

Paper for the Panel from the Group for the Study of Civil-Military Relations

The development of Russian security policy 1992-2002

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This paper will be published in Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, edited by Anne C Aldis & Roger N McDermott, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

ABSTRACT

In this paper I shall provide an overview of actors (both organisations and persons) that were involved in the decision-making process of the Russian security policy since 1992 and of the security documents they generated. First, I shall explain the conceptual thinking of Russian security policy. Next, I shall deal with the development (both chronological and in contents) of the three leading security documents, i.e. the National Security Concept, the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine. Between 1992 and 2002 the RF presented three National Security Concepts, two Foreign Policy Concepts and four Military Doctrines.¹ Other security-related documents of less importance, such as the naval doctrine and military reform plans, will not be treated in this paper. Finally, I shall provide conclusions and an outlook on the future development of Russian security policy.

Introduction

After the break up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation (RF) became its legal successor state. Initially the Russian military and political leadership was convinced that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would develop towards an organisation similar to that of the former Soviet Union, naturally under Russian supervision. However it did not take long before a number of CIS states decided differently. They created their own armed forces and subsequently formed independent security policies. The effect of these developments was that Russia felt itself forced to do the same by forming its own Armed Forces and a Ministry of Defence, in spring 1992. With the abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist ideology the RF was now in need of basic documents for its security policy.

Table 1: Chronology of leading policy documents of the RF on security issues


Date	Policy document
May 1992	<i>Draft</i> RF Military Doctrine published
April 1993	Foreign Policy Concept ratified by Presidential Decree
2 November 1993	Military Doctrine ratified by Presidential Decree

17 December 1997	National Security Concept ratified by Presidential Decree
29 September 1999	<i>Draft</i> Military Doctrine accepted by the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence
5 October 1999	<i>Draft</i> National Security Concept accepted by the RF Security Council
10 January 2000	National Security Concept ratified by Presidential Decree
21 April 2000	Military Doctrine ratified by Presidential Decree
28 June 2000	Foreign Policy Concept ratified by Presidential Decree

Russian Military Conceptual Thought

Current Russian thinking on national security policy is that the state has military, diplomatic, legal (both national and international), information, economic and other means at its disposal for achieving its objectives. These means are joined in the National Security Concept (NSC), Russia's grand strategy. From the NSC separate concepts and doctrines are derived to guarantee security in, amongst others, international, military, economic, social, environmental and information areas. Two of these doctrines are the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine. The differences between Russian security, foreign and military policies are the following. The security policy (NSC) is pointed at safeguarding national interests against external and internal threats. The foreign policy (Foreign Policy Concept, FPC) deals with maintaining relations with actors in the international arena, such as states and international organizations.² The military policy consists of views and measures concerning war, conflicts, crises and their prevention, deterrence and suppression of aggression, force generation and preparation of armed forces, population and economy in securing vital interests of the state.³

Figure 1: Military conceptual framework of the Russian Federation



National Security Concept

Russia's security policy is defined as actions by organs of state power, (lower) government agencies, social and other organisations directed at safeguarding national interests against foreign and domestic threats. These actions consist of predicting and identifying threats, determining tasks to secure national interests; improving forces, means and the system of guaranteeing national security, and finally, mobilizing resources and determining the order of using them. As mentioned earlier, the national security policy of the RF is laid down in the NSC. The NSC is the basic document for formulating and accomplishing a clear-cut and comprehensive policy that determines and accordingly secures Russia's national interests.⁴

Chronological Development of the National Security Concept

Since the first edition of the Military Doctrine, in May 1992, the RF has constantly described the NSC as the highest security document, from which military doctrine is derived.⁵ Still it would take another five and a half years before the first NSC would be published. Initially, neither President Yeltsin nor his government had a clear view on the direction of Russia's security policy. Would the RF proceed as the unchallenged leader of the CIS or would it choose to take an independent course, with an exclusively Russian security policy and national armed forces? Probably because of this lack of clarity and the atmosphere of indecision, no effort was yet made to develop a Security Concept (at national nor at CIS level), although such a concept had already been mentioned in a draft military doctrine for the CIS of February 1992.⁶ The following month, however, on 5 March 1992, a decree 'On National Security' was issued, establishing the Security Council of the RF, an organ tasked to deal with problems of internal and external security.⁷ At the same time a strong appeal to form a national security policy was published by Sergei Rogov, Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKAN RAS). Rogov warned of possible conflicts with other former Soviet republics. Particularly with Ukraine, because of differences on nuclear arms, the Crimea and energy deliveries, relations were quite tense at that moment. Because of this threat, according to Rogov fundamental decisions on security could no longer be delayed. Apparently, there was an urgent need for establishing a mechanism on military-political decision-making. Therefore a national security council was to be formed in order to develop a security strategy.⁸ In May the choice for an independent Russian security policy was made more explicit: Yeltsin ratified a decree to the effect that Russia would have its own Ministry of Defence and RF armed forces.⁹

