Research

Conflict and Fragility

Op-ed

Cross-sector partnerships in fragile settings

12 Mar 2015 - 12:17
Source: A local smallholder farmer cultivating sorghum / Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security / Flickr

An end in itself or means to an end?

Within the international development community, there is a growing consensus among actors from different sectors that societal challenges in developing contexts cannot be solved unilaterally and need to be tackled with others. The potential of so-called cross-sector partnerships receives particular attention in the context of complex development settings, such as countries affected by conflict and fragility. Interest in cross-sector partnerships is based on the belief that structural collaboration between actors from the public sector, the private sector, and civil society is at the heart of integrated efforts to address the multidimensional challenges these societies are faced with. The particular significance of this topic for these types of countries was confirmed during a workshop on cross-sector partnerships hosted by the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, SPARK and the Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law, and organised at the most recent edition of the Africa Works! conference.


Building the case

The comparative advantage of cross-sector partnerships for fragile and conflict-affected countries builds on several key arguments strongly linked to the challenges that these societies and their development partners are generally faced with. First, partnerships are believed to enable actors to fill gaps that are crucial in explaining the absence of peace and development. Most commonly referred to in this respect are lacking and/or malfunctioning formal (government) institutions, the absence of trust and capacity deficits. Second, partnerships are considered to allow actors to share, manage and reduce risks of all kinds, critical in societies which are generally typified as high-risk environments. Examples of risks worth noting here relate to political instability and insecurity. Third, collaboration through a partnership can also be a means to both mobilize and pool resources. For fragile settings this particularly applies to financial means, as a result of insufficient domestic resource mobilization and declining international aid budgets.

In line with this reasoning, the 2011 ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ (‘New Deal’) has identified partnerships as a primary modality to improve engagement in these kinds of settings and calls upon actors from different sectors to collaborate to address the multiple dimensions of conflict and fragility. Through its peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda, the New Deal has become a driving force in broader development frameworks of both fragile and conflict-affected countries and donor governments. During the Africa Works! workshop  government representatives of Sierra Leone, a New Deal pilot country (through its Agenda for Prosperity) and The Netherlands as donor government (e.g. through its Dutch Diamond approach) indicated how New Deal principles are currently being incorporated and applied in their development policies and strategies. Both actors provided examples of various partnerships in which their governments are currently involved to illustrate their commitment.


From theory to practice: the lack of empirical evidence

The case for cross-sector partnerships in settings affected by conflict and fragility has yet to be underpinned with evidence. The growing conceptual attention and significant political commitment within the international development community sharply contrasts with a significant lack of empirical evidence on the potential and feasibility of cross-sector partnerships in these types of settings. There is a large discrepancy between the growing recognition of the potential of cross-sector partnerships among an increasing group of actors, and evidence on implementation and impact on the ground. The little empirical evidence on partnerships that is at our disposal, such as documented by Kolk/ Lenfant based on research in the Democratic Republic of Congo, indicates that 1) there are limited examples that involve more than two sectors; and 2) we have relatively little insight into their impact.


Moving the research agenda forward

Driven by initiatives like the New Deal and the recognition that development interventions in fragile settings have yielded limited results, the belief is that cross-sector partnerships should become the ‘new norm’ for improved engagement in contexts affected by conflict and fragility. However, rather than driven by compelling success stories, this ambition appears to be a default option. There is in fact a risk of regarding cross-sector partnerships as an end in itself rather than as a means to address societal challenges. However, to solidify our understanding of cross-sector partnerships as a mode of delivery in fragile settings, there is a need to look beyond valuable but often generic insights derived from developing contexts in general and focus specifically on the, albeit limited, evidence on cross-sector collaboration that is available for countries affected by conflict and fragility. This research note will draw on the example of a partnership presented at the Africa Works! event. It involves a multinational company, a donor government and international and national NGOs that together work on the “White Sorghum value chain development” project in Burundi (‘Burundi partnership’). For more information on this partnership, please refer to the accompanying note prepared by SPARK and MOBINC, two of the partners in the project. A representative of MOBINC was one of the panel members during the Africa Works! workshop on cross-sector partnerships, where this project was one of the case studies discussed.


Unpacking the partnership narrative

The recognition that the evidence base is largely missing urges us to unpack and problematize some of the assumptions and expectations underlying the plea for cross-sector partnerships in countries affected by conflict and fragility. The narrative seems to imply that for partnerships to be an effective mode of delivery, it takes partners from all three sectors – the public sector, the private sector and civil society – that sectors are clear-cut entities and that each sector represents a homogeneous group of actors. Research can greatly help shed light on the viability of these assumptions by first unpacking the notion of a cross-sector partnership.

Which sectors and which actors within these sectors are meant to engage? On the side of the public sector, the narrative commonly refers to government entities. That means that donor governments and host governments fall within the same category, while representing quite distinct policy agendas. Within the context of the host environment in which the partnership takes place, central and local governments can both play a role, but that does not imply that they speak with the same voice. Additional actors that fall within this category are international organisations such as the UN or the EU. Notwithstanding the New Deal’s commitment to ensure greater ownership of fragile states government, reality in fragile and conflict-affected countries is that among the public sector players, donor governments and international organisations are often better equipped and positioned to engage with non-governmental partners in complex partnerships. 

In the private sector sphere, potential partners range from foreign to domestic firms, from large scale enterprises to micro-entrepreneurs, and could include both formal and informal businesses. Organised forms of businesses such as business associations also fall within this category. Informality, small size and lack of organisation, common traits of a large segment of the local economy of fragile states make the domestic business a less natural candidate for structural cooperation. Unsurprisingly, it is mostly international companies that are involved in joined-up development action. The problem is, however, that international businesses typically do not abound in crisis settings.

