned in this respect can be part of a region-to-region co-operation among various field operations.

The OSCE should pay more attention to its locally-hired professional staff. They contribute significantly to the OSCE's on-site efforts; they constitute an important element of a mission's strength, and are keepers of its institutional memory. However, their employment is not without challenges. These range from remuneration rates, advancement in grade, training and medical care to operational security. In the OSCE, there has been frequent talk that salary levels for local staff are too low in comparison to the income of their foreign colleagues.

With a view to the development of locally-hired staff, we encourage participating States to think about conducting tailor-made vocational training courses in institutions, such as the Center for International Peace Operations (Germany), the Crisis Management Centre (Finland) or the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) that offer participation to local staff in their courses for seconded and contracted staff.

The OSCE needs to continue building on the progress made in implementing UNSCR 1325 on

“Women, Peace and Security”, particularly with an eye to increasing the proportion of women in decision-making processes and the integration of gender aspects into its activities. In 2004, the OSCE “had 15 per cent women in senior management positions throughout the Organization, and today we have 35 per cent. Very few political institutions or private enterprises have such a high share of leadership positions occupied by women. [...] In 2004, 36 per cent of the professional staff were women, compared to 48 per cent today.”<sup>13</sup> Along the same lines, the OSCE needs to do more to become a family-friendly employer of its field officers.

The OSCE has had different experiences regarding different mechanisms to facilitate the quick deployment of experts in times of crisis. While the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) did not work well, an internal rapid deployment roster, created in early 2014 functioned excellently. Its purpose is to make skilled and trained OSCE staff available for quick relocation to new duty stations within the Organization. This was particularly efficient for recruiting and transferring “first responders” to the SMM in Ukraine.<sup>14</sup>

### *3.2 Depoliticizing the Budget Process, Moving to Multi-Year Planning*

The OSCE and its field operations need more predictability in the budgetary and planning process. This becomes particularly obvious in crisis situations. The frequent “hostage-taking” of the annual budget’s approval and its regularly late

adoption trigger discontinuity, delay or interrupt normal recruitment and procurement procedures. Ultimately, this affects the reputation of field activities as reliable partners. It is worth noting that the delayed adoption of the Unified Budget also complicated the rapid response to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014.

It is necessary to depoliticize the budget process and make it a more technical exercise. Part of the solution could be the early start of preparatory budget talks in order to sort out disputed issues as soon as possible. Some argue for “spring consultations” before the “fall decision-making”. At the same time, the process should leave enough room for the Heads of Mission to give a sense of direction to the planning and budget process.

Another option would be to change from annual to multi-year budgets. We suggest moving to a biennial budget cycle as is the practice in other international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where budgetary preparations reportedly start about two years ahead of time. It is worth noting that multi-year planning is already the practice in the OSCE at field levels. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed the so-called “Dayton + 20” plan – a strategic approach that has designed a framework for the mission’s activities until 2015. Parallel to that, the mission’s leadership maintains informal talks in Vienna and with its host government about programmatic priorities for the years to come. This allows the Mission to receive informal endorsement or disagreement and enhances forward-looking planning beyond the normal annual budget cycle.

A further way of addressing financial shortcomings is to campaign for more extra-budgetary funds.

<sup>13</sup> Lamberto Zannier, OSCE Secretary General, Opening Remarks, Gender Equality Review Conference, Vienna, 10 July 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Similarly, there has been positive experience with a virtual pool of equipment that had been established the year before.



This strategy does not enjoy universal acceptance. In the view of some observers, this approach takes parts of the budgetary process out of the consensus rule and makes the organization even more dependent on the donors' good will. That said, if extra-budgetary projects are systematically used to support the Unified Budget's key programmatic pillars, they turn into additional enablers of success. In any case, major players, such as the European Union, the Eurasian Economic Union or key participating States may want to consider making significant and systematic financial contributions to selected thematic efforts of the OSCE. In addition, extra funding may also be sought from benevolent institutions, commercial enterprises, or philanthropists. Event sponsoring and in-kind contributions of industrial companies have also been the practice in the OSCE on occasion.

A long-discussed issue is the need for field operations to prioritize the use of available resources and, in this way, manage them more efficiently. Some see prioritization, as such, as contradicting the Organization's comprehensive approach to security. At the same time, there are good examples where programs have been adjusted to areas of significant threats to security, to the needs of national partners and, not least, to the specific capabilities and comparative advantages of the given field operation. The guiding principle here should be to reduce the number of thematic areas to those with the greatest expected impact.

Recent events have shown that the OSCE needs not only the personnel and material, but also the financial ability to respond to crises. In particular, designated reserve funds should be permanently available in the form of a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Fund, for example. The

absence of such means during the early phase of the Ukrainian crisis was only resolved by using the resources of the OSCE Contingency Fund, cash surplus saved from previous years and significant, quickly-provided, voluntary contributions by participating States.