It did not take long for the military to enter the debate on security. In May 1992 Colonel-General Igor Rodionov, Head of the General Staff Academy, presented a conservative alternative for the official military doctrine that was published earlier that month. Rodionov regarded his document as the leading security document. His view on the national security documents, however, was not shared by all members of the military leadership. For instance, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, who had until recently served as Secretary of the Russian Security Council, spoke out after the publication of the Military Doctrine of November 1993 saying that this doctrine was premature. First a NSC should be developed, which would include national interests and threats against national security. Only then could other subordinated documents such as military and foreign policy doctrines be drafted.¹⁰ Clearly, the military were divided on which course to take in security policy and the hierarchy of the different security documents.

In 1992 Yury Skokov, Secretary of the Security Council, made a start in drafting the NSC. At its first session in the summer of 1992, the Security Council assigned a high priority to the accomplishment of the NSC.¹¹ However, not until July 1994 did the

Security Council install a commission to draft it.¹² The purpose of the NSC was to fill the political vacuum which was the result of the demise of the communist ideology. A fundamental political consensus was supposed to be raised, based upon national interests.¹³ These rather democratic principles sounded attractive, but disguised reality. In the constitution of 1993, the national security policy was the President's responsibility. No longer did parliament have the power to approve documents on security policy, as it did under the previous constitution. Now the president could decide upon security policies without the consent of parliament: consensus was no longer necessary. Still it would be December 1997 before the president signed the first NSC. The most likely reasons for the long period (1992-1997) before the NSC was drafted are as follows:

- During the first few years after the RF had succeeded the Soviet Union, the Russian security elite debated heavily about which course to follow in foreign and security policies.
- The security organs were engaged in a power struggle. For instance, in 1992 the General Staff Academy launched an unofficial military doctrine and, as I shall explain later, the Security Council put aside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in presenting the first Foreign Policy Concept in 1993.
- The period of 1992-1997 was characterised by instability, both internal (for instance the fight between the president and the legislative power in 1993; the first Chechen conflict 1994-96) as well as external (for instance civil wars in neighbouring CIS states such as Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan; hotspots in the Balkans). The Russian executive power (president and government) was forced to pay a lot of attention to these internal and external incidents, which was an obstacle for further maturing of the RF security policy into a NSC.

After the first half of 1999, when the Kosovo conflict had been overshadowing the international agenda, a radical change occurred in Russian security policy. Army General Makhmut Gareyev, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, outlined this turn in policy in an interview on geopolitics, national security and other security related topics.¹⁴ Gareyev stated that NATO's strategy, following the security policy of the USA, was no longer directed at defensive but at pre-emptive use of force, including the possibility of deploying outside the territory of the alliance's treaty, the emphasis being more on the use of military force rather than diplomatic or other non-violent methods of implementing policy. The USA and other influential Western countries were aiming at a unipolar system of international relations at global level under their authority. According to Gareyev, the aggression of NATO against the former Yugoslavia was a clear example of its policy to ignore the UN and the standards of international law.

Gareyev's statements were an unambiguous example of the Russian feelings with regard to NATO's new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and towards the military intervention of this alliance in Kosovo of March – July of that year.¹⁵ Western security policy was now considered to be a threat which resulted in statements in the Russian security policy expressing these anti-Western sentiments. Gareyev claimed that not only external developments but also internal threats, such as the conflict in Chechnya, demanded adjustments of the current security concepts. The statement in the 1997 issue of the NSC, that direct threats against the RF no longer existed, was declared out-of-date. Most of the amendments of the security policy that Gareyev proposed were to be implemented in the new (draft) editions of the NSC and the Military Doctrine in Autumn 1999. By ratifying the final draft of the new NSC on 10 January 2000, President Putin authorized the revised Russian security policy.