With regard to civil society, one typically refers to engagement by NGOs, whether international or local. Civil society, however, articulates its voice in a much more diverse range of institutions ranging from identity-based groups, (e.g. traditional chiefdoms, religious communities) to interest-based groups or community based organisations. In crisis-affected settings, where society tends to be fragmented, these social structures play a critical role in rebuilding and consolidating inter-group relations and state-society links. However, they appear to have been the least prominent players in cross-sector partnerships to date. Furthermore, international NGOs that are typically active in contexts of acute or latent crisis traditionally belong to the fields of humanitarian aid,  peacebuilding and statebuilding and are less experienced in working with the private sector.

The fact that in some cases research institutes are added as a fourth sector (which is, for example, the case with the Dutch Diamond approach highlighted above) shows that different terms add to the confusion about what and who is hiding behind these in-vogue concepts.

Against the background of this large variety of potential partners, the Burundi partnership strikes by the relative restricted selection of partners involved, as it largely consists of a collaboration between international business and local and international NGOs. On the public sector side, there is very little to no engagement. The Dutch government was involved at the start, acting as a broker and financier of the initial collaboration, but has not been actively involved since. The host government, in turn, although expected to become an important partner in the future, appears to have played a marginal role to date. From the private sector, the partnership involves Heineken, a Dutch brewing multinational and its local subsidiary Brarudi. Regarding the civil society, there are several NGOs involved, both international ones like EU-CORD, SPARK and TERRAFINA and local ones like Mobinc, CECM and COSPEC.

Other case studies like the one documented by Kolk and Lenfant in the context of the Democratic Republic of Congo point into a similar direction: cross-sector partnerships appear to be primarily driven by donor governments, international NGOs and international business. An observation that seems to be at odds with the New Deal’s major plea for country-led interventions.


Mapping the actors’ interests

Considering the restricted diversity and unbalanced composition of actors in current partnerships, a better understanding of the interests different actors bring to the field will help explain and potentially influence the extent to which distinct players are willing to engage. The rationale behind this ambition is grounded in the conviction that a minimum level of convergence in interests is required to prompt and sustain the readiness of actors to engage in a systematic cooperation.   

What are the possible interests of actors within sectors to engage in a cross-sector partnership in contexts of fragility? At first sight, interests seem to evolve around three major themes: security, resources, and economic growth. Given the high and quickly changing levels of insecurity in many fragile settings, the safety of citizens, employees and the protection of infrastructure, inputs and assets form a critical concern for governments, businesses and civil society alike. For international companies, building a robust relationship with the local community can be critical to obtain a social licence to operate and forge mutual interest in a secure environment. More generally, revival of economic activity will signal a sense of security to the local population, which in turn encourages others to invest or rebuild their livelihoods. In the Burundi partnership, enabling farmers to create employment for vulnerable groups such as formerly armed youth and returnees, is deemed critical to maintain stability considering the large influx of (potential) labourers. The host government, central and local, has in that sense also an interest in accommodating the private sector.

The pooling of resources is another area of converging interests. Where low capacity and lacking infrastructure increase the cost of production, NGOs and businesses have developed a joint interest in local sourcing. Buying inputs from local producers instead of importing them, can in the long-run reduce the costs of production and, at the same time, create a stable market for local producers. This thinking lies at the heart of the Burundi partnership, where Spark trains cooperatives of local farmers to supply Brarudi with sorghum. While the Dutch donor government used Heineken’s investment in Burundi as a means to leverage its own development resources, thereby achieving a more significant impact, the interests of the host government to be actively involved in the  cooperation are less obvious from a resource sharing point of view. While promoting local sourcing will eventually help unlock the potential of local agriculture and contribute to better household income, the alternative route of importing most inputs (including primary resources) through customs may appear as more lucrative sources of funding.

Economic growth through productive private investments can also benefit a diverse set of actors. If actively involved in attracting foreign investment and promoting local business that benefits the local population through decent employment and better products and services, a nascent or recovering government will emanate from such an engagement with boosted legitimacy. Civil society in turn sees the opportunity of using the well-established demand of a global buyer for instance to serve as a long-term market for their products and services. Again, the case of the Burundi partnership is a good example. Heineken’s legitimate interest in optimising its return on investments is, at least to a fair extent, compatible with the farmers search for a stable source of income and better livelihoods. This shared interest may be tested when the NGOs not only (through cooperatives) help to strengthen the farmers’ productivity and quality of production, but also engage in equipping them with the required skills to improve their bargaining power vis-à-vis the sole buyer on which they are dependent.

Each of these three areas of converging interests deserves further exploration. In practice, a mix of interest areas is likely to be at play. It is also worth noticing that a focus on interests in fragile societies quickly reveals that the boundaries between sectors are porous, with public institutions in many cases serving personalised interests and public sector officials heavily involved in private sector activities.


Conclusion

Given the apparent lack of empirical evidence, this research note aims to shed light on the need to build the evidence-base of cross-sector partnerships in contexts affected by conflict and fragility. In an attempt to help move the research agenda on cross-sector partnerships forward, it proposes to look into the particular nature of private, public and civil society actors in fragile settings, and their comparative power and interests. Strengthening the evidence base through the conduct of research into this direction will make a valuable contribution to a better understanding of the conditions under which structural collaboration would indeed improve the effectiveness of engagement in these kinds of settings. And at the same time by tempering unrealistic expectations it will also help to reduce the risk of treating cross-sector partnerships as an end in itself rather than as a means to address the societal challenges these societies are faced with.