### *3.3 Adjusting Mandates and Structures*

Field operations have to respond flexibly to the needs of their host countries. If this is impossible within given mandates, the mandate should be adjusted in agreement with host governments and in dialogue with other national partners. Mandates are not ends in themselves and should not be untouchable. We have frequently observed that attempts to make mandate adjustments require special willingness on all sides, despite this being a key prerequisite for effectiveness and efficiency.

The ability of field operations to adapt to national requirements also affects their internal structures. There has been experience with reducing the number of field offices and, instead, creating regional hubs. This allows field operations to react dynamically and to re-establish field presences on a temporary basis as required. Adapting mandates and structures is certainly difficult to put into practice. It calls for the Chairmanship's skilled political guidance.

### *3.4 Strengthening the Conflict Prevention Centre*

The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) is the OSCE's prime institution for early warning and early action.

The experiences from the Ukraine crisis show that there is a need to strengthen the CPC in several respects: We suggest increasing the capacities (manpower and finances) of the Conflict Prevention Centre to cover the growing need for political guidance and administrative services particularly in, but not confined to, crisis situations. Specifically, we suggest further strengthening the co-ordinating role of the CPC in the OSCE-wide early warning system. Conversely, field operations should be mandated and institutions requested to contribute to the CPC-guided early warning, in accordance with Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11. Furthermore, the CPC should be better enabled to dispatch fact-finding visits to places of emerging tensions in a timely fashion. This requires additional staff and funding for the CPC as well. The Secretary General and the CPC should be authorized to have a stronger say in translating the Chairmanship's guidance into operational advice for the field operations. They should be explicitly mandated for this. The CPC mediation-support capacity should be further expanded.

### *3.5 Increasing Visibility*

It is necessary to increase the visibility of the OSCE of its capabilities and activities on the ground. Only the current crisis in Ukraine has moved governments to take significant notice of the Organization. They are now actively using the OSCE as a crisis manager, while there is still little understanding of the OSCE's potential capability and readiness to revitalize an all-inclusive European security dialogue. This has to do largely with the prevailing security philosophies of capitals, headquarters and societies. Nonetheless, this

can be counteracted, to some extent, from inside the Organization. Co-ordinated public relations work in Vienna and in the field operations should bring OSCE activities to the attention of opinion-makers and the broad public. Public impact has to be made part of the missions' on-site work. On the media flank, the OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section (COMMS) is asked to carry discussions, messages and information to the outside world – in teamwork with the field operations. Technically, access to and distribution of OSCE information should be made easy and user-friendly.

## Final Note

The conditions for and the forms and functions of OSCE field operations are a matter of permanent change. Thus, the present report cannot be more than a snapshot in time that highlights some aspects of field operations and thus contributes to better focusing the discussion about them. It was not the intention of the authors of this report to put forward a mainstream analysis with recommendations that would have been accepted by everybody anyhow. Rather, we aimed at presenting proposals, which do not (yet) enjoy consensus, to stimulate a necessary debate.

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), Belgrade

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC

Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin

Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku

Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg

Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague

Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), Kyiv

FRIDE – A European Think Tank for Global Action, Madrid

Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP), Tbilisi

Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), Tirana

Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO),  
Center for International Security, Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Moscow

International Institute of Political Sciences, Klaipeda, Lithuania

Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), Riga

Middle East Technical University (METU), Department of International Relations, Ankara

National University of Ireland, Edward M Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention, Maynooth

Network for European Studies (NES) of the University of Helsinki

OSCE Academy in Bishkek

Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw

Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), Bratislava

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm

The Civilitas Foundation, Yerevan



This report is the joint production of a group of twenty-one members of the more than forty current members of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.

The OSCE Network is an autonomous OSCE-related track II initiative. It is neither an OSCE structure nor is it subordinated to the OSCE or its participating States. The Network's members are research institutions from across the OSCE area, engaged in academic research and policy analysis on issues relevant to the OSCE's security agenda. The Network is a flexible and informal format founded by more than a dozen research institutions during the OSCE Security Days on 18 June 2013. Its creation was preceded by in-depth discussions among the founders, the delegations of participating States and OSCE institutions. The Network was inspired by a proposal made by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier in his inaugural speech in July 2011. It is open to think tanks and academic institutions that are willing and able to contribute academic expertise and policy analysis on OSCE-relevant issues. It provides expertise, stimulates discussion and raises awareness of the OSCE. The Network is used for sharing expertise and the co-ordination of activities among its members. Neither the Network nor its members represent the OSCE and the views expressed by network members are their personal opinions and do not reflect the views of the OSCE.

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