*Development of the Contents of the National Security Concept*¹⁶

The major destabilizing factors, pointed out in one or more of the different versions of the NSC, are the following: international dominance by Western states under American authority; weakening of Russia's international position; ignoring Russian national interests and the danger of (international) terrorism. In comparison with the 1997 edition, in the NSC of 1999 the destabilizing factors have increased. This is probably due to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya and because of the enlarged influence of NATO on international politics.

Russia's national interests as stated in the NSC are a reflection of the internal and external developments of the 1990s. Internal developments, such as the (critical) social-economic situation and the conflict in Chechnya, manifest themselves in objectives on removing the causes for internal conflicts and on guaranteeing state power and sovereignty. External developments, such as NATO's security policy (in the Balkans), are reflected in objectives on strengthening the ties within the CIS and with other allies. However, internal national interests, such as security against terrorism, disasters and acts of war, are considered paramount.

With respect to threats the 1997 NSC expresses a generally positive view on international developments and perceives the internal social-economic circumstances as the most important threat for Russia's national security. Within two years this perspective changed radically. In the 1999 NSC a rise in military threats, both in number and in strength and related especially to NATO, is stated. The 1999/2000 editions of the NSC clearly illustrate a turning point in threat perception. Although formally internal threats are still seen as the most important, the extensive description of external threats points out that the latter now have priority. This inconsistency is possibly related to clashes between military and civil experts in drafting the NSC, in which the former consider external and the latter perceive internal threats to be the most significant.

For the purpose of guaranteeing national security the following objectives are presented in the NSC. Externally the RF has changed its objectives from stress on international cooperation at global level, as declared in the 1997 NSC, to emphasis on economic, political and military cooperation and integration within the CIS in 1999. This review in policy is probably the result of disappointment with the cooperation with the West but also of the new impetus for regaining Russia's superpower status, which can best be achieved starting from the CIS. Internal political objectives are directed at strengthening (central) authority. With regard to military objectives, the two Chechen conflicts have produced the lessons that the RF armed forces (of the Defence Ministry, the MoD) now can also be deployed in internal conflicts and that the cooperation between these forces and the troops of the other so-called power ministries must be improved. The chain of command of decisive organs of national security in the NSC unmistakably reveals that the president is the overall deciding factor in guaranteeing national security.

Foreign Policy

According to the formal definition of foreign policy, in the RF the organs of state power as well as institutes and state structures dealing with international affairs carry out the foreign policy by maintaining relations with states and regional and global international organizations.¹⁷ As a continuation of the Soviet tradition, the RF Prime Minister and the government are responsible for economic and internal affairs; these functionaries therefore have a subordinated position in foreign policy. Nowadays the president of the RF possesses the overall responsibility for security policies, including foreign policy, that at the time of the USSR were in the hands of the Secretary-General of the Communist Party and the Politburo.¹⁸

Development of the Foreign Policy Concept

Initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the logical organ to draft the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC). In February 1992 this department tried to implement a FPC. However, the Supreme Soviet prevented this, claiming that the concept was too abstract. Yeltsin, who at the time was involved in a struggle for power with the legislature, in the course of 1992 adopted a more assertive foreign policy, almost certainly in an attempt to gain support. Remarkably, the final version of the FPC was not prepared under the auspices of the Minister of Foreign Affairs but under Yuri Skokov, Secretary of the Russian Security Council.¹⁹ Skokov happened to be the chairman of the Security Council's interdepartmental commission on foreign policy which was to draft the FPC. After approval of the FPC by the Security Council and confirmation by the President, on 29 April 1993 an apparently officially approved summary of the concept was published by Vladislav Chernov, Deputy Head of the Department on Strategic Security of the Security Council.²⁰

More than seven years later, on 28 June 2000, President Putin signed a revised version of the FPC, which replaced the edition of 1993. In the introduction of the new document it is stated that certain tendencies in international politics have compelled the RF to review its foreign and security policies. These negative tendencies were in contrast with the expectation, listed in the 1993 concept, that multilateral cooperation would further intensify. The 2000 edition of the FPC mentions the following basic principles of RF foreign policy:

- The RF is a great power;
- Russia's influence in international politics should be strengthened;
- Political, military and economic cooperation and integration within the CIS has a high priority;
- Aversion to Western security policies.

Russian foreign policy manifests two different approaches. On the one hand maintaining Russia's status as a great power results in striving for more influence within the CIS and emphasis on military and geopolitical aspects. On the other hand the policy is characterised by accepting Russia's post Cold War decline in status, with emphasis on integration in the international system, which is dominated by the West. The danger of the first approach is confrontation with the West, which could lead to isolation and a diminished international position. The danger of the second approach is that this could result in a position dependent on the West.²¹ This dilemma of two sometimes contrasting directions leads to Russia's foreign policy seeming somewhat ambiguous.

Continuing on this duality in foreign policy, the following may be said about Putin's policy until the terrorist attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001. Russia's fixation on its influence within the CIS was prolonged. In order to stress Russia's great power status and the independent course of RF foreign policy, Putin followed an active line to intensify relations with a number of countries. He displayed interest in relations with so-called 'pariah' states such as North Korea and Cuba and has deepened political, economic and military ties with China, India and Iran,²² thus showing that his foreign policy was not dictated by the West. However, Putin realized quite well that these rapprochements with dubious states might cause resistance in the West and weaken Russia's international position.

With reference to the second approach in foreign policy, Putin has regularly admitted that nowadays influence in international politics is determined by economic rather than by military power. Taking into account the fact that internal and external policies are so closely connected, as is also stated in the FPC, Putin has given a high

priority to economic cooperation and integration in the global economy. In view of Russia's geographic position, this leads to the conclusion that closer ties with Europe are in the interest of the RF. Not surprisingly Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov has stated that Russia's primary external interests lie in Europe. Therefore, the RF aims at structural and balanced relations with the European Union (EU). Trade relations between the RF and the EU are intensive: in 2000 40 per cent of Russia's trade was conducted with the EU.²³ Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and foreign policy expert Anatoly Adamishin confirmed the importance of economic cooperation with Europe and the EU in particular. In his idea within ten to twenty years the entry of Russia to the EU could be realized.²⁴ Hence international economic cooperation, especially with the EU, must be considered a central point of Russian foreign policy.

Foreign Policy After 11 September 2001

Since 11 September 2001, Russia's international position has weakened, physically as well as psychologically: physically in the sense that the West has lodged itself in the traditionally Russian 'backyard' of the CIS. Already before 11 September the West had gradually strengthened its position in this region. NATO achieved this through its cooperation programme 'Partnership for Peace' and the USA conducting military exercises with some of the CIS states in Central Asia. Since 11 September a remarkable turning point in positions has occurred. Many CIS states had previously been tied to the RF because of economic and/or military dependency. However, the growing Western presence in this area could very well end this dependency. The involvement of the West in the CIS is slowly appearing to be of the long lasting kind. The USA has been investing hundreds of millions of dollars in airbases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.²⁵ It is not likely that these costly investments are made for stationing troops in that area for a limited period of time. Another aspect of these investments is that they lead to an economic impulse for the CIS states in question. It is said that the USA has to pay \$7,000-7,500 for every air movement from and to Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. This Western, or better American, policy towards the CIS improves the economic as well as the security situation of a number of CIS states and subsequently diminishes their dependency on Moscow. This, then, leads to the conclusion that Russia has 'physically' lost ground in the CIS.

In a psychological sense Putin has also suffered defeat, from a national as well as from a CIS point of view. Nationally after 11 September Putin dropped his resistance to Western initiatives such as the annulment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, the development of America's National Missile Defence and further enlargement of NATO. The Russian security and foreign affairs elite, including the two Ivanovs (Ministers of Defence, Sergei and Foreign Affairs, Igor) voiced a great deal of criticism of Putin for giving in to the West. Putin's aspired status as a 'strong leader' might have been at stake, although his position does not seem to be threatened as yet. Putin has also been 'psychologically' damaged in the eyes of other CIS states, who have noticed that he was forced by the West to give way on a number of occasions. This has affected Russia's status within the CIS.

The fact is that 11 September was beneficial for the realization of Russian objectives in domestic as well as in foreign affairs, even though a number of these benefits have already faded away. After 11 September the West recognized Russia's use of force in Chechnya to be a legal instrument against terrorism. Yet in the spring of 2002 Western criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya revived, both from official circles and from media and public opinion. Western support in fighting international terrorism indeed helped defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, whose destabilizing capacity also

threatened the RF. Nevertheless these Western anti-terrorist actions in Central Asia have resulted in a long-lasting presence of the West in Russia's 'backyard'. One last important effect of 11 September was the benefit of closer cooperation between Russia and NATO. Long negotiations after 11 September have led to an equal say for RF on a limited number of matters such as the fight against terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But Russia still has no direct say in NATO's operational decision making, nor will it receive a right of veto against unwelcome resolutions. With this meagre result, not unexpectedly, RF Chief of the General Staff General Kvashnin was convinced that NATO still considered Russia its opponent and Igor Ivanov continued to reject further enlargement of the alliance.²⁶ The conclusion seems justified that the cooperation between NATO and Russia has improved only to a limited extent. Hence the overall result of 11 September has been mostly negative for Russia, in that it has weakened its position both within the CIS and internationally and has affected the earlier national consensus on security and foreign policy.

Military Doctrine

Assessing RF security policy of the last decade, it is clear that the development of its military doctrine is paramount. Military doctrine forms a part of the national security policy and is a reflection of past and possible future policies. The doctrine provides guidelines in two directions. Firstly, it deals with the needs of the armed forces in the fields of organization, personnel and equipment. Secondly, the doctrine provides guidelines in the methods of warfare.

Military doctrines can be divided into three categories. The most detailed are service doctrines of ground, air and naval forces. The second category concerns an armed forces doctrine, which includes all services. And finally a multinational or alliance doctrine can be formulated. Russia does have one service doctrine, the naval doctrine, which was adopted in July 2001. Since the alliance doctrine of the CIS never came into being, I will concentrate on the armed forces doctrines. They provide guidelines for the use of all (para)military forces, i.e. the armed forces of the Ministry of Defence, as well as the troops of the power ministries.²⁷

Chronological Development of RF Military Doctrine

The draft Military Doctrine of May 1992 seemed to be the start of a movement towards a more assertive, confrontational Russian security policy. For example by adopting the mission of conflict resolution within the CIS, Russia claimed a leading role in this region and in the joint military effort. Russia granted itself the right to protect Russian minorities in other CIS states, making use of force, if necessary. Mobile forces, yet to be formed, could be used to carry out this objective. The war in the Gulf of 1991 had shown the weakness of a static (Iraqi) defence. The doctrine reflected this lesson by introducing the concept of a mobile defence with high-tech weapons in all azimuths. Apart from defensive, offensive use of force was reintroduced as an acceptable concept of operations. The deplorable economic situation made these costly aspirations quite unattainable.

In March 1993, the draft Doctrine of 1992 was submitted to the Supreme Soviet. After approval by parliament the doctrine was to be ratified by the president. At that time Yeltsin was involved in a struggle with the legislative power. As a result there was no parliamentary debate on the doctrine. The struggle for power culminated in the use of military force by Yeltsin to end the rebellious occupation by the Supreme Soviet of its 'White House' on 4 October 1993. With the legislative power eliminated, the Security Council approved a revised version of the doctrine on 2 November; Yeltsin signed it the same day.²⁸ In December 1993 a new constitution was adopted, which formalised the exclusion of the legislative power from decision-making in security (and other fields of) policy and thus strengthened the position of the president. From now on only the president endorsed the military doctrine. Judging from the importance which is attached to the role of MoD forces in security matters, it is not unlikely that the military supported Yeltsin in his battle against the legislative power in exchange for strong influence by them on the contents of the doctrine.

In this doctrine for the first time attention is given to internal conflicts, probably as a result of internal conflicts in some of the CIS states. Another new development was that MoD forces now could be deployed in internal conflicts, which until then had been the prerogative of the (paramilitary) Internal Troops. The aim of acquiring a dominant position within the CIS is further developed by an entry on the possibility of stationing RF troops outside its territory.

In 1996 the Defence Council, a competing security organ of the Security Council, announced the need for a new doctrine.²⁹ Since 1993 a number of negative military-political developments demanded its revision:

- Attempts to diminish Russia's influence in the Caucasus;
- Enlargement of NATO;
- New military threats and regional conflicts;
- The deteriorated socio-economic circumstances in the RF.

First Deputy Chief of the General Staff at the time, Colonel-General Valery Manilov, became the acting chairman of the working group on the new doctrine, which was supposed to be interdepartmental but which was dominated by the military. As former Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Manilov had also played a decisive role in drafting the first NSC. On 29 September 1999 the highest organ of the MoD, the Collegium, approved the draft Military Doctrine. This doctrine was published before the revised NSC, thereby putting aside this theoretically leading security document as well as the Security Council, the highest state organ on security matters.³⁰ The military domination of the working group, the publication of the draft doctrine before the revised NSC, the exclusion of the Security Council in the paragraph on the chain of command and the emphasis on the MoD forces in the draft Doctrine, are all indications that the military exploited the 1999 draft Doctrine to strengthen their own position at the expense of other security organs and paramilitary troops. As with the drafting of the 1993 Doctrine the military had again 'used' the now physically feeble Yeltsin to strengthen their own position.

A new doctrinal development was the increased attention given to internal conflicts, irregular warfare and joint operations by MoD and other forces, coming from the experiences of the first Chechen War. Nuclear weapons became more important, because of the weakness of the conventional forces but also to reacquire the status of superpower. In the analysis of the military-political situation and the threat perception the draft clearly displayed a strong anti-Western view. NATO action in Kosovo apparently stirred up existing negative sentiments against Western security policy within the military. The draft made it unmistakably clear that both internal (the Chechens) and external 'aggressors' (the West) had to realize that Russia was not be trifled with any more.

The 2000 Doctrine, signed by President Putin in April 2000, continued the standpoints of the 1999 draft but also introduced some new ones. Positions against the West and the consequences of the second Chechen conflict were worked out in more detail. New entries regarding the president and Belarus were included. Taking into account his policy of centralization of power, it is not surprising that the position of the president in the chain of command was strengthened. As a result of the Union Treaty of December 1999, Russia and Belarus had intensified their cooperation. The military aspects of the deepened relations were now stated in the doctrine. The new positions were to a large extent the result of Putin's personal ideas and are not yet to be seen as structural.

Development of the Contents of RF Military Doctrine

The development of the treatment of external threats in the various military doctrines over the decade reflects above all the deteriorating relationship with the West, shown by the entries on interference in internal Russian affairs; expansion of military blocs and alliances; attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems. Apart from these matured threats, two other threats are consistently mentioned: the violation of the rights of Russian citizens abroad and the feeling of being surrounded by enemies. As a residue of Soviet thinking that threats only came from abroad, internal threats were not recognized at first; but they have been included since 1993.

During the 1990s the order of conflicts changed, from global and nuclear wars to local and internal armed conflicts being listed as the most important conflicts. The threat of a global war had diminished. Russia was now confronted with armed conflicts within the CIS and in Chechnya. The Russian military-political leadership realized that the security apparatus would increasingly be faced with domestic and regional armed conflicts. This shift from external to internal conflicts was also reflected in the development of the perception of the use of military force. The emphasis changed from external large-scale warfare to operations within the CIS and joint operations of RF armed forces and other troops in internal conflicts.

With regard to ensuring military security the consecutive doctrines show a growing assertive policy, both internally, in response to Chechen separatism, and externally, in response to Western security policy especially with regard to the Balkans. This more assertive approach comes to the fore in entries such as:

- The abandonment of the conventional and nuclear 'no-first-use' statements;
- Lowering of the nuclear threshold;
- Thinking again in terms of 'opponents/enemies';
- (Forward) deployment of RF armed forces and other troops outside Russian territory.

The leadership of the security apparatus, as laid down in the command and control chain of the doctrine, has gradually been concentrated in the hands of the following institutions: the president, the Security Council, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. The Security Council, probably by instigation of the military, was left out of this chain in the doctrines of 1999/2000. However in the course of 2000 Putin made it clear that he intended to strengthen the position of the Security Council at the expense of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.³¹ It is likely that the reinforced position of the Security Council will be expressed in future amendments to current security documents, such as the military doctrine.

Conclusions

In the first half of the 1990s the development of Russian national security policy shows a realistic perception in considering the non-military, internal social-economic situation as the biggest threat. To improve these circumstances, Yeltsin's foreign policy was mainly oriented to the West. Consequently Russian foreign policy was primarily directed at international cooperation, and the non-military means of RF international policy had received priority. In the second half of the 1990s, due to the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the consequent enhanced role of NATO in international politics, Russian security policy changed drastically. Another development was the conflict in Chechnya. The consequences of the Russian intervention in Chechnya, such as bomb attacks in Russia, the high number of casualties on both sides, and (supposed) foreign support for the terrorists, led the Kremlin to believe that, once again, Russia was faced with internal as well as external military threats. This changed RF security policy to the extent that military means for conflict resolution and external threats now received the highest priority. A peaceful international advancement was no longer in prospect. Apart from this, a longing grew towards regaining the status of superpower held by the former Soviet Union, possibly as a way out of Russia's internal and external difficulties. Lacking a sound economic base to support the status of superpower, military means, including nuclear arms, became the best instrument to achieve these political objectives. The aversion to the security policy followed by the West and on top of that the desire for superpower status led to focussing on the CIS politically, economically and militarily.

Shortly after the publication of the NSC in January 2000, subordinate documents such as the Military Doctrine and the FPC were also revisited. The order of publication and the generally similar points of view of the different concepts gave proof of a well-coordinated and comprehensive approach to the foreign and security policies. Hence 2000 can be considered as the year of completion of the process towards an integrated and comprehensive security policy. However this overall consensus on security policy did not exclude continuing clashes of opinion among the security organs, as had been the case throughout the last decade. In order to prevent any unilateral actions the president is forced consistently and strictly to supervise these organs.

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President Putin took a pro-Western course. Was he forced or was this Putin's long-term policy which had been conceived much earlier? The newly appeasing and indulgent Russian attitude towards the West might be related to the great value Putin attaches to improving the economy. In the long run Putin desires to strengthen Russia's international position, not excluding military means to achieve this. However Putin realizes quite well, in contrast to many Soviet leaders, that nowadays influence on a global level is more than ever based on economic leverage. Taking this into account, his rapprochement towards the West, and especially towards Europe, does not seem strange. Closer cooperation with the EU can serve more than one objective of Russian policy. Firstly, economic cooperation with Europe will most likely bring about growth of the Russian economy. An increase in economic weight subsequently results in the strengthening of Russia's international position. Secondly, closer ties with the EU might also weaken the relationship between Europe and the USA, even more so if Russia would be supporting, or participating in, the further development of an independent European security policy with its own military power, which is almost certainly in contrast with American interests. A weakening or even a split within the Western camp is of course beneficial for Russian influence in the international arena. This development would promote the Russian foreign policy principle of multipolarity as the foundation of international politics and could reinforce Russia's status as a great power.

Russia's present and future foreign and security policy is laid down in three documents: the NSC, the FPC and the Military Doctrine. Major points of view in these documents are an assertive attitude towards the West, strengthening Russia's position both within the CIS and on a global level, and lastly an emphasis on military means as an instrument of security policy. The leading security documents have found their origin in the Russian security establishment, consisting of generals, politicians, diplomats and scientists. Judging from their criticism of Putin's gestures towards the West, the state of mind of this elite has not changed since 11 September 2001. For this reason it is not remarkable that, as yet, there are no signs that Putin intends to adjust these documents to exhibit a more positive stance towards the West. His positive policy towards the West since 11 September has only manifested itself by public statements. Thus Putin's rapprochement towards the West has not implied a structural change of Russian foreign and security policy. He has to balance the pressure of his security establishment with reinforcing Russia's economic capacity. Consequently, the above all pragmatic President Putin will continue to manoeuvre between the traditional Russian imperial thinking, in terms of power and influence, as well as recognizing Russia's new post Cold War status, resulting in cooperation with the West.

Current editions of security documents

National Security Concept (January 2000):

Russian: 'Kontsepsiya Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 1 (14 January 2000), p. 1.

www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html

English: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm

Military Doctrine (April 2000):

Russian: 'Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 15 (28 April 2000).

www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html

English: www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm

Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000):

Russian: 'Kontsepsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 25 (14 July 2000), p. 4.

www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/07-10.html

English: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm

Endnotes

¹ As a result of the hostage taking in Moscow in October 2002, there was a broad feeling amongst Russian military-political decision makers concerning the necessity of altering these and other security documents. The National Security Concept (NSC) and the Military Doctrine were specifically mentioned. On 29 October 2002, President Putin affirmed this by ordering his security ministers and chiefs to draft a revision of the NSC. See: S. Bogdanov, 'Voyna Vne Zakona', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (NVO)*, 38, 25 October 2002, p.4; V. Solovyev, 'I Vse-Taki My Pobedim', *NVO*, 39, 1 November 2002, p. 1; *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 39, 5 November 2002.

² V.L. Manilov, *Voyennaya Bezopasnost Rossii* Moscow: Probel, 2000, p. 165 and pp. 231-2.

³ V.D. Zabolotin, *Slovar Voyennykh Terminov* Moscow: OOO NITs Kosmo, 2000, p. 161.

⁴ Manilov, *Voyennaya Bezopasnost Rossii*, pp. 232-3; p. 39; p. 310 and p. 165.

⁵ 'Osnovy Voyennoy Doktriny Rossii (Proyekt)', *Voyennaya Mysl*, Spetsial'nyy Vypusk, 19 May 1992.

⁶ A.F. Klimenko, 'O Role i Meste Voyennoy Doktriny v Sisteme Bezopasnosti Sodruchestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv', *Voyennaya Mysl*, 2, February 1992, p. 16 of pp. 11-21.

⁷ www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/2646-1.html

⁸ S. Rogov, 'Nuzhna li Rossii Svoya Politika Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti?' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 6 March 1992, p. 2.

⁹ N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison and M. Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Royal Institute for International Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 50.

¹⁰ C. J. Dick, 'The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 7/3, September 1994, p. 504.

¹¹ A. Kassianova, 'Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State Identity in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53/6 (2001), p. 828.

¹² Malcolm, et al, *Internal Factors*, p. 114.

¹³ J.M. Godzimirski, 'Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: a Comparative Analysis', *European Security*, 9/4, Winter 2000, p. 76.

¹⁴ G. Miranovich, 'Geopolitika I Bezopasnost' Rossii', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 30 and 31 July 1999.

¹⁵ The Russian security elite was especially disturbed about the responsibility that NATO grants itself in its Strategic Concept for the maintenance of security and stability within the Euro-Atlantic area. In this way NATO permits itself the use of military force, without consent of the UN Security Council, in a region of which the boundaries are not mentioned. See *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999, p. 14. In the Russian view with the experience of Kosovo, Chechnya could very well have been the next conflict for NATO to intervene in. Therefore Russia considered this Concept to be a threat for its national interests.

¹⁶ I carried out extensive research on a thematical comparison of the three NSCs (1997, 1999, 2000). See 'De ontwikkeling van Ruslands Grand Strategy, 1992-2000', *Atlantisch Perspectief* Vol. 25, No. 6, November 2001, pp. 19-24.

¹⁷ Manilov, *Voyennaya Bezopasnost' Rossii*, p. 231.

¹⁸ Malcolm, et al, *Internal Factors*, p. 107.

¹⁹ Godzimirski, 'Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000', pp. 75-6.

²⁰ V. Chernov, 'Natsional'nyye Interesy Rossii I Ugrozy Dlya Yego Bezopasnosti, Boris Yel'tsin Utverdil Kontseptsiyu Vneshney Politiki RF', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 April 1993, pp. 1, 3.

²¹ A. C. Lynch, 'The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53/1, 2001, p. 24 of pp. 7-31.

²² M. A. Smith, *Russia and the Far Abroad 2000*, F72, Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, December 2000, p. 27.

²³ *Strategic Survey 2000-2001*, Oxford University Press: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000, p. 122.

²⁴ A. L. Adamishin, 'Naskol'ko Bezopasna Nyneshnaya Yevropa?' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 November 2000, p. 3.

²⁵ M. Khodarenok, "'Starshego Brata' Sdali za Milliard Dollarov', *NVO*, 8 February 2002, p. 3.

²⁶ *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 9 & 14, 8 March and 23 April 2002.

²⁷ The Power Ministries are the departments, other than the Ministry of Defence, which also have troops at their disposal. These non-MoD forces consist primarily of Internal Troops, Border Guard Troops, Civil Defence Troops, Railroad Troops and FAPSI Troops. See Zabolotin, *Slovar Voyennykh Terminov*, p. 30.

²⁸ M. E. Glantz, 'The Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 7/3, September 1994, p. 473.

²⁹ A. Pel'ts, 'Nuzhna Novaya Voyennaya Doktrina', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 November 1996, p. 1.

³⁰ A. Korbut, 'Rossiya Utochnyayet Voyennuyu Doktrinu', *NVO*, 40, 15 October 1999, p. 1.

³¹ *Military Balance 2000-2001*, Oxford University Press: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000, p. 109.